

THE
· WRITINGS
OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON;

BEING HIS
CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER
PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE,

SELECTED AND PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS;

WITH
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,
NOTES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

By JARED SPARKS.

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PART SECOND;
(CONTINUED);
COMPRISING
CORRESPONDENCE
AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
RELATING TO
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.





CORRESPONDENCE
AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 8 April, 1781.

SIR,

The enclosed return, made up to the first of the month, will show the number of recruits, who have joined this post of the Continental army since its formation upon the new establishment. My requests to the executives of the several States have been earnest, and my orders to the officers in them have been pointed and positive, to send forward the recruits as fast as possible. What to expect, or rather to apprehend, from these delays, Congress can more easily conceive than I can describe. Some States, I am told, despairing of getting their quotas for the war, or three years, are resorting to the old expedient of temporary enlistments, while impediments of another kind withhold the recruits from the army in others.

The bare relation of these facts, without combining other circumstances of equal magnitude and uncertainty, or adding to them the difficulties with which we

are surrounded for want of money, will convince Congress of the impracticability of my fixing at this time on any definitive plan of a campaign, and of my inability to carry into effect those, which have heretofore been the objects of contemplation. They will readily see, that our future operations depend upon contingencies, and that our determinations must be the result of the moment, and dependent upon circumstances.

In this view of matters here, the progress of the enemy under Lord Cornwallis, and in consideration of the reinforcement which has lately gone to him, I have judged it expedient to order the Marquis de Lafayette to proceed with his detachment to the southern army, and put himself under the orders of Major-General Greene. The greatest objection I had to the measure, circumstanced as things now are, was, that the detachment was not formed for the campaign, or for so distant a service as that on which they are now ordered; consequently neither officers nor men were prepared for it; but the urgent call for succour to the southern States, the proximity of this corps to them, the expedition with which it can join the southern army, and the public expense that will be saved by its advance, have overcome all less considerations in deciding upon it. I wish the march of the Pennsylvania troops could be facilitated, and that Moylan's cavalry could be recruited, equipped, and marched without delay; for every judicious officer I have conversed with from the southward, and all the representations I received thence, confirm me in the opinion, that great advantages are to be derived from a superior cavalry. Without magazines, and with an interrupted communication, I do not see how Lord Cornwallis could have subsisted his army, if we had outnumbered him in horse.

I think it my duty to inform Congress, that there is great dissatisfaction at this time in the New York line for want of pay. Near sixteen months' pay, I am told, is due. If it were practicable to give this and the Jersey troops, if they are in the same predicament, a small portion of their pay, it might stop desertion, which is frequent, and avert greater evils, which are otherwise to be apprehended. The four eastern States have given a temporary relief to their troops, which makes the case of others, those of New York particularly, appear more distressing and grievous to them.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

New Windsor, 8 April, 1781.

SIR,

The success of the proposed enterprise, must depend on the absence of the British fleet, the secrecy of the attempt, and a knowledge of the exact situation of the enemy. If, after you have been at the westward, the circumstances, from your intelligence, shall still appear favorable, you will be at liberty to be the bearer of the enclosed letter to the Count de Rochambeau, to whose determination I have referred the matter; as any coöperation on our part, by moving troops towards the Sound, would give such indications of the design, as would effectually frustrate the success. Should you not proceed to the Count, you may destroy that letter. If, on the contrary, you should go to Newport, by keeping an account of the expenses, they will be repaid by the public.

In the mean time, I wish you to be as particular as possible, in obtaining from your friend an accurate

account of the enemy's strength on York, Long, and Staten Islands, specifying the several corps and their distributions. This, I think, from the enemy's present weak state, may be procured with more facility and accuracy than at any former period. I wish to know, also, the strength of the last detachment from New York, and of what troops it was composed.

I need scarcely suggest, if you should go eastward, that it will be expedient to do it in such a manner as not to create suspicion. Indeed, secrecy is absolutely necessary in the whole affair. As Count de Rochambeau does not understand English, it may be well to communicate your business to the Chevalier de Chastellux in the first instance, and through him to the Count, lest it should accidentally get abroad in the communication. I am, &c.*

* In the letter to which the above was a reply, Major Tallmadge had written as follows.

"Since the establishment of the Board at New York for the direction of the *Associated Loyalists*, there appears to have been a regular system adopted to open a more effectual communication with the disaffected in Connecticut. Chains of intelligence, which are daily growing more dangerous, and the more injurious traffic, which is constantly increasing, are but too fatal consequences of this system. My informer has requested me to propose to your Excellency a plan to break up the whole body of these marauders. At Lloyd's Neck, on Long Island, it is supposed there are assembled about eight hundred men, chiefly refugees and deserters from our army. Of this number there may be about four hundred and fifty or five hundred properly armed. Their naval guard consists of one vessel of sixteen guns, two small privateers, and a galley. About eight miles east of Lloyd's Neck, they have a post at Treadwell's Bank, of about one hundred and forty men, chiefly woodcutters armed. I have seen an accurate draft of this post and works." *Hartford, April 6th.*

Major Tallmadge believed, that, if two frigates should enter the Sound, in the absence of the British fleet, and at the same time a suitable body of troops were embarked in boats, the posts might be cut off. He offered to aid or direct an enterprise for such an object.

On receiving General Washington's letter, Major Tallmadge passed over in person to Long Island, and obtained exact knowledge of the

TO COLONEL JOHN LAURENS, AT PARIS.

New Windsor, 9 April, 1781.

MY DEAR LAURENS,

Colonel Armand, who was charged with the delivery of many letters to you from the Marquis de Lafayette, imparting to his friends and the ministry of France your mission, unfortunately arrived at Boston after you had sailed. By him I gave you an account of the revolt of part of the Jersey troops, Arnold's expedition to Virginia, Leslie's arrival at Charleston, and such other matters as occurred after your departure.

Since that period several interesting events have happened; some favorable, others adverse. Among the former may be reckoned Morgan's brilliant action with Tarleton; among the latter, the advantages gained by Lord Cornwallis over General Greene. The official accounts of these I enclose to you. Cornwallis, after the defeat of Tarleton, destroyed his wagons, and made a violent effort to recover his prisoners, but, failing therein moved equally light and rapidly against General Greene, who, though he had formed a junction with Morgan, was obliged to retreat before him into Virginia. Whether from despair of recovering his prisoners, of bringing Greene to a general action, or because he conceived his own situation critical, I do not take upon me to determine; but the fact is, that here commenced Cornwallis's retrograde movements, and Greene's advance from the Roanoke to the place of action.

condition and strength of the forts at Lloyd's Neck and Treadwell's Bank. He then returned, and proceeded to Newport, where he found Count de Rochambeau disposed to assist in the expedition, if it could be made practicable; but, all the armed French frigates being then absent on different destinations, it was not possible at that time to provide the proper naval force.

On the first notice of the storm, which happened on the 22d of January, and of its effects, I intimated to the French general the possibility and importance of improving the opportunity in an attempt upon Arnold. When I received a more certain account of the total loss of the Culloden, and the dismasting of the Bedford, two seventy-four-gun ships belonging to the British fleet in Gardiner's Bay, I immediately put in motion, under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, as large a part of my small force here, as I could with prudence detach, to proceed to the Head of Elk, and, with all expedition, made a proposal to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Destouches for a coöperation in Virginia with the whole of the fleet of our allies and a part of their land force. Before my proposition arrived, in consequence of an application to him from Philadelphia, the Chevalier Destouches had sent a ship of the line and two or three frigates to the Chesapeake Bay, which not only retarded the plan I had proposed (by awaiting their return), but ultimately defeated the project; as the enemy in the mean time remasted the Bedford with the masts taken out of the Culloden, and, following the French fleet, arrived off the Capes of Virginia before it; where a naval combat ensued, glorious for the French, who were inferior in ships and guns, but unprofitable for us, who were disappointed of our object.

The failure of this expedition, which was most flattering in the commencement, is much to be regretted; because a successful blow in that quarter would, in all probability, have given a decisive turn to our affairs in all the southern States; because it has been attended with considerable expense on our part, and much inconvenience to the State of Virginia, by the assembling of its militia; because the world is disappointed

at not seeing Arnold in gibbets; and, above all, because we stood in need of something to keep us afloat, till the result of your mission is known; for, be assured, my dear Laurens, day does not follow night more certainly, than it brings with it some additional proof of the impracticability of carrying on the war without the aids you were directed to solicit. As an honest and candid man, as a man whose all depends on the final and happy termination of the present contest, I assert this, while I give it decisively as my opinion, that, without a foreign loan, our present force, which is but the remnant of an army, cannot be kept together this campaign, much less will it be increased and in readiness for another.

The observations contained in my letter of the 15th of January last are verified every moment; and, if France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs, it will avail us nothing, should she attempt it hereafter. We are at this hour suspended in the balance; not from choice, but from hard and absolute necessity; and you may rely on it as a fact, that we cannot transport the provisions from the States in which they are assessed to the army, because we cannot pay the teamsters, who will no longer work for certificates. It is equally certain, that our troops are approaching fast to nakedness, and that we have nothing to clothe them with; that our hospitals are without medicines and our sick without nutriment except such as well men eat; and that all our public works are at a stand, and the artificers disbanding. But why need I run into detail, when it may be declared in a word, that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come. While, indeed, how easy would it be to retort the enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made to

comport with the general plan of the war to keep a superior fleet always in these seas, and France would put us in a condition to be active by advancing us money. The ruin of the enemy's schemes would then be certain; the bold game they are now playing would be the means of effecting it; for they would be reduced to the necessity of concentrating their force at capital points, thereby giving up all the advantages they have gained in the southern States, or be vulnerable everywhere.

Such of the Pennsylvania line, as had reassembled and were recruited, say about one thousand, were ordered, about the middle of February, to join the southern army; and since the disappointment of our enterprise against Arnold, I have directed the detachment under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette to proceed thither; but how either can march, without money or credit, is more than I can tell. With every wish for your success, and a safe and speedy return, and with every sentiment of esteem and affection, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 10 April, 1781.

SIR,

I had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant only two hours ago. We are greatly indebted to the Chevalier Destouches for the disposition he shows to undertake the expedition to Penobscot, and to you for your readiness to furnish a detachment of troops for the same purpose. The object is certainly worthy of our attention, and if it can be effected will be very agreeable to the States,

particularly to those of the east. M. Destouches can best judge, from the situation of the enemy's fleet, how far it may be attempted with prudence; and your Excellency, from the information you have recently received, what number of troops will be sufficient for the enterprise. I am persuaded it will be calculated how far it is probable the enemy may follow with a part of their fleet; whether the post can be carried by a *coup de main*, or may require so much time as to make it likely the operation will be interrupted before its conclusion, in case of a superior squadron being sent by the enemy; and what possibility there is of protection, or a safe retreat for the ships, and even for the land force, through an unsettled country. All these points are too important not to have been well weighed, and your conversations with the Massachusetts deputies will have enlightened you upon them.

The confidence I have in your judgment assures to you the concurrence of my sentiments, in whatever you may do on the occasion. I will only take the liberty to remark two things; first, that it appears to me frigates, without any ships of the line, will answer the purpose as well as with them, and less will be risked by dividing the body of the fleet. Frigates, including the forty-fours, will afford a safe escort to the troops against any thing now in those seas. With respect to a detachment from the enemy's fleet, it would always be proportioned to the force we should send. If we have two sixty-fours, they would even be an object for their whole fleet. Secondly, as despatch is essential to success, it will in my opinion be advisable not to depend on any coöperation of the militia, but to send at once such a force from your army, as you

deem completely adequate to a speedy reduction of the post.

The country in the neighbourhood of Penobscot is too thinly inhabited to afford any resource of militia there; and to assemble and convey them from remote places would announce your design, retard your operations, and give leisure to the enemy to counteract you. Indeed, I would recommend, for the sake of secrecy, to conceal your determination from the State itself. These hints you will be pleased to make use of only so far as they appear to be well founded.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 11 April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Your favor dated at Elk the 8th instant reached me at ten o'clock last evening. While I give you credit for the manœuvre by which you removed the

* The British had contrived to keep a fortified post at Penobscot, which at this time contained a garrison of about three hundred and fifty men. The Council of Massachusetts thought a good opportunity now presented itself, while the British fleet was in the Chesapeake, to employ the idle hours of the French in an enterprise against Penobscot. Proposals to that effect were made through a deputation, and accepted. M. Destouches agreed to furnish two sixty-fours, two frigates, and a smaller vessel, and preparations were immediately begun. A land force of six hundred men was offered by Count de Rochambeau, and also four mortars, and four twenty-four-pounders. The Chevalier de Chastellux was to command. At first it was expected, that Massachusetts would furnish militia; but this part of the plan was given up, and Count de Rochambeau proposed to enlarge his force to eight hundred men. After all the arrangements had been put in train, the project was finally abandoned, in consequence of the apprehension of M. Destouches, that a superior British naval force would come upon some parts of his squadron while in a divided state. — *MS. Letters of Rochambeau and Destouches, April 6th, 7th, 15th.*

British ships from before Annapolis, I am sorry, as matters are circumstanced, that you have put yourself so much further from the point, which now of necessity becomes the object of your destination. Whether General Phillips remains in Virginia or goes further southward, he must be opposed by a force more substantial than militia alone; and you will for that reason immediately open a communication with General Greene, inform him of the numbers, situation, and probable views of the enemy in Virginia, and take his directions as to marching forward to join him, or remaining there to keep a watch upon the motions of Phillips, should he have formed a junction with Arnold at Portsmouth.*

Every difficulty, so far as respects the wants of the officers and men, and the uneasinesses, which might arise upon their being ordered upon a more distant service than they expected, were foreseen, and would have been removed by recalling the detachment and forming another, had not the reasons of a public nature, which were mentioned in my letter of the 6th, outweighed all private considerations.

You must endeavour to get shoes from Philadelphia, which will be essentially necessary before you can move; and, if you will cause a return to be made of such articles, as will probably be wanting in the course of the campaign, I will endeavour to forward them from hence, with a proportion of any stores, which may have been sent on by the States for their troops. If the officers will write back to their friends here for any additional baggage, of which they may stand in need, it shall be forwarded under careful conductors. The difficulties, which you will experience on the score of

* See APPENDIX, No. I.

provision and transportation, would have been common to any other body of troops. 'They' will I know be great, but I depend much upon your assiduity and activity.

If the most distant prospect of such an operation as you speak of had been in my mind, I should have looked upon your detachment as essential to the undertaking; but I can assure you, without entering into a detail of reasons, which I cannot commit to paper, that I have not at present an idea of being able to effect such a matter. This had very great weight in the determination of the general officers and myself; for we should have been very happy in an opportunity of succouring the southern states by a diversion, could it have been attempted with any tolerable hope of success.

The small remains of the Jersey line seem necessary to form a head, to which the recruits, if any are obtained, may unite themselves. That line stands next for detachment, and therefore it is more than probable that it may soon become necessary to send the whole to the southward. But the reason, which I have just mentioned, operates in favor of keeping the remainder as long as possible. I shall be glad to hear from you, as to the time of your setting out from Elk, your prospects of getting forward, and the temper of the troops; and, above all, I shall ever be happy in knowing that you are well, and that every thing contributes to your happiness and satisfaction, being very truly and sincerely, my dear Marquis, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 14 April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Your two letters of the 10th came to hand last night. In mine of the 11th, I informed you as fully as it was prudent to do upon paper, that there was at present little or no prospect of an operation in the quarter you seem to wish.* The contingencies appeared to me so remote, in the conversations I had with Count de Rochambeau, that I could not justify myself in withdrawing a detachment already so far advanced towards the point in which relief is immediately and absolutely necessary.

To have sent the detachment by water would certainly have been in every respect advantageous; but, even supposing M. Destouches should consent to spare the number of ships you mention, would it be safe to risk so valuable a body of men, and so unequal a force, in the face of the whole British fleet? We cannot suppose their intelligence so bad, but they would have notice of the embarkation, and take measures to intercept it.

Congress have received information through General Forman, that Sir Henry Clinton means in person to take post upon the Delaware at Newcastle. I have heard of no preparation at New York for an embarkation of that consequence, or of any other, and therefore I do not put much confidence in the report, upon so large a scale. A party may perhaps be going into the Delaware Bay to interrupt the commerce of Philadelphia, and draw supplies from the disaffected near the shores. I expect to hear of some desertions from

* A combined attack upon New York.

you in consequence of your move; but the composition of your troops is good, and, if the officers enter upon the service with alacrity, I have no doubt but the men will soon forget their attachments in this quarter, and follow cheerfully. I am, &c.

TO JONATHAN TRUMBULL, JUNIOR.

New Windsor, 16 April, 1781.

SIR,

Colonel Harrison, who has acted as my secretary since the beginning of 1776, has accepted an honorable and profitable civil appointment in the State of Maryland, and is gone to enjoy it. The circle of my acquaintance does not furnish a character, that would be more pleasing to me as a successor to him, than yourself. I make you the first offer, therefore, of the vacant office, and should be happy in your acceptance of it. The pay is one hundred dollars a month; the rations those of a Lieutenant-Colonel in the army, which in fact are additional, as the value thereof is received in money. No perquisites appertain to the office. The secretary lives as I do, is at little expense while he is in my family, or when absent on my business, and is in the highest confidence and estimation from the nature of his office. I mention these things for your information, and shall be happy in a speedy and favorable answer, being, with great esteem and regard, &c.*

* The invitation was accepted by Mr. Trumbull.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windor, 16 April, 1781.

SIR

Previous to the receipt of your letter,* I had directed the commissary of prisoners to renew a proposal, which was some time since made to the enemy, for exchanging General Burgoyne, and a balance of private prisoners due to us, for the residue of our officers on Long Island, and as many of the southern officers as would make up the difference. My motives for this proposal were these. General Burgoyne is said to be in ill health; his death would deprive us in exchanges of the value of one thousand and forty private men, or officers equivalent, according to the tariff which has been settled. I thought it advisable not to risk so considerable a loss, when his exchange would give relief to a number of our officers in captivity, and

* *President of Congress to General Washington.*—"I have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency the enclosed resolve of the 3d instant, directing the recall of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and all other officers, prisoners of war, now absent on their paroles from America, to return immediately.

"It is proper to inform your Excellency, that this resolution is adopted in consequence of information, that the late President Laurens is confined in the Tower of London, as a state criminal, under pretext of his being guilty of treasonable practices. Should this resolution embarrass or impede any measures your Excellency may have adopted relative or preparatory to a general exchange of prisoners, it is taken for granted that you will please to represent the same to Congress, previously to any proceedings for carrying the resolve into execution."—*April 5th.*

Notice of the above requisition was accordingly communicated to Sir Henry Clinton by General Washington, with a request, that the necessary steps might be taken for a speedy compliance with it. In consequence of the fact made known by General Washington, that he had proposed an exchange for General Burgoyne, Congress rescinded their resolve respecting his recall, and authorized the exchange to be completed.—*Secret Journals, April 23d.* General Clinton was then requested to countermand the order, if it had already been transmitted to England.

disembarrass the public of the inconvenience of maintaining them there.

The moment I received your letter, I wrote to Mr. Skinner, countermanding his instructions. I believe the countermand will arrive before he has done any thing in the matter; but if it does not, I am persuaded the enemy will again reject the proposal. As soon as I hear from him, if things are situated as I expect, I will execute immediately the order for the recall of General Burgoyne. To the best of my recollection, all the officers in Europe on parole have been exchanged. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

New Windsor, 18 April, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

Your private letter of the 18th ultimo came safe to hand.* Although the honors of the field did not fall

* *From General Greene's Letter.* — "Our force, as you will see by the returns, was respectable, and the probability of not being able to keep it long in the field, and the difficulty of subsisting men in this exhausted country, together with the great advantages which would result from the action, if we were victorious, and the little injury if otherwise, determined me to bring on an action as soon as possible. When both parties are agreed in a matter, all obstacles are soon removed. I thought the determination warranted by the soundest principles of good policy, and I hope the event will prove it so, though we were unfortunate. I regret nothing so much as the loss of my artillery, though it was of little use to us, nor can it be, in this great wilderness. However, as the enemy have it, we must also.

"I am happy to hear the Marquis de Lafayette is coming to Virginia; though I am afraid from a hint in one of Baron Steuben's letters, that he will think himself injured in being superseded in the command. Could the Marquis join us at this moment, we should have a glorious campaign. It would put Lord Cornwallis and his whole army into our hands.

"I am also happy to hear that the Pennsylvania line is coming to the southward. The mutiny in that line was a very extraordinary one. It

to your lot, I am convinced you deserved them. The chances of war are various, and the best concerted measures, and the most flattering prospects, may and often do deceive us; especially while we are in the power of militia. The motives which induced you to seek an action with Lord Cornwallis, are supported upon the best military principles; and the consequences, if you can prevent the dissipation of your troops, will no doubt be fortunate. Every support, that it is in my power to give you from this army, shall cheerfully be afforded; but if I part with any more troops, I must accompany them, or have none to command, as there is not at this moment more than a garrison for West Point, nor can I tell when there will be.

I am much pleased to find by your letter, that the State of Virginia exerts itself to your satisfaction. My public and private letters strongly inculcate the necessity of this; and I have again urged Congress to use every means in their power to facilitate the march of the Pennsylvania line; as also to recruit, equip, and forward Moylan's dragoons to you with despatch.

I should be very sorry on any occasion to hurt the feelings of Baron Steuben, whom I esteem as a very valuable officer. But in the instance you have mentioned, there is no cause of complaint; for, if he will advert to his own letters to me, he will find that there was a great probability of his having marched with a detachment to reinforce you. Besides which there was a necessity for sending a general officer with the

is reported here to have proceeded from the great cruelty of the officers. A member of Congress writes this; but I believe it to be so far from the truth, that I am persuaded it originated rather through indulgence, than in any other cause."—*MS. Letter, Camp, ten Miles from Guilford Court-House, March 18th.*

detachment from hence, and political considerations, as it was to be a combined operation depending upon critical circumstances with a French land and sea force, pointed to the Marquis de Lafayette. These are the facts, the knowledge of which must, I am persuaded, satisfy the Baron.

I am truly sensible of the merit and fortitude of the veteran bands under your command, and wish the sentiments I entertain of their worth could be communicated with the warmth I feel them. It was my full intention to request you to thank Morgan and the gallant troops under his command for their brilliant victory ; but the hurry, in which my letters are too often written, occasioned the omission at the time I acknowledged the official account of that action.

Your conjecture respecting the cause of the mutiny in the Pennsylvania line has more substantial ground for its support, than the letter of the member of Congress ; and I am mistaken if the licentious conduct of that line was not more the effect of an overcharge of spirits, on the 1st of January, than of premeditated design.

I have the pleasure to tell you, that, as far as I am acquainted with the opinion of Congress with respect to your conduct, it is much in your favor. That this is the sentiment of all the southern delegates I have great reason to believe, because I have it declared to me in explicit terms by some of them. I have received a letter from Mr. Custis, dated the 29th ultimo, in which are these words. "General Greene has by his conduct gained universal esteem, and possesses in the fullest degree the confidence of all ranks of people." He had then just returned from the Assembly at Richmond. I hope the disorder, of which you complained, was no other than the effect of over

fatigue, and that you are now perfectly well. That successes equal to your merits and wishes may attend you, is the ardent desire of, dear Sir, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 21 April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Though the situation of southern affairs would not permit me to recall your corps to this army, yet it was with great reluctance I could resolve upon seeing you separated from head-quarters. My friendship for you makes me desirous of having you near me, and there will occur frequent occasions in coöperative measures, in which it would be of the greatest utility I should have it in my power to consult you. These motives would have induced me to propose to you to return personally to head-quarters, had I not believed you would not choose to quit your corps, and had I not foreseen a difficulty in giving you a command in the remaining troops. A select corps you could not have, and there are so many major-generals, who conceive themselves in a manner wedded to the different lines, and who are to be provided for, that it would not be easy at present to accommodate matters to your having a command in the line. But this difficulty might be overcome, and I cannot forbear, late as it is, leaving it at your option to proceed with your corps or return personally to head-quarters. If the last should be your choice, you will give orders to the officer you leave in command to march with all the necessary precaution, and take the orders of Baron Steuben. You will at the same time write to the Baron, communicating to him your instructions, and to General Greene informing him of your return.

If you resolve to proceed forward, I shall have one consolation, which is, that from the present aspect of things it is perhaps most probable the weight of the war this campaign will be in the southern States, and it will become my duty to go there in person, where I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again. Of this I would not have you say any thing.

April 22d. — The reasons assigned in some of your letters, and others which have occurred to me, chiefly of a political nature, assure me that great advantages will be derived from your being wherever the French army and the American head-quarters are. I therefore not only repeat the offer contained in the enclosed letter, but accompany it with a wish, that you may return, if you can consistently with your own inclination relinquish your present command for the prospects I have mentioned; not else, as it always has been and ever will be my wish to make things as agreeable to you as the nature of the service will admit. I cannot recall the detachment for reasons, which in my judgment are conclusive. The accidents to which letters are liable forbid me, unless I could write to you in cipher, to go into a full explanation of some matters, of which you seem not to be well informed, and in which I wish to set you right; but I dare not attempt it in a common letter, nor will there be any necessity for it if you return.*

* *Lafayette to Washington.* — "A letter from you, relating to the delays of the French, makes a great noise at Philadelphia. Indeed, it gives me pain on many political accounts. There are many confidential communications, which you once requested from me, and which my peculiar situation with both sides of the alliance would enable me to make; but having been ordered from you, and many things I had to say not being of a nature, which would render it prudent to commit them to paper, these personal services must be out of the question, so long as the war continues in Carolina." — *Susquehanna Ferry, April 15th.*

I am very sorry, that any letter of mine should be the subject of public discussion, or give the smallest uneasiness to any person living. The letter, to which I presume you allude, was a confidential one from me to Mr. Lund Washington, with whom I have lived in perfect intimacy for nearly twenty years. I can neither avow the letter, as it is published by Rivington, nor declare that it is spurious, because my letter to this gentleman was written in great haste, and no copy of it was taken. All I remember of the matter is, that, at the time of writing it, I was a good deal chagrined to find by your letter of the 15th of March, from Yorktown in Virginia, that the French fleet had not at that time appeared within the Capes of the Chesapeake; and I meant in strict confidence to express my apprehensions and concern for the delay. But as we know that the alteration of a single word does oftentimes pervert the sense, or give a force to the expression, unintended by the letter-writer, I should not be surprised if Rivington, or the inspectors of his gazette, have taken that liberty with the letter in question; especially as he or they have, I am told, published a letter from me to Governor Hancock and his answer, which never had an existence but in the gazette. That the enemy fabricated a number of letters for me formerly is a fact well known; that they are not less capable of doing it now, few will deny. As to his asserting, that this is a genuine copy of the original, he well knows that their friends do not want to convict him of a falsehood, and that ours have not the opportunity of doing it, though both sides know his talents for lying.*

* A mail had been intercepted and carried into New York, in which was a private letter, dated March 28th, from General Washington to Lund Washington at Mount Vernon. That letter was printed in Riv-

The event, which you seem to speak of with regret, my friendship for you would most assuredly have induced me to impart to you in the moment it happened, had it not been for the request of H——, who desired that no mention should be made of it. Why this injunction on me, while he was communicating it himself, is a little extraordinary. But I complied, and religiously fulfilled it.* With every sentiment of affectionate regard, I am, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 22 April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received your several letters, and am extremely concerned at the temper of your detachment, and the desertions that are taking place. I imagine however that these would have been nearly as great

ington's *Royal Gazette*, April 4th, and contained the following extract. "It was unfortunate (but this I mention in confidence) that the French fleet and detachment did not undertake the enterprise they are now upon, when I first proposed it to them. The destruction of Arnold's corps would then have been inevitable before the British fleet could have put to sea. Instead of this, the small squadron which took the *Romulus* and other vessels was sent, and could not, as I foretold, do any thing without a land force at Portsmouth." The same ideas, in nearly the same language, are expressed in the letter to General Schuyler, March 23d, attached to which will be found an explanatory note.

* Alluding to a personal difference, that had occurred between Washington and his aid-de-camp Colonel Hamilton. The particulars may be seen in the *Life of Hamilton*, Vol. I. p. 333.

From Lafayette's Letter. — "Considering the footing I am upon with your Excellency, it would perhaps appear to you strange, that I never mentioned a circumstance, which lately happened in your family. I was the first who knew of it, and from that moment exerted every means in my power to prevent a separation, which I knew was not agreeable to your Excellency. To this measure I was prompted by affection for you; but I thought it was improper to mention any thing about it, until you were pleased to impart it to me." — *April 15th*

in any other corps that might have been sent, and, after the Pennsylvania line, I think it would be ineligible to detach any other State line. We find by experience, that they are not only dissipated on the march, but, being at a great distance from their States, are almost entirely neglected. Few recruits are raised for them, and these few are lost on the way. We see how totally the Maryland line has declined, and how little is doing to reëstablish it; a line formerly among the most numerous and respectable in the army. Our plan at present appears to me to be to commit the defence of the southern States to the States as far as Pennsylvania inclusive, and to make up by detachment any additional succours, that may be necessary. We must endeavour to compensate these detachments for the loss of State supplies by giving them a larger proportion of Continental. On this principle I am sending to you the articles mentioned in the enclosed list; twelve hundred shirts, twelve hundred linen overalls, twelve hundred pairs of shoes, twelve hundred pairs of socks, and one hundred hunting-shirts, which set out two days ago from this place. I have also urged the Board of War to do their best for you.

Colonel Vose shall be relieved. If there is any good officer of an eastern line here desirous of the command, he must have it. I mentioned to you, that I had a warm remonstrance soon after your departure from the Massachusetts line, on the manner of appointing officers for your corps. If there should be no officer of the proper rank desirous of the command, I shall be glad to employ Lieutenant-Colonel Smith. I will see what can be done in the case of Major Galvan. I wish at all events to retain Gimat; but it will be difficult to remove the one without the other.

It appears to me extraordinary, that your advices

should have given you an idea so different from the whole complexion of the intelligence I had received, concerning the probability of a certain event.* This, and the situation of our own force, have induced me to regard it as barely possible; too precarious to enter far into our dispositions; possible only in a case, which we are not authorized to expect will happen.† I dare not trust the details on which this opinion is founded to paper.

The danger to the southern States is immediate and pressing. It is our duty to give them support. The detachment with you, all circumstances considered, was the most proper for the purpose. The project, which General Greene has lately adopted, adds a particular motive to continuing its destination. It is essential to him, that Phillips should be held in check; and we cannot wholly rely on militia for this. As to a transportation by water, while the enemy command the Chesapeake and Cape Fear, I do not see how it is practicable. The only cause of hesitation in my mind, about sending your corps to the southward, was a separation from you. I refer you to private letters accompanying this, one written previously to your last, the other subsequently. As to our force here, you know what it was when you left us, and you will know what it is now, when I tell you that we have as yet but few recruits. The enemy's present force of regu-

* An attack upon New York. General Washington probably had reasons to apprehend, that a coöperation of the allies for this object was not likely to happen, though the views of the French court had not as yet been received through any direct channel. Colonel Laurens wrote from Paris, on the 11th of April, that "the ministry did not seem to approve of the siege of New York as an operation for the ensuing campaign." The letter containing this intelligence could not have been received by Washington at the date of the above to Lafayette.

† The coming of the second French division.

lar troops at New York is near seven thousand. I shall recommend Major Macpherson, as you request, to General Greene. Present my warmest thanks to that officer and assure him of the sense I have of his services.

You were right, my dear Marquis, in supposing that no explanation could be necessary as to your letter to the Board of War. I know your sentiments and your friendship. I shall not detain the express to enlarge on the other subjects of your letters. I will embrace the first safe opportunity to give you a full view of our affairs, what we are, and what we expect to be, that you may regulate your future correspondence with your court accordingly. Hitherto I could give you nothing material, more than you know, as to ourselves.

I am, my dear Marquis, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE ROGERS CLARK.

New Windsor, 25 April, 1781.

SIR,

At the request of Governor Jefferson, I have already given orders to the commandant at Fort Pitt to afford you every assistance in his power, in the prosecution of your intended expedition.* A few days ago I received a piece of intelligence from New York, which it may be material for you to know. It is, that Colonel Connelly, who formerly lived upon the Ohio, who was taken in the year 1775, and lately exchanged, is to proceed to Quebec, as soon as the season will permit, with as many refugees as he can collect at New York; that he is to join Sir John Johnson in Canada; and

* See the letter to Colonel Brodhead, dated December 29th, 1780.

that they are to proceed, with their united forces, by the route of Birch Island and Lake Ontario to Venango. Their object is to be Fort Pitt and the western posts. It is also said, that Connolly carries blank commissions, which are to be given to persons already in the country, and that there are several hundred persons now in the neighbourhood of Fort Pitt, who are to join him. As this last corresponds with a suspicion, which Colonel Brodhead entertains, I have written to him to take measures to secure or remove every suspected person. I am, Sir, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

New Windsor, 27 April, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Your letter of this date has not a little embarrassed me.* You must remember the ferment in the Pennsylvania line the last campaign, occasioned by the appointment of Major Macpherson, and you know the uneasiness that at this moment exists among the eastern troops on account of the commands conferred upon Colonel Gimat and Major Galvan, although it was the result of absolute necessity.

Should circumstances admit of the formation of another advanced corps, of which I see very little prospect from present appearances, it can be but small, and must be composed almost entirely of eastern troops; and to add to the discontents of the officers of those lines by the further appointment of an officer

* Having received a commission in the army of the United States, in consequence of a resolution of Congress for granting commissions to aids-de-camp, Colonel Hamilton applied for actual employment in a light corps. He was not now an aid-de-camp.

of your rank to the command of it, or in it, would, I am certain, involve me in a difficulty of a very disagreeable and delicate nature, and might perhaps lead to consequences more serious than it is easy to imagine. While I adhere firmly to the right of making such appointments as you request, I am at the same time obliged to reflect, that it will not do to push that right too far, more especially in a service like ours, and at a time so critical as the present.

I am convinced, that no officer can with justice dispute your merit and abilities. The opposition heretofore made has not been for the want of those qualifications in the gentlemen, who are and have been the objects of discontent. The officers of the line contend, without having reference to particular persons, that it is a hardship and reflection upon them to introduce brevet officers into commands, of some permanence, in which there are more opportunities of distinguishing themselves, than in the line of the army at large, and with the men they have had the trouble to discipline and prepare for the field.


My principal concern arises from an apprehension, that you will impute my refusal of your request to other motives, than those I have expressed; but I beg you to be assured I am only influenced by the reasons, which I have mentioned. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 30 April, 1781.

SIR,

I assure your Excellency, that I feel extreme pain at the occasion of that part of your letter of the 26th instant, which relates to an intercepted letter of mine



published by the enemy.* I am unhappy that an accident should have put it in their power to give to the world any thing from me, which may contain an implication the least disagreeable to you, or to the Chevalier Destouches. I assure you sincerely, that I have no copy of the original letter in my possession, so that I am unable by a comparison to determine how far the publication may be just. The enemy have fabricated whole letters for me, and even a series of letters; and it is not improbable that they may have given a different turn to some of my expressions in the present instance. It would however be disingenuous in me not to acknowledge, that I believe the general import to be true. The copy, however, which your Excellency has sent to me, differs in some respects from that which the enemy

* After quoting the extract from the letter to Lund Washington (copied above in the note to a letter to the Marquis de Lafayette, April 22d), Count de Rochambeau said;

“If this was really written by your Excellency, I shall beg leave to observe, that the result of this reflection would seem to be, that we have had here the choice of two expeditions proposed, and that we have preferred the less to a more considerable undertaking, which your Excellency desired. If such is the meaning, I beg your Excellency to call to mind, that the line-of-battle ship and the two frigates went out of Newport on the 9th of February, on a demand made by Congress and the State of Virginia to the Chevalier Destouches; that your letter, with the plan for the going out of the whole fleet with a detachment of one thousand Frenchmen to act conjointly with the Marquis de Lafayette, bears date the 15th; that I did not receive it till the 19th; that, having given an instant communication of it to M. Destouches, I had the honor on the 20th to send his answer to your Excellency; and that, no later than the day after the gale of wind, which weakened the British fleet towards the end of January, by the loss of the Culloden, I offered all the land forces that could possibly be transported by the navy, and have not ceased to do it since. I shall not mention to you the reasons, that delayed the departure of M. Destouches's squadron, because they do not come under my cognizance. I only state these facts to call to your mind these dates, which I beg you to verify by your correspondence, that you may be entirely persuaded, that there will never be the least delay in what concerns the troops whom I command, in the execution of your orders, as soon as I shall receive them.” — *MS. Letter, April 26th.*

have published, as you will perceive by the enclosed Gazette. Whatever construction it may bear, I beg your Excellency will consider the letter as private to a friend, a gentleman who has the direction of my affairs at home, totally unconnected with public affairs, and on whose discretion I could absolutely rely. No idea of the same kind has ever gone to any public body.

When I say, that I believe the general import of the publication to be true, I mean it in this sense, that there did appear to me a degree of delay in executing the enterprise suggested by me, of the causes of which I was not well apprized, and an idea of this kind was probably expressed in my letter to Mr. Washington. As to the apparent insinuation, that the first expedition had been preferred to the one proposed by me, I could not have intended to convey it, in its fullest latitude, because it would have been unjust. I could not but have recollected, that my formal proposal did not reach you till after the departure of the first squadron, though the suggestion of it was previous. My letter however was written in haste, and might have been inaccurately expressed. I have lately learnt, though not officially, that the cause of the delay I have alluded to was a want of supplies for the fleet. Impressed with a real esteem for and confidence in the Chevalier Destouches, I have heard this circumstance with satisfaction.

With this explanation, I leave the matter to his candor and to yours, and flatter myself it will make no impressions inconsistent with an entire persuasion of my sincere esteem and attachment. I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, &c.*

* In M. de Rochambeau's reply to the above, he expressed himself entirely satisfied. See a further explanation in the note appended to

TO MAJOR BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

New Windsor, 30 April, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Fully impressed with the idea of the utility of early, regular, and accurate communication of the kind in contemplation, I shall make no difficulty in acceding to the proposal contained in your private letter from Newport. But at the same time that I am engaging in behalf of the United States a liberal reward for the services of the C——s,* of whose fidelity and ability I entertain a high opinion, it is certainly but reasonable, from patriotism and every other principle, that their exertions should be proportionably great, to subserve essentially the interest of the public. All the interior and minute arrangements of the correspondence I request that you will settle with them as expeditiously and advantageously as may be, and especially that you will urge, in very forcible terms, the necessity of having the communication as circumstantial, frequent, and expeditious as possible.

The great objects of information you are very well acquainted with; such as arrivals, embarkations, preparations for movements, alterations of positions, situations of posts, fortifications, garrisons, strength or weakness of each, distribution and strength of corps, and, in general, every thing which can be interesting and important for us to know.

Besides these, you are also sensible there are many things upon a smaller scale, which are necessary to be reported, and that whatever intelligence is communicated ought to be, not in general terms, but in detail,

the letter to General Schuyler, March 23d; and in the letter to the Marquis de Lafayette, April 22d.

* Two spies in New York, who assumed the names of *Samuel Culper* and *Culper Junior*.

and with the greatest precision. At present I am anxious to know (for the reports have been very numerous, vague, and uncertain), whether another embarkation is preparing, and, if so, to what amount, and where destined; what the present force of the enemy is, particularly on Long Island, in New York, and at Kingsbridge; what corps are at the latter place, how strong, and where posted exactly; and, indeed, what the situation, prospects, and designs of the enemy are, so far as they can be penetrated. I am, &c.

TO LUND WASHINGTON, AT MOUNT VERNON.

New Windsor, 30 April, 1781.*

DEAR LUND,

I am very sorry to hear of your loss. I am a little sorry to hear of my own; but that which gives me

* General Washington commenced a *Diary* on the 1st of May, to which he prefixed the following remarks.

“To have a clearer understanding of the entries, which may follow, it would be proper to recite in detail our wants and our prospects; but this alone would be a work of much time and great magnitude. It may suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words. Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here and there in the different States; instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided and the workmen all leaving them; instead of having the various articles of field-equipage in readiness to be delivered, the quartermaster-general, as the dernier resort, according to his account, is but now applying to the several States to provide these things for their troops respectively; instead of having a regular system of transportation established upon credit, or funds in the quartermaster’s hands to defray the contingent expenses of it, we have neither the one nor the other, and all that business, or a great part of it, being done by military impress, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their affections; instead of having the regiments completed to the new establishment, which ought to have been done agreeably to the requisitions of Congress, scarce any State in the Union has at this hour an eighth part of its quota in the field, and little prospect that I can see of ever

most concern is, that you should go on board the enemy's vessels, and furnish them with refreshments. It would have been a less painful circumstance to me to have heard, that in consequence of your non-compliance with their request, they had burnt my house and laid the plantation in ruins. You ought to have considered yourself as my representative, and should have reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer of refreshments to them with a view to prevent a conflagration.

It was not in your power, I acknowledge, to prevent them from sending a flag on shore, and you did right to meet it; but you should, in the same instant that the business of it was unfolded, have declared explicitly, that it was improper for you to yield to the request; after which, if they had proceeded to help themselves by force, you could but have submitted; and, being unprovided for defence, this was to be preferred to a feeble opposition, which only serves as a pretext to burn and destroy.

I am thoroughly persuaded, that you acted from your best judgment, and believe, that your desire to preserve my property, and rescue the buildings from impending danger, was your governing motive; but to go on board their vessels, carry them refreshments, commune with a parcel of plundering scoundrels, and request a favor by asking a surrender of my negroes, was exceedingly ill judged, and, it is to be feared, will be unhappy in its consequences, as it will be a prece-

getting more than half; in a word, instead of having every thing in readiness to take the field, we have nothing; and, instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land troops, and money from our generous allies, and these at present are too contingent to build upon."

dent for others, and may become a subject of animadversion.

I have no doubt of the enemy's intention to prosecute the plundering plan they have begun; and unless a stop can be put to it, by the arrival of a superior naval force, I have as little doubt of its ending in the loss of all my negroes, and in the destruction of my houses; but I am prepared for the event; under the prospect of which, if you could deposit in a place of safety the most valuable and least bulky articles, it might be consistent with policy and prudence, and a means of preserving them hereafter. Such and so many things as are necessary for common and present use must be retained, and must run their chance through the fiery trial of this summer. I am sincerely yours.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 4 May, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

The freedom of your communications is an evidence to me of the sincerity of your attachment; and every fresh instance of this gives pleasure and adds strength to the bond, which unites us in friendship. In this light I view the intimation respecting the conduct of Mr. Lund Washington. Some days previous to the receipt of your letter, which only came to my hands yesterday, I received an account of this transaction from that gentleman himself, and immediately wrote and forwarded the answer, of which the enclosed is a copy. This letter, which was written in the moment of my obtaining the first intimation of the matter, may be considered as a testimony of my disapprobation of his conduct, and the transmission of it to you, as a proof

of my friendship ; because I wish you to be assured, that no man can condemn the measure more sincerely than I do.

A false idea, arising from the consideration of his being my steward, and in that character more the trustee and guardian of my property than the representative of my honor, has misled his judgment and plunged him into error, upon the appearance of desertion among my negroes, and danger to my buildings ; for sure I am, that no man is more firmly opposed to the enemy than he is. From a thorough conviction of this, and of his integrity, I entrusted every species of my property to his care, without reservation or fear of his abusing it. The last paragraph of my letter to him was occasioned by an expression of his fear, that all the estates convenient to the river would be stripped of their negroes and movable property.

I am very happy to find, that desertion had ceased, and content had taken place, in the detachment you command. Before this letter can reach you, you must have taken your ultimate resolution upon the proposal contained in my letters of the 21st and 22d ultimo, and have made the consequent arrangements. I shall be silent, therefore, on the subject of them ; and only beg, in case you should not return to this army, and the papers were not lost with your other baggage (on which event give me leave to express my concern), that you would permit Mr. Capitaine to furnish me with copies of the drafts, and the remarks of the pilots (taken at Colonel Dey's) on the entrance of the harbour of New York. It is possible they may be wanted ; and I am not able to furnish them without your assistance.

Mrs. Washington, and the rest of my small family, which at present consists only of Tilghman and Hum-

phreys, join me in cordial salutations; and, with sentiments of the purest esteem and most affectionate regard, I remain, my dear Marquis, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 5 May, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received with exceeding great satisfaction and pleasure your favor of the 18th of April,* and am extremely rejoiced to learn, that the spirit of discontent had so entirely subsided, and that the practice of desertion would probably be totally stopped among the troops under your command. The measures you had taken to obtain, on your own credit, a supply of clothing and necessaries for the detachment, must entitle you to all their gratitude and affection; and will, at the same time that it endears your name, if possible, still more to this country, be an everlasting monument of your ardent zeal and attachment to its cause, and the establishment of its independence. For my own part, my dear Marquis, although I stood in need of no new proofs of your exertions and sacrifices in the cause of America, I will confess to you, that I shall not be able to express the pleasing sensations I have experienced at your unparalleled and repeated instances of generosity and zeal for the service on every occasion. Suffer me only to pursue you with my sincerest wishes, that your success and glory may always be equal to your merits.

I was troubled to be informed of the loss of your baggage, but am happy to find, that your private and interesting papers were not with it. Should the map

* See this letter in the APPENDIX, No. I.

of the harbour of New York, with remarks made on it by the pilots, not have been lost, I could wish you would be so obliging as to forward it or a copy to me by some safe conveyance, as it may be eventually advantageous to have it here. Colonel Tupper, who goes to relieve Colonel Vose, will have the honor to deliver this letter to you. I am, &c.

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

New Windsor, 10 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Major-General Heath, second in command, and an officer whose high rank and consideration entitle him to particular notice and attention, is prevailed upon to proceed to the several eastern States, to represent the present distresses of the army for want of provision, and the consequences which must inevitably ensue, unless a more regular system and more vigorous measures for affording supplies are speedily adopted.

From the post of Saratoga to that of Dobbs's Ferry inclusive, I believe there is not (by the returns and reports I have received) at this moment one day's supply of meat for the army on hand. Our whole dependence for this article is on the eastern States; their resources I am persuaded are ample. To request and urge that they may be drawn forth regularly, and to be informed with precision and certainty what may absolutely be depended upon through the campaign, are the objects of this application.

I have already made representations to the States, of the want of provisions, the distress of the army, and the innumerable embarrassments we have suffered in

consequence ; not merely once or twice, but have reiterated them over and over again. I have struggled to the utmost of my ability to keep the army together, but all will be in vain without the effectual assistance of the States. I have now only to repeat the alternative, which has been so often urged, that supplies, particularly of beef-cattle, must be speedily and regularly provided, or our posts cannot be maintained, nor the army kept in the field much longer. I entreat your Excellency, that this representation may be received in the serious light it is meant and deserves, or that I may stand exculpated from the dreadful consequences, which must otherwise inevitably follow in a very short time. I enter not into the detail of matters, as General Heath will be able to give your Excellency every necessary information, as well as to lay the proper estimates of supplies for the campaign before you. I am, &c.*

TO JOHN SULLIVAN, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 11 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Not having seen or heard of any resolve of Congress for establishing the principles of promotion in the army, I am apprehensive that the report of the committee, who had this matter under consideration, is now sleeping in Congress. This, and a recent instance in the Pennsylvania regiment of artillery in proof of the absolute necessity of adopting some mode, by which the whole army may be bound, and a stop thereby be put to those disputes, which keep it in a continual state of distraction and discontent, are the reasons for my trouble

* Sent as a circular to each of the eastern States.

ling you again on this subject, and praying that some decision may be come to by Congress. It is much easier to avoid disagreements, than to remove contents; and I again declare, that if my differing in sentiment from the opinions of the committee in some points has been the occasion of delay, I would, rather than have the matter lie over a moment, yield a free assent to all their propositions; for any principle is better than none. I also wish, though this is more a matter of private than public consideration, that the business could be taken up on account of Mr. Tilghman, whose appointment seems to depend upon it; for, if there are men in the army deserving the commission proposed for him, he is one of them.

This gentleman came out a captain of one of the light infantry companies of Philadelphia, and served in the flying camp in 1776. In August of the same year he joined my family, and has been in every action in which the main army was concerned. He has been a zealous servant and slave to the public, and a faithful assistant to me for nearly five years, a great part of which time he refused to receive pay. Honor and gratitude interest me in his favor, and make me solicitous to obtain his commission. His modesty and love of concord placed the date of his expected commission at the 1st of April, 1777, because he would not take rank of Hamilton and Meade, who were declared aids in order (which he did not choose to be) before that period, although he had joined my family, and done all the duties of one, from the 1st of September preceding.

My public letters to Congress will have informed you of the situation of this army, and I have no scruple in giving it as my decided opinion, that, unless a capital change takes place soon, it will be impossible for me

to maintain our posts, and keep the army from dispersing.

The resolution of Congress to appoint ministers of war, foreign affairs, and finance, gave, as far as I was able to learn the sentiments of men in and out of the army, universal satisfaction. Postponing the first, delaying the second, and disagreeing about the third, have had the directly contrary effect; and I can venture to assure you, not from random guess or vague information, that the want of an able financier, and of a proper plan for the disposition of foreign loans, will be a greater bar to the obtaining of them than perhaps Congress are aware. I could say more on this subject, were I at liberty; but I shall only add, that there is not in my opinion a moment to be lost in placing a proper character at the head of our finance, that he may as soon as possible enter upon the duties of his office. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 11 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I am pleased to hear so flattering accounts of the prospects of obtaining men and some kinds of supplies; but so great are my apprehensions, on the score of provisions, that I am sending General Heath purposely to the eastern States to represent our distresses, and to endeavour to fix a plan for our regular supply in future. I refer you to him for particulars, which I do not choose to trust to paper. After General Heath has finished this business, his private affairs will detain him some time at home; and, as he will be able at the same time to attend to what you

have at present in charge, you may, upon his return from New Hampshire to Boston, come to the army. You will have my warmest thanks for the zeal, with which you have promoted and forwarded every measure tending to the good of the service. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE BARRAS.

New Windsor, 14 May, 1781.

SIR,

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 11th instant. Give me leave to congratulate you on your safe arrival, and your appointment to the command of his Most Christian Majesty's fleet and sea forces upon these coasts. It affords me no small degree of pleasure to find the command devolve upon an officer of your Excellency's distinguished character. I have appointed Monday, the 21st of this month, for the time of our interview at Weathersfield; and I shall very impatiently wait for the opportunity of convincing you personally, that I am, &c.*

* *From the letter of Count de Barras.* — "I have the honor to announce to your Excellency my arrival at Boston, on the 6th of this month, in the frigate Concord; the King having appointed me to the command of his squadron in these seas. I arrived here yesterday. The Count de Rochambeau has communicated to me the letter, which he had the honor to write to your Excellency, requesting an interview. When he shall receive your answer, we will conform to your decision. I am very impatient to have the honor of making an acquaintance with you, and to assure you that I have nothing so much at heart as to render myself serviceable to the King and to the United States." — *Newport, May 11th.*

Count de Rochambeau had written, in communicating the intelligence of the arrival of Count de Barras at Boston; — "I believe it will be necessary, as soon as we have received our despatches, that we should have a conference with your Excellency. By the next express I shall inform you of it. Your Excellency may, however, fix upon the place for our meeting. The Commodore is about sixty years of age, a particular friend

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

New Windsor, 14 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I am glad to find, that you have received the necessary papers, and are entering upon the measures for intercepting the enemy's communications. I hope you will be enabled, by the assistance of the person proposed, if he is found sufficiently faithful and intelligent, to prosecute those measures to good effect; because I think the intelligence obtained through that channel

of Count d'Estaing, and commanded his vanguard when he forced the entrance of this harbour." — *Newport, May 8th.*

The following is an extract from the instructions sent by the Minister of War to Count de Rochambeau, dated Versailles, March 7th.

"1. It is the intention of his Majesty, that you do not abandon Rhode Island, if the squadron destined to act in concert with you for its defence cannot retire to Boston without hazard, or before it shall be relieved from its defensive position at Rhode Island by a superior naval force.

"2. I will inform you, that, in the month of July or August, the superior naval force of which you have just received notice, will withdraw the squadron of M. de Barras from the harbour of Rhode Island; and you will carefully reserve to yourself the knowledge of this arrangement, which may be accelerated.

"3. If, by unforeseen events, or any cause whatever, the army of Washington should be broken up and dispersed, it is the intention of the King, that, under these circumstances, you should decline acceding to any orders or requests of that general to penetrate into the interior of the continent; as in that case it would be prudent to reserve yourself, and to retire to the Antilles if possible, or to St. Domingo, according to the season.

"4. If, on the contrary, the American army remains in its present state, and yet without being able to undertake any combined operation with the squadron; and if this latter should attempt any other enterprise, where the concurrence of a certain number of land forces would be required, the King leaves it in your power to furnish them, provided that the plan be concerted with the American general.

"5. Should there be an opportunity for the squadron at Rhode Island to act independently of the American army, you are aware that the naval forces of the King should concur in all operations, which are considered advantageous to the common cause.

"6. You are also aware, that, as long as the King's troops occupy

may be depended upon, and will eventually be of very great consequence to us. Much, I apprehend, is to be dreaded from the predatory incursions of the enemy this campaign. To be apprized of their designs, and guarded against them at all points, as far as possible, will tend most essentially to disconcert their plans and protect our frontiers. As to the disposition of the Vermontese, I know nothing of it, but from report. At present they are at least a dead weight upon us. It is greatly to be regretted, that they are not by some means or other added to our scale, as their numbers, strength, and resources, would certainly aid us very considerably, and make the enemy extremely cautious how they advanced far in that quarter. The bulk of the people, I am persuaded, must be well affected. Should it be otherwise with any of the individuals, I ardently wish they may be detected in their villany, and brought to the punishment they deserve.*

Rhode Island, the transports destined to receive the troops are to be kept there; when, on the contrary, the army under your command shall penetrate into the country, and the squadron abandons Rhode Island, this squadron will proceed to Boston, and take with it the transports, that have been retained.

"7. If, from the different causes mentioned, you should remain in your position at Rhode Island, and a superior naval force of the King should withdraw the squadron which is in that port, I give you notice, that the Count de Grasse has orders to leave with you two vessels to defend the port, and the transports necessary for your army."

* The British had come up Lake Champlain from Canada, and threatened an invasion of the frontiers of New York in that direction. At the same time there seemed to be an understanding of some sort between the leaders in Vermont and the British officers, which excited a suspicion that the former were acting under disguise, and fostering an improper intercourse with the enemy. General Schuyler had said in his letter;

"The conduct of the Vermontese is mysterious, and if the reports which generally prevail are well founded, their measures will certainly be attended with dangerous consequences to this and the other United States. I cannot however believe that the bulk of the people are in the secret. I rather conjecture that the person whom we suspected last year to have been in New York, and some others, are the only culpable ones,

I have been exceedingly distressed by the repeated accounts I have received of the sufferings of the troops on the frontier, and the terrible consequences which must ensue, unless they were speedily supplied. What gave a particular poignancy to the sting I felt on the occasion was my inability to afford relief. Such partial supplies as were on hand, to the very last barrel of meat, I ordered instantly to be sent, and have promised General Clinton what further succour the States will enable me to give. Major-General Heath has gone to the several eastern States, to enforce my pointed representations, to rouse them to more vigorous exertions, and to make arrangements for supplies during the

and that they amuse the people with making them believe that the whole of their negotiation with General Haldimand is merely calculated to give Congress and this State the alarm, that the independence of Vermont may be acknowledged.

“I was anxious for ceding the jurisdiction beyond a twenty-mile line from Hudson’s River, that their independence might be immediately acknowledged, and they made useful to the common cause; but the governor put a stop to the business, ‘as the affair was referred to the decision of Congress.’ I sincerely wish they would speedily decide, acknowledge them independent, and admit them into the union. If this was instantly done, the measures of their leaders would be brought to the test, and we should know if they had only tended to bring about their independence, or to connect themselves with the enemy. But, unless Congress are pushed to a decision, I believe they will do nothing in it; but who is to urge them, I know not. The governor cannot do it officially, and our delegates, I believe, will not, unless they believe that the decision will go against the Vermontese.” — *MS. Letter, Saratoga, May 4th.*

The old feuds between the inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants and New York had been kept alive by the refusal of New York to assent to the independence of the territory embracing those Grants, which had been recently called *Vermont*. The party dissensions in Congress had prevented a decision by that body, and in the mean time the people of Vermont set up a government of their own, and the leaders were determined not to submit on any terms to the domination of New York. In this state of mind the enemy tampered with them, and hoped for a time to bring them over. The attempt failed, and it appeared in the end, that there was never any serious intention on the part of the Vermontese to listen to the British proposals. The subject is explained in SPARKS’S *Life of Ethan Allen*.

whole campaign. I cannot but hope this measure will be attended with success. I am, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER PAUL JONES.

New Windsor, 15 May, 1781.

SIR,

My partial acquaintance with either our naval or commercial affairs makes it altogether impossible for me to account for the unfortunate delay of those articles of military stores and clothing, which I have been informed have been so long provided in France. If I had had any particular reason to suspect you of being accessory to that delay, which I assure you was not the case, my suspicions would have been removed by the very full and satisfactory answers, which you have, to the best of my judgment, made to the questions proposed to you by the Board of Admiralty, and upon which that Board have in their report to Congress testified the high sense, which they entertain of your merits and services.

Whether our naval affairs have been well or ill conducted, it would be presumptuous in me to determine. Instances of bravery and good conduct in several of our officers have not been wanting. Delicacy forbids me to mention the particular one, which has attracted the admiration of all the world, and influenced a most illustrious monarch to confer a mark of his favor, that can be attained only by a long and honorable service, or by the performance of some brilliant action. That you may long enjoy the reputation you have so justly acquired, is the sincere wish of Sir, &c.*

* Through the misunderstanding of various agents in France, and other causes, there had been an extraordinary delay in sending out the military

TO EZRA STILES, PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

New Windsor, 15 May, 1781.

SIR,

For the honor conferred on me by the President and Fellows of the University of Yale College, by the degree of Doctor of Laws, my warmest thanks are of-

stores for the American army. Paul Jones arrived at Philadelphia, on the 18th of February, in command of the *Ariel*, with a cargo of these stores from L'Orient. Congress immediately ordered an inquiry into the cause of the delay. This duty devolved on the Board of Admiralty, who proposed forty-seven distinct queries, which Paul Jones answered fully and promptly, and to the entire satisfaction of Congress, as to the part he had acted in the matter. He sent to Washington a copy of the queries and of his answers. The Board reported;

"That, ever since Captain Jones first became an officer in the navy of these States, he has shown an unremitted attention in planning and executing enterprises calculated to promote the essential interest of our glorious cause; that in Europe, although in his expedition through the Irish channel in the *Ranger* he did not fully accomplish his purpose, yet he made the enemy feel, that it is in the power of a small squadron, under a brave and enterprising commander, to retaliate the conflagration of our defenceless towns, and took the *Drake*, a ship in number of guns and men superior to the *Ranger*, which she was sent out to capture; that, by his reputation and address, he obtained the command of a squadron, under the flag and laws of these States, at the expense of our generous allies, and therewith captured the *Serapis* and *Scarborough*, spreading universal alarm through the Island of Great Britain and its dependencies; that, in his expedition with that squadron, he made a number of prisoners, sufficient to redeem all our fellow-citizens in British dungeons, and established a cartel for their exchange; that he has made the flag of America respectable among the flags of other nations; that, returning from Europe, he brought with him the esteem of the greatest and best friend of America, and has received from the illustrious monarch of France that reward of warlike virtue, which his subjects obtain by a long series of faithful services or uncommon merit.

"The Board are of opinion, that the conduct of Captain John Paul Jones merits particular attention, and some distinguishing mark of approbation from the United States in Congress assembled."

The allusion in the closing part of Washington's letter is to the capture of the *Serapis* by Paul Jones in the *Bon Homme Richard*. For his valor and intrepidity on that occasion, the King of France ordered a sword to be presented to him; and permission was asked of Congress to invest him with the military Order of Merit.

ferred; and the polite manner, in which you are pleased to request my acceptance of this distinguished mark of their favor, demands my grateful acknowledgments. That the college, over which you preside, may long continue a useful seminary of learning, and that you may be the happy instrument in the hand of Providence for raising it to honor and dignity, and making it promotive of the happiness of mankind, is the sincere wish of, Sir, &c.

TO COLONEL ALEXANDER SCAMMELL.

New Windsor, 17 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have received intelligence, that a party of the enemy are establishing themselves at or near Fort Lee, and building a blockhouse, or some kind of work. If they are permitted to complete their plan, it will not only be difficult to remove them, but they will harass the country from thence, and may be much in the way of some future operation. When I formed the battalion, which you at present command, it was with a view of having a corps ready to execute a project of the kind, which I propose to you, and that is, to endeavour to strike by surprise the party above mentioned.* You will without loss of time see Captain Lawrence, who commands the New York levies near Dobbs's Ferry, and concert measures with him for gaining certain intelligence of the real strength and situation of the enemy; and, if you find them such as seem to give you a tolerable certainty of success, you will plan your attack in such manner, as shall be best warranted from your

* This battalion consisted of four hundred men. The officers were a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and eight captains.

information. The sooner it is done the better, as the enemy, if they are fortifying, will be every day stronger. You will take Captain Lawrence under your command, with the levies of New York and any Jersey militia you may find embodied; but you will trust no officer among them, nor any other but Lawrence, with your design. He is sensible and appears discreet.

As I confide very much in your prudence and judgment, I shall only give you these general directions; namely, to attempt nothing, which may have the appearance of rashness, and to guard well against being drawn into an ambuscade, or being intercepted by a sudden reinforcement from York Island. Captain Lawrence's party, who must be acquainted with every foot of the ground, ought to secure you against the former; and guards, at the practicable landing-places, will certainly prevent the latter. I shall set out in the morning for Connecticut, and shall be absent six or seven days. If you make the attempt, I wish you every success.

I am with great regard, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 17 May, 1781.

SIR,

The Count de Rochambeau having received despatches from the court of France by his son, the Viscount de Rochambeau, who arrived at Boston in the frigate *Concorde*, on the 6th instant, has requested an interview with me. I have appointed the place of

* The party of the enemy, mentioned above, consisted of refugees, who landed on the west side of Hudson's River, and began to repair Fort Lee. They were recalled, however, as soon as Colonel Scammell's detachment marched into that quarter, and the works were abandoned.

meeting at Weathersfield, on Monday next, for which purpose I shall set out hence to-morrow. I am in hopes, that we shall be able, from the intelligence received, to settle a definitive plan of the campaign.

I am sorry to inform your Excellency, that a part of our advanced troops were surprised on Monday morning near Croton River, by about sixty horse and two hundred foot under the command of Colonel Delancey. Colonel Greene, who commanded our party, was mortally wounded in his quarters. The enemy attempted to carry him off, but he died upon the road. Major Flagg was killed. The loss of these two officers is to be regretted, especially the former, who had upon several occasions distinguished himself, particularly in the defence of the post of Red Bank, in 1777, when he defeated Count Donop. I enclose a return of our loss upon the late occasion.*

The enemy on their return fell in with Captain Flagg of the New Hampshire line, who was patrolling near White Plains. They attempted to surround him, and

* *From Washington's Diary, May 14th.* — "About noon intelligence was received from General Paterson at West Point, that the enemy were on the north side of Croton River in force; that Colonel Greene; Major Flagg, and some other officers, with forty or fifty men, were surprised and cut off at the Bridge; and that Colonel Scammell, with the New Hampshire troops, had marched to their assistance. I ordered the Connecticut troops to move and support those of New Hampshire. In the evening information was brought, that the enemy, consisting of about sixty horse and one hundred and forty infantry, had retreated precipitately."

May 16th. — "Went to the posts at West Point; received a particular account of the surprise of Colonel Greene, and the loss we sustained, which consisted of himself and Major Flagg killed; three officers and a surgeon taken prisoners, the latter and two of the former wounded; a sergeant and five rank and file killed; five wounded, and thirty-three made prisoners or missing; in all forty-four, besides officers."

In Rivington's *Gazette*, of May 16th, it is said, that the party, who made the attack, marched from Morrisania under the command of Colonel Delancey, and consisted of about one hundred cavalry and two hundred infantry.

cut him off by dint of superior numbers ; but the captain made so good a disposition of his small force, that he brought them off with the loss of two men only. The enemy had a captain and several men killed in the attack. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Weathersfield, 23 May, 1781.

SIR,

The letter, which I have the honor to enclose from the Count de Rochambeau, will, I imagine, inform you of the intended march of the French army towards the North River, and of the destination of the King's squadron now in the harbour of Newport, if circumstances will admit of the respective movements. I should be wanting in respect and confidence, were I not to add that our object is New York. The season, the difficulty and expense of land transportations, and the continual waste of men in every attempt to reinforce the southern States, are almost insuperable objections to marching another detachment from the army on the North River ; nor do I see how it is possible to give effectual support to those States, and avert the evils which threaten them, while we are inferior in naval force in these seas.

It is not for me to know in what manner the fleet of his Most Christian Majesty is to be employed in the West Indies this summer, or to inquire at what epoch it may be expected on this coast ; but the appearance and aid of it in this quarter are of such essential importance in any offensive operation, and so necessary to stop the progress of the enemy's arms at the southward, that I shall be excused, I am persuaded, for en-

deavouring to engage your good offices in facilitating an event on which so much depends. For this I have a stronger plea, when I assure you, that General Rochambeau's opinion and wishes concur with mine, and that it is at his instance principally I make to you this address.

If we are happy enough to find your Excellency in sentiment with us, it will be in your power to inform the Count de Grasse of the strength and situation of the enemy's naval and land force in this country, the destination of the French squadron under Admiral Barras, and the intentions of the allied arms if a junction can be formed. At present the British fleet lies within Block Island, and about five leagues from Point Judith.

The Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Chastellux agree perfectly in sentiment with me, that, while affairs remain as they now are, the West India fleet should run immediately to Sandy Hook (if there are no concerted operations), where they may be met with all the information requisite, and where most likely it will shut in, or cut off, Admiral Arbuthnot, and may be joined by the Count de Barras. An early and frequent communication from the Count de Grasse would lead to preparatory measures on our part, and be a means of facilitating the operation in hand, or any other, which may be thought more advisable. I know your goodness and your zeal for the common cause too well, to offer any thing more as an apology for this liberty; and I persuade myself it is unnecessary for me to declare the respect and attachment, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Weathersfield, 24 May, 1781.

SIR,

In consequence of a conference held between the Count de Rochambeau and myself at this place, the French army will march, as soon as circumstances will admit, and form a junction with the American army upon the North River. The accomplishment of the object, which we have in contemplation, is of the utmost importance to America, and will, in all probability be attained, unless there should be a failure on our part in the number of men, which will be required for the operation, or the enemy should withdraw a considerable part of their force from the southward. It is in our own power, by proper exertions, to prevent the former; and, should the latter take place, we shall be amply repaid our expenses, by liberating the southern States, where we have found by experience we are vulnerable.

Upon the calculations, that I have been able in concert with some of the most experienced French and American officers to form, the operation in view will require, in addition to the French army, all the Continental battalions from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive to be completed to their full establishment. You must be sensible, that the measures taken for that purpose, in consequence of the last requisition of Congress, have been very far from answering the end; as few recruits, comparatively speaking, have yet been sent forward, and of those, many have been discharged on account of their inability. You must also take into consideration, that a number of those men, who were returned when the requisition was made, have since been taken off by the various casualties incident to an army; I estimate about one sixth of the whole num-

ber, and therefore provision must at this time be made to replace them.

From what has been premised, you will perceive, without my urging further reasons, the necessity I am under of calling upon you in the most earnest manner, to devise means to send into the field without delay the number of men, which has been already voted for the completion of the battalions of your State, and the further deficiency of one sixth just mentioned. The term of three years, or for the war, would undoubtedly be preferable to any shorter period; but if they cannot be obtained on those conditions, necessity must oblige us to take them for the campaign only, which ought to be reckoned to the last day of December. I should hope, that, by proper exertions in collecting and sending forward the men that have been already raised, and compelling by vigorous and decisive methods the delinquent towns to furnish their quotas, the greater part of the men may be collected by the 1st of July.

Arguments surely cannot be wanting to impress the legislature with a due sense of the obligation, which they are under, of furnishing the means now called for. The enemy, counting upon our want of ability, or upon our want of energy, have, by repeated detachments to the southward, reduced themselves in New York to a situation, which invites us to take advantage of it; and, should the lucky moment be lost, it is to be feared that they will, after subduing the southern States, raise a force in them sufficient to hold them, and return again to the northward with such a number of men, as will render New York secure against any force, which we can at this time raise or maintain. Our allies in this country expect and depend upon being supported by us in the attempt, which we are about to make, and those in Europe will be astonished, should we neglect the favorable opportunity, which is now offered.

As it is probable, that some militia, in addition to the full complement of Continental troops, may be necessary to support communications and for other purposes, you will be pleased to direct four hundred men to be held in readiness to march within one week after I shall call for them, to serve three months after they have joined the army. And I would take the liberty of requesting, that the executive may be vested with full powers, during the recess, to comply with any further requisition I may make for men, provisions, or the means of transportation, which last may be most essential in the course of our operations, should it become necessary to bring provisions or stores from a distance.

I shall be glad to be favored with an answer as soon as possible, with an assurance of what I may depend upon; that, if I do not clearly see a prospect of being supported, I may turn my views to a defensive instead of an offensive plan, and save the States and our allies the expense, which would be needlessly incurred by any but an ample and effectual preparation.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 27 May, 1781.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to inform Congress, that I returned from Weathersfield on the evening of the 25th.†

* Sent as a circular to all the New England States. The number of militia requested from Massachusetts was two thousand two hundred, and from Connecticut fifteen hundred. As the defence of Newport, after the French army should leave it, was to be entrusted to the militia of Rhode Island, no militia were required from that State to join the army

† Generals Knox and Duportail had accompanied the Commander-

I met only the Count de Rochambeau at that place, accompanied by the Chevalier de Chastellux. The British fleet having appeared off Block Island, the Count de Barras did not think it prudent to be absent. In consequence of the measures concerted at the late interview, all the French troops, except about two hundred to be left as a guard over their heavy stores and baggage at Providence, are to march as soon as circumstances will admit, and form a junction

in-chief to Weathersfield. The following is an extract from Washington's *Diary*.

"*May 18th.* Set out this day for the interview at Weathersfield with the Count de Rochambeau and Admiral Barras. Reached Morgan's Tavern, forty-three miles from Fishkill Landing, after dining at Colonel Vandenberg's.

"*19th.* Breakfasted at Litchfield; dined at Farmington; and lodged at Weathersfield, at the house of Mr. Joseph Webb.

"*20th.* Had a good deal of private conversation with Governor Trumbull, who gave it to me as his opinion, that, if any important offensive operation should be undertaken, he had little doubt of our obtaining men and provision adequate to our wants. In this opinion Colonel Wadsworth and others concurred.

"*21st.* Count de Rochambeau, with the Chevalier de Chastellux, arrived about noon. The appearance of the British fleet, under Admiral Arbuthnot, off Block Island, prevented the attendance of the Count de Barras.

"*22d.* Fixed with Count de Rochambeau the plan of the campaign.

"*23d.* Count de Rochambeau set out on his return to Newport, while I prepared and forwarded despatches to the governors of the four New England States, calling on them in earnest and pointed terms to complete their Continental battalions for the campaign at least, if it could not be done for the war or three years; to hold a body of militia, according to the proportion given to them, ready to march in one week after being called for; and to adopt some effectual mode to supply the troops when assembled with provisions and the means of transportation. I also solicited the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut earnestly for a loan of powder.

"*24th.* Set out on my return to New Windsor. Dined at Farmington and lodged at Litchfield.

"*25th.* Breakfasted at Coggswell's; dined at Colonel Vandenberg's; and arrived at head-quarters about sunset."

For the result of the conference at Weathersfield, see APPENDIX, No. II.

with me upon the North River. Five hundred militia are to be stationed upon Rhode Island for the preservation of the works, which have been erected for the security of the harbour.

Upon a full consideration of affairs in every point of view, an operation against New York has been deemed preferable to making further detachments to the southward, while they can only be sent by land. The principal reasons, which induced to this determination, are, the difficulty and expense of transportation, the lateness of the season, which would throw the troops into the extremity of the heat of summer; the great waste of men, which we have ever experienced in so long a march at the healthiest season; and, above all, a strong presumption, that the enemy, weakened as they now are by detachments, must either sacrifice the valuable post of New York and its dependencies, or recall a part of their force from the southward to defend them.

The Continental battalions, from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, supposing them complete, aided by four thousand French troops, and such a reinforcement of militia as the operation after its commencement may seem to require, have been deemed adequate to the attempt upon New York with its present garrison. But, as the battalions of those States are still considerably deficient, I have written in the most pressing manner to the respective legislatures, to make up such deficiencies with men for the campaign only, if they cannot be obtained for a longer term, and have desired the governors to hold certain numbers of militia ready for service, should I have occasion to call for them. I am however determined to require no more, than are absolutely necessary.* I shall also call on the State of

* The number of militia assigned to New Jersey was five hundred.

Pennsylvania to hold sixteen hundred militia in readiness.

Congress have been made so fully acquainted with the difficulties of every kind, under which the military department labors, that they must be sensible nothing but the most vigorous exertions on the part of the States to supply men, provisions, and the means of transportation, can enable me to prosecute to effect the operations, which I have agreed, in conjunction with the army of our allies, to undertake, or indeed any other. At the time I made my requisitions upon them, I advanced every argument in my power to induce a compliance ; but, should I find any hesitation, I shall hope for the countenance and support of Congress.

I am very apprehensive of a formidable invasion of the northern frontier, as the enemy from Canada are undoubtedly collecting in considerable force at Crown Point. Should this be the case, it will cause a very unfortunate diversion, and be very embarrassing just at this time, when our whole force will be required here. The necessity, which I clearly foresee we shall be under, of taking every man, who can be spared from other duties, into the field, induces me to request an order for such men of the invalid corps at Boston and Philadelphia, as are fit for garrison duty, to march to West Point, where their services will be the same as those upon which they are now employed, and where they may be very useful.

There has been a necessity of abandoning the post of Fort Schuyler, and removing the garrison and stores to the German Flats. The barracks had been, at the beginning of this month, consumed by fire, and the works so exceedingly damaged by a heavy storm of rain, that they were rendered indefensible ; nor could they be repaired in any reasonable time by the number

of men, who could be spared as a garrison. Brigadier-General Clinton recommended the evacuation of the post, as the only alternative, to which I the more readily consented, as it had been for some time past the opinion of the officers best acquainted with that part of the country, that a post at the German Flats would be more easily supported, and equally advantageous to the security of the frontier. I am, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL DUPORTAIL.

New Windsor, 28 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

As you are perfectly acquainted with the plan, which has been concerted with his Excellency Count de Rochambeau at Weathersfield, I need not enter into a detail of particulars. I have only to request, therefore, that you will be pleased to make the estimates of the articles in your department necessary for the operation, and that the previous arrangements for the siege, as far as they are within the limits of our ability, may be put in the best train, which the circumstances will admit. In the mean time, as it has become necessary, from the decay of the works, the demolition of the barracks, and other circumstances, to abandon the post of Fort Schuyler, and erect new fortifications, at or near Fort Herkimer, I have to request, that you will send an engineer to superintend the works in that department. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COLONEL ELIAS DAYTON.

New Windsor, 28 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The late accounts from New York are mysterious and perplexing, but they at any rate demand that we should be in readiness to move. You will therefore concentrate as much as possible your brigade, and put them under marching orders. The parties at the Clove are not to be immediately called in, but the officers commanding them should be warned to be in readiness. Should an evacuation of New York take place, as many strongly suspect, the troops under your command will be next in order for detachment. You will therefore desire the officers to make preparation for a move farther than merely to join the main body of the army. As I am very anxious to learn what they are really doing in New York, you will oblige me by obtaining and sending me as accurate intelligence as possible. I am, &c.

TO JOHN SULLIVAN, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 29 May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

No arguments were necessary to convince me of the very great public utility, which would result from the success of the plan you proposed laying before Congress. Had I been unapprized of the advantages, which might be derived to our cause from a successful attempt, or even a powerful diversion in that quarter, the reasons you have offered would have carried irrefragable demonstration with them, and induced me to be of your opinion. But the distressed and embarrass-

ed state of our affairs, on account of supplies, with which you are well acquainted, the languid efforts of the States to procure men, and the insuperable difficulties in the way of transportation, would, I apprehend, have rendered the scheme abortive in the first instance. And I must inform you, that there is yet another obstacle, which makes the attempt you have suggested absolutely impracticable by the means you propose, but which I am not at liberty to commit to paper for fear of the same misfortune, which has already happened to some of my letters.

You will have seen before the receipt of this, by my public letter to Congress of the 27th instant, the result of the deliberations of the Count de Rochambeau and myself at Weathersfield. That plan, upon the maturest consideration, and after combining all the present circumstances and future prospects, appeared, though precarious, far the most eligible of any we could possibly devise, whilst we are inferior at sea. The object was considered to be of greater magnitude, and more within our reach, than any other. The weakness of the garrison at New York, the central position for drawing together men and supplies, and the spur, which an attempt against that place, would give to every exertion, were among the reasons, which prompted to that undertaking, and promised the fairest prospect of success, unless the enemy should recall a considerable part of their force from the southward. And even in this case, the same measure, which might produce disappointment in one quarter, would certainly in the event afford the greatest relief in another. While an opportunity presents itself of striking the enemy a fatal blow, I will persuade myself, that the concurring exertions of Congress, of the several States immediately concerned, and of every individual in them, who is well affected

to our cause, will be united in yielding every possible aid. At this crisis, while I rejoice at the appointment of the minister of finance, I have sincerely to regret, that the ministers of the other departments have not also been appointed, especially a minister of war. At the same time I am happy to learn, that the mode of promotion is on the point of being finally established. With the highest sentiments of regard, I am, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 31 May, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Your conduct upon every occasion meets my approbation, but in none more than in your refusing to hold a

* This letter was intercepted by the enemy, sent to the British ministry, and published in the *London Gazette* on the 14th of July. Others of a similar tenor were also intercepted, and Sir Henry Clinton seems to have considered them as written for that purpose, and designedly put in the way of being taken. It has been said, that he believed they were meant to deceive, and that Washington's plans were actually the reverse of those mentioned in the letters. British historians have adopted this idea, and commended it as an evidence of well-timed address on the part of the American general. (*Annual Register* for 1781, p. 123.—ANDREWS'S *History of the Late War*, Vol. IV. p. 198.) It is certain, however, that no such deception was intended, and that the letters expressed the real designs of the Commander-in-chief. The first impressions of Sir Henry Clinton on the subject were confirmed, by a confidential letter from the Marquis de Chastellux to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, intercepted nearly at the same time, in which the writer stated that a combined attack on New York had been determined upon, and took to himself much credit for bringing over Count de Rochambeau to General Washington's opinion. The letter also contained free remarks on the deportment of the French commander, and the reserve in which he held himself as to consulting with his subordinate officers. A copy of this letter was carefully transmitted from New York to Count de Rochambeau, it being doubtless deemed well suited to breed strife in the French camp. It had not this effect, but it was received with displeasure by Count de Rochambeau. "I sent for the Marquis de Chastellux," said he; "I showed him the letter; I then threw it into the fire, and left him a prey to his own reflections." — *Mémoires de Rochambeau*, Tom. I. p. 274.

correspondence with Arnold.* By an account, which I have just received from New York, General Robertson goes to succeed General Phillips.† You may have something to apprehend from his age and experience, but not much from his activity. In a letter, which I wrote to Baron Steuben on the 16th instant, I desired him to inform you, as I did not know at that time where you might be, that I had good reason to believe a detachment of between fifteen hundred and two thousand men had sailed from New York a few days before. I now have it confirmed, and I think you may either look for them in the Chesapeake or further southward.

Your determination to avoid an engagement, with your present force, is certainly judicious. I hope the Pennsylvanians have begun their march before this time, but I have no information of it. General Wayne has been pressed, both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as much expedition as possible, and extraordinary powers are given to enable him to procure provisions. I am, with very sincere regard, &c.‡

* After the death of General Phillips (May 13), the command of the British army in Virginia devolved on Arnold. He sent an officer to Lafayette with a flag and a letter. As soon as Lafayette saw the name at the bottom of the letter he refused to read it, and told the officer, that he would hold no intercourse whatever with Arnold; but with any other officer he should be ever ready to reciprocate the civilities, which the circumstances of the two armies might render desirable.

† This intelligence was not accurate.

‡ This letter was intercepted and published by the enemy; and also another letter to Lafayette of the same date, containing the substance of the interview with Count de Rochambeau at Weathersfield, and the proposed plan of the campaign.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

New Windsor, 1 June, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

The difficulties, which you daily encounter and surmount with your small force, add not a little to your reputation; and I am pretty well assured, that, should you be obliged finally to withdraw from South Carolina and even from North Carolina, it will not be attributed to your want either of abilities or of exertion, but to the true cause, the want of means to support the war in them. I feel for your mortification at the loss of the day before Camden, after it seemed so much in your favor; but I hope you will have found, that the enemy suffered severely, as in their publication of the affair in New York they confess the loss of two hundred. The reduction of Fort Watson does honor to General Marion and Colonel Lee.

I have lately had an interview with Count de Rochambeau at Weathersfield. Our affairs were very attentively considered in every point of view, and it was finally determined to make an attempt upon New York with its present garrison, in preference to a southern operation, as we had not the decided command of the water. You will readily suppose the reasons, which induced this determination, were the inevitable loss of men from so long a march, more especially in the approaching hot season, and the difficulty, I may say impossibility, of transporting the necessary baggage, artillery, and stores by land. If I am supported as I ought to be by the neighbouring States in this operation, which you know has always been their favorite one, I hope that one of these consequences will follow, either that the enemy will be expelled from the most valuable position which they hold upon the continent,

or be obliged to recall part of their force from the southward to defend it. Should the latter happen, you will be most essentially relieved by it. The French troops will begin their march this way as soon as certain circumstances will admit. I can only give you the outlines of our plan. The dangers, to which letters are exposed, make it improper to commit to paper the particulars; but as matters ripen I will keep you as well informed as circumstances will allow.

A detachment of between fifteen hundred and two thousand men sailed from New York about the 13th of May. I advised Baron Steuben of this, and desired him to communicate it to you. I presume they will either stop in the Chesapeake Bay or Cape Fear River, unless the operations of the Spaniards in the Floridas should call for reinforcement to that quarter. But I can hardly flatter myself, that they will attend to the preservation of St. Augustine. We are told that Pensacola has fallen.

The Marquis de Lafayette informed me, that about eight hundred recruits would be ready to march from Virginia by the latter end of May. I have no certain accounts from Maryland lately; but I was told by a gentleman from thence, that about four hundred might be expected to march in April. I make no doubt but you are kept regularly advised by the superintending officers. I have not heard, that General Wayne had left Yorktown, but I have reason to believe he has gone before this time. If no fresh discontents arise among those troops, the detachment with Wayne will be a most valuable acquisition to you. They are chiefly the old soldiers, and completely furnished with every necessary. I am, &c.*

* Wayne's detachment marched from Yorktown, in Pennsylvania, on the 26th of May.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 4 June, 1781.

SIR,

I had last evening the honor of receiving your favor of the 31st of May by the Duke de Lauzun, who informs me, that he is authorized by your Excellency and Count de Barras to enter into a free communication with me upon the subject of the council of war held on board the Duc de Bourgogne, and request my opinion upon the propriety of their determination.*

* Intelligence had been brought to Count de Rochambeau by his son and Count de Barras, that a strong armament had departed from Brest, or would immediately depart, under Count de Grasse, for the West Indies; and that, after he had passed the Azores, Count de Grasse would detach a convoy with somewhat more than six hundred recruits, escorted by the armed vessel *Sagittaire*, and destined to unite with the French army at Newport. Money for the army and navy was also to be brought by the *Sagittaire*. The news was likewise entrusted to Count de Rochambeau alone, that Count de Grasse had orders to sail with his fleet to the coast of the United States in the month of July or August, to relieve the squadron of M. de Barras; and in case M. de Rochambeau should march from Newport to unite with General Washington before the arrival of Count de Grasse's fleet, then the squadron of Barras was to retire to the harbour of Boston for security, as it was supposed, that, without the protection of the French army on shore, the vessels would be in danger of a naval attack from the enemy with a superior force. — *Mémoires de Rochambeau*, Tom. I. p. 270.

It having been decided at the conference between the American and French commanders, held at Weathersfield, that the French army should leave Newport and march to the North River, the manner of disposing of the French fleet was taken into consideration immediately after the return of Count de Rochambeau. The result is explained in the following extract from a letter written by him to General Washington.

"The Count de Barras, instead of going to Boston according to his orders, has held a council of war, the result of which I send here enclosed. I hope your Excellency will as soon as possible send an order, that the militia, who are to be stationed on this Island, be raised to the number of one thousand. They will be joined by four hundred men, whom I shall leave under the orders of M. de Choisy, a brigadier-general, and a very good officer. I think that the State of Massachusetts may furnish the five hundred men, that have been demanded by the council

I must confess to your Excellency, that there is weight in the reasons, which are offered for the detention of his Majesty's fleet in the harbour of Newport, in preference to its going round to Boston; but as I cannot think, that it will be as safe in all possible cases in the harbour of Newport, after the greater part of the French army has been withdrawn, as it would be in the harbour of Boston, I must adhere to my opinion, and to the plan fixed at Weathersfield, as most eligible, all circumstances considered. I would not, however, set up my single judgment against that of so many gentlemen of experience, more especially as the matter partly depends upon a knowledge of marine affairs, of which I candidly confess my ignorance. I would, therefore, in order to avoid delay, rest the matter upon the following footing. If your Excellency, the Count de Barras, and the other gentlemen should, upon further consideration of the subject, aided by any new information, which you may have received, still think it most advisable to adhere to the former resolution of the council, you may make use of the enclosed letters to the governors of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which are left open for your inspection. If, on

of war for the surety of the squadron, and that it is suitable that your Excellency should send to M. de Choisy an order to convene a greater number in case of need, and letters for the governors of the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

"It is useless to say to your Excellency, that one of the chief reasons, that decided the council of war to keep the squadron at Rhode Island, was the fear lest America should look upon this change from Newport to Boston as a retreat. The desire to be nearer for our future operations, when the superior naval force expected in the course of the summer shall arrive in these seas, has been another reason. Your Excellency knows that the harbour of Boston is very unfavorable at this season, on account of the south-west winds, that blow almost continually. The junction of M. de Barras with the forces that might come, would perhaps be delayed for a month, and consequently all the operations depending on it." — *MS. Letter, Newport, May 31st.*

the contrary, you should change your opinions, the letters may be destroyed, as that which was written by me to the governor of Rhode Island from Weathersfield will be sufficient for the purpose of calling out five hundred militia for the present, and such further numbers as exigencies may require.

At any rate, I could wish that the march of the troops might now be hurried as much as possible. The strides, which the enemy are making at the southward, demand a collection of our force in this quarter, that we may endeavour to commence our operation. I know of no measure, which will be so likely to afford relief to the southern States, in so short a time, as a serious menace against New York. This your Excellency may remember was a principal inducement for our undertaking that operation, in preference to the other, which was spoken of; and I assure you the calls upon me from the southward are so pressing, that nothing but seeing our preparations against New York in some degree of forwardness will content them, or convince them that they are likely to derive any advantages from the force, which they see detained here.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO ROBERT MORRIS, SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE.

New Windsor, 4 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The present conveyance is sudden and unexpected. I have only time, therefore, to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of the 29th ultimo, and to assure you, that I felt a most sensible pleasure when I heard of your acceptance of the late appointment of Congress to regulate the finances of this country. My hand and

heart shall be with you; and, as far as my assistance can go, command it. We have, I am persuaded, but one object in view, the public good; to effect which, I will aid your endeavours to the extent of my abilities, and with all the powers I am vested with. I shall be happy in meeting you, and would have written to you more fully at this time, if the bearer was not waiting. I could not, however, refrain from embracing the first opportunity that offered, of expressing the pleasure I felt at hearing from yourself, that you had entered upon the duties of your office, and to assure you with how much truth and sincerity, I am, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES CLINTON.

New Windsor, 5 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

In my letter of the 28th ultimo, I informed you of the succours you might expect, if necessary. The six

* In a private letter Mr. Morris had communicated to General Washington notice, that he had accepted the appointment of *Superintendent of Finance*; and in an official letter of the same date he wrote as follows.

"A committee of Congress having communicated to me the distress of your army for want of bread, and shown me a motion that had been made in Congress in consequence thereof, but which was committed in order to a conference with me on the subject, I found myself immediately impressed with the strongest desire to afford you relief. Not being prepared in my official character with funds or means of accomplishing the supplies you need, I have written to General Schuyler and to Mr. Thomas Lowrey in New Jersey, requesting their immediate exertions to procure upon their own credit one thousand barrels of flour each, and send the same forward in parcels as fast as procured to camp, deliverable to your Excellency's order; and I have pledged myself to pay them in hard money for the cost and charges, within a month, six weeks, or two months. I shall make it a point to procure the money, being determined never to make an engagement that cannot be fulfilled; for if by any means I should fail in this respect, I will quit my office as useless from that moment." — *MS. Letter, May 29th.* — See also *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, Vol. XI. p. 367.

companies of Van Schaick's regiment have since sailed.* Hazen's will follow to-morrow. I have now to communicate my sentiments in general, respecting the disposition and application of this force.

It is clearly my opinion, that the reinforcements lately ordered to the northward should be kept together as much as circumstances will admit, or at least so near as to be speedily assembled upon an emergency; as it is not certain or probable, that they will be continued permanently in that quarter, and as they are designed while there to strike the enemy, should they be so presumptuous as to attempt to penetrate into the country. It also appears to me, that the force on the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers ought not to be so widely scattered as formerly, but stationed in as compact a manner as may be, except such light parties as occasion may require to be kept out. By distributing the troops, with a view of protecting every inch of ground, the efficient force is dissipated and lost, and the several posts are so weakened as to invite the enemy to enterprise. I wish you therefore to concentrate your strength as much as possible at the points you may judge most expedient, to form a plan of defence for the frontier, and to transmit to me the result of your determination. I am, dear Sir, &c.†

* In the letter of the 28th he had promised the six companies of Van Schaick's regiment.

† In another letter, dated the 16th of June, the above orders were in part countermanded, so far as to direct General Clinton to keep these forces more compact than the first orders might imply, since it was probable that they might be withdrawn, at a short notice, to act with the main army in the expected operations against New York.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 6 June, 1781.

SIR,

I have written to the Board of War, on the subject of the removal of the convention troops, and have given it as my opinion, with my reasons, that they had best for the present be halted in Pennsylvania. An exchange of those troops, on proper terms, would certainly be a desirable thing; but under present circumstances I do not think it would be advisable to give the enemy any reinforcement of privates. Every man they get adds immediately to their force. Many of those, whom we obtain in exchange, are out of their term of service, and consequently lost to us.

It is as much my wish, as it can be your Excellency's, that General Gates's affair should be brought to a decision. You must be convinced, that nothing has been left undone by me to effect that purpose. General Gates informs me, that he cannot think of serving, until the matter shall have been properly investigated, and that he shall retire in the mean time to Virginia. I see no probability of any thing further being done until there shall be some recess in southern operations.

I hope the rules of promotion, which Congress have been pleased to establish, will be generally satisfactory. Individuals may be affected by the change of mode, but it will be impossible to devise a plan, which will not interfere in some degree with particular interests. I send your Excellency by this conveyance duplicates of my letters, the originals of which were taken in the last week's mail. The communication by the post from hence to Philadelphia has become so dangerous, that I cannot in future trust any despatches of importance by him, and I beg you will observe the same rule. The

parties sent out know the exact time at which he may be expected, and cannot fail of securing him. They have not the same opportunity of intercepting expresses, as their times of riding are uncertain.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 7 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The freedom of your communications is highly pleasing to me. The portrait you have drawn of our affairs is strictly agreeable to the life, and you do me but justice in supposing, that my mind is fortified against, or rather prepared for, the most distressing accounts that can be given of them. It would not be the part of friendship, therefore, to conceal any circumstance, from an unwillingness to give pain, especially as the knowledge of it, to a man determined not to sink under the weight of perplexities, may be of the utmost importance. But we must not despair; the game is yet in our own hands; to play it well is all we have to do, and I trust the experience of error will enable us to act better in future. A cloud may yet pass over us, individuals may be ruined, and the country at large, or particular States, undergo temporary distress; but certain I am, that it is in our power to bring the war to a happy conclusion.

My public letters to Congress, and in a more especial manner my private communications to Governor Rutledge, will bring you fully acquainted with the situation of things in this quarter, and the prospects before us. How far we shall be able to extricate ourselves from the former, and realize the latter, time

only can show. I have great expectations from the appointment of Mr. Morris, but they are not unreasonable ones; for I do not suppose, that by any magic art he can do more than recover us by degrees from the labyrinth into which our finances are plunged.

I am very sorry for the disagreeable situation of our suffering soldiery at Charleston, and wish they could be relieved without adding to the pressure under which we at present groan. How far it is in General Greene's power to liberate, by exchange, our prisoners in that quarter I know not; but he has all the authority I can give to do this, reserving the troops of convention from his disposal. With these I have trouble enough. In a late interview between the two commissaries of prisoners, Mr. Loring refused to exchange General Burgoyne, unless the prisoners taken at the Cedars are allowed for, which is opposed by a resolve of Congress; and he has actually refused to pay a debt of privates, which three months ago he promised to do.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO GOVERNOR JEFFERSON.

New Windsor, 8 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The progress, which the enemy are making in Virginia, is very alarming, not only to the State immediately invaded, but to all the rest; for I strongly suspect, from the most recent European intelligence, that the enemy are endeavouring to make as large seeming conquests as possible, that they may urge the plea of *uti possidetis* in the proposed mediation.* Your Ex-

* The Empress of Russia and the Emperor of Austria had proposed

cellency will be able to judge of the probability of this conjecture from the circular letter of the President of Congress.*

Were it prudent to commit a detail of our plans and expectations to paper, I could convince you by a variety of reasons, that my presence is essential to the operations, which have lately been concerted between the French commanders and myself, and which are to open in this quarter, provided the British keep possession of New York. There have lately been rumors of an evacuation of that place, but I do not put confidence in them. Should I be supported by the neighbouring States in the manner which I expect, the enemy will, I hope, be reduced to the necessity of recalling part of their force from the southward to support New York, or they will run the most imminent risk of being expelled, with great loss of stores, from that post, which is to them invaluable while they think of prosecuting the war in America; and should we, by a lucky coincidence of circumstances, gain a naval superiority, their ruin would be inevitable. The prospect of giving relief to the southern States, by an operation in this quarter, was the principal inducement for undertaking it. Indeed we found, upon a full consideration of our affairs in every point of view, that, without the command of the water, it would be next to impossible for us to transport the artillery, baggage, and stores of the army to so great a distance; and, besides, we should lose at least one third of our force by desertion, sickness, and the heats of the approaching season, even if it could be done.

Your Excellency may probably ask whether we are

to act as mediators for a general peace. See *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, Vol. XI. p. 33.

* See this letter in the *Secret Journal of Congress*, Vol. I. p. 221.

to remain here for the above reasons, should the enemy evacuate New York, and transfer the whole war to the southward. To this I answer without hesitation, that we must in such case follow them at every expense, and under every difficulty and loss; but that, while we remain inferior at sea, and there is a probability of giving relief by diversion, and that perhaps sooner than by sending reinforcements immediately to the point in distress, policy dictates the trial of the former.

Allow me, before I take leave of your Excellency in your public capacity, to express the obligations I am under for the readiness and zeal with which you have always forwarded and supported every measure, which I have had occasion to recommend through you, and to assure you, that I shall esteem myself honored by a continuation of your friendship and correspondence, should your country permit you to remain in the private walk of life. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* It was the strong desire of the people of Virginia, that Washington would take command of the army in that State. In the letter, to which the above was a reply, Mr. Jefferson had written; —

“We are too far removed from the other scenes of war to say whether the main force of the enemy be within this State; but I suppose they cannot anywhere spare so great an army for the operations of the field. Were it possible for this circumstance to justify in your Excellency a determination to lend us your personal aid, it is evident from the universal voice, that the presence of their beloved countryman, whose talents have been so long successfully employed in establishing the freedom of kindred States, to whose person they have still flattered themselves they retained some right, and have ever looked up as their dernier resort in distress, that your appearance among them, I say, would restore full confidence of salvation, and would render them equal to whatever is not impossible. I cannot undertake to foresee and obviate the difficulties, which stand in the way of such a resolution. The whole subject is before you, of which I see only detached parts, and your judgment will be formed in view of the whole. Should the danger of this State, and its consequence to the Union, be such as to render it best for the whole,

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 13 June, 1781.

SIR,

I am honored by your Excellency's favors of the 9th and 10th instant, and with their very interesting communications, which you may be assured will be kept perfectly secret. I flatter myself, that the whole convoy will arrive in safety in some of the eastern ports, as I believe the British ships are all cruising off the Hook.*

The Count de Barras has furnished me with the re-

that you should repair to its assistance, the difficulty would then be how to keep men out of the field.

"I have undertaken to hint this matter to your Excellency, not only on my own sense of its importance to us, but at the solicitations of many members of weight in our legislature, not yet assembled to speak their own desires. A few days will bring to me that period of relief, which the constitution has prepared for those oppressed with the labors of my office; and a long declared resolution of relinquishing it to abler hands has prepared my way for retirement to a private station. Still, however, as an individual citizen I should feel the comfortable effects of your presence, and have (what I thought could not have been) an additional motive for that gratitude, esteem, and respect, with which I have the honor to be, &c." — *Charlottesville, May 28th.*

In writing to Mr. Jones, a delegate in Congress from Virginia, on the same subject, Washington said;—"Nobody, I persuade myself, can doubt my inclination to be immediately employed in the defence of that country where all my property and connexions are, but there are powerful objections to my leaving this army. Neither time nor prudence will allow me to go into a detail of them on paper. One only I will name, which is, that no other person has power to command the French troops, who are now about to form a junction with this army. Let it suffice for me to add, that I am acting on a great scale; that temporary evils must be endured, where there is no remedy at hand; that I am not without hopes that the tables may be turned; but, these being contingent, I can promise no more than my utmost exertions." — *June 7th.*

* This was the convoy of French vessels with recruits sent by Count de Grasse, under the escort of a fifty-gun ship, as mentioned in a note to the letter above, dated June 4th. Two thirds of the convoy and the ship had arrived at Boston; the other third had been dispersed in a gale near the coast.

sult of the second council of war. I have so high a respect for the opinions of the gentlemen, who composed it, that I should have been satisfied had they barely mentioned their adherence to their former determination; but the new arguments, which have been introduced in favor of the detention of the fleet at Rhode Island, leave me no room to doubt the propriety of the measure.

I am so fully convinced, that your Excellency will make no unnecessary delay in your march, that I have only occasion to repeat my former request, that it may be commenced as soon as circumstances will admit. My last accounts from the Marquis de Lafayette were of the 3d of June. The British army, in very considerable force, were then between Richmond and Fredericksburg; their destination was uncertain; but from their superiority they were at full liberty to go wherever they pleased. The enclosed copy of a letter from the President of Congress to me will give the latest intelligence from South Carolina.

Your requisitions to the Count de Grasse extend to every thing I could wish. You cannot, in my opinion, too strongly urge the necessity of his bringing a body of troops with him, more especially as I am very doubtful, whether our force can be drawn together by the time he proposes to be here. Now four thousand or five thousand men, in addition to what we shall certainly have by that time, would, almost beyond a doubt, enable us with the assistance of the fleet to carry our object. It is to be regretted, that the Count's stay upon the coast will be limited. That consideration is an additional reason for wishing a force equal to giving a speedy determination to the operation.*

* The French fleet in the West Indies, under the command of Count de Grasse, was designed to operate in the waters of the United States

Your Excellency will recollect, that New York was looked upon by us as the only practicable object under present circumstances; but should we be able to secure a naval superiority, we may perhaps find others more practicable and equally advisable. If the frigate should not have sailed, I wish you to explain this matter to the Count de Grasse; for, as I understand it, you have in your communication to him confined our views to New York alone. And, instead of advising him to run immediately into the Chesapeake, will it not be best to leave him to judge, from the information he may from

during some part of the campaign. Count de Grasse wrote as follows to Count de Rochambeau.

"His Majesty has entrusted me with the command of the naval force destined for the protection of his possessions in South America, and those of his allies in North America. The force, which I command, is sufficient to fulfil the offensive plans, which it is the interest of the allied powers to execute, that they may secure an honorable peace. If the men-of-war are necessary for fulfilling the projects, which you have in view, it will be useful to the service, that M. de Barras or M. Destouches be apprized of it, and that pilots be sent to us skilful and well instructed, as the French ships have a larger draft of water than the British. It will not be till the 15th of July, at the soonest, that I shall be on the coast of North America; but it will be necessary, by reason of the short time that I have to stay in that country (also being obliged to leave it on account of the season), that every thing necessary for the success of your projects should be in readiness, that not a moment for action may be lost."—*MS. Letter, dated at Sea, March 29th.*

The above letter was sent by the convoy. Count de Rochambeau despatched a vessel immediately for the West Indies, with full intelligence to Count de Grasse concerning the plans in view, and also the strength, situation, and apparent designs of the enemy. He recommended to him to enter the Chesapeake on his way, as there might be an opportunity of striking an important stroke there, and then to proceed immediately to New York, and be ready to coöperate with the allied armies in an attack upon that city. He likewise requested, that, if possible, five or six thousand land troops might be brought from the West Indies.

He writes thus to General Washington; but in his *Mémoires* he takes somewhat more credit to himself respecting the proposed operation in the Chesapeake.

"I presented to M. de Grasse," says he, "a picture of the distresses of the southern States, and above all of Virginia, which had nothing to

time to time receive of the situation of the enemy's fleet upon this coast, which will be the most advantageous quarter for him to make his appearance in? In the letter, which was written to the minister from Weathersfield, in which he was requested to urge the Count to come this way with his whole fleet, Sandy Hook was mentioned as the most desirable point; because, by coming suddenly there, he would certainly block up any fleet, which might be within; and he would even have a very good chance of forcing the entrance, before dispositions could be made to oppose him. Should the British fleet not be there, he could follow them to the Chesapeake, which is always accessible to a superior force. I am, &c.

oppose the inroads of Lord Cornwallis but a small body of troops under Lafayette, who was sustained only by his good conduct and the nature of the country intersected by many rivers. I transmitted to M. de Grasse the articles of the conference at Weathersfield. I observed to him, that he ought to know better than myself the possibility of forcing a passage into the harbour of New York, since, in circumstances nearly similar, M. d'Estaing, under whose orders he had served, had made an ineffectual proposal to the pilots, in offering them an enormous sum to take his vessels across the bar, which they did not venture to attempt. In short, I represented to him, as my private opinion, that an enterprise in the Chesapeake Bay against Lord Cornwallis would be the most practicable, and the least expected by the enemy, who counted on our distance from that quarter. I requested him to solicit strenuously from the governor of St. Domingo the use for three months of the French brigade under M. de St. Simon, which was destined to act with the Spaniards, who, it appeared to me, would have no employment for it during the campaign. I desired him, also, to effect a loan in our colonies of twelve hundred thousand francs, which might insure the success of this operation. I concluded by entreating him to despatch to me a frigate as soon as possible, with his answer, that I might arrange with General Washington our march by land to join him at the point assigned in the Chesapeake." — *Mémoires*, Tom. II. p. 277.

These schemes of Count de Rochambeau do not appear in his letters to General Washington. There are several indications, that he did not approve an attack upon New York, and only yielded his assent to what he discovered to be the wish of the American commander.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

New Windsor, 13 June, 1781.

SIR,

Having been made acquainted by the Count de Rochambeau, with the design of the Count de Grasse to come to this coast with his fleet, I cannot forbear expressing my ardent wishes, that a body of land forces might also attend this naval armament; for I am apprehensive, that such a decided superiority of men may not be drawn together by the time Count de Grasse will be here, as to insure our success against the enemy's most important posts. His continuance in these seas may also be limited to a short period; and the addition of a respectable corps of troops from the West Indies would, in all human probability, terminate the matter very soon in our favor.

If these should likewise be your sentiments, and if this plan should not interfere with the intentions and interest of his Most Christian Majesty elsewhere, I entreat your Excellency, by the first good conveyance, to represent the propriety and necessity of the measure to the commanders in the West Indies; that by one great and decisive stroke the enemy may be expelled from the continent, and the independence of America established at the approaching negotiation.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* Four days after the above was written, General Washington suggested in a letter to Count de Rochambeau, that an important expedition to the Chesapeake might be undertaken by M. de Barras with his fleet, as it was not wanted at Newport. If such a squadron, as he could command, were in the Chesapeake, it would prevent a reunion of the enemy's forces, and, by shutting out supplies by water, those in Virginia would soon be reduced to great difficulties. Count de Barras expressed himself favorably inclined to the measure, but said he could not be ready to sail under twenty days, and hinted at obstacles, which seem never to have been removed.

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

New Windsor, 21 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have just received a letter from Brigadier-General Clinton, enclosing the examination of two prisoners who were taken lately by one of his scouts; from whence it appears the enemy in Canada have not made any movements in force, or preparations for an incursion; and indeed this intelligence corresponds so exactly with that which has been received through other channels, that I cannot but regret having sent the reinforcement to the northward, at a time when the aid of every man was so essential to the success of the operations in contemplation.

As it will be indispensably necessary, when we advance towards the enemy's lines, to withdraw the regular force from the northward, I have thought proper to advise General Clinton and your Excellency of it, that provision might be made as far as practicable to replace these troops with the men engaged for the campaign and the three years' service. At the same time that I express my unhappiness at being forced to the measure, and assure your Excellency, that nothing but necessity could induce me to recall the Continental troops, I wish it may be understood, that, when the moment of operating arrives, there is not any consideration which can persuade me to counteract the plan, that has been concerted between the Count de Rochambeau and myself. But lest the enemy should attempt to take advantage of their absence; to make inroads on the frontier, in order to distract our attention and cause a diversion in favor of their most important post, I beg leave to recommend in the strongest terms, that every means in your power should be made use of to guard against such an event.

I will also take the liberty to suggest, whether an additional security might not be afforded to those posts, which are exposed to the ravages of the enemy, by my sending a Continental officer to assist in rousing and assembling the force of the country, and to put himself at the head of such militia and volunteers, as might be drawn together on an emergency from the district of country called Vermont; and whether, in that case, Brigadier-General Stark would not be a proper character to employ on this service, especially as he has already obtained a reputation from his successes in that quarter, and is undoubtedly a man of bravery, and has been accustomed to command irregular troops in action. It appears to me, that a popular officer in that situation would be extremely advantageous on many accounts. Whether there may be reasons of state against it, I know not. I have, therefore, submitted it to your consideration. I beg your opinion freely on the subject, and have the honor to be with great respect, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL IRVINE.

New Windsor, 23 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I can easily conceive the disappointment and mortification you have suffered, upon finding the flattering prospects of filling your line so unexpectedly blasted, by the anxious sensations I have experienced on the same subject. If what has been so often urged and repeated will not excite the States to the most strenuous exertions, in completing the Continental battalions, I almost despair of success from any thing I can add to my former representations, arguments, and entreaties.

This however should not relax our unremitting endeavours to serve our country to the extent of our abilities in every possible way.

The desire you express for active service is very commendable. I beg you will be persuaded, that I have not the least inclination to restrain so laudable a passion. You will therefore be at liberty to attempt to rouse the spirit of the country, and put yourself at the head of the cavalry, in the manner you propose. I sincerely wish your efforts may be crowned with success. If the State has not already appointed a general officer to command the State troops, destined for the southern service, I could wish these troops might also be put under your orders. Possibly it might be well to present an offer of your services, and to intimate that you have my consent to accept this command, if the State should think proper to confer it upon you. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 24 June, 1781.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 20th instant, from which I have the pleasure to observe the progress you make in the march of the troops under your command, and your intentions to come to my camp in person from Hartford. Be assured, Sir, I shall be very happy to see you whenever you arrive. You do not mention the route by which you intend to come. You will find me at Peekskill. My intelligence from the southward is too vague and uncertain to communicate to your Excellency. By the time of your arrival, I

hope to be able to give you some certain information of our situation in that quarter. I am, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL STARK.

New Windsor, 25 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Upon finding it necessary, for the operations of the campaign, to recall the Continental troops from the northward, I have ordered six hundred militia from the counties of Berkshire and Hampshire to that quarter, in addition to the militia and State troops of New York; and I have now to request that you will take the general command of all the troops in that department,

* One half of Count de Rochambeau's army embarked on the 10th of June for Providence. The other half followed soon afterwards. They proceeded from Providence by way of Windham to Hartford. The French officers complained of the tardy movement of the ox-teams, which did not bring forward the tents till late at night, long after the troops had arrived at the end of their day's march. But the soldiers bore every inconvenience patiently and with perfect good humor. To encourage the troops, many of the officers marched on foot, and submitted to the same hardships and privations as the soldiers. The Abbé Robin tells us, that the Viscount de Noailles performed the whole march from Providence to the North River on foot.—*Nouveau Voyage dans l'Amérique*, &c. p. 36.

Count de Rochambeau wrote from Providence;—"Of my recruits, that have been landed to-day at Boston, there are four hundred in a good condition to do duty, and two hundred and sixty attacked by the scurvy. The four hundred will arrive here on Saturday. They will be incorporated on Sunday, and on Monday the 18th I shall set off with the regiment of Bourbonnois. The horses, the artillery, and the wagons are arriving from different places, and I hope that the movement of every regiment will go on very regularly on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. I shall leave here two companies of artillery, with my siege artillery, that will be ready to be embarked."—*MS. Letter*, June 15th. The siege artillery was to go by sea when wanted, and was brought up to Providence for greater security. Gordon says that *fifteen hundred* recruits arrived at Boston.—*History*, Vol. IV. p. 123. This is not probable, as all the French accounts represent this reinforcement to have been between six and seven hundred men.

as soon as may conveniently be done. I am induced to appoint you to this command from your knowledge of, and influence amongst, the inhabitants of that country.

You will be pleased, therefore, to repair to Saratoga, and establish your head-quarters at that place, detaining with you four hundred of the troops from Massachusetts, and sending the other two hundred to Colonel Willett, who will remain in command on the Mohawk River, as his popularity in that country will enable him to render essential service there.

In case of an incursion of the enemy, you will make such dispositions as you shall judge most advantageous for opposing them, and protecting the frontier, (not withdrawing the troops from the Mohawk River.) I rely upon it, that you will use your utmost exertions to draw forth the force of the country from the Green Mountains, and all the contiguous territory; and I doubt not your requisitions will be attended with success, as your personal influence must be unlimited amongst those people, at whose head you have formerly fought and conquered with so much reputation and glory.

I request that you will be very particular in keeping up proper discipline, and preventing the troops from committing depredations upon the inhabitants. Believe me to be, dear Sir, &c.*

* The following extract from General Stark's reply is characteristic.

"I shall set out for Saratoga the beginning of next week, and on my passage shall hold a treaty with the Green Mountain Boys; but, not having seen or been acquainted with those turbulent sons of freedom for several years, I am at a loss to determine my reception. I hope it will be such as shall tend to the general good. I shall endeavour to give you a more particular account on my arrival at Saratoga. My health is not fully restored, but perhaps competent to my new command." — *Derryfield, July 15th*. After arriving at Saratoga, he gave a favorable account of the Green Mountain Boys, and stated as a proof of their fidelity and zeal, that a short time before, when there was an alarm from an inroad of the enemy on Hudson's River, more than five hundred of them came out immediately on horseback to repel the invaders.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Camp, near Peekskill, 27 June, 1781.

SIR,

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's favor of the 23d instant from Hartford. It would have given me the greatest pleasure could I have made it convenient to meet you at Newtown; but independently of many arrangements, which are necessary at the first taking of the field, I am detained by the hourly expectation of the Chevalier de la Luzerne. I am pleased to find, that your idea of the position, which will be proper for the troops under your command, coincides exactly with my own; and I shall be happy in giving your quartermaster-general every assistance in reconnoitring and marking out your camp.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cobb, one of my aids-de-camp, will have the honor of delivering to you this letter, and will return to me with any despatch or message, which your Excellency may wish to communicate; or, should you rather incline to come forward from Newtown before the army, Colonel Cobb will be proud to attend you. I shall be much obliged if your Excellency will present to the Count de Barras, by the next occasion, my sincere thanks for the readiness with which he was pleased to accept the proposition I had the honor to make to him through your Excellency. I am, &c.*

* *Extract from Count de Rochambeau's Letter.* — "I arrived here yesterday with the first regiment, which has been followed this day by the second, and will be so to-morrow by the third, and the day after by the fourth. I shall stay here this day and to-morrow to give time for our broken carriages to be mended, and our young artillery-horses and oxen to refresh themselves. I shall set off the day after to-morrow with the first regiment for Newtown, the army to march in four divisions as before; and I shall probably arrive there on the 28th, and stay the 29th and 30th, to assemble the brigades and march in two divisions to the North River. The corps of Lauzun will march as far advanced as my first division

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Head-Quarters, near Peekskill, 28 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Your opinion of the absolute necessity of a repeal of all tender laws, before a new species of paper, though upon ever so good an establishment, will gain credit with the public, is certainly founded upon reason and justified by experience. I am extremely obliged to you for the assistance you have already afforded us in the article of flour. Without that aid, we should have been already distressed; and I must confess to you, that I see no prospect of being supplied, but through your means, as, by the last letters from the President and Council of Pennsylvania, I could expect little or nothing from that quarter. Whether the Assembly, in their present session, have adopted any more vigorous measures to obtain supplies, I have not yet been informed.

General Schuyler a few days ago acquainted you, that there were more considerable quantities of flour upon the North River, than he had expected. The ease and cheapness of transporting any in that situation will undoubtedly induce you to secure what may be in that quarter, should you find yourself enabled to extend your purchases. I have the honor to be, with perfect respect and esteem, &c.

through Middletown, Wallingford, North Haven, Ripton, and North Stratford, in which last place it will be on the 28th."—*MS. Letter, Hartford, June 23d.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, near Peekskill, 29 June, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

The last letter that I have had the pleasure of receiving from you is dated the 3d instant.* I have since that heard a thousand vague reports of your situation, and that of the enemy, but none of them satisfactory. I fear some of your letters have miscarried, as, from your usual punctuality, I am certain you must have written in that time. I hope your next will confirm the accounts, which I have this day received from General St. Clair, that Lord Cornwallis had retreated to the south side of James River.

The army moved out of their quarters a few days ago, and have taken their first position on this ground. Count de Rochambeau, with the van of the French army, will be at Newtown, forty-two miles from hence, this night. You are acquainted with our general plan. Particulars I dare not enter into, before I am assured

* That letter was written while Lafayette was retreating before Lord Cornwallis, and just as he was about to cross the Rapidan to form a junction with Wayne.—“I heartily wish, my dear General,” said he, “that my conduct may be approved, particularly by you. My circumstances have been peculiar, and in this state I have sometimes experienced strange disappointments. Two of these, the stores at Charlottesville and the delay of the northern detachment, have given me much uneasiness and may be attended with bad consequences. There is great slowness and great carelessness in this part of the world. But the intentions are good, and the people want to be awakened. Your presence, my dear General, would do a great deal. Should these detachments be increased to three or four thousand, and the French army come this way, leaving one of our generals at Rhode Island, and two or three about New York and in the Jerseys, you might be on the offensive in this quarter, and there would be a southern army in Carolina. Your presence would do immense good, but I should wish you to have a large force. General Washington, before he personally appears, should be strong enough to hope success.”—*Camp, between the Rappahannoc and North Anna, June 3d.*

from yourself, that there is no danger of any letters falling among those clouds of light troops, which you tell me surrounded Lord Cornwallis's army. I enclose a paper, containing some very agreeable accounts from India. I hope, from the circumstance of a part of them being published by the East India House in London, that they are well founded. Be assured, my dear Marquis, that my anxiety to hear from you is increased by my sincere regard for you, and by the interest I take in every thing which concerns you.

Believe me to be, most affectionately, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DAVID COBB.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 30 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The enclosed letter to the Count de Rochambeau is of very great importance, and requires the utmost secrecy in its communication. This idea you will convey to the Count before its delivery, to effect which you will first converse with the Chevalier Chastellux on the mode of its communication. Its object is to inform the Count, that I have in contemplation a very sudden surprise of some post of the enemy, which will be of very great importance in our operations, and which we have flattering expectations of obtaining; to cover and support which, if obtained, we shall want the aid of the French army; in which case, it will be necessary for the Count to push on his troops with greater haste, than he at present intends, and by a different route from that now in his view. The Duke de Lauzun's legion is to advance.

The movements, which I would wish to be made by the French army, are particularized in my letter to the

Count, which you will see. It will be for you to impress the gentlemen with the importance of their motions to support our operations, as it will be to little purpose for us to obtain advantages, which we may not be able to maintain.

As the Count, with his troops, is now in a very disaffected part of the country, and the Tories will be desirous to give every information in their power, the most profound secrecy will be necessary. Secrecy and despatch must prove the soul of success to the enterprise. This idea you will impress with energy, using your best discretion in the mode. I am, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WATERBURY.†

Head-Quarters, near Peekskill, 30 June, 1781.

SIR,

You will immediately on the receipt of this be pleased to collect as many men of your command as you possibly can, and march them from the place of rendezvous, so as to form a junction, without fail, with Colonel Sheldon at Clapp's in King Street on the 2d of July by sunset. You must not exceed that time on any account. You will bring four days' provision ready cooked. You will receive further orders at Clapp's. Carry no baggage; the movement is to be as light as possible. I must enjoin it, and I shall depend upon your keeping your movement a profound secret from every officer under your command. You

* The letter, of which Colonel Cobb was the bearer to Count de Rochambeau, contained a detailed plan of an attack on the north part of New York Island, the particulars of which are fully explained in the letters here following. Another letter of a similar import was at the same time sent to the Duke de Lauzun.

† At this time an officer of the Connecticut militia.

will be pleased to inform me, by return of Captain Bulkley, of the number of men which you think you shall probably collect. I am, Sir, &c.

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, near Peekskill, 30 June, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

In the fullest confidence I inform you, that I intend to make an attempt by surprise upon the enemy's posts on the north end of York Island, on Monday night. Should we be happy enough to succeed, and be able to hold our conquest, the advantages will be greater than can be well imagined. But I cannot flatter myself, that the enemy will permit the latter, unless I am suddenly and considerably reinforced. I shall march down the remainder of this army, and I have hopes that the French force will be near at hand by that time. But I shall, notwithstanding, direct the alarm-guns and beacons to be fired in case of success; and I have to request, that your Excellency will, upon such signals, communicate the meaning of them to the militia, and put yourself at the head of them, and march with the utmost expedition towards Kingsbridge, bringing with you three or four days' provision at least. In that time I think we shall have so arranged matters as to have little need of the militia suddenly called out. I have, upon a hope that we shall succeed, ordered Brigadier-General Clinton to send down the regular troops immediately. Should circumstances make it necessary, I can countermand the order. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Instructions

SIR,

The object of your present command, — consisting of two regiments, formed into four battalions, under the command of Colonel Scammell and Lieutenant-Colonel Sprout, of a detachment of artillery under the command of Captain Burbeck, of the corps of watermen under the command of Major Darby, and the water-guard under the command of Captain Pray, — is to attempt the surprise of the enemy's posts upon the north end of York Island.

My ideas, as to the most probable mode of attaining this object, have been minutely detailed in the several conversations which we have had upon the subject, and you have been furnished with such papers as I have been able to collect, and upon which my judgment has been formed. But it is not my wish, or desire, that these should be any restraint upon you. Your own observation and the circumstances of the moment must in a great degree govern you.

The success of your enterprise depending absolutely upon secrecy and surprise, it will be wrong to prosecute it a moment after you are discovered, unless the discovery is made so near the works, that you may, by a rapid movement, gain them before the enemy have time to recollect and put themselves in a posture of defence. Fort George, upon Laurel Hill, ought to be your primary object, because success at that place will open a communication with the main, afford an asylum to the troops, who may be disappointed in other attacks, and secure a retreat in case of necessity to the main body of the army.

Should you carry Fort Knyphausen and Fort Tryon

only, you cannot without infinite risk hold them, as we shall not be in a situation to support you from without. I would therefore recommend your damaging them as much as you possibly can and relinquishing them. The artillery-men will be proportionably divided for the three attacks ; each party will be provided with two lanterns and two rockets, one of which is to be fired in each work as soon as it is carried.

If complete success should attend the enterprise, not a moment should be lost in drawing the boats across the Island from the North River into Haerlem Creek, and securing them under the guns of Fort George, if circumstances will admit of it. But in case of a disappointment, and being obliged to retreat by water, and not being able to pass the enemy's ships and boats, the dernier resort must be a push over to the Jersey shore, and an abandonment of the boats, if they cannot be drawn up the bank and carried off on carriages. It will be very essential, that I should be made acquainted as early as possible with your success, and the extent of it. If complete, you will announce it by the firing of thirteen cannon, at one minute's interval, after all less firing and confusion have ceased. If Fort George only is carried, six cannon are to be fired in the same manner. For Fort Knyphausen, Tryon, or both of them, you need not give a signal, because you are, as before directed, immediately to relinquish them.

The foregoing is upon a supposition, that the principal object, the attempt upon the works on York Island, is carried into execution ; but, should you, upon reconnoitring the enemy to-morrow, find it unadvisable to prosecute the plan, or should you be obliged to give it over on account of an early discovery by the enemy's shipping or boats, I would then have you turn your attention to the support of an attempt, which is also to

be made on the morning of the 3d by the Duke de Lauzun upon Delancey's corps lying at Morrisania. To effect this, you will land your men at any convenient place above the mouth of Spiten Devil Creek, and march to the high grounds in front of Kingsbridge, where you will lie concealed until the Duke's attack is announced by firing or other means. You may then dispose of your force in such a manner, in view of the enemy, as to make them think your party larger than it is, which may have the double effect of preventing them from coming over the bridge to turn the Duke's right, and also of preventing any of Delancey's party from escaping that way. Your further operations must depend upon the movements of the enemy and other circumstances.

I expect to be in the neighbourhood of Kingsbridge early in the morning of the 3d, with the remainder of the army. I shall as soon as possible open a communication with you, and give you such orders as the general state of matters may require. If you land upon the east side of the river, above the mouth of Spiten Devil Creek, you will send your boats up along the east shore. If Major Darby receives no particular directions from me, he will proceed with them to King's Ferry. Given at Head-Quarters, near Peekskill, this 1st day of July, 1781.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WATERBURY, AT HORSENECK.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 1 July, 1781.

SIR,

I wrote to you yesterday by Captain Bulkley, directing you to march with all the troops you can collect under your command, and form a junction at Clapp's,

in King Street, with Colonel Sheldon, who is to be at that place on the 2d instant. I am now to inform you, that you will also be joined at the same time and place by the French legion, under the command of the Duke de Lauzun, who is a brigadier in the service of his Most Christian Majesty, and an officer of distinction, long service, and merit. The Duke is to command all the troops, that will be assembled at the point mentioned. You will therefore be pleased on his arrival to put yourself and troops under his orders and command, he being furnished with my instructions for his movement subsequent to meeting you at Clapp's.

As the Duke will be a stranger to that part of the country, which is to be the scene of your operations, it will be in your power to give him much assistance and information, which I have not a doubt but you will do with the greatest cheerfulness and alacrity. The service, to which you will be called, requires great precaution, attention, and despatch. I am, Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 2 July, 1781.

SIR,

I have this morning received your Excellency's favor of last evening. I think it will be very well for your Excellency to proceed to-morrow to North Castle, where you will continue until you assemble your whole force, unless you should hear from me within that time. Being at North Castle will put you in a direct route to receive your provisions from Crompond, and it will be in a direct way for your troops to advance to White Plains, or any other point below, as circumstances shall appear to demand.

Colonel Hull, an active and very intelligent officer, will have the honor to deliver this to your Excellency. He is charged with my instructions to the Duke de Lauzun; and, being perfectly acquainted with our intended movements, and with the scene of operations, he will give all the aid in his power to the Duke. The same gentleman will be able to reply to any queries your Excellency shall be pleased to put to him. With perfect esteem and regard, I am, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX, AT NEW WINDSOR.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 2 July, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The arrangement you have made, for the periods of transportation of the heavy stores from Philadelphia, agrees perfectly with my ideas of the matter; as I think we must be certainly able to determine ultimately upon our plan of operations by the time they are to be in motion.

An enterprise, which I have long had in contemplation, will be executed in the course of this night, if General Lincoln, who commands the operating party, finds the attack advisable upon reconnoitring the situation of the enemy, and he can do it by surprise. The enterprise is against the posts upon the north end of York Island. The remainder of the army marched this morning towards Kingsbridge. Part of the French troops were last night at Ridgebury, and will be at Bedford this evening. They will, in the course of to-morrow, be at hand to support us, should there be occasion. At the same time that the posts upon York Island are attempted, I have planned a surprise upon Delancey's corps at Morrisania, which is

to be executed by the Duke de Lauzun in conjunction with Sheldon's regiment and Waterbury's State troops.

Should we succeed in the attempt upon the posts, every effort will be made to hold them, and your assistance will be materially necessary. I shall take the speediest method of communicating the event to General McDougall at West Point, who will bring out the militia to our support. You may therefore take it for granted, that we have succeeded, if you see or hear the signals. You will in such case come immediately down, leaving Colonel Stevens to put every thing in readiness to follow. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Valentine's Hill, eight o'clock, P. M., 3 July, 1781.

SIR,

Count Fersen will do me the favor to deliver this to your Excellency. The operations of this day are over, and I am sorry to say, that I have not had the happiness to succeed to my wishes, although I think very essential benefit will result to our future operations from the opportunity I have had, in a very full manner, to reconnoitre the position and works of the enemy on the north end of York Island. The particular events of the day I shall do myself the honor to communicate, when I have the pleasure to join your Excellency.

The American army and the legion of the Duke de Lauzun will march to-morrow to White Plains. If it will be convenient to you, I shall be happy to receive your Excellency with your troops at that place the day after to-morrow. When I shall have an opportunity to

converse with your Excellency, I conceive I shall be able to give you such reasons for forming your junction at White Plains in the first instance, as will satisfy you of the utility and fitness of the position for commencing the preparations for our concerted operations of the campaign.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Camp, near White Plains, 4 July, 1781.

SIR,

A few minutes after my arrival upon this ground I received your Excellency's favor of this morning.† Were I to give way to the anxiety I feel to see the union between your army and mine, I should request you to march to-morrow morning from North Castle; but when I consider the fatigue, which your troops have undergone from their long and rapid marches at this very warm season, I am much inclined to wish you to give them one more day's rest in your present quarters, and the more so, as there is now no real occasion for making an uncommon degree of haste. I shall however leave the matter entirely to your Ex-

* *From the Orderly Book, July 3d.* — "The Commander-in-chief takes the earliest opportunity of expressing his thanks to the Duke de Lauzun, his officers and men, for the very extraordinary zeal manifested by them in the rapid performance of their march to join the American army. And the General also takes occasion to thank the officers and men of the American army, for the alacrity with which they have supported themselves under the fatiguing march of yesterday and last night. The troops, who were engaged to-day, merit his particular thanks."

† *From Count de Rochambeau.* — "I arrived here with the first brigade yesterday at nine o'clock in the morning. The second brigade, by a forced march, joined me in the afternoon; and we are now all together ready to execute your orders. I wait with the greatest impatience to hear from you and the Duke de Lauzun." — *North Castle, July 4th.*

cellency's determination; only wishing you to give me notice of your approach, that I may have the happiness of meeting and conducting you to your camp, which will be about four miles on this side of the village of White Plains. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near Dobbs's Ferry, 6 July, 1781.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to inform your Excellency, that the army marched from their camp near Peekskill on the morning of the 2d, without either tents or baggage, and reached Valentine's Hill, about four miles on this side of Kingsbridge, a little after daylight the morning following.

General Lincoln, with a detachment of eight hundred men, fell down the North River in boats, landed near Phillips's House before daylight on the morning of the 3d, and took possession of the ground on this side of Haerlem River, near where Fort Independence stood. This movement was principally intended to support and favor an enterprise, which I had projected against a corps of refugees under the command of Colonel Delancey at Morrisania, and other light troops without the bridge, and which was to have been executed by the Duke de Lauzun with his own legion, Colonel Sheldon's regiment, and a detachment of State troops of Connecticut under the command of Brigadier-General Waterbury. The Duke, notwithstanding the heat of the day of the 2d, marched from Ridgebury, in Connecticut, and reached East Chester very early next morning; but, upon his arrival there, finding by the firing that General Lincoln had been attacked, and the

alarm given, he desisted from a further prosecution of his plan (which could only have been executed to any effect by surprise), and marched to the General's support, who continued skirmishing with the enemy and endeavouring to draw them so far into the country, that the Duke might turn their right and cut them off from their work on the east side of Haerlem River, and also prevent their repassing that river in boats. General Parsons had possessed the heights immediately commanding Kingsbridge, and could have prevented their escape by that passage. Every endeavour of this kind proved fruitless; for I found, upon going down myself to reconnoitre their situation, that all their force, except very small parties of observation, had retired to York Island. This afforded General Duportail and myself the most favorable opportunity of perfectly reconnoitring the works upon the north end of the Island, and making observations, which may be of very great advantage in future. Finding nothing further could be done, I returned the day before yesterday to this ground, where I expect to be joined this day by his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, who reached North Castle on the 2d instant.

I cannot too warmly express the obligations I am under to the Count, for the readiness with which he detached the Duke de Lauzun, and for the rapidity with which he pushed the march of his main body, that he might have been within supporting distance, had any favorable stroke upon the enemy below given us an opportunity of pursuing any advantage, which might have been gained. General Lincoln had five or six men killed and about thirty wounded in his skirmish.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* The following extract from General Washington's *Diary* will more fully explain the recent operations.

"July 2d. — General Lincoln's detachment embarked last night after

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, near Dobbs's Ferry, 13 July, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I sincerely congratulate you on the favorable turn of affairs announced in your last, and I hope you will be enabled to maintain that superiority, which you seem

dark, at or near Teller's Point; and, as his operations were to be the movements of two nights, he was desired to repair to Fort Lee this day, and reconnoitre the enemy's works, position, and strength, as well as he possibly could, and take his ultimate determination from appearances; that is, to attempt the surprise, if the prospect was favorable, or to relinquish it, if it was not; and in the latter case to land above the mouth of Spiten Devil, and cover the Duke de Lauzun in his operation on Delancey's corps. At three o'clock this morning I commenced my march with the Continental army, in order to cover the detached troops and improve any advantages, which might be gained by them. I made a small halt at the New Bridge over Croton about nine miles from Peekskill, another at the church by Tarrytown till dusk (nine miles more), and completed the remaining part of the march in the night, arriving at Valentine's Hill (at Mile Square) about sunrise. Our baggage and tents were left standing at the camp at Peekskill.

"3d. — The length of the Duke de Lauzun's march, and the fatigue of his corps, prevented his coming to the point of action at the hour appointed. In the mean time General Lincoln's party, who were ordered to prevent the retreat of Delancey's corps by the way of Kingsbridge, and prevent succours by that route, were attacked by the Yagers and others; but, on the march of the army from Valentine's Hill, they retired to the Island. Being disappointed in both objects, from the causes mentioned, I did not care to fatigue the troops any more, but suffered them to remain on their arms, while I spent a good part of the day in reconnoitring the enemy's works. In the afternoon we retired to Valentine's Hill, and lay upon our arms. The Duke de Lauzun and General Waterbury lay on the east side of the Brunx River on the East Chester road.

"4th. — Marched and took a position a little to the left of Dobbs's Ferry, and marked a camp for the French army upon our left. The Duke de Lauzun marched to White Plains, and Waterbury to Horseneck.

"5th. — Visited the French army, which had arrived at North Castle.

"6th. — The French army formed the junction with the American on the grounds marked out. The legion of Lauzun took a position in advance of the Plains on Chatterton's Hill, west of the River Brunx. This day also the minister of France arrived in camp from Philadelphia."

The American army was encamped in two lines, with the right resting on Hudson's River near Dobbs's Ferry. The French army was stationed

to be gaining over Lord Cornwallis.* We have had a variety of reports of General Greene's further successes in South Carolina. By some we are told, that both Augusta and Ninety-Six have fallen, but in a letter, which I have just received from Monsieur Marbois, he says that Augusta has been taken, and the siege of Ninety-Six raised. Count de Rochambeau formed a junction with me at the camp, about twelve miles from Kingsbridge, a few days ago. We are waiting for re-

on the hills at the left, in a single line reaching to the Brunx River. There was a valley of considerable extent between the two armies.

From the Orderly Book, July 6th.—"The Commander-in-chief with pleasure embraces the earliest public opportunity of expressing his thanks to his Excellency, the Count de Rochambeau, for the unremitting zeal with which he has prosecuted his march, in order to form the long wished-for junction between the French and American forces; an event, which must afford the highest degree of pleasure to every friend of his country, and from which the happiest consequences are to be expected. The General entreats his Excellency, the Count de Rochambeau, to convey to the officers and soldiers under his immediate command the grateful sense he entertains of the cheerfulness, with which they have performed so long and laborious a march at this hot season. The regiment of Saintonge is entitled to peculiar acknowledgments for the spirit, with which they continued and supported their march without one day's respite."

* A retreat had been recently commenced by Lord Cornwallis, after pursuing Lafayette to the interior of Virginia. In the letter referred to above, Lafayette said;

"The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us. Twice I gave them a chance of fighting (taking care not to engage farther than I pleased), but they continued their retrograde motion. Our number is, I think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the opinion. I thought at first that Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me down as low as possible, and use the cavalry to advantage. But it appears he does not as yet come out, and our position will admit of partial affairs. His Lordship had (exclusive of the riflemen from Portsmouth, said to be six hundred,) four thousand men, eight hundred of whom were dragoons or mounted infantry. Our force is about equal to his; but only fifteen hundred are regulars, and fifty dragoons. Our little action marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place, at which they first began to retreat, to Williamsburg is upwards of one hundred miles. His Lordship has done us no harm of any consequence. He has lost a very large part of his former conquests, and has not made any in this State. General Greene demanded of me only to hold my ground in Virginia; but the

inforcements to the Continental line, and for militia, and are in the mean time establishing our communication at Dobbs's Ferry.

I shall shortly have occasion to communicate matters of very great importance to you, so much so, that I shall send a confidential officer on purpose. You will in the mean time endeavour to draw together as respectable a body of Continental troops as you possibly can, and take every measure to augment your cavalry. Should the enemy confine themselves to the lower

movements of Lord Cornwallis may answer better purposes than that in the military line." — *MS. Letter, June 28th.*

In the following letter to the governor of Virginia of the same date, Lafayette gives an account of the recent action.

"Colonel Simcoe was so lucky as to avoid a part of the stroke; but, although the whole of the light corps could not arrive in time, some of them did. Major Macpherson, having taken up fifty light infantry behind fifty dragoons, overtook Simcoe, and, regardless of numbers, made an immediate charge. He was supported by the riflemen, who behaved most gallantly and did great execution. The alarm-guns were fired at Williamsburg (only six miles distant from the field). A detachment just then going to Gloucester was recalled, and the whole British army came out to save Simcoe. They retired next morning, when our army got within striking distance.

"Our loss is two captains, two lieutenants, ten privates wounded; two lieutenants, one sergeant, six privates killed; one lieutenant, twelve privates, whose fate is not known; one sergeant taken. The enemy had about sixty killed, among whom are several officers, and about one hundred wounded. They acknowledge the action was smart, and Lord Cornwallis was heard to express himself vehemently upon the disproportion between his and our killed, which must be attributed to the great skill of our riflemen. This little success has given great satisfaction to the troops, and increased their ardor. I have put all the riflemen under Campbell. To-morrow I intend to reconnoitre a position below Byrd's Ordinary. Your return to Richmond, and this little affair, will particularly mark his Lordship's retreat, and the recovery of every part of the State not under naval protection." — *MS. Letter, June 28th.*

Count de Rochambeau, speaking of this skirmish in a letter to the minister of war in France, said, "The Marquis de Lafayette has conducted himself extremely well during this campaign in Virginia; advancing upon the enemy and retreating, as occasion required, with prudence and skill."

country, you will no doubt pay attention to the formation of magazines above. These will be in every case essential, whether the war continues in Virginia, or whether it shall still be carried on in South Carolina. Should General Greene come into Virginia in person, you will be good enough to communicate the foregoing to him.

In the present situation of affairs, it is of the utmost importance that a communication by a chain of expresses should be opened between this army and that in Virginia. They are already established from hence to Philadelphia, and if there is none from you to Philadelphia, you will be pleased to take measures for having it formed. You will also endeavour to establish such a communication with the coast, as to be able to know whether any troops are detached by sea from Lord Cornwallis's army; for it is more than probable, that, if he finds himself baffled in attempting to overrun Virginia, he will take a strong post at Portsmouth, or Williamsburg, and reinforce New York or South Carolina. Should any detachment be made, you will transmit to me the earliest intelligence. What you say in confidence of the conduct of a certain officer shall be kept a profound secret, and I will contrive means of removing him from the quarter where he is so unpopular.

The Rhode Island regiment is so thinly officered, that Colonel Olney wishes one of the subalterns of the light company may be suffered to return, when Captain Olney joins. You will act in this as circumstances may permit. You have the compliments and good wishes of all your friends in the French army. Those of the American are not behindhand with them. With the warmest affection and esteem, I am, &c.

TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE.

Head-Quarters, near Dobbs's Ferry, 13 July, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Your favors of the 2d and 5th instant have afforded me infinite satisfaction, as the measures you are pursuing for subsisting the army perfectly accord with my ideas, and are, I am certain, the only ones, which can secure us from distress or the constant apprehensions of it.* Had magazines of any consequence been formed in the different States, in pursuance of the late requisitions of Congress, the disposal of the articles collected at a distance from the army would have merited your attention; but so little has been done in that way, that I imagine you will not think the matter worthy of notice, when I inform you of the trifling quantities which remain on hand. No magazines of flour have been formed at any place. No salt meat was put up in Pennsylvania, Jersey, or New York. There had been, by estimate, seven or eight thousand barrels of meat and fish put up in Connecticut, of which between two and three thousand have come forward, and the remainder is, I believe, in motion. Massachusetts put up

* By a resolve of Congress, Robert Morris, as superintendent of finance, was vested with powers to dispose of the *specific supplies*, which had been required to be furnished by the several States, in such manner as he, with the advice of the Commander-in-chief, should judge best suited to promote the public interest, and answer the purposes of the present campaign. — *Journals, June 4th*. It was the opinion of Mr. Morris, that all these supplies should be sold, on the best terms that could be obtained, and that the army should in future be supplied by contracts. The plan of specific supplies had proved very inoperative, both from the tardiness of the States in complying with the requisitions, and from the great expense attending transportation. In some instances, where the magazines were distant, the articles could be bought and furnished near the army for a less amount, than it would cost to transport them from the places of deposit.

very little salt meat, and most of it has been consumed upon the communication by the recruits, or transported to Albany. Rhode Island purchased one thousand barrels, of which about six hundred remain at Providence, and I would wish them to be still kept there for a particular purpose. I could never learn, with certainty, how much was put up in New Hampshire ; but I have directed all that was at Portsmouth to be transported by water to Providence, as I wish to form a small magazine of salt provision at that place, as I mentioned before, for a particular purpose. No magazines of rum have been formed. We have been in a manner destitute of that necessary article, and what we are now likely to draw from the several States will be from hand to mouth. From the foregoing state of facts you will perceive in how small a degree the requisitions of Congress have been complied with, and may form a judgment of the miserable manner in which the army has been subsisted.

Having lately, at the request of the Board of War, furnished them with my opinion of the quantity of provision, which ought to be laid up at the several posts, they will be able, at the interview which you propose to have with them, to lay before you my ideas upon the subject of a contract for supplying the army. I beg you to be assured, that I never can think your correspondence tedious or troublesome. Duty as well as inclination will always prompt me to listen with pleasure to your observations upon the state of our public affairs ; and I shall think myself happy, if I can in any manner contribute to assist you in the arduous task you have undertaken. I shall very anxiously wait for the visit, which you promise to make me. I am, with very sincere respect and esteem, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LORD STIRLING.

Head-Quarters, near Dobbs's Ferry, 14 July, 1781.

MY LORD,

While I am with the detachment of the army below, you will remain in command here. Your principal attention will be paid to the good order of the camp, and the security of the baggage and stores left in it. There will be no need of advanced pickets, as you will be fully covered in front. The camp guards should be vigilant, and the officers commanding them should see that the men are not permitted to straggle, or to plunder the baggage of the officers and soldiers.

The greatest harmony having hitherto subsisted between the French and American soldiers, your Lordship will be particularly careful to see that it is not interrupted by any act of imprudence on our part; and, as Baron Viomenil, who will command the French line, is older in commission than your Lordship, you will take the parole and countersign from him daily. It is scarcely probable that the enemy will make any attempt upon the camp, while so respectable a force is near their own lines. Should they do it, it must be by water. The officer commanding the water-guard will communicate any movement to Colonel Greateon at Dobbs's Ferry, who will give immediate intelligence to you, which you will of course transmit to Baron Viomenil. The party at Dobbs's Ferry being for the purpose of erecting a work there, they are not to be withdrawn for camp duties. I am, &c.

TO RICHARD HENRY LEE.

Camp, near Dobbs's Ferry, 15 July, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The moving state in which the army was at the time your letter of the 12th ultimo came to hand, the junction of the allied troops at that period, and a variety of matters which have occurred since the junction, and consequent thereon, rather than a disinclination to continue a correspondence, the benefits of which were in my favor, must plead as an excuse for my silence till now. Unconscious of having given you just cause to change the favorable sentiments you have expressed for me, I could not suppose an alteration on your part; and, as I never suffer reports, unsupported by proofs, to have weight in my mind, I know no reason why our correspondence should cease, or become less frequent than heretofore, excepting on my part, that, as our affairs get more or less involved in perplexity, my attention is proportionably engaged, and more or less leisure is allowed for indulgences.*

* It will be recollected, that the name of Richard Henry Lee occurs in the papers relating to *Conway's Cabal*, and he was supposed by some persons to take a part hostile to Washington in that affair. This opinion seems never to have been sustained by any other evidence than suspicion. It had the effect, however, to break off the intimacy, which previously existed between the two friends. On the present occasion, Mr. Lee made the first advance, and commenced his letter in the following words.

"Although our correspondence has been long interrupted, I hope that our friendship never will be, notwithstanding the arts of wicked men, who have endeavoured to create discord and dissension among the friends of America. For myself, having little but my good wishes to send you, it was not worth while to take up your attention a moment with them. The contents of this letter will, I am sure, require no apology, because you always approve that zeal, which is employed in the public service, and has for its object the public good."

He then proceeds to describe the situation of things in Virginia, with the enemy in the heart of the State and an inferior force to resist

That we have had a very competent portion, and a great variety of difficulties of late, a person, so well informed of public matters as you are, needs not be told. The distresses of Virginia I am but too well acquainted with; but the plan you have suggested as a relief for it is, in my judgment, a greater proof of your unbounded confidence in me, than it is, that your means proposed would be found adequate to the end in view, were it practicable to make the experiment, which at present it is not, as there are insuperable obstacles to my removing from the immediate command of the auxiliary troops.

The reasons for this opinion I cannot commit to paper, at all times liable to miscarriage, but peculiarly so of late. I am fully persuaded, however, and upon good military principles, that the measures I have adopted will give more effectual and speedy relief to the State of Virginia, than my marching thither with dictatorial powers, at the head of every man I could draw from

them, and the dangers that threatened upon every side. "It would be a thing for angels to weep over," said he, "if the goodly fabric of human freedom, which you have so well labored to rear, should in one unlucky moment be levelled with the dust. There is nothing I think more certain, than that your personal call would bring into immediate exertion the force and the resources of this State and the neighbouring ones, which, directed as they would be, will effectually disappoint and baffle the deep laid schemes of the enemy."

In this letter Mr. Lee enclosed a copy of one, which he had written to some of the members of Congress, and in which he had expressed himself as follows.

"Let General Washington be immediately sent to Virginia, with two or three thousand good troops. Let Congress, as the head of the federal union, in this crisis direct, that, until a legislature can convene and a governor be appointed, the General be possessed of dictatorial powers, and that it be strongly recommended to the Assembly, when convened, to continue those powers for six, eight, or ten months, as the case may be; and that the General may be desired instantly on his arrival in Virginia to summon the members of both Houses to meet where he shall appoint, to organize and resettle their government." — *MS. Letters, Chantilly, June 12th.*

hence, without leaving the important posts on the North River quite defenceless, and these States open to devastation and ruin. When I say this, I would be understood to mean, if I am properly supported by the States eastward of Jersey inclusive. My present plan of operation, which I have been preparing with all the zeal and activity in my power, will, I am morally certain, with proper support produce one of two things; either the fall of New York, or a withdrawal of the troops from Virginia, excepting a garrison at Portsmouth, at which place, I have no doubt of the enemy's intention of establishing a permanent post. A long land march, in which we have never failed to dissipate half of our men, the difficulty and expense of transportation, and other reasons not less powerful, but which I dare not commit to writing, decided me in my present plan; and my hopes, I trust, will not be disappointed.

In half an hour's conversation I could, I think, convince you of the utility of my plan; but, as I have before observed, I do not attempt it by letter, because I have already had two important ones intercepted in the mails, the sight of which, I am persuaded, occasioned the retrograde movements of Lord Cornwallis, and will be the means of bringing a part of his force to New York, to the accomplishment of one part of my expectation.

No endeavours of mine have been wanting to obtain a naval superiority in these seas, nor to employ that which we have to valuable purposes. How far I have succeeded in the latter is but too obvious; how far I may see my wishes accomplished in the former, time must discover. With great esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WATERBURY.

Head-Quarters, 21 July, 1781.

SIR,

The army will make a movement this evening. You will march your corps on the same route, and in such time and manner as to be at East Chester between daybreak and sunrise. Your troops should be supplied, if possible, with three days' cooked provisions; and the movements of the army, as well as of your troops, must be kept a secret until the moment you march.*

* With a view of ascertaining the exact position of the enemy on the north end of New York Island, General Washington resolved to reconnoitre their posts from the western shore of the Hudson. For this purpose, on the 18th of July, he crossed the river at Dobbs's Ferry, accompanied by Count de Rochambeau, General de Beville, and General Duportail. They were attended by an escort of one hundred and fifty men from the Jersey troops, then stationed on the west side of the river. The day was spent in reconnoitring from the high grounds between Dobbs's Ferry and Fort Lee. The subsequent manœuvres near Kingsbridge are briefly sketched in the following extract from his *Diary*.

"*July 21st.* — I ordered about five thousand men to be ready to march at eight o'clock, for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy's posts at Kingsbridge, and of cutting off, if possible, such of Delancey's corps as should be found without their lines. At the hour appointed the march commenced, in four columns, on different roads. Major-General Parsons with the Connecticut troops, and twenty-five of Sheldon's horse, formed the right column, with two field-pieces, on the North River road. The other two divisions, under Major-Generals Lincoln and Howe, together with the corps of sappers and miners, and four field-pieces, formed the next column on the Saw-mill River road. The right column of the French, on our left, consisted of the brigade of Bourbonnois, with the battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs, two field-pieces, and two twelve-pounders. Their left column was composed of the legion of Lauzun, one battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs, the regiment of Soissonnois, two field-pieces, and two howitzers. General Waterbury, with the militia and State troops of Connecticut, was to march on the East Chester road, and to be joined at that place by the cavalry of Sheldon, for the purpose of scouring Frog's Neck. Sheldon's infantry was to join the legion of Lauzun and scour Morrisania, and to be covered by Scammell's light infantry, who were to advance through the fields, waylay the roads, stop all communication, and prevent intelligence from getting to the enemy. At

In order to prevent the enemy from obtaining any intelligence whatever from us, I have ordered small parties to waylay all the roads from the North River to East Chester. I must request that you will send an active subaltern and twenty men with good guides early this afternoon across the fields and woods from your encampment to some good position for an ambuscade, on the side of the road leading from New Rochelle to

Valentine's Hill the left column of the American troops and right of the French formed their junction, as did the left of the French also, by *mis-take*, as it was intended it should cross the Brunx by Garrineau's and recross it at Williams's Bridge. The whole army (Parsons's division first) arrived at Kingsbridge about daylight, and formed on the heights back of Fort Independence, extending towards Delancey's Mills; while the legion of Lauzun and Waterbury's corps proceeded to scour Morrisania and Frog's Neck to little effect, as most of the Refugees had fled, and hid themselves in such obscure places as not to be discovered; and by stealth got over to the islands adjacent, and to the enemy's shipping, which lay in the East River. A few, however, were caught, and some cattle and horses brought off.

"*July 22d.* — The enemy did not appear to have had the least intelligence of our movement, or to know we were upon the heights opposite to them, till the whole army was ready to display itself. After having fixed upon the ground, and formed our line, I began with General Rochambeau and the engineers to reconnoitre the enemy's position and works; and first from Tippet's Hill opposite to their left. From thence it was evident, that the small redoubt (Fort Charles) near Kingsbridge would be absolutely at the command of a battery, which might be erected thereon. It also appeared equally evident, that the fort on Cox's Hill was in bad repair, and little dependence placed in it. There is neither ditch nor friezing, and the northeast corner appears quite easy of access, occasioned as it would seem by a rock. The approach from the inner point is secured by a ledge of rocks, which would conceal a party from observation, till it got within about one hundred yards of the fort, around which, for that or a greater distance, the ground has little covering of bushes upon it. There is a house on this side under Tippet's Hill, but out of view, I conceive, of the crossing-place most favorable to a partisan stroke. From this view, and every other I could get of Forts Tryon, Knyphausen, and Laurel Hill, the works are formidable. There are no barracks or huts on the east side of the hill, on which Forts Tryon and Knyphausen stand, nor are there any on the hill opposite, except those by Fort George. Near the Blue Bell there is a number of houses, but they have more the appearance of stables than bar-

East Chester, as near the latter as may be without hazard of discovery. This party must remain perfectly concealed, with orders to apprehend all persons going towards Kingsbridge. It is essential that your party should not be seen by the inhabitants, as this might frustrate the very object of our operations. You will be convinced, Sir, by your own experience and good sense, that the profoundest secrecy is absolutely necessary in all military matters, and in no instance more

racks. In the hollow, near the barrier gate, are about fourteen or fifteen tents, which are the only encampment I could see without the line of palisades. A continued hill from the creek, east of Haerlem River and a little below Morris's White House, has from every part of it the command of the opposite shore, and all the plain adjoining is within range of shot from batteries, which may be erected thereon. The general width of the river, along this range of hills, appears to be from one hundred to two hundred yards. The opposite shore, though more or less marshy, does not seem miry, and the banks are very easy of access. How far the battery, under cover of the blockhouse on the hill northwest of Haerlem town, is capable of scouring the plain, is difficult to determine from this side ; but it would seem as if the distance were too great to be within the range of its shot on that part of the plain nearest the creek before mentioned, and which is also nearest the heights back of our old lines thrown up in the year 1776. It unfortunately happens, that, in the rear of the continued hill before mentioned, there is a deep swamp, and the grounds west of that swamp are not so high as the heights near Haerlem River. In the rear of this again is the Brunx, which is not to be crossed without boats below Delancey's Mills.

"*July 23d.* — Went upon Frog's Neck to see what communication could be had with Long Island, and the engineers attended with instruments to measure the distance across. Having finished the reconnoitre without damage, a few harmless shot only being fired at us, we marched back about six o'clock by the same routes we went down, but in a reversed order of march, and arrived at camp about midnight."

Supposing it probable, that Count de Grasse would shortly appear off Sandy Hook with his fleet, General Washington wrote to him, on the 21st of July, in Count de Rochambeau's cipher, acquainting him with the junction of the allied armies, their position and strength, and the force of the enemy ; and also explained the plans then in view as to future operations. This letter was sent under cover to General Forman, at Monmouth, with a request that he would keep look-outs on the heights, and, as soon as the fleet should approach, go on board the fleet in person and deliver the letter to Count de Grasse.

indispensably so, than in movements towards the enemy's lines. After you have given all the necessary orders, I could wish you would come to head-quarters and dine with me, as I may have many things to communicate personally to you. I am, &c.

TO THOMAS MCKEAN, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.*

Head-Quarters, 21 July, 1781.

SIR,

I have been honored by the receipt of your letter of the 14th and 17th of this month, with the several resolutions of Congress, and the extracts from intercepted letters enclosed. I am obliged by your attention in the communication of the extracts, although I had been favored with them through another channel, previous to the receipt of yours. The intelligence to be collected from them, if properly improved, I think may turn greatly to our advantage.†

I take this opportunity most sincerely to congratulate you, Sir, on the honor conferred on you by Congress, in being elected to preside in that most respectable body. Happy, as I expect to be in your correspondence, I dare say I shall have no reason to complain of the mode of your conducting it, as from a knowledge of your character I flatter myself it will ever be performed with great propriety. I take the liberty, however, to request as a particular favor, that you will be so good as to convey to me, as you have opportunity, any interesting intelligence, which you may receive

* Chosen President of Congress on the 10th of July, as successor to Mr. Huntington, who had resigned. Samuel Johnson, of North Carolina, was first chosen, but he declined accepting the appointment.

† See these extracts from intercepted letters in the APPENDIX, No. III.

either from Europe, or respecting our Continental affairs. Your situation will put it particularly in your power to oblige me in this respect, and be assured, Sir, that a greater obligation cannot be conferred; since, for want of communication in this way, I have often been left in the dark in matters, which essentially concern the public welfare, and which, if known, might be very influential in the government of my conduct in the military line.

I am very happy to be informed, by accounts from all parts of the continent, of the agreeable prospect of a very plentiful supply of almost all the productions of the earth. Blessed as we are with the bounties of Providence, necessary for our support and defence, the fault must surely be our own, and great indeed will it be, if we do not by a proper use of them obtain the noble prize for which we have so long been contending, the establishment of liberty, peace, and independence. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE BARRAS.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 21 July, 1781.

SIR,

I have been honored with your Excellency's favor of the 15th instant. I have no doubt but the reasons which induce you to decline the removal of the squadron under your command to the Chesapeake at this time are founded in propriety; but I am certain, that, could the measure have taken place, it would have been attended with most valuable consequences, more especially as, from reports and appearances, the enemy are about to bring part of their troops from Virginia to New York. Although the detachments from

your fleet under the command of the Baron d'Angely did not succeed at Huntington, we are not the less obliged to your Excellency for directing the attempt to be made. If that post is maintained, I think an opportunity of striking it to advantage may still be found, and I doubt not but you will readily embrace it. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 25 July, 1781.

SIR,

I have been honored with your favor of the 10th, announcing your resignation of the chair of Congress and the election of Mr. McKean to that important sta-

* The reason assigned by M. de Barras for remaining at Newport was, that he thought it imprudent to risk any new enterprise, which might contravene the general plan of operations, and retard his junction with Count de Grasse. A few days afterwards (July 30), General Washington wrote in his *Diary*, that Count de Barras had expressed himself in still stronger terms against a removal from Newport. "This induced me," said he, "to desist from further representing the advantages, which would result from preventing a junction of the enemy's force at New York, and blocking up those now in Virginia; lest in the attempt any disaster should happen, and the loss of or damage to his fleet should be ascribed to my obstinacy in urging a measure, to which his own judgment was opposed, and the execution of which might impede his junction with the West India fleet, and thwart the views of the Count de Grasse upon this coast."

A large body of refugees was stationed at Lloyd's Neck, near Huntington Bay, where they had built a fort and provided other means of defence. A project had been for some time in view to attack and drive them from this post. Having no employment for his squadron at Newport, Count de Barras detached for this service three frigates with two hundred and fifty land troops, the whole under the command of the Baron d'Angely. The detachment sailed on the 10th of July, and was joined in the Sound by several boats with American volunteers and pilots from Fairfield. A landing was effected in the morning of the 12th near the fort at Lloyd's Neck; but it was soon discovered, that the place was much stronger than had been supposed, and not to be carried without

tion. I flattered myself with the hope of an opportunity of personally acknowledging the attentions, which I received from you during your presidency; but as I find you could not with convenience make a visit to the army on your way home, I am constrained to take this method of returning my thanks and expressing my sincere wishes for the reëstablishment of your health. I am exceedingly happy to hear, that our political affairs begin to assume a new and pleasing appearance, which, if continued, will I hope have an influence upon the military. That department is yet laboring under every difficulty and distress, and there seems to me little chance of its being relieved from the debility to which it is reduced; for, notwithstanding my pressing requisitions, and the more pressing occasion which there is for recruits at this moment, I may almost say I have not received one man since my last demand.

The station, which you have lately filled with so much honor, has given you an opportunity of making yourself intimately acquainted with our real situation; and a representation from you to your State will naturally have more weight, than that of a stranger to public affairs. Be assured, Sir, you cannot employ your time better at home, than in constantly impressing all ranks with the necessity of recruiting and supplying the army. I have the honor to be, &c.

cannon, which had not been provided. The party retreated and reëmbarked. Two or three men were wounded by a cannon-shot from the fort. The enemy's vessels went up a river beyond the reach of the French frigates, so that no damage was done to them. The expedition was throughout a failure. — *MS. Letter of Count de Barras, July 15th.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 30 July, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

With peculiar satisfaction I do myself the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your several favors, and to assure you at the same time, that it is with the warmest pleasure I express my full approbation of the various movements and operations, which your military conduct has lately exhibited; while I confess to you that I am unable to conceive what more could have been done under your circumstances, than has been displayed by your little persevering and determined army. Lord Rawdon's reinforcement from England was a most untoward circumstance; but even this, I hope, will soon be surmounted by your good fortune.

You will be informed from the Marquis, of every circumstance that has taken place in Virginia. A detachment from the army of this brave and fortunate young nobleman will, I hope, soon arrive to your assistance in Carolina.

By our movements in this quarter, and the main army taking a position near New York, and making every preparation for a serious attempt upon that place, we have already produced a happy effect, that of a withdrawal of a considerable part of the troops under the command of Lord Cornwallis as a reinforcement to their garrison, which has been some time past closely confined to York Island. This withdrawal will probably disappoint their views of conquest in Virginia, and will exceedingly embarrass the prospects of the British ministry in the proposed treaty to be opened at Vienna.* This is a very great object, even should any

* Conditional instructions had been sent from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Cornwallis, that the latter should despatch to New York a detach-

thing prevent our obtaining further success in our operations against New York.

The operating force of the enemy in the southern States being confined in all probability to South Carolina, will leave the other States in a condition to afford you such succours as, with the aid of the Marquis's detachment, will, I trust, enable you to fulfil your hopes and wishes in their utmost extent in your command. Should this event take place, you may be assured, that, added to the honor that will be thereby reflected on your own person, it will afford me the highest satisfaction. I sincerely wish we had the means of communicating more frequently with each other. Be assured, Sir, my concern for your honor and welfare interests me most particularly in every event which attends you.

A reason, which cannot at this time be communicated, induces me to request that you will be pleased to give me the earliest and most minute information of every event, that takes place with you, and a circumstantial detail of the present situation of the State of South Carolina, its strength and operative force, with its resources for the support of an army, and the extent of those resources, with the places where they may be collected and secured; also the strength, position, and circumstances attending the enemy's force.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

ment from his army, as soon as he should have established himself in a fortified post near the Chesapeake. Their departure was delayed, however, till the French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake, and in reality no part of Lord Cornwallis's army left Virginia for the purpose of reinforcing Sir Henry Clinton. — See the correspondence in *Lord Cornwallis's Answer to Sir Henry Clinton's "Narrative,"* &c. pp. 79–188.

* *From the Orderly Book, July 31st.* — "The light companies of the first and second regiments of New York (upon their arrival in camp), with the two companies of York levies under the command of Captains Sackett and Williams, will form a battalion under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton and Major Fish. After the formation of the battalion,

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 30 July, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your favors of the 8th and 20th instant. The first relieved me from much anxiety, as I had seen Mr. Rivington's account of the action at Green Spring, which you may suppose was highly colored in their favor.* You ask my opinion of the Virginia campaign. Be assured, my dear Marquis, your conduct meets my warmest approbation, as it must that of every body. Should it ever be said, that my attachment to you betrayed me into partiality, you have only to appeal to facts to refute any such charge. But I trust there will be no occasion.†

Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton will join the advanced corps under the orders of Colonel Scammell."

* See an account of this engagement in MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*, Vol. IV. p. 442. For a short time the action was very warm. In describing it General Wayne wrote; "Our field-officers were generally dismounted by having their horses either killed or wounded under them. Colonel Mercer, and another young Virginia gentleman, were not more fortunate. I will not condole with the Marquis for the loss of two of his, as he was frequently requested to keep at a greater distance. His native bravery rendered him deaf to the admonition."—*July 8th*. By Lord Cornwallis's official return, his loss was eleven killed, sixty-six wounded, and one missing. The American loss was five captains, one captain-lieutenant, four lieutenants, eleven sergeants, and one hundred and eighteen rank and file, killed, wounded, and missing.

† *Lafayette to General Washington*.—"I am anxious to know your opinion concerning the Virginia campaign. That the subjugation of this State was the great object with the ministry is an indisputable fact. I think your diversion has been of more use to the State, than my manœuvres; but the latter have been much directed by political views. So long as Lord Cornwallis wished for an action, not one gun was fired; from the moment he declined it, we have been skirmishing; but I took care not to commit the army. His naval superiority, his superiority of horse and of regulars, his thousand advantages over us were such, that I am lucky enough to have come off safe. I had an eye upon European negotiations, and made it a point to give his Lordship the disgrace of a retreat. So soon as he had crossed James River he improved the opportunity to

I very much approve of your intention of reinforcing General Greene, as soon as circumstances will admit, and as strongly as possible. If he can only maintain the advantages he has already gained in the Carolinas and Georgia, the British ministry will make a very different figure in the political scene from that, which it is plain they expected, by Lord George Germain's letters of March last.

Private Letter, July 30th. — I take your private letter of the 20th in the light which you wish it, that of an unreserved communication from one friend to another; and I should be wanting in candor, were I not to expose my sentiments to you in as free a manner. I am convinced, that your desire to be with this army arises principally from a wish to be actively useful. You will not, therefore, regret your stay in Virginia until matters are reduced to a greater degree of certainty, than they are at present, especially when I tell you, that, from the change of circumstances with which the removal of part of the enemy's force

send Tarleton into Amelia, but was disappointed in the stores, which he expected to find, and which had been previously removed. I thought at first the cavalry would join Rawdon, and detached Wayne and Morgan either to manœuvre Tarleton down, or to determine his course. Upon this he retired with precipitation towards Portsmouth, where the British army is for the present.

"From every account it appears, that a part of the enemy will embark. The light infantry, the guards, the thirtieth regiment, the Queen's rangers are, it is said, destined to New York. Of this I have sent accounts by water to Rhode Island, but question if the boats will arrive. My opinion was, that the cavalry would push towards Carolina; but their late movements seem to indicate a different intention. Lord Cornwallis, I am told, is much disappointed in his hopes of command. I cannot find out what he does with himself. Should he go to England, we are, I think, to rejoice at it. He is a bold and active man, two dangerous qualities in this southern war." — *MS. Letter, Malvern Hill, July 20th.*

What is here said, respecting Lord Cornwallis's disappointment as to his command, is in allusion to his succeeding Sir Henry Clinton, who it had been supposed would resign. He had for some time solicited his recall.

from Virginia to New York will be attended, it is more than probable, that we shall also entirely change our plan of operations. I think we have already effected one part of the plan of the campaign settled at Weathersfield; that is, giving a substantial relief to the southern States, by obliging the enemy to recall a considerable part of their force from thence. Our views must now be turned towards endeavouring to expel them totally from those States, if we find ourselves incompetent to the siege of New York. The difficulty of doing this does not so much depend upon obtaining a force capable of effecting it, as upon the mode of collecting that force to the proper point, and transporting the provisions and stores necessary for such an operation. You are fully acquainted with the almost impracticability of doing this by land; to say nothing of the amazing loss of men always occasioned by long marches, and those towards a quarter in which the service is disagreeable. I should not, however, hesitate to encounter these difficulties, great as they are, had we not prospects of transporting ourselves in a manner safe, easy, and expeditious. Your penetration will point out my meaning, which I cannot venture to express in direct terms.*

I approve of your resolution to reinforce General Greene, in proportion to the detachment which the enemy may make to New York. Let your next attention be paid to training and forming the militia, with which you may be furnished, and disposing of them in such a manner, that they may be drawn at the shortest notice to whatever point the enemy may make their capital post, which I conclude will be at Portsmouth. The establishment of magazines at safe depos-

* Alluding to the expected arrival of Count de Grasse with a French fleet.

its will be in all cases necessary ; but, above all things, I recommend an augmentation of your cavalry to as great an extent as possible. It may happen, that the enemy may be driven to the necessity of forcing their way through North Carolina to avoid a greater misfortune. A superiority of horse on our side would be fatal to them in such a case.

The advantages resulting from a move of the French fleet from Newport to the Chesapeake were early and strongly pointed out to Count de Barras, and I thought he had once agreed to put it in execution ; but, by his late letters, he seemed to think that such a manœuvre might interfere with greater plans, and therefore he declined it. It would now be too late to answer the principal object, as, by accounts from a deserter, the troops arrived from Virginia last Friday.

Should your return to this army be finally determined upon, I cannot flatter you with a command equal to your expectations or my wishes. You know the over proportion of general officers to our numbers, and can therefore conceive where the difficulty will be. General McDougall is not yet provided for, and the Jersey and York troops are reserved for him. They are promised to him, though they have not yet joined.

In my letter to General Greene, which I beg the favor of you to forward, I have hinted nothing of what I have said to you, for fear of miscarriage. You will probably find a safe opportunity from your army to him, and you will oblige me by communicating the part of this letter, which relates to my expectation of being able to transport part of the army to the southward, should the operation against New York be declined.

I wish, as I mentioned in my last, to send a confidential person to you to explain at large what I

have so distantly hinted; but I am really at a loss, on account of not knowing the officers better, to find one upon whose discretion I can depend. My own family, you know, are constantly and fully employed. I hope, however, that I have spoken plain enough to be understood by you. With every sentiment of affection and regard, I am, &c.

TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 2 August, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The expectation of the pleasure of seeing you has prevented me hitherto from making a communication of a most important and interesting nature. But circumstances will not admit of further delay, and I must trust it to paper. It seems reduced almost to a certainty, that the enemy will reinforce New York with part of their troops from Virginia. In that case, the attempt against the former must be laid aside, as it will not be in our power to draw together a force sufficient to justify the undertaking. The detachment, which the enemy will probably leave in Virginia, seems the next object which ought to engage our attention, and which will be a very practicable one, should we obtain a naval superiority, of which I am not without hopes, and be able to carry a body of men suddenly round by water. The principal difficulty, which occurs, is obtaining transports at the moment they may be wanted; for, if they are taken up beforehand, the use for which they are designed cannot be concealed, and the enemy will make arrangements to defeat the plan.

What I would wish you to inform yourself of, therefore, without making a direct inquiry, is what number

of tons of shipping could be obtained in Philadelphia at any time between this and the 20th of this month, and whether there could also be obtained at the same time a few deep-waisted sloops and schooners proper to carry horses. The number of double-decked vessels, which may be wanted, of two hundred tons and upwards, will not exceed thirty. I shall be glad of your answer as soon as possible, because, if it is favorable, I can direct certain preparations to be made in Philadelphia and at other convenient places, without incurring any suspicions. There certainly can be no danger of not obtaining flour in Philadelphia; and as you seem to have doubts of procuring salt meat there, I shall direct all that is at the eastward to be collected at places from whence it may be shipped upon the shortest notice. You will also oblige me by giving me your opinion of the number of vessels, which might be obtained at Baltimore, or other places in the Chesapeake, in the time before mentioned or thereabouts.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 2 August, 1781.

SIR,

I regret being obliged to inform your Excellency, that I find myself at this late period very little stronger than I was when the army first moved out of their quarters. I leave your Excellency to judge of the delicate and embarrassed situation in which I stand at this moment. Unable to advance with prudence beyond my present position, while perhaps in the general opinion my force is equal to the commencement of

operations against New York, my conduct must appear, if not blamable, highly mysterious at least. Our allies, with whom a junction has been formed upwards of three weeks, and who were made to expect, from the engagements which I entered into with them at Weathersfield in May last, a very considerable augmentation of our force by this time, instead of seeing a prospect of advancing, must conjecture, upon good grounds, that the campaign will waste fruitlessly away. I shall just remark, that it will be no small degree of triumph to our enemies, and will have a very pernicious influence upon our friends in Europe, should they find such a failure of resource, or such a want of energy to draw it out, that our boasted and expensive preparations end only in idle parade.

I cannot yet but persuade myself, and I do not cease to encourage our allies with the hope, that our force will still be sufficient to carry our intended operation into effect; or, if we cannot fully accomplish that, to oblige the enemy to withdraw part of their force from the southward to support New York, which, as I informed you in my letter from Weathersfield, was part of our plan. Your Excellency must be sensible, that the fulfilment of my engagements must depend upon the degree of vigor, with which the executives of the several States exercise the powers with which they have been vested, and enforce the laws lately passed for filling up and supplying the army. In full confidence that the means, which have been voted, will be obtained, I shall continue my preparations; but I must take the liberty of informing you, that it is essentially necessary I should be made acquainted, immediately upon the receipt of this, with the number of Continental levies and militia, that have been forwarded, and what are the prospects of obtaining the remainder. I

will further add, that it will be equally necessary to see that the monthly quota of provision, stipulated at the meeting of the commissioners at Providence, is regularly complied with. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 8 August, 1781

SIR,

I do myself the honor to inform Congress, through your Excellency, that, at a late meeting between the American and British commissaries of prisoners, it has been proposed by the latter to go into a full exchange of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne and all the remaining officers of convention (by composition where rank will not apply) for the remainder of our officers in this quarter, and after them for those taken at the southward. One of the terms insisted upon is, that the prisoners surrendered by the capitulation of the Cedars, to the amount of four hundred and forty-three, shall be allowed.

I have not thought myself at liberty to accede to these proposals without the concurrence of Congress, for the following reasons; that I imagine our minister at the court of Versailles has been already directed to propose the exchange of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne for the Honorable Mr. Laurens; that I do not know whether it would be agreeable to Congress to release the whole of the convention officers, before they have obtained a settlement for the subsistence of those troops; and lastly because the refusal of the ratification of the convention of the Cedars has never been repealed.

* Sent as a circular to each of the eastern States.

I would beg leave to remark on the two last, that the exchange of our full colonels can never be obtained but by composition, and that it is better to effect this by a composition for inferior officers than for men, because the enemy gain no reinforcement by such a mode. To relieve the full colonels in this quarter only, who, all but one, have been prisoners since 1777, would take seven hundred privates. Should the security for the convention debt still be urged, I would answer, that we may perhaps deceive ourselves in supposing that the balance upon a general settlement, for the subsistence of all prisoners since the commencement of the war, will be much in our favor. I am inclined to think we shall find it the contrary, and owing to this, namely, that the British have constantly kept their accounts with accuracy and have vouchers ready to support them. We, on the other hand, shall be found very deficient on that score; indeed, I fear almost totally so, except in the instance of the convention troops and prisoners of war latterly.

Congress will judge of the expediency of repealing their act respecting the convention of the Cedars upon the present occasion. Mr. Skinner, the commissary-general of prisoners, will have the honor of delivering this to your Excellency. I shall be obliged by an answer to the several points contained in it, at his return, that I may instruct him accordingly.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* There had been some difficulty in regard to the exchange of private individuals, who were taken when not acting in any military or public capacity. The following extract from a letter to Mr. Skinner will show upon what principles General Washington regarded this description of prisoners.

“You are to insist upon the release of inhabitants taken out of arms, without any compensation. You may inform Mr. Loring, that I would not wish to be obliged to seize private persons to obtain the relief of

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 15 August, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received your letters of the 26th and 30th ultimo and 1st instant. I cannot learn that any troops have yet arrived at New York from Virginia. A fleet of twenty sail came in last Saturday with troops, but they are said to be Hessian recruits from Europe. The *Concorde* frigate has arrived at Newport from Count de Grasse. He was to leave St. Domingo the 3d of this month, with a fleet of between twenty-five and twenty-nine sail of the line, and a considerable body of land forces. His destination is immediately for the Chesapeake; so that he will either be there by the time this reaches you, or you may look for him every moment. Under these circumstances, whether the enemy remain in full force, or whether they have only a detachment left, you will immediately take such a position as will best enable you to prevent their sudden retreat through North Carolina, which I presume they will attempt the instant they perceive so formidable an armament. Should General Wayne, with the troops destined for

those who are now in New York. I have it at this time in my power to secure every loyalist in the western part of Connecticut, in the county of Westchester, and in great part of Bergen; but I have not encouraged a practice, which I have reprobated in the enemy, and which nothing shall induce me to put in execution, but seeing no other mode of procuring the release of our citizens." — *August 8th.*

On receiving General Washington's letter, Congress resolved, that he should be authorized to go into a full exchange of General Burgoyne and all the remaining officers of the convention of Saratoga; and, also, that the prisoners taken at the Cedars should be considered as subjects of exchange, on condition that allowance should be made for several Canadian officers taken by the Americans at St. John's and Chamblee, and sent into the British lines on parole in 1776, concerning whose exchange there had been a dispute. — *Journals, August 21st.*

South Carolina, still remain in the neighbourhood of James River, and should the enemy have made no detachment to the southward, you will detain those troops until you hear from me again, and inform General Greene of the cause of their delay. If Wayne should have marched, and should have gained any considerable distance, I would not have him halted.

You shall hear further from me as soon as I have concerted plans and formed dispositions for sending a reinforcement from hence. In the mean time, I have only to recommend a continuation of that prudence and good conduct, which you have manifested through the whole of your campaign. You will be particularly careful to conceal the expected arrival of the Count; because, if the enemy are not apprized of it, they will stay on board their transports in the Bay, which will be the luckiest circumstance in the world. You will take measures for opening a communication with Count de Grasse the moment he arrives, and will concert measures with him for making the best use of your joint forces until you receive aid from this quarter. I would not wish you to call out a large body of militia upon this occasion, but rather keep those you have compact and ready for service. I am, &c.*

* *Lafayette to General Washington.* — "A correspondent of mine, a servant to Lord Cornwallis, writes on the 26th of July at Portsmouth, and says his master, Tarleton, and Simcoe are still in town, but expect to move. The greater part of the army is embarked. There are in Hampton Road one fifty-gun ship, two thirty-six-gun frigates, and eighteen sloops loaded with horses. There remain but nine vessels in Portsmouth, which appear to be getting ready. My Lord's baggage is yet in town. His Lordship is so shy of his papers, that my honest friend says he cannot get at them. There is a large quantity of negroes, very valuable indeed, but no vessels it seems to take them off. What garrison they have, I do not know. I shall take care, at least, to keep them within bounds. General Muhlenberg, with a corps of light infantry and horse, is moving towards Portsmouth; but, although I do not think they are going up the

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 16 August, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have only time to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 8th instant and to congratulate you on your fortunate escape ; which is attended with the more flattering circumstances, from its being effected entirely by your own presence of mind.* As the remaining part of Colonel Cortlandt's regiment is now ordered to join the main army, I have given directions to General Clinton to leave with you a small guard of men, who are the least capable of active service. The commissary will have orders to replace the rum, which you have borrowed for the public service, as soon as our circumstances will conveniently admit. At present

river or the bay, the less so as they have made a parade of taking pilots on board, I had rather act on the cautious side, and by keeping a supporting position leave no chance to his Lordship to out-manœuvre us. Should a French fleet now come into Hampton Road, the British army would, I think, be ours.

"I am going to send a flag to Lord Cornwallis. I owe him the justice to say, that his conduct to me has been peculiarly polite ; and many differences between commissaries have been very graciously adjusted by him to my satisfaction."—*Malvern Hill, July 31st.*

Cornwallis took possession of York and Gloucester on the 1st and 2d of August, and, having removed with as much expedition as possible all his army from Portsmouth, commenced fortifying those posts.

* There had been intimations communicated to General Schuyler at different times, that the enemy were laying plans to seize his person. He gave little heed to these rumors at first, but they were pressed upon him so confidently, that he thought prudence required some precaution. In this he went no farther, however, than to avoid exposing himself unnecessarily, and to be prepared for any sudden assault upon his house.

"The enemy, finding it impossible," said he in his letter, "to surprise me out of my house, attempted last night about nine o'clock to take me in it. They forced the gate of a close court-yard, and entered through the kitchen. Four white men, whom I had in the house, having flown to their arms, very gallantly disputed the passage into my hall, where I was at supper, and gave me time to gain my bed-chamber, where my arms

there is not enough to satisfy the most pressing necessities of the service. With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Camp, at Phillipsburg, 17 August, 1781.

SIR,

In consequence of the despatches received from your Excellency by the frigate *Concorde*, it has been judged expedient to give up for the present the enterprise against New York, and turn our attention towards the south, with a view, if we should not be able to attempt Charleston itself, to recover and secure the States of Virginia, North Carolina, and the country of South Carolina and Georgia. We may add a further inducement for giving up the first-mentioned enterprise, which is the arrival of a reinforcement of near three thousand Hessian recruits. For this purpose we have determined to remove the whole of the French army, and as large a detachment of the American as can be spared, to the Chesapeake, to meet your Excellency there.

The following appear to us the principle cases, which

were deposited. The enemy's numbers prevailed. They secured two of my men, wounded a third, and obliged the other to fly out of the house for safety. Some then entered, whilst others surrounded the house. Those in the quarter exposed to my fire retired, on the first discharges. Those, that had got into the saloon leading to my bed-room, retreated with great precipitation, on hearing me call, 'Come on, my lads; surround the house, and secure the villains, who are plundering.' I believe this little incident saved me; for, although the townsmen ran with all possible celerity to my assistance as soon as they heard the firing, yet they came too late to overtake the enemy, who carried off the two men and part of my plate. Myers, who was wounded, headed the party, which consisted of about twenty. General Clinton has ordered me a sergeant's guard."

-- *MS. Letter, Albany, August 8th.*

will present themselves, and upon which we shall be obliged ultimately to form our plans. We have therefore stated them with a few short observations upon each. Your Excellency will be pleased to revolve them in your mind, and prepare your opinion by the time we shall have the pleasure of meeting you in Virginia.

First, What shall be done, if the enemy should be found with the greater part of their force in Virginia, upon the arrival of the French fleet? Secondly, What shall be done, if a detachment only shall be found there? Thirdly, What shall be done, if the British force be totally withdrawn from thence?

As to the first, it appears to us, that we ought, without loss of time, to attack the enemy with our united force.

As to the second, it appears proper to destine such part of our force as will be amply sufficient to reduce the enemy's detachment, and then determine what use shall be made of the remainder. And here two things present themselves for our consideration. The enemy will either have sent the greater part of their force from Virginia to New York or to Charleston. If to New York, (which is the least probable under present circumstances,) Charleston will have but a moderate garrison, and it may be possible to attack it to advantage. If to Charleston, then the enemy will be so superior to General Greene, that they will be able to regain the whole of the State of South Carolina, and of consequence Georgia. We therefore think, that, in this latter case, such a force at least should be detached to South Carolina, as will enable us to keep the field and confine the enemy in or near Charleston.

In the third case we mean, that, supposing the enemy should have totally evacuated Virginia, it appears to us

necessary to make a solid establishment at Portsmouth, or any other place if more proper, in order to render a fleet in the Chesapeake Bay entirely secure, and to employ the remainder of our land force and such vessels as may be proper for the service, as has been explained in the preceding article; that is, either in the siege of Charleston, if the garrison shall be found sufficient to warrant the attempt, or to cover and secure the country, should it be found otherwise.

Returning to the enterprise against New York will depend on a number of circumstances, the discussion of which we will leave until we have the happiness of a conference with your Excellency. We have only to observe, that the execution of all or any of the plans, which we have proposed, goes upon the supposition of a decided naval superiority; except that of marching a reinforcement into South Carolina.

We would beg leave to take up so much of your time, as to point out to you the vast importance of Charleston, and what advantages the enemy derive from the possession of it. It is the centre of their power in the south. By holding it they preserve a dangerous influence throughout the whole State, as it is the only port, and the only place from whence the people can procure those articles of foreign produce, which are essential to their support; and it in a great measure serves to cover and keep in subjection the State of Georgia. From thence the enemy can also establish small posts in North Carolina; and, if they maintain a post in the Chesapeake, they keep up the appearance of possessing four hundred miles upon the coast, and of consequence have a pretext for setting up claims, which may be very detrimental to the interests of America in European councils.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with the position

of Charleston (neither is it necessary at this time) to enter into a detail of the proper mode of attacking it, or of the probability which we should have of succeeding. For these we will refer you to Brigadier-General Duportail, commander of the corps of engineers in the service of the United States, who will have the honor of presenting this. That gentleman, having been in Charleston as principal engineer during the greater part of the siege, and in the environs of it as a prisoner of war a considerable time afterwards, had opportunities of making very full observations, which he judiciously improved.

A variety of cases, different from those we have stated, may occur. It is for this reason we have thought proper to send General Duportail to your Excellency. He is fully acquainted with every circumstance of our affairs in this quarter, and we recommend him to you as an officer, in whose abilities and in whose integrity you may place the fullest confidence. We would observe, that it will be very essential to the despatch of the business in contemplation, for you to send up the Elk River, at the head of the Chesapeake Bay, all your frigates, transports, and vessels proper for the conveyance of the French and American troops down the bay. We shall endeavour to have as many as can be found in Baltimore and other ports secured, but we have reason to believe they will be very few. We have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, attachment, esteem, &c.*

* This letter was signed jointly by General Washington and Count de Rochambeau. It will have been seen by the preceding letters, that the thoughts of General Washington had for several days been turned towards a southern expedition, instead of an attack on New York; and the arrival of the reinforcement of Hessians in that city on the 11th had added still stronger motives for this change of plan. After receiving intelligence from Count de Grasse, therefore, that he should sail directly

TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE.

Head-Quarters, Dobbs's Ferry, 17 August, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have in confidence imparted to you the alteration of our late plan, and made you acquainted with our intended operations. Besides the provision necessary at the Head of Elk to carry the troops down the bay, a very considerable quantity will be wanted in Virginia. I should suppose three hundred barrels of flour, as

to the Chesapeake, no time was lost in determining what course to pursue. The news came from Count de Barras.

Diary, July 14th. — "Received despatches from the Count de Barras, announcing the intended departure of Count de Grasse from Cape François with between twenty-five and twenty-nine sail of the line, and three thousand two hundred land troops, on the 3d instant, for the Chesapeake Bay; and the anxiety of the latter to have every thing in the most perfect readiness to commence our operations at the moment of his arrival, as he should be under the necessity, from particular engagements with the Spaniards, to be in the West Indies by the middle of October. The Count de Barras at the same time intimated his intentions of an enterprise against Newfoundland; in opposition to which both Count de Rochambeau and myself remonstrated, as being impolitic and dangerous under the probability of Rodney's coming on this coast.

"Matters having now come to a crisis, and a decided plan to be determined on, I was obliged,—from the shortness of Count de Grasse's promised stay on this coast, the apparent disinclination of their naval officers to force the harbour of New York, and the feeble compliance of the States with my requisitions for men hitherto, and the little prospect of greater exertion in future,—to give up all ideas of attacking New York, and instead thereof to remove the French troops and a detachment from the American army to the Head of Elk, to be transported to Virginia for the purpose of coöperating with the force from the West Indies against the troops in that State."

In the letter, which accompanied the despatches above mentioned, Count de Barras said, that Count de Grasse did not require him to form a junction with the West India squadron, but left him at liberty to undertake any other enterprise, which he might think proper. In conformity with this permission, and with the spirit of the original but contingent instructions from the ministers, he proposed an expedition to Newfoundland, and said he should wish to take with him the land forces, that had been left at Newport under M. de Choisy. This step was strongly disapproved

many of salt meat, and eight or ten hogsheads of rum would be sufficient at Elk. For what will be consumed in Virginia, I imagine the order must be general, as we can neither ascertain the number of men, who will be drawn together, or the time they will be employed.

I have written to the Count de Grasse, and have requested him to send up his light vessels of every kind to Elk ; but I would nevertheless wish to have all that may be at Baltimore and the upper parts of the bay secured. I shall therefore be obliged to you to take measures at a proper time for that purpose. When

by both General Washington and Count de Rochambeau ; and, as soon as he received their remonstrance against it, Count de Barras resolved to proceed to the Chesapeake.

It is probable, likewise, that some degree of personal feeling had its influence on the wishes of Count de Barras. In the council of war, which was held some time before respecting the removal of the fleet to Boston, after a debate indicating a little warmth among the officers, Count de Rochambeau represents M. de Barras as using the following language. "No person is more interested than I am in the arrival of M. de Grasse in these seas. He was my junior ; he has just been appointed lieutenant-general. At the moment his approach is made known, I shall set sail to put myself under his orders. I will finish this campaign ; I will never make another."—*Mémoires de Rochambeau*, Tom. I. p. 276. Hence it appears, that the two naval commanders stood in a delicate relation to each other ; and it may be presumed, that this was the reason why Count de Grasse left Count de Barras at liberty to join him or not, as he should be inclined ; and also why the latter preferred a separate enterprise.

The same anecdote is mentioned by M. Soulés (*Histoire des Troubles de l'Amérique Anglaise*, Tom. III. p. 372), whose work on the American revolution is the best written and most authentic in the French language. The author had access to public documents in the department of war ; but all the particulars relating to the operations of Rochambeau's army are taken almost word for word from a narrative, which had been drawn up by Count de Rochambeau, and which was afterwards published as a part of his *Mémoires*. A large portion of M. Soulés' book was read in manuscript by Count de Rochambeau, and also by the minister of war ; and, although this process might contribute to its accuracy, yet it would hardly leave unshackled the author's independence and judgment.

See a letter from Count de Grasse to Count de Rochambeau in the APPENDIX, No. IV.

that time will be, and when you shall give orders for the deposit at Elk, I will hereafter inform you. I shall direct the quartermaster in due season to take up all the small craft in the Delaware for the purpose of transporting the troops from Trenton to Christiana. Should he have occasion for advice or assistance from you upon this occasion, I must request you to give him both. I am confident it will be necessary to give the American troops, destined for southern services, one month's pay in specie. This will amount to about

dollars. If it will be possible for you to procure this sum, you will infinitely oblige me and will much benefit the service. I shall also stand in need of a sum of specie for secret services, I suppose about five hundred guineas. I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Instructions.

SIR,

You are to take the command of all the troops remaining in this department, consisting of the two regiments of New Hampshire, ten of Massachusetts, and five of Connecticut infantry, the corps of invalids, Sheldon's legion, the third regiment of artillery, together with all such State troops and militia, as are retained in service, and who would have been under my own command.

The security of West Point and the posts in the Highlands is to be considered the first object of your attention. In order to effect this, you will make such

* To this request for money Mr. Morris made a very discouraging reply, stating that he had none, but would make every possible exertion. See his answer in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 431.

dispositions as in your judgment the circumstances shall from time to time require ; taking care to have as large a supply of salted provisions as possible constantly on hand ; to have the fortifications, works, and magazines repaired and perfected as far as may be ; to have the garrison at least in all cases kept up to its present strength ; and to have the minuter arrangements and plans for the defence and support of this important post perfectly understood and vigorously acted upon, in case of any attempt against it. Ample magazines of wood and forage are to be laid in against the approaching winter. The former should be cut on the margin of the river, and transported by water to the garrison. The latter ought to be collected from the country below the lines, in the greatest quantities possible, and deposited in such places as you shall judge proper.

The force now put under your orders, it is presumed, will be sufficient for all the purposes above mentioned ; as well as to yield a very considerable protection and cover to the country, without hazarding the safety of the posts in the Highlands. This is to be esteemed, as it respects the friendly inhabitants and resources of the country, an extremely interesting object ; but, when compared with the former, of a secondary nature. The protection of the northern and western frontiers of the State of New York, as well as those parts of that and other States most contiguous and exposed to the ravages and depredations of the enemy, will claim your attention. But, as the contingencies, which are to be expected in the course of the campaign, may be so various, unforeseen, and almost infinite, that no particular line of conduct can be prescribed for them, upon all such occasions you will be governed by your own prudence and discretion, in which the fullest confidence is placed.

Although your general rule of conduct will be to act on the defensive only, yet it is not meant to prohibit you from striking a blow at the enemy's posts, or detachments, should a fair opportunity present itself.

The most eligible position for your army, in my opinion, will be on the north side of Croton River; as well for the purpose of supporting the garrison of West Point, annoying the enemy, and covering the country, as for the security and repose of your troops. Waterbury's brigade, which may be posted towards the Sound, Sheldon's corps, the State troops of New York, and other light parties, may occasionally be made use of to hold the enemy in check, and carry on a *petite guerre* with them; but I would recommend keeping your force as much collected and as compact as the nature of the service will admit, doing duty by corps instead of detachments whenever it is practicable, and above all exerting yourself most strenuously and assiduously, while the troops are in a camp of repose, to make them perfect in their exercise and manœuvres, and to establish the most regular system of discipline and duty. The good of the service and the emulation of corps will, I am persuaded, prompt the officers and men to devote their whole time and attention to the pleasing and honorable task of becoming masters of their profession. The uncertainty, which the present movements of the army will probably occasion with the enemy, ought to be increased by every means in your power, and the deception kept up as long as possible.

It will not be expedient to prevent such militia as were ordered from coming in, until the arrival of the Count de Grasse, or something definite or certain is known from the southward; and even then (but of this you will be advised) circumstances may render it advisable to keep the enemy at New York in check,

to prevent their detaching to reinforce their southern army, or to harass the inhabitants on the seacoast.

The redoubt on the east side of Dobbs's Ferry is to be dismantled and demolished, and the platforms to be taken up and transported up the river, if it can conveniently be done. The blockhouse on the other side is to be maintained, or evacuated and destroyed, as you shall think proper. The water-guards and other precautions to prevent a surprise, you will be pleased to take into consideration, and regulate in such a manner as you shall judge most expedient. You will be pleased, also, to keep me regularly advised of every important event, which shall take place in your department. Given under my hand at Head-Quarters, this 19th day of August, 1781.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

King's Ferry, 21 August, 1781.

SIR,

I have this moment the honor of your letter by Monsieur Blanchard. I am very sorry for the difficulties and impediments, which fall in the way of your march, and hope they will decrease as you proceed. I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that my troops arrived at the Ferry yesterday, and began to pass the river at ten o'clock in the morning, and by sunrise of this day they were all completely on this side of the river. I hope your army will be enabled to cross with the same facility when they arrive.

I have no news worthy of communicating from any quarter. I shall be happy in your company to-morrow at dinner at my quarters, and will meet you at the ferry to-morrow by eight o'clock, when we will either

be furnished with some cold repast *en passant*, or I will take you to my quarters about three miles from the Ferry, where you shall be introduced to a warm breakfast. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

King's Ferry, 21 August, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Agreeably to my intentions communicated to you on the 15th instant, the troops destined for the southern quarter are now in motion. The American detachment is already on the west side of the Hudson. The French army I expect will reach the Ferry this day. Our march will be continued with all the despatch that our circumstances will admit. As it will be of great

* The American army passed from their encampment along the road near the river to King's Ferry, and crossed to Stony Point on the 21st. The French army marched by the way of White Plains, North Castle, Pine's Bridge, and Crompond, and crossed the river with all their baggage and stores between the 22d and 25th. The two armies pursued their march to Trenton by different routes; one column passing through Chatham, Springfield, and Brunswick, for the purpose of keeping up as long as possible an appearance of threatening Staten Island, or of marching round to Sandy Hook to facilitate the entrance of the French fleet into the harbour. A French bakery was also established at Chatham, as a blind to the enemy, which should strengthen the opinion that operations were intended in that quarter. General Washington remained with the army till the 30th, when he and Count de Rochambeau set off for Philadelphia, and arrived there the next day. He immediately applied himself to provide vessels, and other means of transporting the army, baggage, and stores from Trenton to the Head of Elk. So few vessels could be found, that one regiment only went by water, with the stores, down the Delaware and up Christiana Creek. All the remaining troops marched by land, and passed through Philadelphia. General Lincoln had the immediate command of the army in its progress southward.

An extract from Mr. Morris's Diary, containing an animated account of General Washington's reception in Philadelphia on this occasion, may be seen in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 462.

importance towards the success of our present enterprise, that the enemy on the arrival of the fleet should not have it in their power to effect their retreat, I cannot omit to repeat to you my most earnest wish, that the land and naval forces, which you will have with you, may so combine their operations, that the British army may not be able to escape. The particular mode of doing this I shall not at this distance attempt to dictate. Your own knowledge of the country, from your long continuance in it, and the various and extended movements, which you have made, have given you great opportunities for observation; of which I am persuaded your military genius and judgment will lead you to make the best improvement. You will, my dear Marquis, keep me constantly advised of every important event respecting the enemy or yourself.

I am, &c.

P. S. The enclosed for the Count de Grasse is left open for your observation, and committed to your care for its safe conveyance. If any water-craft can be procured in the country where you are, you will be pleased to have them sent to the Head of Elk by the 8th of September, to facilitate the embarkation of the troops who will be there by that day.*

* When Cornwallis had retired before Lafayette, and was near Williamsburg, as the former had a superior force, Lafayette did not choose to bring him to a general action; but he wished at the same time to impress upon him an idea of the largeness of his numbers, in order that Cornwallis might not be induced to turn upon him, and thus compel him again to retreat. He had taken into his service a very shrewd negro man, whom he had instructed to go into the enemy's camp and pretend to give himself up to them. This task the man performed with so much cunning, that he was actually employed by Lord Cornwallis as a spy, at the time he was acting in the same capacity for the other side. But he was true to his first employer. Lafayette wrote a fictitious order to General Morgan, requiring him to take his station at a certain post in conjunction with the army. The paper was then torn and given to the negro,

TO ROBERT MORRIS AND RICHARD PETERS.*

King's Ferry, 21 August, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

I have devoted the first moment of my time, which I could command (while the troops are halted for the French army at this place), to give my sentiments unreservedly on the several matters contained in your favor of the 13th instant. This I will attempt to do with all that frankness and sincerity, which, from your candor in your communications, you have a right to expect, and for doing which with the greater freedom the importance of the subject will be my apology. Persuaded that we are influenced by the same motives, and anxious in pursuit of the same object, I am only unhappy, that I should be forced to dissent in a single instance from the opinion of those, for whose judgment and ability I have the highest deference, respecting the surest and best mode for attaining that object.

But, being at the same time fully sensible of the ne-

with directions how to proceed. He returned to Cornwallis, who asked him what news he brought from the American camp. He said there was no news, that he saw no changes, but every thing appeared as it was the day before. Holding the tattered paper in his hand, he was asked what it was, and replied that he had picked it up in the American camp, but, as he could not read, he did not know that it was of any importance. The General took it, and was surprised to find such an order. He had not heard of Morgan's having joined the army, or of his being expected. It made him cautious, however, for a day or two before he was undeceived, and the object of Lafayette was gained.

* Mr. Morris, as superintendent of finance, and Mr. Peters, as a member of the Board of War, had been appointed commissioners by Congress to proceed to head-quarters, and consult the Commander-in-chief respecting the arrangement and numbers of the army for the ensuing year.—*Journals*, July 31st. They had recently been in the camp for that purpose, and had addressed a letter to General Washington containing several queries on that subject. See the letter in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 426. The basis of their scheme was a reduction of the army.

cessity of prosecuting the war with as much vigor as our circumstances will admit, and of using the strictest economy in the prosecution of it; upon these very principles, I beg leave to give it as my opinion, that a reduction of the number of officers and men as fixed by the last arrangement, or any material alteration of the establishment of the army for the next campaign, would not in the present situation of affairs be expedient, for the following reasons.

In the first place, because the enemy must resolve to prosecute the war, or be disposed to make a peace; in either of which cases, a respectable army in the field on our part will, I conceive, more than compensate the expenses of it, and will eventually be the best and most economical system of policy we can possibly act upon. For, should the enemy still be determined to carry on the war with obstinacy, not only policy, but even necessity, would urge us to keep up a superior army, as the surest and only means of forcing them to a peace, and freeing us from the calamities and expenses of the war; as it is evident from many circumstances, that they have relied more for success on our want of exertions, than upon their own military prowess or resources, and that this has been one principal inducement of their persevering hitherto. But, on the other hand, should they be inclined to a pacification, a powerful and well appointed army would both enable us to dictate our own terms at the negotiation, and hasten the completion of it.

In addition to this, whoever considers how much more expensive and less serviceable militia are than Continental troops, how heavy and repeated a burden on the public their bounties are, when they are hired; when drafted, how disagreeable and frequently distressing for them to be torn from their families to a life with

which they are totally unacquainted ; how precarious and uncertain the aid is, which may be expected from them in such cases ; what glorious opportunities have been lost by us, and what almost ruinous advantages have been taken by the enemy in times of our weakness, for want of a permanent force in the field, — will, I am persuaded, be convinced, that we ought to have constantly such an army as is sufficient to operate against the enemy, and supersede the necessity of calling forth the militia except on the most extraordinary occasions. I will also beg leave to remind you, Gentlemen, of the great reduction of the number of regiments on the Continental establishment, namely, from one hundred and sixteen to fifty since the year 1777, and to observe, in consequence, that, in my opinion, we do not find the enemy so much exhausted, or their strength so debilitated, as to warrant any farther diminution of our established force. By one of the late intercepted letters from Lord George Germain, it appears the enemy considered the number of men, in their provincial corps only, greater than the whole number of men in the service of the continent. Since which time the reinforcements that have arrived from Europe amount, by the best accounts I have been able to obtain, to at least four thousand men.

That the States are able, by proper exertions, to furnish the number of men required by the last arrangement of the army, may I think rationally be supposed ; as the population in many of them has rather increased than diminished since the commencement of the war ; and as the greater part of them do actually, when called upon in an emergency, give a sufficient number of men for services of short duration to complete their Continental regiments. That the country abounds with supplies of all kinds is acknowledged from all quarters.

Whether the men can be obtained, or the resources drawn forth, is more than I will presume with certainty to determine; but one thing is certain, that it is idle to contend against great odds, when we have it in our power to do it upon equal or even advantageous terms.

There are also several arguments, which I omit to enforce, that might be adduced particularly to prove the impropriety of reducing the number of officers, or making any considerable alteration in the system; such as our having found by experience, that the proportion of officers is not too great for the number of men; that the same or a greater proportion has been esteemed necessary in other more ancient services; and that the full complement is more indispensably requisite in ours, because there is a larger number of levies and recruits to train and discipline annually, than is to be found in the regiments of other nations; and because a greater number of officers is taken from the line to perform the duties of the staff, than in most other services. It is likewise an established fact, that every alteration in the military system, or change in the arrangement, unless founded in the most obvious principles of utility, is attended with uneasiness among the officers, confusion with regard to the disposition of the men, and frequently with irregularities and disagreeable consequences before it is carried completely into execution. Perfect order throughout the whole army has but just been restored since the last arrangement took place. Another innovation in the present situation might be more mischievous in its effects.

Thus I have, Gentlemen, from a desire of faithfully performing my duty, from the experience (of whatever degree it is) which I have acquired in the service of my country, and from the knowledge I have of the

present state of the army, given my sentiments on the first of your queries, which likewise involves the answer to the second. With regard to the third, I am of opinion, that the recruits ought if possible to be engaged for the war, or three years; but, if this cannot be done, that the community, district, or class, furnishing a man for a shorter term of service, ought to be compellable to have him replaced by the period when his time of service expires; and that funds ought to be established, if practicable, for recruiting the men engaged for short services, while they continue with the army, as it is found by experience that they may be enlisted with more facility and less expense, than under any other circumstances. With respect to the fourth, fifth, and sixth queries, I am in doubt whether any alteration can be made on those subjects, which shall tend essentially, all things considered, to the public good. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING HIS BRITANNIC
MAJESTY'S SHIPS OF WAR AT NEW YORK.

Head-Quarters, 21 August, 1781.

SIR,

The almost daily complaints of the severities exercised towards the American marine prisoners in New York, have induced the Honorable the Congress of the United States to direct me to remonstrate to the commanding officer of his Britannic Majesty's ships of war in that harbour upon the subject, and to report to them his answer. The principal complaint now is, the inadequacy of the room in the prison-ships to the number of prisoners confined on board of them, which causes the death of many, and is the occasion of

most intolerable inconveniences and distresses to those who survive. This line of conduct is the more aggravating, as the want of a greater number of prison-ships, or of sufficient room on shore, cannot be pleaded in excuse.

As a bare denial of what has been asserted by so many individuals, who have unfortunately experienced the miseries I have mentioned, will not be satisfactory, I have to propose, that our commissary-general of prisoners, or any other officer, who shall be agreed upon, shall have liberty to visit the ships, inspect the situation of the prisoners, and make a report, from an exact survey of the situation in which they may be found, whether, in his opinion, there has been any just cause of complaint. I shall be glad to be favored with an answer as soon as convenient. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Head-Quarters, King's Ferry, 24 August, 1781.

SIR,

I take the earliest opportunity to inform your Excellency, that, by a letter which the Count de Rochambeau has received from Newport, the Count de Barras has taken a resolution to join your fleet in the Chesapeake; for which purpose he intended, if the winds should prove favorable, to depart from Newport on the 21st instant. This information is communicated to your Excellency, that you may take such measures as you shall think proper to facilitate the intended junction.

* See the answer in the APPENDIX, No. V.

From the progress already made in our march towards the Chesapeake, it is estimated that the troops may arrive at the Head of Elk by the 8th of September. That no delay may retard our embarkation, I take the liberty again to urge the necessity of your Excellency's sending up all your frigates and transports to the Head of Elk, in such time, that they may be sure of being there by the 8th of next month. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE.

Chatham, 27 August, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Accounts brought by several vessels to Philadelphia and to the eastward leave little doubt, that the Count de Grasse must have already arrived in the Chesapeake, or that he must be very soon there. The Count de Rochambeau and myself have therefore determined that no time ought to be lost in making preparations for our transportation from Trenton to Christiana, and from the Head of Elk down the Chesapeake. I have written by this opportunity to Colonel Miles, and have directed him immediately to engage all the proper kind of craft for the navigation of the Delaware, which can be found in Philadelphia or in the creeks above and below it; and, as your advice may be useful to him, more especially so far as respects procuring the vessels at a distance from Philadelphia, I have desired him to wait upon you for that purpose. I shall also be obliged to you for using your influence with the gentlemen of Baltimore, to permit any vessels that may be in that port to come up to Elk and assist us in transportation. I have little doubt,

from the cheerfulness with which they furnished the Marquis last winter, that they will comply with your requisition on the present occasion. But, lest there should be a necessity for the interference of the executive of the State, I have written to Governor Lee upon that and other matters. I enclose the letter under a flying seal for your information, and you will be good enough to forward it by a chain of expresses which is established. Any vessels, which may be procured in the Chesapeake, should rendezvous as soon as possible in Elk River.

You will be pleased to make the deposit of flour, rum, and salt meat at the Head of Elk, which I requested in a former letter. I am very fearful that about fifteen hundred barrels of salt provisions, and thirty hogsheads of rum, which I directed to be sent from Connecticut and Rhode Island under convoy of the Count de Barras, would not have been ready when the fleet sailed from Newport. Should that have been the case, the disappointment will be great. I would wish you to see whether a like quantity of those articles can be procured in Philadelphia or in Maryland, if we should find that they have not gone round from the eastward.

I must entreat you, if possible, to procure one month's pay in specie for the detachment, which I have under my command. Part of those troops have not been paid any thing for a long time past, and have upon several occasions shown marks of great discontent. The service they are going upon is disagreeable to the northern regiments; but I make no doubt that a *douceur* of a little hard money would put them in proper temper. If the whole sum cannot be obtained, a part of it will be better than none, as it may be distributed in proportion to the respective wants and

claims of the men. The American detachment will assemble in this neighbourhood to-day; the French army to-morrow. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Philadelphia, 2 September, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Nothing could have afforded me more satisfaction than the information, communicated in your two letters of the 21st and 24th ultimo, of the measures you had taken, and the arrangements you were making, in consequence of the intelligence I had given you. Calculating upon the regular force under your immediate orders, the militia who have already been called for, and may be expected in the field, the French army, and the American corps now marching with Major-General Lincoln from the northward, in addition to the land forces expected on board of the fleet, I flatter myself we shall not experience any considerable difficulties from the want of men to carry our most favorite projects into execution. The means for prosecuting a siege with rapidity, energy, and success, and for supplying the troops while they are engaged in that service, as they are most precarious, have been and still continue to be the great objects of my concern and attention.

* The pressure for money to pay the troops was in part relieved by a loan of twenty thousand hard dollars from Count de Rochambeau, which Mr. Morris engaged to replace by the 1st of October.—*Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 463. Colonel Laurens arrived in Boston from his mission to France on the 25th of August, bringing with him in cash two millions and a half of livres, being part of the donation of six millions, which had recently been given to the United States by the King of France. This was a seasonable supply, and enabled the superintendent of finance to fulfil his engagement. See APPENDIX, No. VI.

Heavy cannon, ordnance stores, and ammunition, to a pretty large amount, are now forwarding. General Knox, in whose immediate province these arrangements are, and who knows the whole of our resources, is making every exertion to furnish a competent supply, and will be on the spot to remedy every deficiency, as far as the circumstances will possibly admit. Having also from the first moment been extremely anxious respecting the supplies of the army, (in which I comprehend not only provisions of the bread and meat kind, but also forage and the means of transportation,) I had written pressing to the governors of Maryland and Virginia on that subject previous to the receipt of your favor of the 21st of August. I have since reiterated my entreaties, and enforced, in the strongest terms I was capable of using, the requisitions for specific supplies made by Congress, and now again called for by the superintendent of finance from the states of Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland; and, as to the supplies of Pennsylvania, we are to look for them from the financier himself. I hope and trust the efforts of these States and of Virginia will be uncommonly great, and proportionate to the magnitude of the object before us.

In order to introduce some kind of system and method in our supplies, to know with certainty what may be depended upon, and to put the business in the best possible train of execution, I shall send forward the heads of departments, as soon as their presence can be dispensed with. I have spoken to the surgeon-general respecting hospital stores and medicines. All that can be done will be done in that department. As to clothing I am sorry to inform you, that little is to be expected, except in the article of shoes, of which a full supply will be sent on.

In my progress to the southward, I shall take care, as far as practicable, to make all the arrangements necessary for the operation in view, and to impress the executives with an idea of the absolute necessity of furnishing their quotas of supplies regularly ; as we have no other resources to rely upon for the support of the army, and especially, as I am very apprehensive, that a quantity of fifteen hundred barrels of salted provisions, which I had ordered to be shipped under convoy of the Count de Barras, did not arrive in time for that purpose.

But, my dear Marquis, I am distressed beyond measure to know what has become of the Count de Grasse, and for fear that the English fleet, by occupying the Chesapeake, towards which my last accounts say they were steering, may frustrate all our flattering prospects in that quarter. I am also not a little solicitous for the Count de Barras, who was to have sailed from Rhode Island on the 23d ultimo, and from whom I have heard nothing since that time. Of many contingencies we will hope for the most propitious events. Should the retreat of Lord Cornwallis by water be cut off, by the arrival of either of the French fleets, I am persuaded you will do all in your power to prevent his escape by land. May that great felicity be reserved for you.*

* This felicity it was his good fortune to realize. The British commander sought for an opportunity to escape into North Carolina, but the address and vigilance of Lafayette disconcerted all his schemes. After Cornwallis had arrived at York, and commenced his fortifications, Lafayette asked Colonel Barber if he knew of a trusty, capable soldier, whom he could send as a spy into Cornwallis's camp. He answered that there was one in the New Jersey line by the name of Morgan, who was in all respects suited to such an enterprise. The general sent for him, and told him that he had a very difficult task to propose to him, which was, that he should pretend to desert, go over to the British camp, and enlist as a soldier. Morgan answered, that he was

You see how critically important the present moment is. For my own part, I am determined still to persist, with unremitting ardor, in my present plan, unless some inevitable and insuperable obstacles are thrown in the way. Adieu. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Chester, 3 o'clock, P. M., 5 September, 1781.

SIR,

With pleasure I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed copy of a letter from

ready to do any thing in the service of his country, and to oblige his general, but that his feelings revolted at such a proposal. He must assume the character of a spy, and, if detected, he would not only lose his life, but bring a lasting disgrace upon his name. He desired the reputation of a good soldier, and a zealous, true lover of his country, but he could not endure the thoughts of being a spy. After some conversation, however, he told the general that he would go, on one condition, which was, that, in case any disaster should happen to him, the general should make the true state of the case known, and have the particulars published in the New Jersey gazettes, that no reproach might come upon his family and friends for his supposed misconduct. To this the general assented.

Morgan joined the British camp and enlisted. Lafayette left every thing to his discretion, but told him that he wished intelligence of important movements, and moreover desired the impression particularly to be given, that he had boats enough to transport all his army across James River. Morgan had been a little time in camp, when Lord Cornwallis sent for him and asked him many questions. Tarleton was with him at the time, and inquired of Morgan among other things how many boats General Lafayette had on the river. He said he did not know the exact number, but he had been told there were enough to carry over all the army at a moment's warning. "There!" exclaimed Cornwallis to Tarleton, "I told you this would not do;" from which it appeared, that they had this project in view.

The French fleet in the mean time arrived. General Lafayette had been out to reconnoitre, and when he returned he found six men in the British uniform and one green-coated Hessian at his quarters; and among them was Morgan. "Well, Morgan," asked the general, with surprise,

General Gist. It announces the safe arrival in the Chesapeake of Admiral de Grasse with twenty-eight ships of the line. On this happy event I beg your Excellency to accept my warmest congratulations. I shall proceed, with all possible despatch, forwarding as I go the troops and stores, with all the expedition in my power. On my arrival at the Head of Elk, if I do not find water-craft sufficient to embark the whole of the stores and troops, I shall forward on the former by water, with as many troops as can go by that conveyance, and march the others by land.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

"whom have you got here?" "Five British soldiers, who have deserted with me, and a Hessian whom we captured at the out-post," was his reply. He went on to say, that, as the French fleet had arrived, and he presumed his services could no longer be of any use to his general in the British camp, he had returned, and these deserters and this prisoner were the fruits of his expedition.

The general sent for Morgan the next day, and told him that his conduct had been in the highest degree meritorious, and that he proposed to make him a sergeant. Morgan listened to the proposal, and said he was highly gratified to have pleased his commander, but declined the promotion. He added, that he believed himself a good soldier, but that he was by no means certain he should make a good sergeant; that he joined the army from a principle of duty and patriotism, because he believed his country needed his services, and the same motives induced him to prefer a station where he was satisfied he should be the most useful. The general then offered him money, but this he refused also, saying his circumstances were such at home, that he did not need money. "What then can I do for you?" inquired the general. "I have one favor to ask," replied Morgan; "during my absence some person has taken my gun; I set a great value upon it, and, if it can be restored, it will give me particular pleasure." The gun was described, and the general issued an order requiring it to be returned. This was all the reward, that Morgan could ever be prevailed on to accept.

The above anecdote was related to me by General Lafayette himself, nearly fifty years after the event, with much warmth of feeling and admiration of the soldier's magnanimity.

* An animated account of the effect, which this intelligence produced on the French officers, is given by the Abbé Robin. The French army had entered Philadelphia in the morning of that day, amidst the accla-

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Head of Elk, 6 September, 1781.

SIR,

I have been honored by your Excellency's favor of the 2d instant, and do myself the pleasure to felicitate you on the happy arrival of so formidable a fleet of his Most Christian Majesty in the Bay of Chesapeake under your Excellency's command. This happy event I hope will be improved to the most salutary purposes for the united interests of both nations.

Expecting to have the honor of a personal interview with your Excellency almost as soon as this will reach your hand, I shall not, in writing, give you the trouble of a particular detail of my designs. I will only inform you that the van of the two armies, the French and Americans, consisting of about two thousand men, (there not being transports for the whole) will embark in about two days, and will fall down the Chesapeake

mations of the people. On every side were demonstrations of joy. After the spectacle was over, the officers dined with the Chevalier de la Luzerne. While they were at table, a messenger arrived with a letter to the Chevalier containing the news.—*Nouveau Voyage*, p. 90.

The Abbé Robin landed at Boston in June with the reinforcement detached from the squadron of M. de Grasse. He joined Rochambeau's army, and marched with it to Virginia. The next year he published in Paris the result of his observations in America, embracing military operations, the situation and appearance of the country, and the character, manners, and habits of the people. His book is entitled *Nouveau Voyage dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, en l'Année 1781*. Some of the Abbé's sketches are lively and spirited. A good temper is visible in all his remarks. His prevailing foible may be ascribed to his former secluded mode of life. The novelty of the scene seemed to fill him with a wonder similar to that, which we may suppose to have been experienced by the companions of Columbus on their first visit to the New World. The Abbé's astonishment at common things sometimes reaches so high, as to become a hazardous experiment on the gravity of his readers.

to form a junction with the troops under the command of the Count de St. Simon, and the Marquis de Lafayette, and to coöperate in blocking up Cornwallis in York River, and preventing him from making his retreat by land, or collecting any supplies from the country. This junction of the van of our troops is proposed to be made in James River, unless your Excellency and the commanders of the land troops should judge some other point of debarkation to be more favorable to our intentions; in which case you will be pleased to meet the transports while on their way, with orders to proceed to any other point which may be fixed on.

The remainder of the troops from hence will be forwarded with all the expedition our circumstances will admit. In the mean time, as it will be of the greatest importance to prevent the escape of his Lordship from his present position, I am persuaded that every measure, which prudence can dictate, will be adopted for that purpose, until the arrival of our complete force, when I hope his Lordship will be compelled to yield his ground to the superior power of our combined forces.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head of Elk, 7 September, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received with infinite satisfaction the information of the arrival of the Count de Grasse; and have an additional pleasure in finding, that your ideas on every occasion have been so consonant to my own, and that by your military dispositions and prudent measures you have anticipated all my wishes. Every thing

has hitherto succeeded agreeably to my desires and expectations. The want of a sufficient number of vessels to transport the whole of the troops, ordnance, and stores at once, is only a misfortune that could not be avoided.

We shall have transports enough, I believe, to embark the heavy cannon, necessary stores, and the van of the American and French armies, consisting of one thousand men from each, by to-morrow. No measure will be left unessayed, no effort unattempted, to get forward the remainder of the troops and stores, and commence the operation as soon as it is possible in the nature of things to be done. I forbear to enter into more particulars, as I shall set out for the theatre of action to-morrow, and hope to have the pleasure of communicating with you personally in a few days, and of making every arrangement, in conjunction with the admiral, which may be deemed necessary. I am, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Mount Vernon, 10 September, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

We are thus far on our way to you. The Count de Rochambeau has just arrived. General Chastellux will be here, and we propose, after resting to-morrow, to be at Fredericksburg on the night of the 12th. The 13th we shall reach New Castle; and the next day we expect to have the pleasure of seeing you at your encampment. Should there be any danger as we approach you, I should be obliged if you will send

* General Washington reached Baltimore on the 8th, where he was met by a deputation of the citizens from whom he received a public address, to which he replied.

a party of horse towards New Kent Court-House to meet us. With great personal regard and affection, I am, my dear Marquis, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.


Williamsburg, 15 September, 1781.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform Congress, that I arrived at this place last evening; that, soon after my arrival, I received the pleasing intelligence, that the Count de Grasse, who had put to sea on the 5th in pursuit of the British fleet, had returned to his former station at Cape Henry, having driven the British from the coast, taken two of their frigates, and effected a junction with the squadron of the Count de Barras.*

In consequence of my having been informed of the sailing of the fleet from the Capes, and being apprehensive that we were not assured of the security of our navigation in the bay, I had ordered the troops, who were embarked at the Head of Elk, to stop until we had further intelligence. Orders are this morning gone on to press them forward with every despatch possible. I am distressed to find, that the supplies of the army collecting here are on too precarious a footing. Already a want of provisions has been experienced. Every measure is taking, that is in my power, to be better assured of our supplies in future. How far I shall succeed in my endeavours, time must discover. I have the honor to be, &c.

* On his passage from the West Indies to the Chesapeake, Count de Grasse captured a British armed vessel, bound from Charleston to New York, in which was Lord Rawdon, who was taken prisoner and brought into the Chesapeake.



TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Williamsburg, 15 September, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Upon information of the sailing of the fleet from the Chesapeake Bay, I gave orders for the troops, who were embarked, to be stopped. Since my arrival at this place, I am informed that Count de Grasse has been joined by Count de Barras, and, having captured two English frigates, has returned to his former station at the Capes. On this pleasing information I have sent forward Count Fersen to hurry on the troops with all possible despatch. Every day we now lose is comparatively an age. As soon as it is in our power with safety, we ought to take our position near the enemy. Hurry on then, my dear Sir, with your troops on the wings of speed. The want of our men and stores is now all that retards our immediate operations. Lord Cornwallis is improving every moment to the best advantage; and every day that is given him to make his preparations may cost us many lives to encounter them.

I am very sensible of your vigilance and activity. My impatience, however, to commence our operations impels me to write as I have done. You will come with your troops to the College Landing in James River, where, unless you receive other orders, you will debark. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Williamsburg, 15 September, 1781.

SIR,

I had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter of the 4th of this month soon after my arrival at this

place. I am at a loss to express the pleasure, which I have in congratulating your Excellency on your return to your former station in the bay, and the happy circumstance of forming a junction with the squadron of the Count de Barras. I take particular satisfaction in felicitating your Excellency on the glory of having driven the British fleet from the coast, and taking two of their frigates. These happy events, and the decided superiority of your fleet, give us the happiest presages of the most complete success in our combined operations in this bay.

It is with much regret, that I find the want of transports in the bay has retarded the progress of the troops expected from the northward. If it is possible for your Excellency to give us any assistance in this distress, it will be attended with inexpressible advantage to the prosecution of our measures, and will be acknowledged with the highest gratitude. Such of our troops, as could not be embarked at the Head of Elk, are marching to Baltimore, where they are to be put on board such transports as may be collected at that place.

It is very much the wish of the Count de Rochambeau, as well as of myself, to have the honor of an interview with your Excellency; but our particular circumstances render us dependent on your goodness for the means of conveyance. If your Excellency could despatch some fast-sailing cutter to receive us on board, and inform us as to the time and place, we shall be very happy to attend on you, at the earliest moment you shall fix. Count Fersen, an aid to Count de Rochambeau, is sent on to hurry down the troops that are embarking. If your Excellency can furnish him the means of proceeding up the bay, it will be very agreeable. I am, &c.

P. S. Since writing the above, I am informed with much pleasure, that your Excellency has anticipated my wishes in sending transports up the bay.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

Williamsburg, 15 September, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have to request you, in the most earnest manner, to send forward all the recruits that are furnished by the State of Pennsylvania for their line. Let it not be said, that those troops are kept from service for want of a few articles, which they could wish to be furnished with, when other troops doing duty in the field are combating almost every distress imaginable in the want of almost every necessary. If any thing in the power of the State can be instantly done towards their equipment, I wish the authorities to be called upon, and hope they will furnish what they can without delay. It is the highest absurdity in the world to keep those troops in a state of idleness at great expense, and at the same time for want of them to put the public to the same or much greater charge, by calling in the aid of militia, which we are now obliged to do. I beg you, therefore, to hurry on those troops, with all the expedition in your power, by water down the Chesapeake, embarking at Baltimore,

* On the 10th of September, Count de Barras arrived in the Chesapeake, with the squadron from Rhode Island, the French siege artillery, and the land forces under M. de Choisy. Ten transports from this squadron, two frigates lately captured from the enemy, and other prize-vessels, were immediately despatched up the bay to receive on board the French troops, who could not find means of transportation from the Head of Elk and Baltimore, and had pursued their route by land. They embarked at Annapolis, and proceeded by water to James River.

where craft can doubtless be found by taking the proper precaution, and their transportation will be perfectly secure, so long as the fleet maintains its present station. The place of debarkation will be in James River, probably at the College Landing, unless further orders shall be given to carry them to some other place nearer the point of our operations. I am, &c.*

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Williamsburg, 22 September, 1781.

SIR,

The enclosed letter for your Excellency, and the copies of others to Count de Rochambeau and myself, have this moment come to my hands. I deem the intelligence they contain of so much importance, that I have thought it proper to transmit them immediately to you by the Baron Closen, one of the aids-de-camp to Count de Rochambeau.† I am, dear Sir, &c.

* *From the Diary, September 17th.*—"In company with Count de Rochambeau, the Chevalier de Chastellux, General Knox, and General Duportail, I set out for an interview with the admiral, and arrived on board the *Ville de Paris* (off Cape Henry) the next day about noon; and, having settled most points with him to my satisfaction, except not obtaining an assurance of sending ships above York, I embarked on board the *Queen Charlotte*, the vessel I went down in; but, by reason of hard blowing and contrary winds, I did not reach Williamsburg again till the 22d."

Count de Grasse also gave notice, that his fleet could not continue on this station beyond the 1st of November.

† The intelligence contained in the letters was, that Admiral Digby had just arrived at New York with a reinforcement of six ships of the line.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Williamsburg, 23 September, 1781.

SIR,

On my arrival at this place I found it would be attended with good consequences for me to see Admiral de Grasse in person. This visit I have performed, and met the Count on board the *Ville de Paris* at Cape Henry, from whence I have just returned. I am happy to inform Congress, that I found the French admiral disposed in the best manner to give us all the assistance in his power, and perfectly to coöperate with me in our present attempt.

The vessels from the Head of Elk are now debarking their stores and troops, except some few which are not yet arrived. This is accounted for from their being dull sailers. They are expected soon. I still find myself embarrassed for want of provisions, and sufficient means of transportation; but by superior exertions I hope to surmount these difficulties, and to find myself soon before the enemy's works at York and Gloucester. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Williamsburg, 25 September, 1781.

SIR,

I cannot conceal from your Excellency the painful anxiety under which I have labored since the receipt of the letter, with which you honored me on the 23d instant.* The naval movements, which your Excellency states there as possible, considering the intelligence communicated to you by Baron de Closen,

* See this letter in the APPENDIX, No. VII.

make it incumbent upon me to represent the consequences that would arise from them, and to urge a perseverance in the plan already agreed upon. Give me leave, in the first place, to repeat to your Excellency, that the enterprise against York, under the protection of your ships, is as certain as any military operation can be rendered by a decisive superiority of strength and means; that it is in fact reducible to calculation; that the surrender of the British garrison will be important in itself and its consequences; and that it must necessarily go a great way towards terminating the war, and securing the invaluable objects of it to the allies.

Your Excellency's departure from the Chesapeake, by affording an opening for the succour of York, which the enemy would instantly avail themselves of, would frustrate these brilliant prospects; and the consequence would be, not only the disgrace and loss of renouncing an enterprise, upon which the fairest expectations of the allies have been founded, after the most expensive preparations and uncommon exertions and fatigues, but perhaps the disbanding of the whole army for want of provisions.

The present theatre of the war is totally deficient in the means of land transportation, being intersected by large rivers, and the whole dependence for interior communication being upon small vessels. The country has besides been so much exhausted by the ravages of the enemy, and the subsistence of our own army, that our supplies can only be drawn from a distance, and under cover of a fleet commanding the Chesapeake. I most earnestly entreat your Excellency farther to consider, that, if the present opportunity should be missed, and you should withdraw your maritime force from the position agreed upon, no future day can

restore to us a similar occasion for striking a decisive blow ; that the British will be indefatigable in strengthening their most important maritime points ; and that the time of an honorable peace will be more remote than ever.

The confidence, with which I feel myself inspired by the energy of character and naval talents, which so eminently distinguish your Excellency, leaves me no doubt, that, upon a consideration of the consequences, which must follow your departure from the Chesapeake, you will determine upon the measure, which the dearest interests of the common cause would dictate. I had invariably flattered myself, from the accounts given me by skilful mariners, that your position, moored in the Chesapeake, might be made so respectable as to bid defiance to any attempt on the part of the British fleet, at the same time that it would support the operations of a siege, secure the transportation of our supplies by water, and economize the most precious time by facilitating the debarkation of our heavy artillery and stores conveniently to the trenches in York River. It is to be observed, that the strength of the enemy's reinforcement under Admiral Digby, as we have the intelligence from the British, may not only be exaggerated, but altogether a *finesse* ; and, supposing the account consistent with truth, their total force, it was hoped, would not put them in a condition to attack with any prospect of success.

If the stationary position, which had been agreed upon, should be found utterly impracticable, there is an alternative, which however inferior, considered relatively to the support and facility of our land operations, would save our affairs from ruin. This is, to cruise with your fleet within view of the Capes, so as effectually to prevent the entrance of any British vessels.

Upon the whole, I should esteem myself deficient in my duty to the common cause of France and America, if I did not persevere in entreating your Excellency to resume the plans, that have been so happily arranged; and, if invincible maritime reasons shall prevent, I depend as a last resource upon your pursuing the alternative above mentioned, and rendering the Chesapeake inaccessible to any enemy's vessel.

However the British admiral may manœuvre, and endeavour to divert your Excellency from the object in view, I can hardly admit a belief, that it can be his serious intention to engage in a general action with a fleet, whose force will be superior, supposing the most flattering accounts of the British to be true; past experience having taught them to engage with caution, even upon equal terms, and forced from them acknowledgments, which prove the respect with which they have been inspired. Let me add, Sir, that even a momentary absence of the French fleet may expose us to the loss of the British garrison at York; as in the present state of affairs, Lord Cornwallis might effect the evacuation with the loss of his artillery and baggage, and such a sacrifice of men as his object would evidently justify.

The Marquis de Lafayette, who does me the honor to bear this to your Excellency, will explain many particularities of our situation, which could not well be comprised in a letter. His candor and abilities are well known to you, and entitle him to the fullest confidence in treating of the most important interests. I have earnestly requested him not to proceed any farther than the Capes,* for fear of accidents, should your Ex-

* This letter, sustained by the explanations and arguments of the Marquis de Lafayette, produced a change in the schemes of Count de Grasse; and he agreed to remain within the Capes, and blockade the bay during

cellency have put to sea. In this case he will despatch a letter to you in addition to this.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Head-Quarters, 27 September, 1781.

SIR,

I am much indebted to your Excellency for the instant communication, with which you have honored me, of the disposition that you have determined for your fleet. The resolutions that you have taken in our circumstances prove, that a great mind knows how to make personal sacrifices to secure an important general good. Fully sensible of those, which you have made on the present occasion, I flatter myself, that the result of the operations, conducted under your auspices, will compensate them by its utility to the common cause. Your Excellency may depend on every assistance, that the allied armies can give, relatively to the battery which you propose at Point Comfort, and that our utmost exertions will be used in hastening the investment of the enemy. I am, &c.

P. S. I am this moment informed by deserters, that the enemy are preparing more fire-ships against

the siege. He laid the matter before a council of war. "The result has been," said he in his reply, "that the plan I had suggested was the most brilliant and glorious, but it would not fulfil the views we had proposed. It is consequently decided, that a large part of the fleet shall anchor in York River, that four or five vessels shall be stationed so as to pass up and down in James River, and that you shall aid us with the means to erect a battery on Point Comfort, where we can place cannon and mortars. We shall immediately proceed to execute this arrangement, and I hasten to give you notice, that we may act in concert for the advancement of our operations."

your vessels in the river, and that the old Fowey is to be one.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp, near York, 1 October, 1781.

SIR,

Last evening I was honored with your Excellency's favor of the 21st with its enclosure. The intelligence contained in it, respecting the British fleet, is very agreeable, and has been transmitted to Admiral de Grasse. In my last I informed you, that our preparations for a near investment of the enemy at York were fast ripening to a point. I have now to acquaint your Excellency, that I marched from Williamsburg with the whole army on the 28th, and approached near to the enemy, about two miles from York, where a show was made of some opposition on our left; but, Count de Rochambeau, who commanded that part of the army, moving some field-artillery towards them, under direction of the Baron Viomenil, and giving a few shot,

* Near the British works at Gloucester were stationed the legion of the Duke de Lauzun, and the Virginia militia under General Weedon. Those officers represented, that, considering the nature of the ground, their strength, and the facility with which the enemy might reinforce that post, an augmentation of their numbers was indispensable, both to enable them to occupy a good defensive position, and to confine the enemy within their lines. General Washington applied to Count de Grasse for a detachment of six or eight hundred marines to be sent from his ships on this service. M. de Choisy was the bearer of the letter making the request. The troops were obtained, though Count de Grasse spared them with reluctance, and desired that no future requisition of the kind might be made upon him, as his situation was critical, and he was unwilling to have his men so divided as to subject him to embarrassment in case of a contingency. The American and French troops at Gloucester were put under the command of M. de Choisy, who was a brigadier-general in the French service.

they retired. On the 29th, the American troops moved forward, and took their ground in front of the enemy's works on their left; there being no opposition, save a few scattered shot from a small work by Moor's Mill, and a battery on the left of Pigeon Quarter. There was a small fire all day from our riflemen and the enemy's Yagers. On the 30th in the morning we discovered that the enemy had evacuated all their exterior works, and withdrawn themselves to those near the town. By this means we are in possession of very advantageous grounds, which command their line of works in a very near advance. All the expedition, that our circumstances will admit, is using to bring up our heavy artillery and stores to open our batteries. This work I hope will be executed in a few days, when our fire will immediately commence.

The investment of the enemy is fully completed and drawn very near to their lines, saving the water communication above the town on York River. To complete that part, a request is gone to Count de Grasse, desiring him to push a ship or two above the town; which, if effected, will answer many very valuable purposes. The position of Count de Grasse is judiciously taken, the main fleet being disposed in Lynnhaven Bay, and detachments made to secure the rivers; and the determination of the Count seems to be fully to comply with our wishes in every necessary co-operation. I shall continue to keep Congress advised of such occurrences as are worthy the communication.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Before York, 1 October, 1781.

SIR,

I should have had the honor of acknowledging sooner the note, which your Excellency transmitted by the Marquis de Lafayette, but an expectation of being able to accompany my answer with interesting intelligence induced me to defer it to the present moment. With regard to the station, which your Excellency has determined for the main fleet, the reasons, which you are pleased to communicate, prove that it unites all advantages, and inspire the greatest confidence in the accomplishment of its object.

I have only one proposition to submit on the subject of naval dispositions, and the objects of it are too essential not to be exposed in their fullest light. I mean the stationing two or three ships above the enemy's posts on York River. For the want of this only means of completing the investment of their works, the British remain masters of the navigation for twenty-five miles above them, and have, by their armed vessels, intercepted supplies of the greatest value on their way to our camp. The loss is redoubled, by diminishing our means and augmenting those of the enemy at a most critical time. We are even necessitated, for the protection of Williamsburg and the magazines in our rear, to leave a post of seven or eight hundred men in that quarter; a diminution of our force that in present circumstances we can but ill support. But, unless this detachment is made, the enemy might in the greatest security land above Queen's Creek to cover their left flank, and by a very short march effect the most destructive purposes; while the circuitous march which we, from the nature of the country, should be obliged

to make, would render it impossible to arrive in time to prevent or punish them. We are besides reduced to the impossibility of concerting measures with the corps of troops at Gloucester, being obliged, in order to communicate with them, to make a circuit of near ninety miles, whereas in the other case it would be both easy and expeditious. But what is a still more decisive consideration is, that Lord Cornwallis has, by the York River, an outlet for his retreat, and that he may, by embracing a leading wind and tide and stealing a march, proceed unmolested to West Point, where, upon debarking his troops, he will have the Pamunky on one flank and the Mattapony on the other; and that finally he may, by mounting the greater part of his men, and by successive forced marches, push his way, with a compact, disciplined army, through a country whose population is too scattered to be collected for sudden opposition, and make it impossible for us to overtake him. Many people are of opinion, that Lord Cornwallis will embrace this as the only means of safety; and it is certain, that, unless the investment is completed as above mentioned, he will have it in his power either now or in a last extremity.

The present position of the fleet and army perfectly secures us against every enterprise on the part of the enemy in James River.

Upon the whole, I can assure your Excellency, that this seems to be the only point in which we are defective. The enemy have already abandoned all their exterior works, and withdrawn altogether to the body of the place, and given us great advantages for opening the trenches. The engineers have had a near and satisfactory view of the works, without interruption, and we have most to apprehend Lord Cornwallis's escape.

For these reasons I earnestly entreat, that you will

be pleased to authorize and enjoin the commanding officer of the ships in York River, to concert measures with me for the purpose above mentioned. In this case an additional ship may be necessary to remain at the mouth of the river. The Experiment and two frigates, if your Excellency thinks proper, would be best calculated for the station above.

If, upon mature examination of the passage, it should appear too great a risk for the ships, I would at least solicit your Excellency, that the vessels may advance higher up the river, and take a more menacing position with respect to the enemy on our right. But I must confess, that I am so well satisfied by experience, of the little effect of land batteries on vessels passing them with a leading breeze, that, unless the two channels near York should be found impracticable by obstructions, I should have the greatest confidence in the success of this important service.

Your Excellency's approbation of this measure would supersede the necessity of a defence against fire-ships. But the nature of the river besides renders it physically impossible to form any obstructions of the kind proposed. I entreat your Excellency to accept the sentiments of respectful attachment, with which I have the honor to be, &c.*

* The attempt to pass up York River was declined by Count de Grasse, not because he thought the works at York and Gloucester would present serious obstacles, but because he believed his large vessels would not be secure in that station. The enemy had a great number of boats and small craft, and with these they could easily bring fire-ships in the night, from which his vessels would be exposed to imminent danger, confined in the narrow channel of a river; especially as he had not in his whole fleet a sufficient number of row-boats and light craft for defence in such a situation, even if they could all be transported up the river in safety. This objection he deemed insuperable, and the project was laid aside. It was revived again, however, a few days afterwards. The passage and the river above York were reconnoitred by a French officer, and, upon his representation, Count de Grasse agreed to send

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp, before York, 6 October, 1781.

SIR,

Since mine to your Excellency of the 1st instant, we have been employed in repairing the enemy's works upon Pigeon Hill, and in constructing a new intermediate redoubt. These will serve to give security to our troops in making their approaches. We have been assiduously employed in making fascines and gabions, and in transporting our heavy cannon, mortars, and stores from Trebell's Landing, on James River. In the last we made slow progress, until the arrival of the wagons and teams from the northward; but, it being the opinion of the engineers, that we now have a sufficient stock to commence operations, we shall this night open trenches. I take a very singular pleasure in congratulating Congress upon the very important and brilliant victory gained by General Greene on the 8th of September.* I am, &c.

TO EDWARD RUTLEDGE.

Camp, before York, 6 October, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

I am fully impressed with the justice and truth of every remark contained in your letter of the 12th ultimo, and you may be assured, were the means of carrying your wishes into effect under my control and direction, that they should be applied, as soon as cir-

up some of his vessels, provided General Washington would furnish such a number of row-boats as would protect them from the fire-ships. This was about to be executed when Lord Cornwallis proposed terms of surrender.

* At the battle of Eutaw Springs.

cumstances would admit, to the end which you propose. I have not time, neither could I with prudence enter into the reasons, which I think will operate against carrying your very desirable plan fully into execution. Your good sense will naturally suggest what the principal one is. Of this, however, you may be assured, that, after the present operation is closed, and I hope it will terminate well, every thing which depends upon me, and all the influence I can exert, shall be used towards exterminating the British from the southern States. If we cannot do it entirely we will at least endeavour to confine them within so narrow bounds, that they will scarcely have enough to found a claim of possession upon.*

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Camp, before York, 6 October, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

How happy am I, in at length having it in my power to congratulate you upon a victory as splendid as I hope it will prove important. Fortune must have been coy indeed, had she not yielded at last to so persevering a pursuer as you have been. I hope, now she is yours, that she will change her appellation of fickle to that of constant.

I can say with sincerity, that I feel with the highest degree of pleasure the good effects, which you mention

* Mr. Rutledge's letter was dated at Philadelphia, and contained suggestions for a coöperation between the French fleet and the land troops to recover Charleston from the enemy. He said that he had consulted the Chevalier de la Luzerne on the subject, and laid before him a plan, which that minister approved, saying, that he would use his influence with Count de Grasse to obtain naval aid from him to effect its objects.

as resulting from the perfect good understanding between you, the Marquis, and myself. I hope it will never be interrupted, and I am sure it never can be while we are all influenced by the same pure motive, that of love to our country and interest in the cause in which we are embarked. I have happily had but few differences with those, with whom I have the honor of being connected in the service. With whom, and of what nature these have been, you know. I bore much for the sake of peace and the public good. My conscience tells me, that I acted right in these transactions; and, should they ever come to the knowledge of the world, I trust I shall stand acquitted by it.

Baron Steuben, from the warmth of his temper, had got disagreeably involved with the State, and an inquiry into part of his conduct must one day take place, both for his own honor and their satisfaction. I have for the present given him a command in this army, which makes him happy. I shall always take pleasure in giving Mrs. Greene's letters a conveyance; and, should she persist in the resolution of undertaking so long a journey, as that from New England to Carolina, I hope she will make Mount Vernon, where Mrs. Knox now is, a stage of more than a day or two. With much esteem and regard, I am dear Sir, &c.

TO DON FRANCISCO RENDON.*

Head-Quarters, before York, 12 October, 1781.

SIR,

I was yesterday honored with your favor of the 2d. It gives me pleasure to find so good a disposition in

* Agent in the United States from the Spanish government.

Don Bernardo de Galvez* to concert his operations in such a manner against the common enemy, that the interests of his Most Catholic Majesty and those of ourselves and our ally may be mutually benefited. You must be sensible, that, in the present political situation of affairs, I cannot, with any degree of propriety, in behalf of the United States propose any joint plan of operations to General Galvez, though I flatter myself that difficulty will be ere long removed.

Neither can I at this time determine whether we shall be able to act offensively against the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia. That will in a great measure depend upon the naval assistance we shall be able to derive from our ally. Of this you may assure General Galvez, that, should any offensive plan be formed, which is to be undertaken by the allied arms, I will use my influence with the French commanders to give him due notice, should I not be able to open a correspondence with him myself. In the mean time you may inform him, that he cannot make a more powerful diversion in favor of the southern States, than by pushing his arms against East Florida.

I am obliged by the extract of General Galvez's letter to the Count de Grasse, explaining at large the necessity he was under of granting the terms of capitulation to the garrison of Pensacola, which the commandant required. I have no doubt, from General Galvez's well known attachment to the cause of America, that he would have refused the articles, which have been deemed exceptionable, had there not been very powerful reasons to induce his acceptance of them.

I am, Sir, &c.

* Commander of the Spanish forces in Louisiana and Florida.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, before York, 12 October, 1781.

SIR,

My last despatch to your Excellency was of the 6th. I then informed you, that we should open trenches that night. We did so, and established our first parallel within six hundred yards of the enemy's works, with the loss of only one officer of the French artillery wounded, and sixteen privates killed and wounded, the greater part of whom were of the French line.

The 7th and 8th we were employed in completing the first parallel, and in erecting batteries somewhat advanced of it. On the 9th, at five o'clock in the afternoon, the American battery on the right opened, having six eighteen and twenty-four pounders, two mortars, and two howitzers; and at three o'clock the French battery on the left opened, having four twelve-pounders, and six mortars and howitzers. We were informed, that our shells did considerable execution in the town, and we could perceive that our shot, which were directed against the enemy's embrasures, injured them much. The 10th, two French batteries, one of ten eighteen and twenty-four pounders, and six mortars and howitzers, the other of four eighteen-pounders, opened, as did two more American batteries, one of four eighteen-pounders, the other of two mortars. The fire now became so excessively heavy, that the enemy withdrew their cannon from their embrasures, placed them behind the merlins, and scarcely fired a shot during the whole day. In the evening the Charon frigate of forty-four guns was set on fire by a hot shot from the French battery on the left, and entirely consumed. Her guns and stores had been taken out. By the report of a deserter, our shells, which were thrown

with the utmost degree of precision, did much mischief in the course of the day.

Yesterday morning two of the enemy's transports were fired by hot shot and burnt. This has occasioned them to warp their shipping as far over to the Gloucester shore as possible. We last night advanced our second parallel within three hundred yards of the enemy's works, with little or no annoyance from them. Only one man was killed, and three or four wounded. I shall think it strange indeed, if Lord Cornwallis makes no vigorous exertions in the course of this night, or very soon after.

I cannot but acknowledge the infinite obligations I am under to Count de Rochambeau, the Marquis de St. Simon, commanding the troops from the West Indies, the other general officers, and indeed the officers of every denomination in the French army, for the assistance which they afford me. The experience of many of those gentlemen, in the business before us, is of the utmost advantage in the present operation. And I am sensible it must give your Excellency and Congress the highest pleasure to know, that the greatest harmony prevails between the two armies. They seem actuated by one spirit, that of supporting the honor of the allied arms, and pushing their approaches with the utmost vigor. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, before York, 16 October, 1781.

SIR,

I had the honor to inform your Excellency in my last, of the 12th instant, that we had the evening before opened our second parallel. The 13th and 14th

we were employed in completing it. The engineers having deemed the two redoubts on the left of the enemy's line sufficiently injured by our shot and shells to make them practicable, it was determined to carry them by assault on the evening of the 14th. The following disposition was accordingly made. The work on the enemy's extreme left was to be attacked by the American light infantry under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette; the other by a detachment of the French grenadiers and chasseurs, commanded by Major-General the Baron Viomenil. I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that we succeeded in both. Nothing could exceed the firmness and bravery of the troops. They advanced under the fire of the enemy without returning a shot, and effected the business by the bayonet only. The reports of his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, the Marquis de Lafayette, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton,* copies of

* See Hamilton's Report in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. XIII. p. 61.

Lafayette said in his report;—"Colonel Gimat's battalion led the van, and was followed by that of Colonel Hamilton, who commanded the whole advanced corps. At the same time a party of eighty men, under Colonel Laurens, turned the redoubt. I beg leave to refer your Excellency to the report I have received from Colonel Hamilton, whose well-known talents and gallantry were on this occasion most conspicuous and serviceable. Our obligations to him, to Colonel Gimat, and to Colonel Laurens, each and all the officers and men, are above expression. Not one gun was fired; and the ardor of the troops did not give time for the sappers to derange the *abatis*; and, owing to the conduct of the commanders and bravery of the men, the redoubt was stormed with an uncommon rapidity. Colonel Barber's battalion, which was the first in the supporting column, being detached to the aid of the advance, arrived at the moment they were getting over the works, and executed their orders with the utmost alacrity. The Colonel was slightly wounded."—*October 16th.*

The following statement confutes an error of history, which is too important to be passed over.

"The irritation produced by the recent carnage at Fort Griswold had not so far subdued the humanity of the American character as to induce retaliation. Not a man was killed except in action. 'Incapable,

which I enclose, enter more particularly into a detail of the mode in which the attacks on the parts of the French and American columns were conducted. We made prisoners in both redoubts, one major, two captains, three subalterns, and sixty-seven privates.

The works, which we have carried, are of vast importance to us. From them we shall enfilade the enemy's whole line, and I am in hopes we shall be able to command the communication from York to Gloucester. I think the batteries of the second parallel will be in sufficient forwardness to begin to play in the course of this day. The enemy last night made a sortie for the first time. They entered one of the French and one of the American batteries on the second parallel, which were unfinished. They had only time to thrust the points of their bayonets into the touch-holes of four pieces of the French and two of the American artillery, and break them off; but the spikes were easily extracted. They were repulsed the moment the supporting troops came up, leaving behind them seven or eight dead, and six prisoners. The French had four officers and twelve privates killed and wounded, and we had one sergeant mortally wounded. I enclose to your Excellency a return of the killed and wounded

said Colonel Hamilton in his report, 'of imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocations, the soldiery spared every man that ceased to resist.' Mr. Gordon, in his *History of the American War*, states the orders given by Lafayette, with the approbation of Washington, to have directed that every man in the redoubt, after its surrender, should be put to the sword. These sanguinary orders, so repugnant to the character of the Commander-in-chief and of Lafayette, were never given. There is no trace of them among the papers of General Washington; and Colonel Hamilton, who took a part in the enterprise, which assures his perfect knowledge of every material occurrence, has publicly contradicted the statement." — MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*, Vol. IV. p. 486.

For an account of the attack on Fort Griswold, and the barbarities practised on that occasion, see the same Volume, p. 476.

of both armies up to the present time. It is much smaller than might have been expected.*

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Head-Quarters, before York, 17 October, 1781.

SIR,

I had yesterday evening the honor of receiving your Excellency's favor of the same date. Sixteen flat-boats will be ready to meet the ships whenever the wind shall admit their ascending the river. I cannot conceive the reason why no more pilots have gone down to you. The governor sent immediately to those, who were recommended by Captain Lilly.

I do myself the honor to transmit the copy of a letter, which I have just received from Lord Cornwallis. I have informed him in answer thereto, that I wish him, previous to the meeting of the commissioners, to send his proposals in writing to the American lines, for which purpose a cessation of hostilities for two hours will be allowed.

I should be anxious to have the honor of your Excellency's participation in the treaty, which will according to present appearance shortly take place. I need not add how happy it will make me to welcome your Excellency in the name of America on this shore, and embrace you upon an occasion so advantageous to the interests of the common cause, and on which it is so much indebted to you.

Should naval reasons deprive me of this happiness, by

* According to this return, as copied from Washington's *Diary*, the Americans had lost twenty-three killed and sixty-five wounded; the French, fifty-two killed, and one hundred and thirty-four wounded.

requiring your Excellency's presence on board, I entreat that you will be pleased to appoint an officer to represent you, and take charge of the capitulation to be signed by your Excellency.* I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL DE CHOISY.

Head-Quarters, 19 October, 1781.

SIR,

I have the honor, with many congratulations, to inform you that one o'clock this afternoon is appointed for the delivery of two of the enemy's redoubts on the Gloucester side; one to a detachment of French, the other to a detachment of American troops. The garrison is to march out at three o'clock (with shouldered arms, drums beating a British or German march, the cavalry with their swords drawn, and the colors of the whole cased,) to a place which you will be so good as to appoint, in front of the posts, where they will ground their arms, and afterwards return to their encampment. You will be so good as to communicate this to General Weedon, and to make the necessary arrangements, and desire him to take every precaution to prevent the loss or embezzlement of the arms. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near York, 19 October, 1781.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform Congress, that a reduction of the British army, under the command of Lord

* See the correspondence and articles of capitulation in the APPENDIX, No. VIII.

Cornwallis, is most happily effected. The unremitted ardor, which actuated every officer and soldier in the combined army on this occasion, has principally led to this important event, at an earlier period than my most sanguine hopes had induced me to expect.

The singular spirit of emulation, which animated the whole army from the first commencement of our operations, has filled my mind with the highest pleasure and satisfaction, and had given me the happiest presages of success.

On the 17th instant, a letter was received from Lord Cornwallis, proposing a meeting of commissioners to consult on terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester. This letter (the first that had passed between us) opened a correspondence, a copy of which I do myself the honor to enclose; that correspondence was followed by the definitive capitulation, which was agreed to and signed on the 19th, a copy of which I herewith transmit, and which, I hope, will meet with the approbation of Congress.

I should be wanting in feelings of gratitude, did I not mention, on this occasion, with the warmest sense of acknowledgment, the very cheerful and able assistance, which I have received in the course of our operation from his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau. Nothing could equal this zeal of our allies, but the emulating spirit of the American officers, whose ardor would not suffer their exertions to be exceeded.

The very uncommon degree of duty and fatigue, which the nature of the service required from the officers of engineers and artillery of both armies, obliges me particularly to mention the obligations I am under to the commanding and other officers of those corps.

I wish it were in my power to express to Congress, how much I feel myself indebted to the Count de

Grasse and the officers of the fleet under his command, for the distinguished aid and support which have been afforded by them, between whom and the army the most happy concurrence of sentiments and views has subsisted, and from whom every possible coöperation has been experienced, which the most harmonious intercourse could afford.

Returns of the prisoners, military stores, ordnance, shipping, and other matters, I shall do myself the honor to transmit to Congress, as soon as they can be collected by the heads of the departments to which they belong.

Colonel Laurens and the Viscount de Noailles, on the part of the combined army, were the gentlemen who acted as commissioners for forming and settling the terms of capitulation and surrender, herewith transmitted, to whom I am particularly obliged for their readiness and attention exhibited on the occasion.

Colonel Tilghman, one of my aids-de-camp, will have the honor to deliver these despatches to your Excellency; he will be able to inform you of every minute circumstance, which is not particularly mentioned in my letter. His merits, which are too well known to need any observations at this time, have gained my particular attention, and I could wish that they may be honored by the notice of your Excellency and Congress.

Your Excellency and Congress will be pleased to accept my congratulations on this happy event, and believe me to be, with the highest esteem, &c.*

* This letter was referred to a committee of Congress, who reported a series of resolves, which were adopted. The thanks of Congress were voted to General Washington, Count de Rochambeau, and Count de Grasse respectively, and also to all the officers and soldiers. Two stands of colors, taken at Yorktown, were presented to General Washington; two pieces of field-ordnance to Count de Rochambeau; and a similar

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Head-Quarters, 20 October, 1781.

SIR,

The surrender of York, from which so great glory and advantage are derived to the allies, and the honor of which belongs to your Excellency, has greatly anticipated our most sanguine expectations. Certain of this event, under your auspices, though unable to determine the time, I solicited your attention, in the first conference with which you honored me, to ulterior objects of decisive importance to the common cause. Although your answer on that occasion was unfavorable to my wishes, the unexpected promptness, with which our operations here have been conducted to their final success, having gained us time, the defect of which was one of your principal objections, a conviction of the most extensive and happy consequences engages me to renew my representation.

Charleston, the principal maritime port of the British in the southern parts of the continent, the grand deposit and point of support for the present theatre of the war, is open to a combined attack, and might be carried with as much certainty as the place which has just surrendered. This capture would destroy the last hope, which induces the enemy to continue the war; for, having experienced the impracticability of recovering the populous northern States, they have determined to confine themselves to the defensive in that quarter,

tribute to Count de Grasse. A horse, properly caparisoned, and an elegant sword, were given to Colonel Tilghman, who had been the bearer of the despatches containing the news of the capitulation. It was also resolved, that Congress would cause to be erected at Yorktown a marble column, adorned with emblems of the alliance between the United States and France, and inscribed with a succinct narrative of the events of the siege and capitulation. — *Journals, October 29th.*

and prosecute a most vigorous offensive at the southward, with a view of reconquering States, whose sparse population and natural disadvantages render them infinitely less susceptible of defence, although their productions make them the most valuable in a commercial view. Their general naval superiority, previous to your arrival, gave them decisive advantages in the rapid transport of their troops and supplies, while the immense land marches of our succours, too tardy and expensive in every point of view, subjected us to be beaten in detail.

It will depend upon your Excellency, therefore, to terminate the war, and enable the allies to dictate the law in a treaty. A campaign so glorious and so fertile in consequences could be reserved only for the Count de Grasse. It rarely happens, that such a combination of means, as are in our hands at present, can be seasonably obtained by the most strenuous human exertions ; a decisively superior fleet, the fortune and talents of whose commander overawe all the naval force, that the most strenuous efforts of the enemy have been able to collect ; an army flushed with success, demanding only to be conducted to new attacks ; and the very season, which is proper for operating against the points in question.

If, upon entering into the detail of this expedition, your Excellency should determine it impracticable, there is an object, which, though subordinate to that above mentioned, is of capital importance to our southern operations, and may be effected at infinitely less expense ; I mean the enemy's post at Wilmington in North Carolina. Circumstances require that I should at this period reinforce the southern army under General Greene. This reinforcement, transported by sea under your convoy, would enable us to carry the post

- A British columns.
- B First Cavalry.
- C American Battery.
- D American Battery.
- E French Battery.
- F French Battery.
- G French Battery.
- H French Battery.
- I Second Cavalry.
- K British columns.
- L British columns.
- M Third French Battery.
- N French Caval Battery.
- O American Battery.



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in question with very little difficulty, and would wrest from the British a point of support in North Carolina, which is attended with the most dangerous consequences to us, and liberate another State. This object would require nothing more than the convoy of your fleet to the point of operation, and the protection of the debarkation.

I entreat your Excellency's attention to the points, which I have the honor of laying before you, and that you will be pleased at the same time to inform me what are your dispositions for a maritime force to be left on the American station.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* The day after the above letter was written, General Washington himself went on board the admiral's ship, both to pay his respects and offer his thanks for the services that had been rendered by the fleet, and to endeavour to impress upon Count de Grasse the importance of the plan he had suggested. He returned the same evening; but, having promised to Lafayette the command of the detachment destined against Wilmington, in case Count de Grasse could be persuaded to undertake the convoy and debarkation of the troops, he left that officer on board the *Ville de Paris* for the purpose of further consultation with the admiral. Two days afterwards Lafayette also came back, and made the following report.

"The Count de Grasse would be happy to be able to make the expedition to Charleston, all the advantages of which he feels; but the orders of his court, ulterior projects, and his engagements with the Spaniards, render it impossible to remain here the necessary time for this operation. His wish to serve the United States is such, that he desires to enter into engagements for a coöperation during the next campaign, as far as the plans of the court will permit. The expedition to Wilmington requiring less time, the Count de Grasse would undertake to conduct to that place a detachment of two thousand Americans. As to the manner of operating, it must be determined according to the particular information, that we shall collect. It will be necessary immediately to have pilots, persons well acquainted with the country, with whom the Count de Grasse would desire to converse as soon as possible, in order to give his answer definitely. The American troops must be furnished with their own provisions, the naval army having none to spare. The Count de Grasse gives us leave to make use of the vessels in York River. The *Loyalist*, the *Queen Charlotte*, and the *Cormorant* have been

TO BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

Head-Quarters, near York, 22 October, 1781.

SIR,

As the transmission of the enclosed paper, through the usual channel of the department of foreign affairs, would on the present occasion probably be attended with great delay, and recent intelligence of military transactions must be important to our ministers in Europe, at the present period of affairs, I have thought it would be agreeable both to Congress and to your Excellency, that the matter should be communicated immediately by a French frigate despatched by Count de Grasse. Annexed to the capitulation is a summary return of the prisoners and cannon taken in the two places of York and Gloucester. I have added, upon the principles above mentioned, an extract from General Greene's report of his last action in South Carolina.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

sold to the State of Virginia, but the Count de Grasse does not think he will be able to embark the American troops on board his ships of the line. How then shall we provide sailors to man the other vessels? The count has fifteen American sailors. There are some small armed vessels.

"If, after having seen the persons acquainted with the coast, the Count de Grasse thinks he shall be able to take the troops on board his line-of-battle ships, and debark them without danger, then it will be useless to take the transports. If frigates can run into a convenient place, then the troops will be embarked on board of frigates. The day of departure is to be the first of November, or if possible sooner."

* A copy of this letter was sent to Mr. Jay in Spain, and to Mr. Adams in Holland. Dr. Franklin replied as follows. "I received duly the honor of your letter, accompanying the capitulation of General Cornwallis. All the world agree, that no expedition was ever better planned or better executed. It has made a great addition to the military reputation you had already acquired, and brightens the glory that surrounds your name, and that must accompany it to our latest posterity.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 26 October, 1781.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to enclose to your Excellency copies of returns of prisoners, arms, artillery, ordnance, and other stores surrendered by the enemy in their posts of York and Gloucester on the 19th instant, which were not completed at the time of my last despatches, and are but this moment handed to me. A draft of these posts, with the plan of attack and defence, is also transmitted, and twenty-four standards taken at the same time are ready to be laid before Congress.

Our operations against the enemy in this State being concluded, it becomes my duty to inform Congress of the disposition I have made for the future destination of the troops under my command. The Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia Continental troops are ordered as a reinforcement to the army under

No news could possibly make me more happy. The infant Hercules has now strangled the two serpents, that attacked him in his cradle, and I trust his future history will be answerable."—*Passy, April 2d.*

The "two serpents" were the armies of Burgoyne and Cornwallis. A medal containing this device was afterwards struck by the direction of Dr. Franklin.—*Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. III. p. 308.

In the *General Orders*, issued the day after the capitulation, high praise was awarded both to the French and American officers and troops for their conduct during the siege. These orders, as contained in the *Remembrancer* (Vol. XIII. p. 62), differ widely from the original. They were probably retranslated from the French. The following is the closing part of the original orders, as taken from the *Orderly Book*.

"Divine service is to be performed to-morrow in the several brigades and divisions. The Commander-in-chief earnestly recommends, that the troops not on duty should universally attend, with that seriousness of deportment and gratitude of heart, which the recognition of such reiterated and astonishing interpositions of Providence demands of us."
— *October 20th*

General Greene. I shall myself, with the troops of the States to the northward of Pennsylvania, return to my former position on the North River and the communications with it. The first mentioned division, composing a body of two thousand men, under the direction of the Marquis de Lafayette, will, on their way to South Carolina, make an expedition against the enemy's posts at Wilmington in North Carolina. To effect which purpose, they will be transported to a proper point of debarkation, under convoy of the Count de Grasse, who encourages me, if circumstances and the situation of the water will admit, to give them his coöperation, so long as shall be necessary to accomplish, by a *coup de main*, their object at Wilmington. Immediately upon the reduction of that post, the troops will proceed to join General Greene.

That I may not, from the above arrangement, incur the censure of Congress, or the States, who may have flattered themselves with an expectation of my pushing my operations further southward than this State; in justice to my own endeavours, and for the satisfaction of Congress, I find myself obliged to transmit to your Excellency a summary of reasons, which have induced my determination. In doing which, I take the liberty to submit to Congress copies of two propositions, which I have had the honor to make to Count de Grasse, with his answers to each. The first, which was made immediately on my arrival at Williamsburg, and is dated the 18th of September, will show, that other objects than the reduction of the British force under the command of Lord Cornwallis were early in my contemplation, and will also declare what were at that time the sentiments of the French admiral. The second proposition, made after the surrender of the British army, will evince with how much reluc

tance I was brought to relinquish a further prosecution of favorite views. In addition to these two communications, Congress will scarcely need to be informed, that, having no means of water conveyance, the transportation, by land, of the army, with all their baggage, artillery, ordnance stores, and every apparatus necessary for the siege of Charleston, would be impracticable, and attended with such immense trouble, expense, and delay, as would (exclusive of the necessity of naval coöperation) be sufficient to deter me from the undertaking; especially as the enemy, after regaining the naval superiority on this coast, could reinforce or withdraw the garrison at pleasure.

The prosecution, therefore, of the southern war, upon that broad scale which I had wished, being as I judge to be relinquished, nothing remained in my opinion more eligible, than to reinforce General Greene's army to such a state of respectability, as that he might be able to command the country of South Carolina, and at the same time, if possible, by that reinforcement to effect an accomplishment of the smaller object mentioned; and to march myself, with the remainder of the army, to the North River, where they would be ready at the ensuing campaign to commence such operations against New York, as may be hereafter concerted, or to effect any other purposes that may be judged practicable or eligible. Add to these reasons, that Count de Rochambeau, from the exhausted state of his stores and other considerations, seemed inclined to take his resolution to remain in this State with his troops for the winter, at any rate six weeks to refresh them. Upon a full consideration of the reasons offered, I flatter myself, that my conduct will stand approved in the judgment of Congress, whose approbation I shall ever be solicitous to obtain.

I enclose, also, for the observation of Congress, a copy of my letter to the ministers of the United States at the courts of Europe, conveying to them the intelligence of our success in this State against the British troops. The reasons for this conduct, as stated in that letter, I must rely upon, as my justification with Congress for the liberty taken by me in that communication.

Unacquainted with the state of politics between Congress and the courts of Europe respecting future negotiations, whatever our prospects from that quarter may be, I cannot justify myself to my own mind without urging Congress in the warmest terms to make every arrangement for an early and efficacious campaign the ensuing year, that may be found necessary. Arguments, I flatter myself, need not be adduced to impress on Congress the high importance of this idea. Whatever may be the events of the coming winter or ensuing summer, an effectual and early preparation for military operations will put us upon the most respectable footing, either for war or negotiation; while a relaxation will place us in a disreputable situation in point of peaceful prospects, and will certainly expose us to the most disgraceful disasters, in case of a continuance of the hostile disposition of our enemies.

Nothing is yet heard of Admiral Digby, with his fleet, near these coasts. Whatever his intentions may be, Count de Grasse, I believe, is ready to meet him.

I have the honor to be, &c.

P. S. *October 29th.* In the moment of closing my despatch, I am favored with the definitive determination of the Count de Grasse respecting the troops, whom I hoped to have transported to Wilmington by water. His ideas are communicated in his letter to

the Marquis de Lafayette, a copy of which I transmit herewith.* In consequence of this resolution, and having no transports, I am obliged to send on the troops destined for the southern district by land. They will commence their march in a few days, under the command of Major-General St. Clair. The command of the expedition against Wilmington had been promised to the Marquis, upon the contingency of the troops being transported by water. On the failure of this event, the Marquis does not proceed with the reinforcement. My present despatch being important, I have committed it to the care of Colonel Humphreys, one of my aids-de-camp, whom for his attention, fidelity, and good services, I beg leave to recommend to the notice of Congress and your Excellency.

* *Count de Grasse to Lafayette.*—"The more I reflect on the plan which you mentioned to me, the more I see the impossibility of undertaking to transport troops, baggage, artillery, and ammunition. My ulterior operations require my return to an appointed place at a fixed day. That day approaches, and it would be impossible for me to break my engagement voluntarily. The passage from hence to Cape Fear may possibly be accomplished in two days, but it may also require more than fifteen. The debarkation of troops and stores may be attended with delays, and expose me to censure. Besides, it might happen, that, from an obstinate succession of southerly winds, I should be obliged to take the resolution of repairing to my rendezvous. Then I should be under the necessity of carrying with me, during the whole campaign, a detachment of troops useful to the Continent, of which I should be very sorry to deprive it. Thus, all that I can do, is to promise to escort as well as I can the vessels, that may have troops on board; but it will be impossible for me to remain on the coast beyond the 8th of next month; and even this delay must be repaired on my part by the greatest activity. If you are deficient in the means of embarking or debarking, let us think no more of the measure. But do not attribute my refusal to any thing, but the impossibility of executing a matter that was agreeable to you."—*MS. Letter, October 26th.*

A long letter was likewise written by Count de Grasse to General Washington on the subject, stating the same objections, and expressing his regret, that the orders he was bound to follow, and the engagements he had made to be in the West Indies, prevented him from coöperating in this enterprise, which held out the fairest prospects of success.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL DUPORTAIL.

Camp, near York, 26 October, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

In answer to yours of the 24th, I beg leave to inform you, that as no immediate operation requires your presence in this country, I shall most cheerfully second your application to Congress for a six months' furlough for yourself and Colonel Gouvion, for the purpose of arranging your private affairs in France. The other request* appears to me to involve difficulties, that will deprive me of the pleasure, which, from a sense of your merit, I should feel on every possible occasion in promoting your views. In the present instance, the infringement of the rights of seniority in so many individuals, and the pretensions of some, who have particular claims upon their country, convince me that your desires could not be accomplished but at the expense of the tranquillity of the army. I cannot forbear adding at the same time, that it will always afford me the greatest pleasure to give the most particular testimony of the zeal, talents, and distinguished services of yourself and Colonel Gouvion; and I entreat you to be persuaded of my earnest wish, that you may receive, at a more convenient opportunity, those rewards from Congress, which you deserve. I am, &c.†

* That Washington should encourage his application to Congress for promotion to the rank of major-general.

† In reply General Duportail said, that he was fully aware of the difficulties here stated, that it was not his desire or intention to interfere with the claims of other officers, but that he considered his case a peculiar one. He had come to America at the request of Congress, and served during the whole war, and thus thrown himself out of the line of promotion in the French army. He requested, that General Washington would not at any rate oppose his application to Congress. It will be seen hereafter, that this request was more than complied with, on the part of the Commander-in-chief.

TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

Camp, near York, 27 October, 1781.

MY LORD,

In answer to your Lordship's letter of this date, I can only express my surprise, that any of your officers object to a clause, which is essential in every parole, and repeat, that, however inclined I am to comply with your Lordship's wishes, I find myself in the impossibility of doing so on the present occasion. I request, therefore, that you will be pleased to communicate my final determination to the gentlemen, who have made difficulties on the subject, and exhort them to sign the form of parole which has been already adopted, if they are really desirous of going to New York and Europe. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT AND PROFESSORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF WILLIAM AND MARY.

27 October, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

I accept very kindly the address of the President and Professors of the University of William and Mary. The reduction of the British force in this State, for which I feel myself highly indebted to the noble exertions of our brave and generous allies, is a circumstance which gives me great pleasure, not only as it affords a return of peaceful security to many of my fellow citizens, but as it will, I hope, in its event be productive of more extensive good consequences. The seat of literature at Williamsburg has ever in my view been an object of veneration. As an institution important for its communication of useful learning, and

conducive to the diffusion of the true principles of rational liberty, you may be assured, that it shall receive every encouragement and benefaction in my power towards its reëstablishment.

The sick and wounded of the army, whom my necessities have compelled me to trouble you with, shall be removed as soon as circumstances will permit, an event which will be as pleasing to me, as agreeable to you. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE GRASSE.

Head-Quarters, 28 October, 1781.

SIR,

Your Excellency did me the honor to mention, in one of your letters, and subsequently in the note transmitted by the Marquis de Lafayette, that, from a desire to serve the United States, your Excellency would enter into engagements for such coöperations the next campaign as should not be incompatible with the orders of your court. This offer is too essential to the interests of the common cause, not to be embraced by me with the greatest eagerness, while it claims my warmest acknowledgments for the continuance of your friendly disposition towards America. As it is impossible, at this distance of time, to determine whether it will be most advantageous for the allies to open the campaign with the siege of New York, and thence proceed to that of Charleston, or make Charleston the leading operation, I take the liberty of proposing to your Excellency the following general dispositions, as equally applicable to either; namely, that your Excellency would assemble a decisive naval superiority in the Bay of Chesapeake, towards the end of

May, from which central position we might easily transport ourselves for a reunion of our means against whichever of the maritime points above mentioned circumstances should render it most advisable to attack first. With your Excellency, I need not insist either upon the indispensable necessity of a maritime force capable of giving you an absolute ascendancy in these seas, nor enlarge upon the advantages, which must be derived from anticipating the British in opening the campaign, next to the immediate prosecution of our present successes with the union of superior means now in our power, and which would infallibly terminate the war at one stroke.

The plan, which I have the honor to submit to your Excellency, is that which appears to me most likely to accomplish the great objects of the alliance. You will have observed, that, whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest. The court of France are convinced of it, and have declared their resolution to give this indispensable succour. The triumphant manner in which your Excellency has maintained the mastery of the American seas, and the glory of the French flag, lead both nations to look to you as the arbiter of the war. Public and private motives make me most ardently wish, that the next campaign may be calculated to crown all your former victories. I entreat your Excellency to be persuaded of my regard for your glory, and of the sincere friendship with which I shall invariably continue, my dear General, &c.*

* In his reply Count de Grasse said, that he should communicate General Washington's proposal to the French court, and doubted not that every thing in their power would be done to promote his views, and establish American liberty. St. Simon embarked his troops, and the fleet sailed out of the Chesapeake on the 4th of November for the

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

Instructions.

SIR,

The detachment, of which you will have the command, for the southward is to consist of the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia Continental troops. You will march them by the most convenient route, and in the most expeditious manner, without fatiguing the troops, towards Wilmington in North Carolina, or other posts in that State; of which you will endeavour to dispossess the enemy, if their situation, from the intelligence you shall receive as you advance, shall in your judgment render it practicable and advisable. If it does not, you will continue your march to the southern army, and put yourself under the command of Major-General Greene.

As Wilmington and other places in North Carolina may cease to be objects, from a change of circumstances in the States to the southward of this, it will be necessary for you to open an immediate communication by letter with General Greene, and govern yourself by his advice and orders; and it may be well to communicate, in confidence, to the Executive of the State of North Carolina the enterprise against Wilmington, that you may procure such information and aid as it may be in their power to give. For ordnance and stores, and for the means of transportation and other matters in the quartermaster's department, you will consult General Knox and Colonel Pickering, and will make your arrangements with the commissary, or

West Indies. General Washington presented to Count de Grasse two horses, which were sent off to the fleet.

The French army remained in Virginia till the following summer. The head-quarters of Count de Rochambeau were at Williamsburg.

State agent, for supplies of provision. Given at Headquarters, near York in Virginia, this 29th day of October, 1781.

P. S. If there are any men upon detachment, they are to be called in and marched with their regiments. A sufficient number of officers must be left to carry on the sick and invalids as fast as they recover. Some good field-officers should remain to superintend the business.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Instructions.

SIR,

All the troops, who are about to return to the northward, will be under your command; and I entreat you to use every means in your power to hasten them forward by land or water, or partly by both, as circumstances may require. The ordnance, and stores of every kind, must be despatched, or in such train for it as to need no further cover or aid from the troops, ere they can move from their present encampment. The ordnance vessels, and vessels carrying stores of every other kind, should receive of sick, invalids, and weak men, as many as they can transport with safety and convenience; after which, if there is not water transportation for the remainder, they must be marched by land, on the route by which the cavalry and teams came from the Head of Elk to this place.

For the reputation of the troops, and preservation of property, you will use your utmost exertions to prevent any species of abuse on the march. Destruction of fences is too often among the wanton injuries, which

are committed. A few axes, and strict attention of the officers, will infallibly prevent this, and I trust it will be done. You will be able, after informing yourself of the extent of the water transportation, to determine on the number of men, who must march by land, and make your arrangements with the quartermaster-general accordingly. If there are any men upon detachment, they are to be called in and marched with their regiments. A sufficient number of officers must be left to take forward the sick and invalids, as fast as they recover. Some good field-officer should remain to superintend this business. Given at Head-Quarters, this 29th day of October, 1781.*

TO GOVERNOR RUTLEDGE, SOUTH CAROLINA.

Head-Quarters, near York, 31 October, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have to acknowledge your Excellency's two favors, and am not surprised at the urgency with which you express your sentiments on a subject of so much importance to yourself in particular, and to the general interest of the United States.† I have only to la-

* The troops were transported by water to the Head of Elk, and they marched thence by land. The New Jersey troops were stationed for the winter near Morristown, and the two New York regiments, under General James Clinton, at Pompton. All the others proceeded to the North River, where the light companies joined their respective regiments. Hazen's regiment was ordered to Lancaster in Pennsylvania.

The British prisoners were marched to Winchester in Virginia, and to Fort Frederic and Fredericktown in Maryland. The barracks at Fort Frederic were found to be in such a state of decay, that the division of the prisoners intended for that place was stationed at Fredericktown. As these prisoners were guarded only by militia, many differences occurred, and occasionally serious quarrels, between them and the inhabitants; and they were subsequently removed to Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, and guarded by Continental troops.

† The aid of the French fleet in an enterprise against the enemy at Charleston.

ment, that it is not in my power to give you that satisfactory reply, which your fond hopes would lead you to expect. I can assure you, that every argument has been used with the Count de Grasse to induce him to continue his stay on these coasts, and to aid with his fleet the combined army in an operation against Charleston; but without success. The advanced season, the orders of his court, and his own engagements to be punctual to a certain time fixed upon for his ulterior operations, forbid a compliance on his part, and I am obliged to submit.

An attempt to besiege Charleston, without the aid of a superior naval force, being utterly impracticable, a very respectable reinforcement of Continental troops is ordered for the support of General Greene; with which I flatter myself he will be able to command the country of South Carolina, and confine the enemy to the town of Charleston; and I fancy to myself a future day, not far distant, when they will be obliged to abandon that place. As you will, before this can reach you, be fully informed of our success against Earl Cornwallis, I omit to add any thing on that subject, but beg your Excellency to accept my sincere congratulations on that favorable event. I am, dear Sir, &c.*

* The Virginia militia at the siege of Yorktown were commanded by General Nelson, at that time governor of the State. The following anecdotes were related to me by General Lafayette.

When the cannon were prepared for bombarding the town, Governor Nelson was requested to direct the pointing of them to those parts where they would do the greatest execution. He showed to the officers a large house, which was a conspicuous object, and which he said was probably the head-quarters. He advised them to aim at that house. It proved to be his own. This evidence of patriotism was regarded with high admiration by the French officers.

Before the siege of Yorktown commenced, the public treasury of Virginia was without money, and there was danger that the militia would disband for the want of pay. Governor Nelson applied to a wealthy person to borrow money on the credit of the State. But the public affairs

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near York, 31 October, 1781.

SIR,

I do myself the honor of transmitting to your Excellency a letter from General Duportail, in which he explains the motives of an intended application to Congress for permission to go to France, and for the promotion of himself and other officers of his corps. I should conceal sentiments, with which I am very strongly impressed, and do injustice to very conspicuous merit, if I did not upon the present occasion offer my testimony to the distinguished abilities and services, both of General Duportail and Colonel Gouvion. Their claim to the particular attention of Congress at this juncture is founded upon the practice of Europe; sieges being considered as the particular province of the corps of engineers, and as entitling them, when attended with a success important in itself and its consequences, to the great military rewards. These officers, besides, are supported by a series of conduct in the line of their department, which makes them not depend merely upon the present circumstances.

For these reasons, I am induced to recommend General Duportail's memorial to Congress for the promotions which he specifies, and the leave of absence; the latter being by no means incompatible with the good of the service at the present period, as I am reduced, notwithstanding all my efforts, to the necessity of retiring into winter-quarters. The same principles as those above mentioned forbid me to be silent on the subject of General Knox, who is closely united with

were then in so precarious a condition, and the prospects so uncertain, that the money-holder refused to lend on such security. Governor Nelson then offered his own property as a pledge, which was accepted, and the loan was obtained.

General Duportail in the merit of the siege; being at the head of the artillery, which is the other principal instrument in conducting attacks. The resources of his genius have supplied, on this and many other interesting occasions, the defect of means. His distinguished talents and services, equally important and indefatigable, entitle him to the same marks of the approbation of Congress, that they may be pleased to grant to the chief engineer. I am, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Mount Vernon, Virginia, 15 November, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Not till the 5th instant was I able to leave York. Engaged in providing for the detachment that was to go southerly, embarking the troops that were to pro-

* *Certificate.* — "General Duportail, commandant of the corps of engineers, having signified his desire of obtaining leave to go to France for the arrangement of his domestic affairs, it is with the greatest satisfaction I embrace this opportunity of testifying the sense, which I entertain of his distinguished talents and services. His judgment in council and well-conducted valor in the field claim the highest applause, and have secured to him the esteem and confidence of the army. His plan and conduct of the attacks in the late important and successful siege of York, where he commanded the corps of engineers, afford brilliant proofs of his military genius, and set the seal to his reputation; while they entitle him to my warmest thanks. Given at Head-Quarters, 31st October, 1781."

General Duportail was promoted, on the 16th of November, according to the above recommendation, but General Knox was passed over. There was a serious difficulty in the case, owing to the local partiality of some of the members of Congress, and to the opinion of others that general principles should be adhered to. The commission of Knox as brigadier bore a subsequent date to those of James Clinton, Moultrie, and McIntosh. The members from New York, South Carolina, and Georgia would not agree to the promotion of Knox, unless those officers were promoted at the same time; and a vote for the whole could not be carried. Several trials were made, and General Washington was consulted on the

ceed northerly, making a distribution of the ordnance and stores for various purposes, and disposing of the officers and other prisoners to their respective places of destination, I could not leave that part of the country sooner.

On that day I arrived at Eltham, the seat of Colonel Bassett, time enough to see poor Mr. Custis breathe his last. This unexpected and affecting event threw Mrs. Washington and Mrs. Custis, who were both present, into such deep distress, that the circumstance of it, and a duty I owed the deceased in assisting at his funeral, prevented my reaching this place till the 13th; and business here and on the road will put it out of my power to arrive at Philadelphia before the last days of the present month.

As this may extend to a later period than your business in that city may require, I owe it to your friendship and to my affectionate regard for you, my dear Marquis, not to let you leave this country, without carrying with you fresh marks of my attachment to you,

subject after his arrival in Philadelphia. To Mr. B  e, a delegate from South Carolina, he wrote as follows, on the 8th of March.

“I am clearly of opinion, for reasons which I had the honor of detailing to you yesterday, that the promotion of General Knox singly will involve fewer disagreeable consequences, than any other method, which I have yet heard proposed; for I am persuaded that no officer, senior to himself, as well acquainted as I am with his extraordinary exertions to prepare without proper means the siege-artillery for the last campaign, the despatch with which he transported it, and his uncommon assiduity and good management of it at Yorktown, would think his promotion an improper reward, or any reflection upon his own merit. If extraordinary exertions do not meet with particular attention, there is no stimulus to action, and an officer has little more to do than to steer clear of courts-martial.”

The representations of the Commander-in-chief at last prevailed, and, on the 22d of March, Knox was promoted to the rank of major-general, and his commission was ordered to be dated on the 15th of the preceding November, thereby giving him precedence of General Duportail, and advancing him over the abovementioned brigadiers.

and new expressions of the high sense I entertain of your military conduct and other important services in the course of the last campaign, although the latter are too well known to need the testimony of my approbation, and the former I persuade myself you believe is too well riveted to undergo diminution or change.

As you expressed a desire to know my sentiments respecting the operations of the next campaign, before your departure for France, I will without a tedious display of reasoning declare in one word, that the advantages of it to America, and the honor and glory of it to the allied arms in these States, must depend absolutely upon the naval force, which is employed in these seas, and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act decisively, unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can more than negative advantages be expected without it. For proof of this, we have only to recur to the instances of the ease and facility with which the British shifted their ground, as advantages were to be obtained at either extremity of the continent, and to their late heavy loss the moment they failed in their naval superiority. To point out the further advantages, which might have been obtained in the course of this year, if Count de Grasse could have waited, and would have covered a further operation to the southward, is unnecessary; because a doubt did not exist, nor does it at this moment, in any man's mind, of the total extirpation of the British force in the Carolinas and Georgia, if he could have extended his coöperation two months longer.

It follows then as certain as night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it every thing honorable and glorious. A constant naval superiority would terminate the war speedily; without it, I do not know that it will

ever be terminated honorably. If this force should appear early, we shall have the whole campaign before us. The months from June to September inclusive are well adapted for operating in any of the States to the northward of this; and the remaining months are equally well suited to those south; in which time, with such means, I think much, I will add every thing, might be expected.

How far the policy of Congress may carry them towards filling their Continental battalions does not lie with me to determine. This measure, before and since the capitulation, has been strongly recommended by me. Should it be adopted by that body, and executed with energy in the several States, I think our force, comprehending the auxiliary troops now here, will be fully competent to all the purposes of the American war, provided the British force on this continent remains nearly as it now is. But this is a contingency, which depends very much upon political manœuvres in Europe; and, as it is uncertain how far we may be in a state of preparation at the opening of the next campaign, the propriety of augmenting the present army under the command of Count de Rochambeau is a question worthy of consideration; but, as it lies with Congress to determine, I shall be silent on the subject.

If I should be deprived of the pleasure of a personal interview with you before your departure, permit me to adopt this method of making you a tender of my ardent vows for a propitious voyage, a gracious reception from your prince, an honorable reward for your services, a happy meeting with your lady and friends, and a safe return in the spring to, my dear Marquis, your affectionate friend, &c.*

* As soon as the plan of an operation against Wilmington was abandoned, in consequence of the French admiral declining to afford an es-

P. S. I beg you to present my best respects to the Viscount de Noailles, and let him know that my warmest wishes attend him.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Mount Vernon, 15 November, 1781.

SIR,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 31st ultimo, covering the resolutions of Congress of the 29th, and a proclamation for a day of public prayer and thanksgiving, and have to thank you, Sir, most sincerely for the very polite and affectionate

court to the troops, Lafayette resolved to return to France. The season being too far advanced to admit of any further active service till the next year, he was desirous of taking this opportunity to visit his family. With the approbation of General Washington he proceeded to Philadelphia, and Congress granted him permission of absence for such a period as he should think proper. Resolves were at the same time passed highly complimentary to his character, his zeal, and military conduct, particularly during the last campaign. Among other resolves were the following.

“That the secretary of foreign affairs acquaint the ministers plenipotentiary of the United States, that it is the desire of Congress that they confer with the Marquis de Lafayette, and avail themselves of his information relative to the situation of public affairs in the United States.

“That the secretary of foreign affairs further acquaint the minister plenipotentiary at the court of Versailles, that he will conform to the intention of Congress by consulting with and employing the assistance of the Marquis de Lafayette in accelerating the supplies, which may be afforded by his Most Christian Majesty for the use of the United States.”
— *Journals*, November 23d.

The superintendent of finance was likewise ordered to furnish him with a proper conveyance to France.

In a letter from Congress to the King of France, of which Lafayette was the bearer, he was also commended to the notice of his sovereign in very warm terms. *Secret Journal*, Vol. III. pp. 48, 52. — *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. X. p. 5.

The letter from Lafayette to Congress, expressing his gratitude for these testimonies of their esteem and confidence, may be seen in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. XIII. p. 318.

Having received his instructions from Congress, and completed the

manner in which these enclosures have been conveyed. The success of the combined arms against our enemies at York and Gloucester, as it affects the welfare and independence of the United States, I viewed as a most fortunate event. In performing my part towards its accomplishment, I consider myself to have done only my duty, and in the execution of that I ever feel myself happy; and at the same time, as it augurs well to our cause, I take a particular pleasure in acknowledging, that the interposing hand of Heaven, in the various instances of our extensive preparations for this operation, has been most conspicuous and remarkable.

After the receipt of your favor, I received official information through the secretary of Congress, of the new choice of their president. While I congratulate

necessary preparations, he went to Boston, where a frigate to take him on board awaited his arrival.

Lafayette to the President of Congress. — “Sir; On the point of leaving this coast, I do myself the honor to address Congress, not only with a view to acquaint them with the time of my departure, but also from a warm desire to repeat the assurances of my respect and gratitude. Confiding in their usual kindness to me, I dare flatter myself that they will accept of this homage of an affectionate heart, and have the honor to be, &c.” — *On board the Alliance, off Boston, December 23d.*

It was not only in America, but in his own country, and by the King's ministers, that Lafayette was praised for the manner in which he had conducted the Virginia campaign.

“We have learned with great pleasure,” said Count de Vergennes in writing to him, “that, notwithstanding you have not had the direction in chief of this grand operation [the siege of Yorktown], yet your prudent conduct and preliminary manœuvres prepared the way for success. I followed you step by step through your whole campaign in Virginia, and should often have trembled for you, if I had not been confident in your wisdom. It requires no common ability and skill to enable a man to sustain himself as you have done, and during so long a time, before such a general as Lord Cornwallis, who is lauded for his talents in war; and this, too, with a great disproportion in your forces. It was you, who conducted him to his fatal destination, where, instead of making you prisoner, as he had predicted, he was reduced to the necessity of surrendering himself in that character.” — *MS. Letter, Versailles, December 1st*

you, Sir, on a release from the fatigues and troubles of so arduous and important a task, I beg you to accept my sincere thanks for the pleasure and satisfaction, which I have received in the correspondence with which you have honored me, and the many interesting communications of intelligence with which you have favored me. I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO WILLIAM RAMSAY, WILLIAM RUMNEY, JOHN FITZ-
GERALD, ROBERT F. HOOE, AND OTHERS,
INHABITANTS OF ALEXANDRIA.

Alexandria, 20 November, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

I accept with peculiar satisfaction the very kind and affectionate address of the citizens of Alexandria. The long experience, which in former times I have had of their sincerity and cordiality, stamps it with particular value; and permit me to say, that, to make a peaceful return to this agreeable society of my fellow citizens, is among the most ardent of my wishes, and would prove my greatest comfort for all the toils and vicissitudes, which I have experienced during my absence.

The great Director of events has carried us through a variety of scenes, during this long and bloody contest, in which we have been for seven campaigns most nobly struggling. The present prospect is pleasing. The late success at Yorktown is very promising, but on our own improvement of it depend its future good consequences. A vigorous prosecution of this success

* President McKeap, being Chief Justice of the State of Pennsylvania, was obliged to retire from Congress for a time to attend to the duties of that office. Mr. Hanson, of Maryland, was chosen to succeed him as President of Congress on the 5th of November.

will, in all probability, procure us what we have so long wished to secure, an establishment of peace, liberty, and independence. A relaxation of our exertions at this moment may cost us many more toilsome campaigns, and be attended with the most unhappy consequences.

Your condolence for the loss of that amiable youth, Mr. Custis, affects me most tenderly. The loss, I trust, will be compensated to you in some other worthy representative.*

Amidst all the vicissitudes of time or fortune, be assured, Gentlemen, that I shall ever regard with particular affection the citizens and inhabitants of Alexandria. I am, Gentlemen, &c.

TO GEORGE PLATER, PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,
AND THOMAS COCKEY DEY, SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, OF MARYLAND.

Annapolis, 22 November, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

I very sensibly feel the honor, which has this day been conferred upon me by the vote of thanks of so respectable a body, as that of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland. The regard, which they have been pleased to express for me personally, the delicate manner in which they have recalled to view those distant events, which in some degree led to our present happy situation, and the general approbation, which they have generously bestowed upon the whole of my conduct, must ever secure to them my warmest esteem, and must at the same time operate as fresh incentives to merit their future good opinion.

* Mr. Custis was a member of the Virginia House of Delegates.

It is with the highest degree of pleasure I observe, that a proper allowance has been made for the capital share, which the land and sea forces of our great and good ally had in the reduction of the common enemy at York in Virginia. I should deem myself unpardonable, were I not upon every occasion, more especially upon such a one as the present, to declare, that to the sound counsels and vigorous exertions of their Excellencies Count de Rochambeau and Count de Grasse much, very much, was owing.

While I agree in sentiment with the honorable bodies over which you preside, that we may entertain a rational ground of belief, that, under the favor of Divine Providence, the freedom, independence, and happiness of America will shortly be established upon the surest foundation, I think it a duty incumbent upon me to observe, that those most desirable objects are not to be fully attained but by a continuance of those exertions, which have already so greatly humbled the power of our inveterate enemies. Relaxation upon our part will give them time to recollect and recover themselves; whereas a vigorous prosecution of the war must inevitably crush their remaining force in these States, or put them to the necessity of entirely withdrawing themselves.

I cannot conclude without expressing my warmest wishes for the prosperity of a State, which has ever stood among the foremost in her support of the common cause. I confess myself under particular obligations for the ready attention, which I have ever experienced to those requisitions, which, in the course of my duty, I have occasionally been under the necessity of making. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* General Washington arrived in Philadelphia on the 27th of November, and the next day he attended Congress, being introduced into the

TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Philadelphia, 28 November, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the 6th instant, and to thank your Excellency with great sincerity for the very cordial and affectionate congratulations, which you are pleased to express on our late success in Virginia.

I most earnestly hope, that this event may be productive of the happy consequences you mention; and I think that its good effects cannot fail to be very extensive, unless, from a mistaken idea of the magnitude of this success, unhappily a spirit of remissness should seize the minds of the States, and they should set

hall by two members. He was addressed by the president as follows.

"Sir; Congress, at all times happy in seeing your Excellency, feel particular pleasure in your presence at this time, after the glorious success of the allied arms in Virginia. It is their fixed purpose to draw every advantage from it, by exhorting the States in the strongest terms to the most vigorous and timely exertions. A committee has accordingly been appointed to state the requisitions necessary to be made for the establishment of the army, and they are instructed to confer with you upon that subject. It is, therefore, the expectation of Congress, that your Excellency would remain for some time in Philadelphia, that they may avail themselves of your aid in this important business, and that you may enjoy a respite from the fatigues of war, as far as is consistent with the service."

To this address General Washington replied;

"Mr. President; I feel very sensibly the favorable declaration of Congress expressed by your Excellency. This fresh proof of their approbation cannot fail of making a deep impression upon me; and my study shall be to deserve a continuance of it. It is with peculiar pleasure I hear, that it is the fixed purpose of Congress to exhort the States to the most vigorous and timely exertions. A compliance on their part will, I persuade myself, be productive of the most happy consequences. I shall yield a ready obedience to the expectation of Congress, and give every assistance in my power to their committee. I am obliged by the goodness of Congress in making my personal ease and convenience a part of their concern. Should the service require my attendance with the army upon the North River, or elsewhere, I shall repair to whatever place my duty calls, with the same pleasure that I remain in this city."

themselves down in quiet with a delusive hope of the contest being brought to a close. I hope this may not be the case. To prevent so great an evil shall be my study and endeavour; and I cannot but flatter myself, that the States, rather than relax in their exertions, will be stimulated to the most vigorous preparations for another active, glorious, and decisive campaign, which, if properly prosecuted will, I trust, under the smiles of Heaven, lead us to the end of this long and tedious war, and set us down in the full security of the great object of our toils, the establishment of peace, liberty, and independence.

Whatever may be the policy of European courts during this winter, their negotiation will prove too precarious a dependence for us to trust to. Our wisdom should dictate a serious preparation for war, and in that state we shall find ourselves in a situation secure against every event.

Your Excellency's wish for some ships of our allies to be stationed at New London, I should have been happy to promote, if circumstances would have permitted; but Admiral de Grasse has taken almost all his ships of war with him; and, except a frigate or two left in York River for the security and aid of the French troops, who will have their winter-quarters in the vicinity of Yorktown, not a ship of force is left upon the American station. The supply of fresh beef to the Island of Martinico is certainly a desirable object to our allies, and is worthy of attention, but no security can be given to its transportation from the quarter you mention. I am, &c.

TO JOHN HANSON, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, 30 November, 1781.

SIR,

While I congratulate your Excellency on your appointment to fill the most important seat in the United States, I take the same opportunity to thank you, with great sincerity, for the very polite manner in which you are pleased to tender me the advantages of your correspondence. As a mutual free communication cannot fail to be attended with great satisfaction to me, and will undoubtedly be productive of very useful consequences to the public cause, you may be assured I shall pay very particular attention to your letters. I sincerely accord with you in sentiment, that our public affairs at present assume a promising aspect; but suffer me to begin the freedom of our correspondence by observing to your Excellency, that upon our future vigorous improvement of the present favorable moment depend the happy consequences, which we now promise ourselves as the result of all the successful events of the last campaign. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN, SECRETARY AT WAR.*

Philadelphia, 5 December, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

From the tenor of your private letter of this date, I presume you are unacquainted with my recommen-

* It was determined in February, of the present year, that a department of war should be instituted, with a secretary at its head. The difficulty of a choice seems to have caused a delay in the appointment of that officer. Even as late as the 2d of October an election could not be made. In a letter of that date from General Varnum, then a member of Congress, he writes; "We have attempted to elect a secretary at war. Generals Greene, Lincoln, and Knox are in nomination. All the votes

dation of General Knox to Congress, at the time General Duportail was mentioned to that body by me. If my expressions in his favor were not warm and full, they fell as far short of my intention as of his merit, and did injustice to both; because I absolutely refused to recommend the latter without the former, whom I thought equally at least entitled upon every principle to promotion. If any thing further can be done by me, it must, I conceive, be obtained by some other means than a direct application to Congress. In the mean time I hope General Knox will take no hasty resolution, or at least suspend the execution of it, if he should. I am most sincerely yours, &c.

TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Philadelphia, 6 December, 1781.

SIR,

I am induced to mention a subject, which has already occasioned many discussions. The situation of those men ought to be attended to, who, by the chance of war, are subjected to the authority of your sovereign or mine. It is much to be wished, that all difficulties in exchange may be obviated, the expenses of maintaining prisoners liquidated, and solid arrangements made to provide for them in future.

From a sincere desire to accomplish these objects, I will, upon receiving your Excellency's approbation of the plan, appoint Brigadier-General Knox and Gouver-

are for one or other of those gentlemen. We effected nothing. It is said, that General Greene cannot be taken from the army, considering the situation at the south." General Lincoln was chosen on the 30th of October, though he did not enter upon the duties till a month afterwards. Other facts respecting a choice of a secretary at war may be seen in Vol. VII. p. 460.—See also SPARKS'S *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, Vol. I p. 238.

neur Morris, on the part of the United States, to meet commissioners, properly authorized by you, either at Elizabethtown, upon Staten Island, or at any other place, which may be deemed mutually convenient.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Philadelphia, 15 December, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

I thank you for your kind congratulations on an event, which is certainly most important, considered in a public view, and which adds to my personal satisfaction, by finding that it in some degree relieves you from that load of difficulty and distress, with which you had so long been contending. The evacuation of the State of North Carolina is another very fortunate circumstance.*

I presented your recommendation of Colonel Williams to Congress, backed by my own, urging the expediency of filling up the vacant brigadierships; and, if thought proper at this time, there is no doubt of Colonel Williams being promoted.†

I hope General St. Clair has before this time joined you. The enemy have sent no reinforcement from New York to Charleston, nor do I learn that any preparations are making for such a measure. If it should be the opinion, that the British force in South Carolina is adequate to the maintenance of Charleston, I should not be surprised, if Sir Henry Clinton were to content himself with acting upon the defensive in that quarter,

* The British had recently retired from Wilmington.

† As General Smallwood had been promoted to the rank of major-general, Colonel Otho H. Williams was recommended by General Greene to supply his place as brigadier in the Maryland line.

at least until the pleasure of the ministry can be known; because an additional force, sufficient to regain and make establishments in the country, is more than can well be spared from New York. I am informed, that the English prints of a late date speak of a reinforcement preparing from that city for Carolina and Florida; and I think it not improbable, for I fancy Lord Cornwallis's private despatches, after the battle of Guilford, painted his affairs in no very favorable light.

I am apprehensive that the States, elated by the late success, and taking it for granted that Great Britain will no longer support so losing a contest, will relax in their preparations for the next campaign. I am detained here by Congress to assist in the arrangements for the next year; and I shall not fail, in conjunction with the financier, the minister of foreign affairs, and the secretary at war, who are all most heartily well disposed, to impress upon Congress, and get them to impress upon the respective States, the necessity of the most vigorous exertions.

I really know not what to say on the subject of retaliation. Congress have it under consideration, and we must await their determination. Of this I am convinced, that of all laws it is the most difficult to execute, where you have not the transgressor himself in your possession. Humanity will ever interfere and plead strongly against the sacrifice of an innocent person for the guilt of another; and, as to destruction of property within the enemy's lines, it is in fact destroying our own. It will be to the eternal disgrace of the nation, which drives us to the disagreeable necessity of thinking of means to curb their barbarity.* I am with the warmest sentiments of esteem, &c.

* On these topics General Greene had written; "Before an exchange is gone fully into, I wish something decisive may be done respecting

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, 27 December, 1781.

SIR,

I have been honored with the resolves of the 20th instant, directing me to make inquiry into the power and conduct of the Board of Directors of the Associated Loyalists in New York.* I shall pursue such steps as will be most likely to promote the ends which Congress have in view.

I have taken the liberty of enclosing the copies of two letters from the commissary-general of prisoners, setting forth the debt, which is due from us on account of naval prisoners, the number remaining in captivity, their miserable situation, and the little probability there is of procuring their release for the want of proper subjects in our hands.

Before we proceed to an inquiry into the measures, which ought to be adopted to enable us to pay our debt, and to effect the exchange of those, who still remain in captivity, a matter which it may take some time to determine, humanity and policy point out the necessity

Colonel Hayne. As retaliation necessarily involves the whole Continent, I wish your Excellency's order and the order of Congress thereon. The latter have signified their approbation of the measures I took. But, as retaliation did not take place immediately, nor did I think myself at liberty to act on a matter of such magnitude but from the most pressing necessity, and as the enemy did not repeat the offence, I have been at a loss how to act with respect to the original one, not having any officer of equal rank with Colonel Hayne in my possession. I am ready to execute whatever may be thought advisable. It would be happy for America, if something could be done to put a stop to the practice of burning, both in the northern States and here also; and, to prevent it here, I wrote to the enemy a letter on the subject, a copy of which I enclose; and if they do not desist, I will put the war on the footing I mention." — *MS. Letter, November 21st.*

* This board was established to superintend the affairs of the Refugees, or Loyalists. William Franklin, formerly governor of New Jersey, was its president.

of administering to the pressing wants of a number of the most valuable subjects of the republic. Had they been taken in the Continental service, I should have thought myself authorized, in conjunction with the minister of war, to apply a remedy ; but as the greater part of them were not thus taken, as appears by Mr. Skinner's representation, I must await the decision of Congress upon the subject. Had a system, some time ago planned by Congress and recommended to the several States, been adopted and carried fully into execution, I mean that of obliging all captains of private vessels to deliver over their prisoners to the Continental commissioners upon certain conditions, I am persuaded that the numbers taken and brought into the many ports of the United States would have amounted to a sufficiency to have exchanged those taken from us ; but, instead of that, it is to be feared, that few in proportion are secured, and that the few, who are sent in, are so partially applied, that it creates great disgust in those remaining. The consequence of which is, that, conceiving themselves neglected and seeing no prospect of relief, many of them enter into the enemy's service, to the very great loss of our trading interest. Congress will, therefore, I hope, see the necessity of renewing their former or making some similar recommendation to the States.

In addition to the motives above mentioned, for wishing that the whole business of prisoners of war might be brought under one general regulation, there is another of no small consideration, which is, that it would probably put a stop to those mutual complaints of ill treatment, which are frequently urged on each part. For it is a fact, that, for above two years, we have had no reason to complain of the treatment of the Continental land prisoners in New York, neither have we been charged with any improper conduct towards those

in our hands. I consider the sufferings of the seamen for some time past, as arising in a great measure from the want of that general regulation, which has been spoken of, and without which there will constantly be a great number remaining in the hands of the enemy
I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN, SECRETARY AT WAR.

Philadelphia, 30 December, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

You have enhanced the value of the trophies, with which Congress have been pleased to honor me in their resolve of the 29th of October, by the polite and affectionate manner of presenting them.* When I consider how much I am indebted, for this singular mark of public esteem, to the exertions of the generals, and indeed of all the other officers, who accompanied me to that field of glory to the allied armies, I feel a sensation of gratitude, which I cannot express. Believe me sincere when I assure you, that I hold myself under very particular obligations for your able and friendly counsel in the cabinet and vigor in the field. I am with truth, my dear Sir, your very affectionate humble servant.

TO THOMAS CHITTENDEN, VERMONT.†

Philadelphia, 1 January, 1782.

SIR,

I received your favor of the 14th of November, by Mr. Brownson. You cannot be at a loss to know why

* As secretary at war it devolved on General Lincoln to present to the Commander-in-chief two of the enemy's standards taken at Yorktown, which had been assigned to him by Congress.

† Mr. Chittenden had been chosen governor of Vermont by the people

I have not heretofore, and why I cannot now, address you in your public character, or answer you in mine; but the confidence, which you have been pleased to repose in me, gives me an opportunity of offering you my sentiments, as an individual wishing most ardently to see the peace and union of his country preserved, and the just rights of the people of every part of it fully and firmly established.

It is not my business, neither do I think it necessary now, to discuss the origin of the right of a number of inhabitants to that tract of country, formerly distinguished by the name of the New Hampshire Grants, and now known by that of Vermont. I will take it for granted, that their right was good, because Congress by their resolve of the 7th of August imply it, and by that of the 21st are willing fully to confirm it, provided the new State is confined to certain described bounds. It appears therefore to me, that the dispute of boundary is the only one which exists, and that, this being removed, all further difficulties would be removed also, and the matter terminated to the satisfaction of all parties. Now, I would ask you candidly whether the claim of the people of Vermont was not for a long time confined solely, or very nearly, to that tract of country which is described in the resolve of Congress of the 21st of August last, and whether, agreeably to the tenor of your own letter to me, the late extension of your claim upon New Hampshire and New York was not more of a political manœuvre, than one in which you conceived yourselves justifiable. If my first question be answered in the affirmative, it certainly bars your new claim; and, if my second be well founded, your end is answered and you have nothing to do but withdraw

of that territory, in February, 1778, and he acted as such during the revolution.

your jurisdiction to your old limits, and obtain an acknowledgment of independence and sovereignty, under the resolve of the 21st of August, for so much territory as does not interfere with the ancient established bounds of New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. I persuade myself you will see and acquiesce in the reason, the justice, and indeed the necessity of such a decision.

You must consider, Sir, that the point now in dispute is of the utmost political importance to the future union and peace of this great country. The State of Vermont, if acknowledged, will be the first new one admitted into the confederacy, and, if suffered to encroach upon the ancient established boundaries of the adjacent ones, will serve as a precedent for others, which it may hereafter be expedient to set off, to make the same unjustifiable demands. Thus, in my private opinion, while it behoves the delegates of the States now confederated to do ample justice to a body of people sufficiently respectable by their numbers, and entitled by other claims to be admitted into that confederation, it becomes them also to attend to the interests of their constituents, and see, that, under the appearance of justice to one, they do not materially injure the rights of others. I am apt to think this is the prevailing opinion of Congress, and that your late extension of claim has, upon the principles I have above mentioned, rather diminished than increased the number of your friends, and that, if such extension should be persisted in, it will be made a common cause, and not considered as only affecting the rights of the States immediately interested in the loss of territory, a loss of too serious a nature not to claim the attention of any people.

There is no calamity within the compass of my foresight, which is more to be dreaded, than a necessity of

coercion on the part of Congress ; and consequently every endeavour should be used to prevent the execution of so disagreeable a measure. It must involve the ruin of that State against which the resentment of the others is pointed.

I will only add a few words upon the subject of the negotiations, which have been carried on between you and the enemy in Canada and in New York. I will take it for granted, as you assert it, that they were so far innocent, that there never was any serious intention of joining Great Britain in their attempts to subjugate your country ; but it has had this certain bad tendency ; it has served to give some ground to that delusive opinion of the enemy, upon which they in a great measure found their hopes of success, that they have numerous friends among us, who only want a proper opportunity to show themselves openly, and that internal disputes and feuds will soon break us in pieces ; at the same time the seeds of distrust and jealousy are scattered among ourselves by a conduct of this kind. If you are sincere in your professions, these will be additional motives for accepting the terms, which have been offered, and which appear to me equitable, and thereby convincing the common enemy, that all their expectations of disunion are vain, and that they have been worsted in the use of their own weapon, — deception.

As you unbosomed yourself to me, I thought I had the greater right of speaking my sentiments openly and candidly to you. I have done so ; and if they should produce the effects, which I most sincerely wish, that of an honorable and amicable adjustment of a matter, which, if carried to hostile lengths, may destroy the future happiness of my country, I shall have attained my end, while the enemy will be defeated in theirs. Believe me to be, with great respect, Sir, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE, AT PARIS.

Philadelphia, 4 January, 1782.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I cannot suffer Colonel Gimat to leave this city for France without a remembrance from me to you. I have remained at this place ever since you left it, and am happy in having discovered the best disposition imaginable in Congress to prepare vigorously for another campaign. They have resolved to keep up the same number of corps that constituted the army of last year, and have urged the States warmly to complete them. Requisitions of money are also made; but how far the ability and inclinations of the individual States to tax heavily will coincide with the views of Congress, is more than I am able, at this early period, to inform you. A further pecuniary aid from your generous nation, and a decisive naval force upon this coast, in the latter end of May or beginning of June, unlimited in its stay and operations, would, unless the resources of Great Britain are inexhaustible, or she can form powerful alliances, bid fair to finish the war in the course of the next campaign.

Aid in money would enable our financier to support the expenses of the war with ease and credit, without anticipating or deranging those funds, which Congress are endeavouring to establish, and which will be productive, though they may be slow in the establishment. A naval superiority would compel the enemy to draw their whole force to a point, which would not only disgrace their arms by the relinquishment of posts and the States which they affect to have conquered, but might eventually be fatal to their army; or, by attempting to hold these posts, they might be cut off in detail; so that, in either case, the most important good consequences would result from the measure.

General Lincoln has accepted his appointment of secretary of war. Proper plans of economy are adopting in every department, and I do not despair of seeing ere long our affairs under much better management than they have been ; which will open a new field productive, it is to be hoped, of a fruitful harvest. As you will have received, in a more direct channel than from hence, the news of the surprise and recapture of St. Eustatia by the arms of France, I shall only congratulate you on that event, and add, that it marks in a striking point of view the genius of the Marquis de Boullie for enterprise, and for intrepidity and resources in difficult circumstances. His conduct upon this occasion does him infinite honor.

I shall be impatient to hear of your safe arrival in France, and to receive such communications as you know will be interesting to the cause we espouse, and in which we are actors. Though unknown to Madame de Lafayette, I beg you to present me to her as one of her greatest admirers. Be so good also as to make a tender of my best wishes to the Duke de Lauzun, and other gentlemen of the army of Count de Rochambeau, who may be in the circle of your friends, and with whom I have the honor of an acquaintance. With sentiments of purest affection and most perfect regard, I am, my dear Marquis, your assured friend, &c.

P. S. — *January 5th.* Since writing the foregoing, I have had the letter and resolves, herewith sent, put into my hands by the delegates from Virginia in Congress. I have a peculiar pleasure in becoming the channel, through which the just and grateful plaudits of my native State are communicated to the man I love. By advices just received from South Carolina, the enemy have evacuated all their posts in that State, and have

concentred their whole force in Charleston. Wilmington is also evacuated, and North Carolina is freed from its enemies. The disaffected part of the State are suing for mercy, and executing, it is said, some of their own leaders for having misguided them.*

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Circular to the States.

Philadelphia, 22 January, 1782.

SIR,

Although it may be somewhat out of my province to address your Excellency on a subject not immediately of a military nature, yet I consider it so nearly connected with, and so essential to, the operations under

* The following letter from M. de Ségur, minister of war, was written to Lafayette in behalf of the King, after receiving the news of the capitulation at Yorktown.

"SIR,

"The King being informed of the military talents, which you have repeatedly displayed in commanding the different corps of the army entrusted to you in America, and of the wisdom and prudence, by which you have been guided in the various parts you have acted in relation to the interests of the United States, and of the confidence placed in you by General Washington; his Majesty has charged me to inform you, that the praises so justly merited have attracted his attention, and that your conduct and success have caused him to form an opinion of you the most favorable that you can desire, and which may authorize you to depend on his goodness. To give you a most flattering and decided proof of it, his Majesty assures to you the rank of field-marshal [maréchal de camp], when you shall have quitted the service of the United States, and returned to that of his Majesty. By this decision you will, therefore, be considered a field-marshal, dating from the capitulation at Yorktown by General Cornwallis, on the 19th of October of the present year, in consideration of your having then fulfilled the duties of that rank in the army of the United States of America." — *MS. Letter from Ségur to Lafayette, December 5th, 1781.*

my direction, that I flatter myself my interference will not be deemed impertinent.

Upon applying to the superintendent of finance to know how far I might depend upon him for the pay, feeding, and clothing of the army for the current year, and for the sums necessary to put it and keep it in motion, he very candidly laid open to me the state of our moneyed affairs, and convinced me, that although the assistance we had derived from abroad was considerable, yet it would be by no means adequate to our expenses. He informed me further, that, to make up the deficiency, the States had been called upon by Congress for eight millions of dollars for the service of the year 1782, and showed me the copy of a circular letter from himself to the several legislatures, in which he had so fully and clearly pointed out the necessity of a compliance with the requisition, that it is needless for me to say more on that head, than that I entirely concur with him in opinion, so far as he has gone into the matter.* But there are other reasons, which could not be so well known to him as they are to me, as having come under my immediate observation, and which, therefore, I shall take the liberty to mention.

Your Excellency cannot but remember the ferment, into which the whole army was thrown twelve months ago for the want of pay and a regular supply of clothing and provisions; and with how much difficulty they were brought into temper, by a partial supply of the two first, and a promise of more regular supplies of all in future. Those promises the soldiery now begin to claim; and, although we shall be able to satisfy them tolerably in respect to clothing, and perfectly in regard to provisions, if the financier is enabled to comply with

* See this letter in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 494.

his contracts, yet there is no prospect of obtaining pay, until a part of the money required of the States can be brought into the public treasury. You cannot conceive the uneasiness, which arises from the total want of so essential an article as money, and the real difficulties in which the officers in particular are involved on that account. The favorable aspect of our affairs, and the hopes that matters are in a train to afford them relief, contribute to keep them quiet; but I cannot answer for the effects of a disappointment.

Enabling the financier to comply with his contracts is a matter of the utmost consequence; the very existence of the army depends upon it. Should he fail in his payments, the contract ceases, and there is no alternative left, but to disband or live upon the seizure of the neighbouring property. The saving to the public, by feeding an army by contract, is too well known to need any illustration, and that alone ought to be a sufficient inducement to the States to find the means of adhering to it.

It will perhaps be urged, that the sum called for is immense, and beyond the ability of the country to pay. There is one plain answer to that objection, should it be made. It is, that, if the war is carried on, a certain expense must be incurred, and that such expense must be drawn from the people, either by a partial, cruel, and I may say illegal seizure of the property, which lies most convenient to the army, or by a regular and equitable tax in money or specific articles. Money, if it can be procured, is to be preferred, because it is neither liable to waste, nor is it expensive in the mode of collection or transportation. Whereas I think I may venture to say, that a great proportion of the specific articles has been wasted after the people have furnished them, and that the transportation alone of what have

reached the army has in numberless instances cost more than the value of the articles themselves.

To bring this war to a speedy and happy conclusion must be the fervent wish of every lover of his country ; and sure I am, that no means are so likely to effect these as vigorous preparations for another campaign. Whether, then, we consult our true interest, substantial economy, or sound policy, we shall find, that relaxation and languor are of all things to be avoided. Conduct of that kind on our part will produce fresh hopes and new exertions on that of the enemy ; whereby the war, which has already held out beyond the general expectation, may be protracted to such a length, that the people, groaning under the burthen of it, and despairing of success, may think any change a change for the better.

I will close with a request, that your Excellency will be good enough to take the first opportunity of laying these sentiments before the legislature of your State. From the attention, which they have ever been pleased to pay to any former requisitions or representations of mine, I am encouraged to hope, that the present, which is equally important with any I have ever made, will meet with a favorable reception.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* A circular letter, dated December 17th, had been sent by Congress to the several States, urging strongly a compliance with the requisitions for money and men to prosecute the war. — *Secret Journal*, Vol. I. p. 227.

The French ministry seem to have been as fearful as General Washington himself, that the recent successes would have a tendency to cool the zeal and diminish the efforts of the Americans in preparing for a future prosecution of the war.

“The capture of Cornwallis,” said Count de Vergennes in a letter to M. de la Luzerne, “should excite the ardor of the Americans, and prove to them that the English are not invincible. Great preparations should be made for the next campaign, that advantage may be taken of this loss on the part of the British. We earnestly desire, that our allies may

TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE.

Philadelphia, 25 January, 1782.

SIR,

By a letter, which General Lincoln addressed to me before he went to the eastward, I find that you approve of my plan of sending officers to the four New England States particularly, with the returns of their deficiencies of troops, and with instructions to attend upon the legislatures, and endeavour to impress them with the

profit by it. The more they multiply their exertions, the more certain will be their success in procuring the tranquillity of their country. But, if they return to their accustomed inactivity, they will give England time to repair her losses, as she seems determined to do, and to prolong the war, which it is for the interest of the United States to terminate as soon as possible. It is greatly to be desired, that, during the approaching year, America may be entirely freed from the enemy. An attempt must be made to take New York and Charleston. The Americans ought to be inspired with the greatest ardor in anticipating these two events. The King will certainly concur, as far as circumstances will permit; and, to facilitate as much as possible the preparations of Congress, his Majesty is resolved in the course of the year to make them another loan of six millions of livres, by instalments of five hundred thousand a month. Let Mr. Morris, the minister of finance, be informed of this, and make his arrangements accordingly; but, let him be told in the most peremptory manner, that nothing more can be given, and that no drafts on the American agents in Europe must be made, except what are provided for out of this fund.

"It is impossible to conceive upon what grounds the Americans hope, that England is prepared to negotiate with them an advantageous peace. To convince them of the contrary, I send you a copy of all the papers, which have passed relative to the mediation. You will see by the last answer of the court of London to the mediating powers, that England still regards the Americans as rebel subjects, and will not begin a negotiation with France and Spain, till they will consent that she shall treat the colonies as she thinks proper; that is, till we will consent to abandon them. The King has not replied to the letter sent to him by the mediating powers in consequence of this answer from the court of London. You may, in the mean time, assure Congress, that the King will persist invariably in the principles of the alliance, and will never lend himself to a negotiation, which shall have for its object a direct or indirect violation of them." — *MS. Letter, Versailles, December 24th, 1781*

expediency, and indeed necessity, of filling their battalions previously to the opening of the campaign.

He informed me, also, that you would be glad to give the same officers some instructions relative to the business of your department. If so, I could wish you would have your letters ready to go by the next post, by which time I expect to have the returns prepared. I have not yet fixed upon the gentlemen, but you can leave blanks for the insertion of the names of those, who may be chosen.

As we may reasonably expect to hear soon again from Sir Henry Clinton, on the subject of the meeting of commissioners, I think it would be well to be preparing the substance of the powers to be delegated to the gentlemen, to whom the transaction of the proposed business will be committed. What I would wish you to prepare particularly, is so much as will relate to the liquidation of the accounts of prisoners, and to making provision for their maintenance in future.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

Philadelphia, 29 January, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

I have no doubt, from the various and essential services you have rendered to your country, that you must be extremely obnoxious to the enemy. To protect your person against any insidious attempts from them, a guard was therefore ordered from the New York line; but, as it is important that the troops should be collected, and the corps be kept together as much as possible this winter, I should wish all the men, who are able, might join their regiments at Pompton. And,

in the mean time, I have enclosed an order to the commanding officer of the New Hampshire line to furnish a guard to replace the former, while those regiments continue at the northward. I hope in the spring there may be such a provision made of State troops, or levies, that this guard may also be relieved or taken off without hazard or inconvenience.

Every information tending to prove, that the affairs respecting the Grants may be speedily and happily accommodated, gives me singular satisfaction. I will flatter myself, that both the articles of intelligence you have received are well grounded,* and that it will be the unremitting effort of every one, who is well affected to the general cause, to prevent the horrors of civil discord in any part of the United States. It has been intimated, that some of the enemy's shipping and armed vessels have been detained by the ice in Lake Champlain in such a manner, that they might be destroyed and the cannon brought off. If the fact is so, I will thank you for as early and explicit information as possible, that measures may be taken accordingly. The destruction of those vessels, would, I think, greatly impede any future incursions from that quarter.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Circular to the States.

Philadelphia, 31 January, 1782.

SIR,

I have the honor of transmitting herewith accurate returns of the number of men now actually in service

* Relating to the affairs of Vermont.

from your State, in order that measures may be taken for completing the regiments to the full establishment, agreeably to the resolution of Congress on the 10th of December. I cannot omit so favorable an occasion of expressing to your Excellency my sentiments on that subject, and of entreating, in the most earnest manner, that there may be a speedy, pointed, and effectual compliance with those requisitions.

It will, I flatter myself, be unnecessary to recapitulate all the arguments I made use of in the circular letter I had the honor to address to the governors of the several States, at the close of the campaign of 1780; in which, it must be remembered, I took the liberty to urge, from the knowledge I had of our affairs and a series of experience, the policy, the expediency, the necessity of recruiting the army, as the only probable means of bringing the war to a speedy and happy conclusion. If those arguments had any influence at that time, if the consequent exertions were crowned with any success, if the present crisis exhibits new and more forcible inducements for still greater efforts, let me point your Excellency and the legislature to those considerations; and especially let me recommend, in the warmest terms, that all the fruits of the successes, which have been obtained the last campaign, may not be thrown away by an inglorious winter of languor and inactivity.

However, at this advanced stage of the war, it might seem to be an insult to the understanding to suppose a long train of reasoning necessary to prove, that a respectable force in the field is essential to the establishment of our liberties and independence; yet, as I am apprehensive the prosperous issue of the combined operation in Virginia may have (as is too common in such cases) the pernicious tendency of lulling the coun-

try into a lethargy of inactivity and security ; and as I feel my own reputation, as well as the interest, the honor, the glory, and happiness of my country, intimately connected with the event, I will ask the indulgence to speak more freely on those accounts, and to make some of the observations, which the present moment seems to suggest.

The broken and perplexed state of the enemy's affairs, and the successes of the last campaign on our part, ought to be a powerful incitement to vigorous preparations for the next. Unless we strenuously exert ourselves to profit by these successes, we shall not only lose all the solid advantages that might be derived from them, but we shall become contemptible in our own eyes, in the eyes of our enemy, in the opinion of posterity, and even in the estimation of the whole world, which will consider us as a nation unworthy of prosperity, because we know not how to make a right use of it.

Although we cannot, by the best concerted plans, absolutely command success, although the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, yet, without presumptuously waiting for miracles to be wrought in our favor, it is our indispensable duty, with the deepest gratitude to Heaven for the past, and humble confidence in its smiles on our future operations, to make use of all the means in our power for our defence and security. This period is particularly important, because no circumstances since the commencement of the war have been so favorable to the recruiting service as the present, and because it is to be presumed, from the increase of population and the brilliant prospects before us, that it is actually in our power to complete the army before the opening of the campaign. However flattering these prospects may be,

much still remains to be done, which cannot probably be effected unless the army is recruited to its establishment; and consequently the continuance or termination of the war seems principally to rest on the vigor and decision of the States in this interesting point. And, finally, it is our first object of policy, under every supposable or possible case, to have a powerful army early in the field; for we must suppose the enemy are either disposed to prosecute the war, or to enter into a negotiation for peace. There is no other alternative. On the former supposition, a respectable army becomes necessary to counteract the enemy, and to prevent the accumulating expenses of a lingering war; on the latter, nothing but a decidedly superior force can enable us boldly to claim our rights and dictate the law at the pacification. So that, whatever the disposition of the enemy may be, it is evidently our only interest and economy to act liberally, and exert ourselves greatly during the present winter to cut off at once all the expenses of the war by putting a period to it.

And soon might that day arrive, and we might hope to enjoy all the blessings of peace, if we could see again the same animation in the cause of our country inspiring every breast, the same passion for freedom and military glory impelling our youths to the field, and the same disinterested patriotism pervading every rank of men, that was conspicuous at the commencement of this glorious revolution; and I am persuaded, that only some great occasion was wanting, such as the present moment exhibits, to rekindle the latent sparks of that patriotic fire into a generous flame, to rouse again the unconquerable spirit of liberty, which has sometimes seemed to slumber for awhile, into the full vigor of action.

I cannot now conclude this letter without expressing

my full expectation, that the several States, animated with the noblest principles and convinced of the policy of complying faithfully with the requisitions, will be only emulous which shall be foremost in furnishing its quota of men; that the calculations of the numbers wanted to fill the deficiencies may be so ample as, allowing for all the casualties and deductions, will be sufficient certainly to complete the battalions; that the measures for this purpose may be so explicit, pointed, and energetic, as will inevitably furnish the recruits in season; and that such checks may be established to prevent imposition, as to the quality of the men, that no recruits may be accepted but those, who are in fact able-bodied and effective. Should any of a different description be sent to the army, they must be rejected, the expense thrown away, and the service injured, though others are required to fill their places; for it is only deceiving ourselves with having a nominal instead of a real force, and consuming the public provisions and clothing to no effect, to attempt to impose decrepit and improper men or boys upon us as soldiers.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Philadelphia, 9 February, 1782.

SIR,

I have been honored with your Excellency's favor of the 12th and 22d ultimo, the latter enclosing copies of General Greene's letter to you and your answer. After informing you that I concur with you in opinion, that it would not be politic at this moment to move a detachment from your main body to the southward, permit me to assure you, that I very sensibly feel your

goodness in determining to advance the legion as soon as possible to the frontiers of North Carolina. I have only to request, that the commanding officer may have orders to proceed further or not as circumstances may require. The move of the legion will be perplexing to the enemy; and, as it has been heretofore the advance corps of your army, you may, I think, give out, and it will carry with it strong marks of probability, that your whole army is to follow, as soon as the weather will admit of the march. Supposing the enemy should receive the reinforcement from Ireland, I do not imagine that they will, after the many severe blows they have felt from plunging themselves into the country, march to any great distance from Charleston; especially if they consider, that, while France has a naval superiority in the West Indian or American seas, a body of troops might be easily thrown in between them and the town, whereby their ruin would be inevitable.

It would certainly be our true interest, if it could be done, to give General Greene such a force, that he should be able, under all circumstances, to keep the enemy confined to their posts upon the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia; but, should your excellent and valuable body of men be made use of for that purpose, it might possibly interfere with the plan of the campaign, which we may shortly expect from your court. Those States, whose troops compose the southern army, will be pressed to send forward reinforcements to General Greene as early and as expeditiously as possible.

I am apprehensive that your Excellency will think me unmindful of a most agreeable piece of duty, which I have been directed to perform by Congress. It is the presentation of two of the field-pieces taken at York, with an inscription engraved on them expressive

of the occasion. I find a difficulty in getting the engraving properly executed. When finished, I shall with peculiar pleasure put the cannon into your possession.

In an address, which I have lately received from the Senate of the State of Virginia, on account of the surrender of York and Gloucester, I am desired to make their most grateful acknowledgments to your Excellency and to the officers and men under your command, for your eminent services upon that occasion, and to assure you, that they see with pleasure the harmony, which subsists between the inhabitants of the State and their generous allies. I take the first opportunity of making this agreeable communication.

In my letter of the 14th of January, I requested that Lord Rawdon might be exchanged for Brigadier-General Moultrie of South Carolina, in preference to any of the colonels mentioned by Sir Henry Clinton; it being more conformable to our practice than to make exchanges by composition. I now take the liberty of confirming that request.* I am, &c.

TO COLONEL ARMAND, AT CHARLOTTESVILLE.†

Philadelphia, 13 February, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

I am favored with your letter of the 25th of January, and am happy to inform you, that Colonel Ternant and the other gentlemen of your corps are exchanged. Arrangements are made with the financier respecting the recruiting money, of which Colonel Ternant will give you a satisfactory account; and also acquaint you with the steps, that have been taken to procure the

* Lord Rawdon was afterwards exchanged for General Scott.

† Colonel Armand returned from France, and joined the army before the siege of Yorktown.

greater part of the horses by contract. Colonel Carington, quartermaster to the southern army, who is now in this town, before he returns to Virginia, will be enabled to make such provision for furnishing the supplies required from that department, as I hope will free you from further trouble on that subject. The secretary at war will inform you whether the addition of an officer to each troop of cavalry was meant to extend to the legionary corps or not.

I have to request, that you will not lose a moment's time in marching as large a number of your legion as possible to join the army under the orders of Major-General Greene. By arriving at a critical period the corps may possibly have an opportunity of signalizing itself, and rendering essential service to the public. Colonel Ternant, who is the bearer of this, will be able more fully to enforce the reasons of my sentiments and wishes. You will perceive that officer is appointed inspector to the southern army. It is an office of importance, and requires a gentleman of ability and activity to perform the duties of it with propriety. I pray you will be persuaded, that I can never be unmindful of the zeal and attachment you have always discovered for the service, and that, I am, with great regard, dear Sir, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, 18 February, 1782.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to enclose copies of the reports of the commissary-general of prisoners, who has just returned from New York, with copies of the papers to which he refers. Your Excellency will per-

ceive thereby, that the restriction upon the exchange of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis operates against the liberation of Brigadier-General Scott, seven colonels and two lieutenant-colonels, who, upon the principles of the tariff established between us and the enemy, are equivalent to his Lordship in value.

I also enclose the copy of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, by which it would appear that the exchange of Mr. Laurens might be effected for Earl Cornwallis, should Congress think proper to accede to the proposal. I beg leave to remark upon that letter, that there has been some misconception either on the part of Colonel Laurens or Lord Cornwallis, as to what passed on the subject in Virginia. Colonel Laurens asked me there, whether, supposing an exchange could be effected between his father and his Lordship, I should have any objection to it. I answered, none personally, and that, as Congress had made no difficulty in offering General Burgoyne for Mr. Laurens, I thought they might now probably offer Lord Cornwallis, but that the matter did not depend upon me. This I find has been construed into absolute consent on my part.

With respect to the policy of prohibiting the exchange of Lord Cornwallis I will not pretend to determine. I cannot, however, help observing, that it operates disagreeably in giving uneasiness to those officers of ours, who can only be exchanged by composition, and who are by the enemy set against him, and that it may be considered as a departure from the spirit of the terms of the capitulation of York.

Mr. Sproat's proposition of the exchange of British soldiers for American seamen, if acceded to, will immediately give the enemy a very considerable reinforcement, and will be a constant draft hereafter upon the prisoners of war in our hands. It ought also to

be considered, that few or none of the naval prisoners in New York and elsewhere belong to the Continental service. I however feel for the situation of these unfortunate people, and wish to see them relieved by any mode, which will not materially affect the public good. In some former letters upon this subject I have mentioned a plan, by which I am certain they might be liberated nearly as fast as captured. It is by obliging the captains of all armed vessels, both public and private, to throw their prisoners into common stock under the direction of the commissary-general of prisoners. By these means they would be taken care of and regularly applied to the exchange of those in the hands of the enemy. Now the greater part are dissipated, and the few that remain are applied partially. I shall be obliged to your Excellency for obtaining and transmitting to me the sentiments of Congress upon these subjects as early as convenient.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.*

Philadelphia, 18 February, 1782.

MY DEAR LAURENS,

I have had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 10th of December, and also the report of the judicious and successful movement of General Greene, by which he compelled the enemy to abandon their out-posts. This brilliant manœuvre is another proof of the singular abilities which that officer possesses.

Since my last despatches from South Carolina I have been informed, by way of Virginia, of the intelligence

* Colonel Laurens joined the southern army shortly after the capitulation at Yorktown.

General Greene had received, that a reinforcement was expected from Ireland, of the application he had made in consequence to the Count de Rochambeau, and of the resolution the Count had taken of detaching the legion of Lauzun to his aid. I hope this force, together with the corps of Armand, will give such a decided superiority of cavalry, as will prevent the enemy from reoccupying and ravaging the country again, should the whole reinforcement from Ireland arrive. And I must confess, that I cannot entirely rely upon it, as I have not heard the intelligence from any other quarter, although a frigate has just arrived at New York with the King of England's speech, and despatches from administration. Nothing however has transpired except the speech, from the complexion of which no decisive opinion can be formed.

But I think a little time will disclose what the enemy's intentions are, should they still persist in the prosecution of the war, and whether they mean to occupy the two great posts of New York and Charleston, or concentrate the whole of their force together. In the former case, reinforcements may undoubtedly be expected; and I know of nothing, which can be opposed to them with such a prospect of success, as the corps you have proposed should be levied in Carolina. To make the campaign decisive is our great object. I wish that the States might be impressed with the necessity of taking their measures accordingly, and that the war might not be procrastinated by want of exertion on our part.* Believe me,

* *General Washington to General Greene.* — "A frigate has just arrived at New York from England. She was despatched immediately after the news of Cornwallis's surrender. I have seen the New York prints, and no mention is made of any reinforcement having sailed for America; a circumstance, which, had it happened, I think would not have been omitted at this time, when the loyalists are desponding, and looking upon

my dear Laurens, I am convinced, under all circumstances, of your unbounded zeal in the service of your country. That success may ever attend you in the pursuit of personal glory and public felicity, is the earnest wish of your affectionate friend, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, 20 February, 1782.

SIR,

Since my letter to your Excellency of the 18th instant, I have been honored with the public and secret resolves of Congress of the same date; the former empowering me to appoint commissioners for the purposes therein mentioned, the latter prohibiting the exchange of Lieutenant-General Lord Cornwallis by composition, which is the only mode by which he ever can be exchanged, except for civil characters, we having no military grade answerable to his.*

themselves as lost and unsupported. The reinforcement from New York was not more than six or seven hundred men. The King's speech at the opening of the British Parliament is firm, and manifests a determination to continue the war, although there is no appearance of his having made any alliances. This I hope will prove to the States the necessity of complying with the requisitions upon them for men and supplies. Every argument that I could invent to induce them to it, has been made use of by me in two sets of circular letters. No part of the intelligence brought by the frigate has yet gone abroad. It is no doubt of consequence. If any alteration is to be made in the disposition of the force remaining in America, it must soon become visible. Until we hear from the court of France, we can only be making general preparations. Men are the most material of all; and I cannot say that the means of obtaining them, so far as I have yet heard, are efficacious." — *February 18th.*

* By the resolves here referred to, Congress invested General Washington with powers to negotiate an exchange of prisoners on the broadest scale, and to take measures for settling all accounts respecting prisoners; but these resolves were accompanied with a "*secret instruction*," that nothing contained therein "should be construed to authorize the ex-

I find myself so exceedingly embarrassed by the operation of the secret resolve, that I hope Congress will excuse me for pointing out the difficulties in which it involves me personally, and the manner in which it affects, as I conceive, the public good. By the public resolve all former restrictions are taken off, and I am at liberty to go into a general exchange without limitation. When it therefore shall be found, that Lord Cornwallis is still detained, those officers of ours (particularly our full colonels, most of whom can only be exchanged on composition), who will be sufferers on that account, will naturally apply to me for the reasons. I must either submit to their opinions of a conduct so apparently strange, or, to justify myself, must be under the necessity of betraying a secret vote of Congress.

In order more clearly to point out the manner, in which the secret resolve, if adhered to, will operate against the public interest, I must beg leave to request the attention of Congress to a short recital of the reasons, which induced me, at this particular time, to propose a meeting of commissioners to the British Commander-in-chief.

On my return from Virginia, the superintendent of finance informed me, that the subsistence of the prisoners of war had now become so serious a matter, that there was an absolute necessity of endeavouring to ob-

change of Lieutenant-General Cornwallis by composition." It appears to have been the object of this reservation to secure the release of Mr. Laurens, who was yet retained a prisoner in England, and had been for more than a year shut up in the Tower of London. The southern members were particularly strenuous on this point, as well as indignant at the mode adopted by Lord Cornwallis in prosecuting the war at the south. For a remarkable expression of the feelings of the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia on this subject, see *Journals, February 23d.*

tain payment of the money already due to us upon that account, and at all events to fix upon some certain and regular mode of payment for their maintenance in future. In order to effect these objects, he advised my making propositions to Sir Henry Clinton to appoint commissioners, not only to liquidate the accounts of prisoners, but to endeavour, by the establishment of a permanent cartel (a matter, which we have never yet been able to obtain), to adjust a number of points relating to the exchanges and accommodation of prisoners, for want of which, individuals, as well the subjects of the United States as those of Great Britain, are daily suffering.

Sir Henry Clinton, after several letters had passed between us on the subject, acceded to the proposition in the most extensive sense. Commissioners were named, and I only waited for the authority of Congress to enable me to invest the commissioners on our part with proper powers. This by the public resolve of the 18th is amply granted, but by the subsequent secret resolve it is in a manner done away. The powers of our commissioners can only have reference to the public resolve, and whatever stipulations are entered into will be upon a confidence, that no further obstructions will be thrown in the way. The exchange of Lord Cornwallis (as heretofore) would be one of the first things demanded; and, should that be rejected, as it must be, the enemy would not only have it in their power to tax us with a breach of faith, but they might recede in turn from any part of their agreements; and it is to be feared, that they would pitch upon that respecting the payment for the maintenance of their prisoners, as it will be a weighty matter to them, and one which they can evade with less inconvenience than almost any other, as we have

a very great number of theirs to support, and they few of ours.

In addition to what I have said, I have only further to remark, that the gentlemen, who have been named by me to execute the commission, have objections to going upon it, unless they can meet those from the British on fair and open terms. This can only be done either by withdrawing the secret vote entirely, or by adhering publicly to the resolution of detaining Lord Cornwallis, and trying what can be effected under such circumstances. The last would remove my present scruples, if it should not be deemed a violation of the capitulation; but I fear, as I before mentioned, that the general interest would suffer by the measure. We never can expect that such a cartel, as will be really beneficial to us, will be acceded to while an officer of Lord Cornwallis's high rank and family influence is excepted, nor indeed while a power is reserved or implied of being able to deprive of the right of exchange any other officer, who may hereafter as a prisoner of war become entitled to the advantages of a stipulation of such a nature as a cartel.*

I ever with diffidence enter into discussions of the above kind, and I am now more than commonly apprehensive, that my conduct may appear reprehensible, as Congress have been pleased, upon several late applications, to adhere to their former opinions respecting Lord Cornwallis. Had I^e not seen new difficulties arising from restricting his exchange, I should have

* On a consideration of this letter, it was resolved by Congress, "That the Commander-in-chief be authorized to agree to the exchange of Earl Cornwallis by composition; provided that the Honorable Henry Laurens be liberated, and proper assurances be obtained, that all accounts for the support of the convention prisoners, and all other prisoners of war, shall be speedily settled and discharged."—*Journals, February 23d.*

deemed myself as inexcusable in further controverting the will of Congress, as I should have been, had I remained silent when I thought my voice might have conduced to the general good. That this has been my only motive for taking up so much of your time I beg you will believe, as sincerely as that I am, with the utmost respect, &c.

TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Philadelphia, 26 February, 1782.

SIR,

I have appointed the meeting of our respective commissioners to be at Elizabethtown on the 15th of next month. If I hear nothing further from your Excellency, I shall take it for granted, that you accede to the time and place. And I would propose, as is usual in such cases, that a cessation of hostilities should take place, during the meeting, from Amboy to Newark, both included.

As my commissioners will go fully authorized to treat of the exchanges of Lord Cornwallis and the Honorable Mr. Laurens, I have no occasion to be particular in my answer to your Excellency's letter on that subject. I shall only observe, that I apprehend Lord Cornwallis misunderstood Colonel Laurens, in the conversation they had upon that matter in Virginia. I could never have given an assurance, that his Lordship should be exchanged for Mr. Laurens, the father of the colonel, as I had no authority to make any such stipulation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM IRVINE.

Instructions.

SIR,

You will proceed with all convenient despatch to Fort Pitt, the object of your command, and you will take such measures for the security of that post and for the defence of the western frontier, as your Continental force combined with the militia of the neighbouring country will admit. Under present appearances and circumstances, I can promise no further addition to your regular force, than a proportion of recruits for the Virginia and Pennsylvania regiments, which are already upon the western station; consequently offensive operations, except upon a small scale, cannot just now be brought into contemplation. You may, however, still continue to keep yourself informed of the situation of Detroit, and the strength of the enemy at that place.

With respect to the subject of the letters, which you have lately received from Colonel Gibson, I can only repeat what I have said to you personally. You must endeavour to convince both officers and men, that measures are actually taking to put them upon such a footing with regard to their provisions, clothing, and pay, that it is to be hoped they will ere long have no reason to complain. They will have already found the difference between their past and present mode of obtaining provisions and clothes; and they cannot therefore doubt, that the only remaining difficulty, which is on account of pay, will be removed as soon as the financier can reap the advantages of the taxes for the current year, which are but just laid, and cannot therefore come yet into use. The officers and men must, upon a moment's reflection, be convinced of the wis-

dom of applying the public money in hand to procuring victuals and clothes. They cannot be dispensed with even for a day; and when both are assured that certificates of pay, due to the 1st of the present year, will be given with interest, and that pay thenceforward will be more regular and as frequent as the public treasury will admit, they ought to be satisfied.

Should the troops composing the western garrison be discontented with their situation, and think that they are partially dealt by, you may make them an offer of being relieved and of taking their chance of the emoluments, which they may suppose accrue to those serving with either the northern or southern armies. There may be policy in this offer, because, if I am not mistaken, most of the men, who have connexions in the upper country, would rather remain there at some disadvantage than be brought away from their families.

You will make such arrangements, as shall comport with the above instructions and the strictest principles of economy, with General Knox and the quartermaster-general respecting military and other stores necessary for the posts under your orders; and you will, I am persuaded, use every means in your power to prevent any waste or embezzlement of them. Given at Headquarters, at Philadelphia, the 8th of March, 1782.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX AND
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.

Instructions.

GENTLEMEN,

The powers of equal date herewith authorize you to proceed to Elizabethtown, in the State of New Jer-

sey, in order to meet commissioners on the part of the enemy, on Friday the 15th * instant, for the purposes in the powers fully recited.

You will consider the settlement of accounts for the subsistence of prisoners of all descriptions from the commencement of the war to ; obtaining payment, or security for the payment, of the large balance, which it is presumed was due to the United States at that period, and establishing some certain arrangements for the regular payment of the subsistence of prisoners from that time forward, as the principal objects of your commission.

From the want of an appointment of a commissary of prisoners until some time after the commencement of the war, from the variety of hands to which the charge of prisoners was committed, and from the little attention, which was for a long time paid to the sums expended for their support, I fear it will be difficult for you to collect the materials necessary to form our account with sufficient accuracy to satisfy yourselves, or to gain credit with the commissioners on the part of the enemy. And it is also probable, that the accounts, which will be produced by them, will be alike subject to many objections for want of proper vouchers and other causes.

You are therefore at liberty, if you find no probability of being able to make a regular settlement, to compound the matter, by fixing upon such a sum as shall appear to you reasonable, which sum shall, upon payment, be looked upon as a full and final discharge of all demands on the part of the United States from the commencement of the war to the time which you

* The commissioners did not meet and exchange powers till the 31st of March. the time having been deferred at the request of Sir Henry Clinton.

shall specify. You are, then, in order to prevent all future disputes, to determine, of what a ration for the support of a prisoner of war shall mutually consist; the value of that ration, not only in whole, but in its component parts; what vouchers shall be esteemed mutually valid; and to obtain and give proper assurances for the regular monthly and quarterly payments of the balances, as they may respectively become due.

Before you proceed to the negotiation of exchanges, you will pay due regard to the resolve of Congress of the 23d of February last, with a copy of which you are furnished, which authorizes the exchange of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis only upon certain conditions therein specified. By the word *liberated*, in the resolve referred to, it is not to be understood, that Mr. Laurens is to be given up without any equivalent. At what the enemy will rate him is uncertain. Congress once offered a lieutenant-general for him; and, if the same should be demanded now, and insisted upon, you are at liberty to comply. If circumstances should render the exchange of Lord Cornwallis impracticable, the respective commissaries of prisoners may proceed to the exchange of other officers; and, if the enemy should persist in their resolution of detaining a certain number of our officers of rank, as a counter security to our detention of Lord Cornwallis, it may be submitted to, upon the following principle, that it will be better for four or five gentlemen (the number who will be involved) to remain in captivity, than the whole, amounting to considerably above one hundred.

In compliance with a resolve of Congress of the 20th of December last, a copy of which and some papers relating to it you have herewith, you will enter into a discussion with the British commissioners upon the

powers and conduct of the Board of Directors of the Associated Loyalists in New York, and you will endeavour to devise some means for the prevention of that kind of depredation, which is complained of. On this subject you will do nothing conclusive, but report to me the substance of the measure, which may have seemed to the British commissioners and yourselves most likely to answer the end.

I recommend to your particular attention the case of one Summers, a native of Pennsylvania, taken in 1778, and yet detained upon Long Island, notwithstanding every reasonable offer has been made to procure his exchange. The commissary of prisoners can inform you fully of his situation and circumstances.

Should you enter into either a general or special cartel, you will endeavour to stipulate, that, in future, citizens not in arms shall not be considered as subjects of capture, but in particular cases, such as for guides, for intelligence, and such like purposes; and that they shall be well treated, and discharged after the ends for which they were captured are answered.

Should the admiral accede to my proposition of sending commissioners to meet you, on the subject of the treatment and exchange of marine prisoners, you will endeavour in the first place to obtain a change in the mode of keeping our seamen confined. The daily complaint of the miseries incident to confinement on board prison-ships will authorize you to remonstrate warmly on that head, and to insist upon an alteration of conduct. In respect to the support and mode of payment for the subsistence of seamen, you will be guided by the instruction relating to the rations of soldiers.

You are acquainted with the difficulties under which we labor, as to the means of procuring the exchange

of the American seamen, who fall into the hands of the enemy. It but rarely happens, that those captured by private vessels of war are given up to the Continental commissaries. Some are taken into our service, many escape through negligence, and therefore it is that the balance of marine prisoners has been generally greatly against us. The mode proposed by Admiral Digby of giving up land prisoners for seamen is altogether inadmissible. It would prove a constant source of reinforcement to the enemy. Under present circumstances I do not see, that you can come to any final determination upon the mode of exchanging or liberating seamen. Should commissaries meet you on that subject, you will in conjunction with them form a plan, which may be deemed mutually equitable and convenient, and report upon it.

You have herewith the copies of the letters, which have passed between the British general and admiral and myself upon the subject of your commission. The superintendent of finance will furnish you with materials for stating our claims for subsistence of prisoners, so far as he has been able to obtain them; and the commissary of prisoners will furnish you with any official papers, which may be in his possession, and which may be found necessary to the accomplishment of a general or special cartel. Given under my hand and seal, at Philadelphia, the 11th day of March, 1782.

P. S. Since the above, I have been furnished by Congress with a number of representations respecting the treatment of our marine prisoners. I have thought it proper to put them into your hands, that you may make the necessary use of them.

TO JAMES MCHENRY.

Philadelphia, 12 March, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

The fair hand, to whom your letter of the 20th of January was committed, presented it safely, and, as you rightly observed, the value of it was enhanced thereby. Good laws, ample means, and sufficient powers, may render the appointment of your intendant * a public benefit; and, from the spirit of your people, I hope these are provided. Without them, the appointment must be nugatory. Never, since the commencement of the present revolution, has there been in my judgment a period, when vigorous measures were more consonant with sound policy than the present. The speech of the British King, and the addresses of the Lords and Commons, are proofs to my mind of two things; namely, their wishes to prosecute the American war, and their fears of the consequences. My opinion of the matter is, therefore, that the minister will obtain supplies for the current year, prepare vigorously for another campaign, and then prosecute the war, or treat of peace, as circumstances and fortuitous events may justify; and that nothing will contribute more to the first, than a relaxation or apparent supineness on the part of these States. The debates upon the addresses evidently prove, what I have here advanced, to be true; for these addresses, as explained, are meant to answer any purpose the ministers may have in view. What madness then can be greater, or what policy and economy worse, than to let the enemy again rise upon our folly and want of exertion? Shall we not be justly charge-

* An officer recently appointed by the legislature of Maryland, and "vested with powers to destroy that disorder in the affairs of the State, which had arisen chiefly from bad money and want of money."

able for all the blood and treasure, which shall be wasted in a lingering war, procrastinated by false expectations of peace, or timid measures for the prosecution of it? Surely we shall; and much is it to be lamented, that our endeavours do not at all times accord with our wishes. Each State is anxious to see the end of our warfare accomplished, but shrinks when it is called upon for the means; and either withholds them altogether, or grants them in such a way as to defeat the end. Such, it is to be feared, will be the case in many instances respecting the requisitions of men and money.

I have the pleasure, however, to inform you, that the Assembly of this State,* now sitting, have passed their supply-bill without a dissenting voice, and that a laudable spirit seems to pervade all the members of that body; but I fear, notwithstanding, that they will be deficient in their quota of men. It is idle at this late period of the war, when enthusiasm is cooled, if not done away, when the minds of that class of men, who are proper subjects for soldiers, are poisoned by the high bounties which have been given, and the knowledge of the distresses of the army so generally diffused through every State, to suppose that our battalions can be completed by voluntary enlistment. The attempt is vain, and we are only deceiving ourselves and injuring the cause by making the experiment. There is no other effectual method to get men suddenly, but that of classing the people, and compelling each class to furnish a recruit. Here every man is interested; every man becomes a recruiting officer. If our necessity for men did not press, I should prefer the mode of voluntary enlistment; as it does, I am sure it will not

* Pennsylvania.

answer, and that the season for enterprise will be upon us long ere we are ready for the field.

The anxious state of suspense, in which we have been for some time, and still remain, respecting the naval engagement in the West Indies and the attempt upon Brimstone Hill in the Island of St. Kitt's, is disagreeable beyond description. The issue of these events must be very interesting, and may give a very unfavorable turn to affairs in that quarter, and to America in its consequences. With much sincerity and affection, I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE BIENIEWSKY.*

Philadelphia, 18 March, 1782.

SIR,

I am honored with your letter of this morning. It would give me very great pleasure to recommend to Congress an officer of your rank and abilities, could I suppose that such a recommendation would have any weight in inducing them to accept those offers of service, which you, Sir, so generously make to this country; but I am sorry to say, that the situation of our affairs at this time is such, that a considerable reduction

* This celebrated soldier and adventurer, whose life had been replete with so many romantic incidents, had recently arrived in the United States. His letter to General Washington will explain his objects and wishes, and is here translated.

"*Philadelphia, March 18th.* — Sir; My ignorance of the English language constrains me to request Baron Steuben to be the bearer of these lines to your Excellency. I have come to America under the auspices of the minister of France; but, my design being to serve the United States, I solicit your interest with Congress in my behalf, offering to your country (of which I am desirous to become a citizen) my blood, my skill, and my courage; and, in case my offer should be accepted, I ask of you the favor to serve the next campaign by your side and under your orders. Perhaps some fortunate circumstance may furnish me

has lately taken place among our old officers, by which some very valuable general officers, who have served their country during the whole of this contest, and who wish to remain in service, will be obliged to retire. I sincerely lament, that your arrival in America was not at an earlier period, when this country could have employed you in a manner suitable to your rank, and thereby received essential benefit from that military experience, which a length of service must have given you. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Philadelphia, 18 March, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

It gives me the more pain to hear of your distresses for want of clothing and other necessaries, as you are at so great a distance, that you cannot be suddenly relieved, even if we had the means. I am not, however, without hopes, that, should the war be continued to the southward (of which I have my doubts, for reasons which I shall presently give), matters will be put into a much better train than they have hitherto been. The arrangements made already, by the superintendent of finance, have been attended with infinite public advanta-

with an opportunity of justifying the marks of esteem and confidence with which you may honor me.

"You honored my cousin-german, Pulaski, with your confidence. If you will continue it to me, my zeal and attachment shall requite your goodness. I have just quitted the service of the Emperor, whom I served in the last war against the King of Prussia in the rank of *général de bataille*; and I entered into the service of France only to put myself in a condition to come to America. Such has been my conduct. The rest must depend on the judgment of your Excellency. I have the honor to be, &c.

"COUNT DE BIENIEWSKY."

ges, and he is extending those arrangements as fast as circumstances will possibly admit. I am sorry to see a jealousy, arising from a supposition that there has been a partiality of conduct. I am certain there has been no such intention, and that, instead of a charge of having done too little, it will soon be a matter of wonder how Mr. Morris has done so much with so small means. As I know he corresponds with you on the affairs of his department, I shall content myself with saying, that, before Colonel Carrington leaves town, measures will be taken to enable him to make provision in future for the ready transportation of stores, and for the accommodation of troops moving to the southward. It is agreed that the laboratory shall be removed from Richmond to New London.

In my former letters upon this subject, I acquainted you with the reasons, which operated against Count de Rochambeau's detaching more than the legion of Lauzun towards South Carolina, upon your requisition for a reinforcement. Although my instructions to you did not mention a power to call upon the Count for assistance, yet I look upon it as implied in my desire to you to correspond with him. The circumstances of the moment must determine whether any or what can be spared by him.

By late advices from Europe, and from the declarations of the British ministers themselves, it appears, that they have done with all thoughts of an excursive war, and that they mean to send but small, if any further reinforcements to America. It may be also tolerably plainly seen, that they do not mean to hold all their present posts, and that New York will be occupied in preference to any other. Hence, and from other indications, I am induced to believe that an evacuation of the southern States will take place. Should this happen, we

must concentrate our force as the enemy do theirs. You will, therefore, upon the appearance of such an event, immediately make preparations for the march of the army under your command to the northward. What troops shall, in that case, be left in the southern States, will be a matter of future discussion.

No other reinforcement went from New York to South Carolina, than that of the four hundred who had arrived. Letters, which you had not received when you last wrote, will have informed you, that our first intelligence respecting the number of men embarked was false. With the highest sentiments of esteem, I am, my dear Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Philadelphia, 19 March, 1782.

SIR,

Under present appearances, I think General de Choisy should not move beyond Charlotte Court-House. There are several reasons to induce a belief, that the enemy mean to evacuate South Carolina and Georgia. If such an event is to take place we must soon know it.* I requested the minister of finance to inform you, that whenever it became necessary I would meet you at this place. Mount Vernon, exclusive of the happiness of entertaining you at my own house, would be very agreeable to me, but I could not at the opening of the campaign go so far from the army. I congratulate your Excellency upon the total surrender of the Islands of

* It was proposed, that a detachment from the French army under General de Choisy, in which was included Lauzun's legion, should reinforce General Greene, and it had proceeded on the route as far as Charlotte county in Virginia. Lauzun himself had returned to Europe.

St. Kitt's and Nevis, which is fully confirmed. Montserrat must, I think, fall of course. I have also the pleasure to inform you, that the Marquis de Lafayette, and the gentlemen who went with him, all arrived safe in France after a passage of twenty-two days. I shall set out for the army to-morrow. I am, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX AND GOUVERNEUR
MORRIS, AT ELIZABETHTOWN.

Morristown, 28 March, 1782.

GENTLEMEN,

I have had intimations, that, under the idea of the cessation of hostilities within certain limits, a number of people intend to come over from New York to our lines. To prevent all intercourse of this kind is the principal design of this letter. Sir William Howe, on a former occasion, proposed that a neutrality should take place to a certain distance from the spot where our commissioners were to assemble, in order that they might not meet with any interruption in the transaction of their business, from the hostilities and alarms, which might otherwise have happened in the neighbourhood. It was upon this principle, and for this reason, that the present proposal was made on my part; nor was it indeed, nor could it be construed, to extend any farther.

It is therefore my particular desire, that no persons coming from the enemy be permitted to land, except the commissioners and those immediately connected with them. And, as I think it expedient, not only to prevent new channels of communication with the enemy from being opened, but as far as practicable to shut the former, I could wish you would take the trouble to in-

form yourselves of the practice of sending and receiving flags on the lines, and point out such alterations and regulations as you shall deem proper to prevent the evils, which have been complained of, as resulting from too frequent an intercourse with the enemy.

I have been informed by the commissary of prisoners, that the enemy are preparing to send out a considerable quantity of goods, under the sanction of passports granted by me for bringing out clothing and necessaries for the use of their prisoners. This is so contrary to my intention, and may be productive of such ill consequences, that I have sent Colonel Smith to explain the matter to you, and to request that you will examine the list, and signify what articles should be considered as necessaries, and what quantity ought to be permitted to be sent out. Mr. Skinner is directed to give you the necessary information. He will also explain to you the mode, which has prevailed, of making partial exchanges. This subject I need not recommend particularly, as it is comprehended within the limits of your commission. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO COLONEL MATTHIAS OGDEN.

Instructions.

SIR,

The spirit of enterprise, so conspicuous in your plan for surprising in their quarters and bringing off the Prince William Henry and Admiral Digby, merits applause; and you have my authority to make the at-

* General Washington left Philadelphia on the 23d of March, having been there four months; and, after stopping a day or two at Morristown, he proceeded to Newburg, where he arrived on the 1st of April, and established his head-quarters at that place.

tempt, in any manner, and at such a time, as your own judgment shall direct. I am fully persuaded, that it is unnecessary to caution you against offering insult or indignity to the persons of the Prince and Admiral, should you be so fortunate as to capture them; but it may not be amiss to press the propriety of a proper line of conduct upon the party you command.

In case of success, you will, as soon as you get them to a place of safety, treat them with all possible respect; but you are to delay no time in conveying them to Congress, and reporting your proceedings with a copy of these orders. Take care not to touch upon the ground, which is agreed to be neutral, namely, from Newark to Rahway and four miles back. Given at Head-Quarters, this 28th day of March, 1782.*

TO THE GENERAL AND FIELD OFFICERS
OF THE ARMY.

Head-Quarters, 19 April, 1782.

The Commander-in-chief submits the papers accompanying this, containing the case of Captain Joshua Huddy, lately hanged within the county of Monmouth in New Jersey State by a party of the enemy, to the consideration of the general officers of brigades and regiments, and thereupon requests from them, separately and in writing, a direct and laconic reply to the following queries.

1. Upon the state of facts in the above case, is retaliation justifiable and expedient?

2. If justifiable, ought it to take place immediately, or

* It is not known, that any attempt was made to carry the above project into effect.

should a previous representation be made to Sir Henry Clinton, and satisfaction demanded from him?

3. In case of representation and demand, who should be the person or persons to be required?

4. In case of refusal, and retaliation becoming necessary, of what description shall the officer be, on whom it is to take place; and how shall he be designated for the purpose? *

* While commanding a small body of troops at a post on Tom's River in Monmouth county, New Jersey, Captain Huddy had been attacked by a party of refugees from New York, and taken prisoner after a gallant defence. He was conveyed to New York and put in close confinement. On the 12th of April he was sent out of the city, in the charge of a number of refugees, commanded by Captain Lippencot, and hanged on the heights near Middletown. The people in the neighbourhood were extremely exasperated at this act of wanton barbarity; and, at their solicitation, General Forman, who resided at Monmouth, obtained affidavits and a proper statement of facts, with which he first went to Elizabethtown, where the American commissioners, General Knox and Gouverneur Morris, were then attempting to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, and laid the matter before them. By their advice he proceeded to General Washington's head-quarters, and his statement and the papers of which he was the bearer were submitted to the consideration of the general and field officers.

Twenty-five officers sent answers to the above queries in writing. They were unanimous in the opinion, that retaliation was justifiable and expedient; that the leader of the party, who murdered Captain Huddy, was the person, who ought to suffer; and that, in case he could not be obtained, an officer equal in rank to Captain Huddy should be selected by lot from the British prisoners. Twenty-two of the American officers agreed in the decision, that a representation should first be made to Sir Henry Clinton and satisfaction demanded; the other three thought, that the laws of war and the enormity of the offence justified an immediate execution, without previous notice to the British commander.

The officers assembled at the quarters of General Heath, who stated to them the questions. He says they were ordered not to converse together on the subject, till each one had written his opinion, sealed it up, and sent it to the Commander-in-chief. — HEATH'S *Memoirs*, p. 335. If this order was literally obeyed, the unanimity not only in their sentiments, but in the manner of expressing them, was remarkable.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX AND GOUVERNEUR
MORRIS, AT ELIZABETHTOWN.

Newburg, 20 April, 1782.

GENTLEMEN,

I have been favored with your letter of the 16th of April by General Forman. Convinced from the state of facts, which has been exhibited to me, that justice, expediency, and necessity require, that satisfaction should be obtained for the murder of Captain Huddy, I have in the first instance made a representation to Sir Henry Clinton and demanded, that the officer, who commanded the party, or, if he was not a captain, such a number of agents in the execution, as are equal by tariff to that rank, should be delivered up to condign punishment. In case of refusal, I have formed the resolution, that retaliation shall take place upon a British officer of equal rank. It therefore remains with the enemy alone to prevent this distressing alternative ; for, having formed my opinion upon the most mature reflection and deliberation, I can never recede from it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 21 April, 1782.

SIR,

The enclosed representation from the inhabitants of the county of Monmouth, with testimonials to the facts, which can be corroborated by other unquestionable evidence, will bring before your Excellency the most wanton, unprecedented, and inhuman murder, that ever disgraced the arms of a civilized people.

I shall not, because I believe it to be altogether un-

necessary, trouble your Excellency with any animadversions upon this transaction. Candor obliges me to be explicit. To save the innocent, I demand the guilty. Captain Lippencot, therefore, or the officer who commanded at the execution of Captain Huddy, must be given up ; or, if that officer was of inferior rank to him, so many of the perpetrators as will, according to the tariff of exchange, be an equivalent. To do this, will mark the justice of your Excellency's character. In failure of it, I shall hold myself justifiable, in the eyes of God and man, for the measure to which I shall resort.

I beg your Excellency to be persuaded, that it cannot be more disagreeable to you to be addressed in this language, than it is to me to offer it ; but the subject requires frankness and decision. I have to request your speedy determination, as my resolution is suspended but for your answer. I am, Sir, &c.*

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.

Newburg, 22 April, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

I have received, since my arrival at these quarters, your favor of the 12th of February, respecting the exchange of your honorable father for Lord Cornwallis. I am sorry to inform you, that, upon my arrival at Philadelphia, and for a long time after I had been there, I experienced the greatest disinclination in Congress

* Sir Henry Clinton's answer to this letter, and some other parts of the correspondence between General Washington and the British commanders, respecting the case of Captain Huddy and Captain Asgill, were published, and are contained in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. XIV. pp. 144, 155; Vol. XV. pp. 127, 191.

to the exchange of Lord Cornwallis upon any terms; and that it was not till after I had combated their objections in different ways, and at several meetings of their committees, that I got the matter placed upon such a footing, as to leave me at liberty to negotiate the exchange of that officer at any rate. The principal difficulties are now so far removed, as to admit commissioners on each side to meet, and they are now sitting at Elizabethtown for the purpose of exchanges (in which Mr. Laurens's is particularly given in charge), and for settling of accounts; and I hope, unless some untoward impediment should intervene in the prosecution of this business, that you will soon meet the accomplishment of your wishes.

It has been my uniform opinion since the capitulation of Yorktown, that, unless the enemy can send such reinforcements to this continent, as will in their judgment place their two principal posts of New York and Charleston in a state of perfect security, or unless they are sure of having a naval superiority on this coast during the operations of the campaign, they will concentrate their force at one of those points; and further it has as invariably been my opinion, that New York will be the last hold they will quit in the United States. If I am mistaken in the first, I shall believe, that a negotiation of peace or a truce is near at hand, and, that they hazard much for the *uti possidetis*, which, from present appearances, and my conception of the views of the British government, I have not the smallest idea of; I mean peace this year.

With the greatest truth and sincerity,

I am, dear Sir,

your most affectionate servant,

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Newburg, 23 April, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

Your apprehensions, in consequence of the movement of the legion of Lauzun, need not be much alarmed; the present situation of the enemy in New York, I am persuaded, will not afford any reinforcements to your quarter.

The recruits raising in the States, from which your army is drawn, are completing as far as circumstances will admit, and, if needed, will be ready to go to you as early as the operations of the campaign are decided; which, at present, from a variety of circumstances, among which a want of intelligence from Europe is not the least, are held in uncertainty. The State of Maryland had some time ago about three hundred men enlisted, and waiting only for their clothes, which have been sent on from Philadelphia. A number also is collected in Pennsylvania. But, until our information respecting the enemy's intentions, and their future mode of war, is more clearly ascertained, as well as our knowledge of the support and assistance, which we expect from our ally, it may not be well to hasten on the recruits to your army. You are not insensible of the disadvantages we have ever experienced in attempts to reinforce at your distance by land; it having hitherto proved a weakening of the main army, without any essential augmentation to yours.

In present circumstances, without the aid of naval forces and water conveyance, your own experience and the general knowledge you have of the country will readily decide upon the impracticability of transporting by land such heavy stores and artillery, as would be necessary for great operations. So that you have only

to content yourself with such a force as will be competent to the purpose of confining the enemy to their lines, and prevent them from carrying their ravages into the country. I wait with impatience for intelligence, which will decide the intentions of the enemy, and fix the operations of the campaign on our part. This, I hope, is not far distant. I am, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Newburg, 25 April, 1782.

SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's favor of the 18th instant, by Count Bieniewsky, and do myself the pleasure to congratulate you on your safe return to Philadelphia in good health. The plan, which the Count means to offer to the consideration of Congress, appears to be projected on a liberal scale, and, with some explanation and perhaps alteration, may be well worthy of their attention. This gentleman is fully possessed of my sentiments on the subject of his proposals, and is at liberty to make such use of them as he thinks proper. He will have the honor of communicating them to your Excellency, and of informing you, that, as they involve political as well as military considerations, I have confined my opinion to the latter parts of the plan. I shall take an early occasion to address you on the subject of your letter. In the mean time, I pray you to be assured, that, with every sentiment of the most perfect esteem, regard, and respect, and with much personal attachment,

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE BIENIEWSKY.

Newburg, 27 April, 1782.

SIR,

At your request, and in consequence of a letter from the Chevalier de la Luzerne, I have given to the plan, which you propose to present to Congress, all the consideration I am capable of, and beg leave to observe thereupon, that the utility of your plan for introducing a legionary corps of Germans into the service of the United States of America depends, in my opinion, upon the political state of affairs in Europe, the probability of the war's continuing, and the mode of conducting it; as also upon the time, which will be required to bring this corps into action.

Of the first, I have not the means of judging, but I think the second is not so problematical, as to induce Congress to reject a contract, which, with some alterations, and a surety of receiving the men in twelve months from this date, may be attended with considerable advantages.

Political considerations must, no doubt, have their influence in determining upon a plan of this nature and magnitude; and there may be an impropriety in my hazarding an opinion too pointedly on the policy of it; but, at your request, and at the desire of the minister of France, I shall offer my sentiments on the several articles in the order, in which they stand in the plan before me. With much esteem and regard, I am, Sir, &c.*

* The scheme proposed by Count de Bieniewsky was, that he would raise in Germany and transport to America a body of troops, consisting of three legionary corps of cavalry, infantry, grenadiers, chasseurs, and artillery, the whole amounting to three thousand four hundred and eighty-three effective men; that they should be subject to the orders of the United States, and take the oaths of fidelity and allegiance; that he would agree to raise, clothe, arm, and bring them to the United States

TO GOVERNOR GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 27 April, 1782.

SIR,

Though it is by no means my opinion, that the enemy will divide their force and again take possession of Rhode Island, there are some circumstances, which seem to carry such an appearance. I therefore think it would be highly imprudent, on our part, to leave any fortifications standing on the Island of Rhode Island, which may be of use to them in such an event. The works round Newport can, under no circumstances, be of any advantage to us, and I must therefore request your Excellency to cause them to be levelled immediately.

I am not well enough acquainted with the situation and nature of the work on Butts's Hill, to determine positively whether it ought to be destroyed or not. It appears to me, that, in case the enemy should reoccupy the island, it would be important for us to have possession of that ground; but whether, in such an event, possession could be kept, your Excellency must determine. I have no troops to spare to garrison it. If the work is tenable, might not a small guard be kept in it, and such arrangements be made, that, at the first signal of the appearance of a fleet, a number of militia might be thrown in sufficient to keep possession of it? Should you think this impracticable, I would wish the works to be destroyed. I have the honor to be, &c.

for the gross sum of five hundred and eighteen thousand livres; that a stipulated monthly payment should afterwards be made, and that they should have a grant of lands. Other conditions of a subordinate nature were suggested. The plan was examined by General Washington, who remarked in writing on some of its parts. The result was, that Count de Bieniewsky laid it before Congress. A committee, of which Mr. Madison was chairman, made a report upon it, which was adopted. "The zeal

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Newburg, 27 April, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

Finding the commissioners appointed to liquidate the accounts of moneys due for the maintenance of prisoners, and make permanent provision for their future support, have separated without accomplishing any thing, I think it highly expedient, that measures should be adopted, at this moment, for taking the German prisoners of war into our service. As this measure has been considerably agitated, I shall not amplify upon the justice and propriety of it, which to me seem very obvious. I am equally well persuaded of the policy there will be in augmenting every company with at least ten of these men, or more if they can be obtained; for I am convinced, that, by such an incorporation, they will make exceedingly cheap and valuable recruits, and, being able-bodied and disciplined men, they will give a strength and solidity to our regiments, which they will not otherwise acquire this campaign. All my accounts respecting the recruiting service are unfavorable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived, to my knowledge, from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence of the requisitions of Congress in December last.

Should the plan be adopted by Congress, the sooner it is carried into execution the better. In that case, I think the men ought to be recruited for the continent, and not carried to the credit of the quotas of the State

for the American cause," say the committee, "which the author of it professes, and which the generous terms of the plan evince, have not failed to inspire a just esteem for his character and a disposition to favor his wishes. Considerations, however, which in no respect derogate from this esteem or this disposition, render it expedient for Congress to decline the offer, which has been made to them." — *Journals*, May 29th.

with whose lines they are to serve. For, without making any alteration in the establishment, they may be annexed to the regiments in such a manner, that they can be formed into distinct corps whenever their fidelity and attachment shall be sufficiently evinced, if circumstances should then require it. All the matters of bounty and encouragement being arranged with the financier, and the particulars of the scheme adjusted, as soon as provision shall be made for their subsistence on the journey, I would detach a captain and subaltern from every regiment, to receive and conduct them to the army, so that they may certainly join the respective regiments, at farthest, by the 1st of June. In the interim, I would beg leave to propose, lest the enemy should attempt to counteract the design, that the business should be kept secret, until it is ripe for execution; and then be negotiated by some gentlemen of address appointed for the purpose. I request an answer as speedily as possible. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Newburg, 28 April, 1782.

SIR,

I receive with much gratitude the remembrance and compliments of the principal officers of the French army in Virginia, and thank your Excellency for the trouble of being the bearer of them to me, and of the letter from Count de Rochambeau.

With equal sensibility and pleasure I received the communications from your court, and now acknowledge my obligations to your Excellency for them. Though not decisive, they are nevertheless important. The late instance of their generous aid, hinted at by your Ex-

cellency and particularized by Mr. Morris, is one among a variety of important considerations, which ought to bind America to France in bonds of indelible friendship and gratitude, never, I hope, to be sundered.* Induced by that entire confidence, which I repose in your Excellency, and a full conviction that a nation, which combines her force with ours for purposes of all others most interesting to humanity, ought not to be deficient in any information I can give to adapt objects to means, that an accordance of them may be inseparable, I shall without hesitation exhibit to you our present force, and my ideas of the increase of it by recruits, according to the best view of it which lies before me.

It can scarcely be necessary to inform your Excellency, that our military establishment for the present year consists of four regiments of artillery, four legionary and two partisan corps, and fifty regiments of infantry, besides the corps of invalids; or that Congress have called in pointed terms upon each State to complete its regiments to the establishment, the aggregate of which, if complied with, would amount to thirty-four thousand three hundred and eight men, exclusive of commissioned officers, sergeants, and music, Hazen's regiment, and the corps of invalids. Of this force, one legionary corps, two regiments of artillery, and twenty-two of infantry, besides Hazen's regiment and the invalids, compose the northern army. But as Hazen's

* Alluding to a loan of six millions of livres, which, after hearing of the capitulation at Yorktown, the King of France had resolved to make to the United States within the coming year; although, previously to that event, M. de la Luzerne had been instructed to inform Congress in positive terms, that no more money could be expected from France. It was thought expedient not to make this intelligence public for a time, lest it should diminish the efforts of the people in providing for the continuance of the war. See above, p. 230.

regiment is fostered by no State, discouraged from recruiting by all, and without funds, it must soon dwindle to nothing, being now very weak.

The present totality of the rank and file, exclusive of sergeants, of the regiments composing the northern army, amounts to nine thousand one hundred and forty-six. From this number the sick, men in different branches of the staff department, and such as are employed on other extra duties, whom the peculiarity of our circumstances compels me to furnish from the army, being deducted, will reduce the efficient operating force of these corps to seven thousand five hundred and fifty-three rank and file; and I should be uncandid if I were not to acknowledge, that I do not expect it will be increased by recruits in the course of the campaign to more than ten thousand fit for duty in the field. This, Sir, in my opinion, will be the full amount of the established regiments of the States east of Pennsylvania. To ascertain the number of militia, which may be assembled for occasional offensive operations, is more than I can do. The general opinion is, that there will be no want of militia for any enterprise we can have in view. Be this as it may, this one thing is certain, that militia are not only slow in their movements, but, undertaking to judge also of the propriety of them, will wait till the necessity for acting strikes them; which, in most cases, is as injurious to the service as inability or want of inclination; disappointment being the consequence of delay. This observation I could not refrain from making, because, in all combined operations, especially those which may depend upon the season or a limited period for their execution, it is of the utmost importance to know the fact.

The enclosed return, which is a copy of the last state

of the force under the orders of Major-General Greene that has come to my hands, will give your Excellency every information in my power respecting the state and condition of that army; which was to be augmented by the partisan corps of Colonel Armand, consisting of about two hundred horse and foot. Independently of those, there are two small regiments at Fort Pitt, one from the State of Pennsylvania, the other from Virginia, which are included in the general establishment of the army; but no particular return is here given of them.

What measures are adopted by the States of Georgia and North and South Carolina to recruit their battalions, I know not. Virginia marched about four hundred men near the end of February for the southern army, and, by an act of the legislature passed at their last session, resolved to raise more; but in what forwardness they are, or what is to be expected from the act, I am equally uninformed. Maryland and Pennsylvania depend upon voluntary enlistments, and are proceeding very slowly in the business of recruiting, especially the latter. It is impossible for me, therefore, to say to what number that army will be increased.

This, Sir, is an accurate state of the force we have at present, and my expectation of what it may be, independent of militia.

The enemy's force, from the best information I have been able to obtain of it, may stand thus. At New York, regulars, including their established corps of provincials, rank and file, nine thousand; militia of the city, refugees, and independent companies, four thousand; (sailors and marines, according to the number of ships, which may be in the harbour, and, this being uncertain, no number is given;) at Charleston about three thousand three hundred; at Savannah about seven hundred.

In Canada, including British, German, and established provincials, five thousand ; at Penobscot about five hundred ; at Halifax and its dependencies, uncertain, say three thousand five hundred ; in all, twenty-six thousand.

The above estimate, so far as it respects New York, Charleston, and Savannah, is I believe to be depended upon. The force in Canada by some accounts is more, by others less, than five thousand. The regular British and German troops in that country cannot exceed four thousand ; but, in addition to these, are the corps of Sir John Johnson and others, which I am told have been considerably increased by the disaffected of this and other States, who have fled to Canada. But it is to be observed, that this force, be it what it may, is employed in the occupation of posts between Quebec and Michilimackinac, and on Lake Champlain, through an extent of not less than seven or eight hundred miles, and that all these posts are dependent upon the first for provision and supplies of every kind. I am less certain of the enemy's force in Nova Scotia than elsewhere. The number here given is not from recent intelligence, and may be erroneous, as their garrisons are weakened or strengthened according to circumstances. Cumberland, Windsor, Annapolis, and St. John's River are posts dependent upon Halifax, and included in the three thousand five hundred men here mentioned.

If this state of matters be satisfactory to you, or useful in the formation of any plans against the common enemy, I shall be very happy in having given it.

Permit me now, Sir, to express the high sense I have of the honor you have done me in communicating the favorable opinion entertained of my conduct by the court and nation of France, and to acknow-

ledge my obligation to those officers, who have inspired these sentiments. To stand well in the eyes of a nation, which I view as one of the first in the world, and in the opinion of a monarch, whom I consider as the supporter of the rights of humanity, and to whom I am personally indebted for the command he has been pleased to honor me with, is highly flattering to my vanity, at the same time it has a first claim to all my gratitude.* It is unnecessary, I hope, to add fresh assurances of the respect and esteem, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL KNOX AND GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.

Newburg, 30 April, 1782.

GENTLEMEN,

It is with great pleasure, that I make use of the earliest occasion to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches by Colonel Smith, which contain an ample account of your proceedings in consequence

* *From M. de la Luzerne's Letter.* — "I cannot deny myself the pleasure of informing you of the sentiments, with which the reports of the French officers, on their return to Versailles, inspired the court and nation towards your Excellency. Their testimony can add nothing to the universal opinion respecting the great services, which you have rendered to your country; but, to the esteem and admiration of the French, will henceforth be added a sentiment of affection and attachment, which is a just return for the attentions our officers have received from you, and for the progress they have made in their profession by serving under your orders." — *April 18th.*

Dr. Franklin wrote to Mr. Livingston, secretary of foreign affairs; — "The French officers, who have returned to France this winter, speak of our people in the handsomest and kindest manner; and there is a strong desire in many of the young noblemen to go over to fight for us; there is no restraining some of them; and several changes in the officers of their army have taken place in consequence." — *Passy, March 4th.*

of the commission you were charged with by me. I have also received from Sir Henry Clinton an abstract of the same negotiations, as stated by his commissioners. From the whole aspect of the matter, I have little doubt, that the reasons you mention, as the operating principles with the enemy, have been the real cause of defeating the success of a negotiation so desirable in itself, and which promised to be so beneficial in its consequences. I have transmitted to Congress a copy of your report, and have submitted solely to their decision the subject of future exchanges; not less lamenting the unreasonableness of our enemies, than regretting the miseries of war, which may be augmented and protracted by such unreasonable conduct.*

I should do injustice to my own feelings on this occasion, if I did not express something beyond my bare approbation of the attention, address, and ability exhibited by you, Gentlemen, in the course of this tedious and fruitless negotiation. The want of having succeeded in the great objects of your mission does

* The British commissioners were General Dalrymple and Mr. Andrew Elliot. Three principal points were brought into discussion; a cartel for a general exchange of prisoners; a liquidation of all accounts on both sides for the maintenance of prisoners; and provision for their future support. In Sir Henry Clinton's letter to Washington, stating the results of the negotiation as reported by his commissioners, he complains that the Americans made unreasonable demands; first, in requiring him to agree to an exchange of prisoners in all parts of the world, whereas it was known, that his powers extended to such only as had been captured in America; secondly, in an exorbitant requisition of two hundred thousand pounds sterling, as the balance due to the United States for the maintenance of British prisoners, from the beginning of hostilities to that time, whereas, in Sir Henry's opinion, the balance was greatly in his favor; and, thirdly, in demanding, that, for the future, provisions should not be purchased in the United States for the support of British prisoners, but should be sent to them from the British posts. On these essential points, as well as on many others of less moment, the difference of opinion was so great that no arrangement could be effected. See SPARKS'S *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, Vol. I. p. 242

not, however, lessen in my estimation the merit, which is due to the unwearied assiduity for the public good, and the benevolent zeal to alleviate the distresses of the unfortunate, which seem to have actuated you on every occasion, and for which I entreat you will be pleased to accept my most cordial thanks; and at the same time believe that I am, Gentlemen, with the highest sentiments of regard and esteem, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 30 April, 1782.

SIR,

I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency copies of the minutes of proceedings and the report of my commissioners appointed to meet commissioners on the part of the British general, Sir Henry Clinton, for the purposes mentioned in their instructions, a copy of which is herewith communicated. A private letter from my commissioners, and a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, both written in consequence of this negotiation, are also enclosed for the consideration of Congress.

After this exposition of the subject it is unnecessary, and it might be improper, for me to make any observations on these papers. I submit them to the wisdom of Congress, and have only to beg for my own direction, that I may be early informed of their determination, how far any future exchanges of prisoners of war shall be continued, under the practice which has been formerly adopted for that purpose. I beg leave to point the attention of Congress particularly to that part of the commissioners' letter to me, which mentions the extension of a pardon to the refugees in the service of the enemy. Their ideas on this

subject are so perfectly consonant to my own, formed on the principles of policy and expediency, that I cannot omit to notice it, and to submit to the consideration of Congress, whether the adopting of this measure under proper restrictions may not be attended with happy consequences to our cause, and be equally productive of ruin and confusion to the British interest in America. Lamenting that the benevolence of my intentions has been so totally defeated, by the unhappy and fruitless issue of this negotiation, I have only to add, that, with the most perfect regard, I am, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAZEN.

Head-Quarters, 3 May, 1782.

SIR,

The enemy, persisting in that barbarous line of conduct, which they have pursued during the course of this war, have lately most inhumanly executed Captain Joshua Huddy, of the Jersey State troops, taken prisoner by them at a post on Tom's River; and in consequence I have written to the British Commander-in-chief, that, unless the perpetrators of that horrid deed were delivered up, I should be under the disagreeable necessity of retaliating, as the only means left to put a stop to such inhuman proceedings.

You will, therefore, immediately on receipt of this, designate by lot for the above purpose a British captain, who is an unconditional prisoner, if such a one is in your possession; if not, a lieutenant under the same circumstances from among the prisoners at any of the posts, either in Pennsylvania or Maryland. So soon as you have fixed on the person, you will send him under a safeguard to Philadelphia, where the minister

of war will order a proper guard to receive and conduct him to the place of his destination.

For your information respecting the officers, who are prisoners in our possession, I have ordered the commissary of prisoners to furnish you with a list of them. It will be forwarded with this. I need not mention to you, that every possible tenderness, that is consistent with the security of him, should be shown to the person whose unfortunate lot it may be to suffer.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES ROBERTSON.*

Head-Quarters, 4 May, 1782.

SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 1st instant. Your Excellency is acquainted with the determination expressed in my letter of the 21st of April to Sir Henry Clinton. I have now to inform you, that, so far from receding from that resolution, orders are given to designate a British officer for retaliation. The time and place are fixed; but I still hope the result of your court-martial will prevent this dreadful alternative.

Sincerely lamenting the cruel necessity, which alone can induce so distressing a measure in the present instance, I do assure your Excellency, that I am as earnestly desirous as you can be, that the war may be

* For nearly three years Sir Henry Clinton had from time to time solicited his recall, and at length the King granted him permission to return to Europe, which he received the last week in April. The command then devolved on General Robertson. He retained this station, however, only about a week, when Sir Guy Carleton arrived in New York, and took command of the British armies in America, as the permanent successor of Sir Henry Clinton.

carried on agreeably to the rules, which humanity formed, and the example of the politest nations recommends, and shall be extremely happy in agreeing with you to prevent or punish every breach of the rules of war within the spheres of our respective commands.

I am unacquainted with the circumstances of the detention of Badgely and Hatfield. The matter shall be examined into and justice done; but I must inform you, that in my opinion deserters, or characters, who for the crimes they have committed are amenable to the civil power, cannot on either side be protected under the sanction of a flag. I do not pretend to say, that the abovementioned persons are in that predicament.

Recrimination would be useless. I forbear, therefore, to mention numerous instances, which have stained the reputation of your arms, marked the progress of this war with unusual severity, and disgraced the honor of human nature itself. While I wave this ungrateful discussion, I repeat the assertion, that it is my most ardent desire, not only to soften the inevitable calamities of war, but even to introduce on every occasion as great a share of tenderness and humanity, as can possibly be exercised in a state of hostility.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Newburg, 4 May, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

By the letter to Brigadier-General Hazen, which I have enclosed to you under a flying seal for your inspection, you will observe the distressing alternative to which we are at last reduced. I must request you will give that letter a safe and speedy conveyance.

As soon as the British officer, whose unfortunate lot it is to be designated as the object of retaliation, shall arrive in Philadelphia, it will be necessary to have a sufficient escort, under the command of a very discreet and vigilant officer, in readiness to receive and conduct him to the cantonment of the New Jersey troops. I pray you will be pleased to give the orders proper for the occasion, and direct the officer commanding the party to apply to the commandant of the Jersey line, who will have final instructions respecting the matter.

Keenly wounded as my feelings will be, at the deplorable destiny of the unhappy victim, no gleam of hope can arise to him but from the conduct of the enemy themselves. This he may be permitted to communicate to the British Commander-in-chief, in whose power alone it rests to avert the impending vengeance from the innocent by executing it on the guilty. At the same time it may be announced, that I will receive no application nor answer any letter on the subject, which does not inform me that ample satisfaction is made for the death of Captain Huddy on the perpetrators of that horrid deed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Circular to the States.

Head-Quarters, 4 May, 1782.

SIR,

I find myself arrived at that period, at which I hoped to have seen the battalions of the several States com-

pleted to their establishment, in conformity to the requisitions of Congress of the 19th of December last.

The enclosed returns of recruits, which I have caused to be made up to the 1st instant, will show how totally short of my expectations the exertions of the States have fallen. From your State you will find that only recruits have joined the army in consequence of the above requisition.

All my accounts from Europe concur in declaring, that the British King and ministers are still determined to prosecute the war. It becomes, therefore, our decided duty to be prepared to meet these hostile intentions, in whatever way they are to be carried into execution; to do which, our utmost exertions are now called for. You will suffer me therefore to entreat, that, if your State has any expectation from the military operations of this season, not another moment may be lost in providing for and carrying into most effectual execution the full completion of its battalions. It is scarcely necessary to inform you, that on this expectation all our calculations must be formed, and on this event must rest the hopes of the ensuing campaign.

My intelligence of the actual aid we may expect from our allies is not yet so explicit as to lead me to decide absolutely on the mode of operations for this campaign; but were our expectations of support from that quarter ever so promising, yet, from the negligence and languor of the States, from whence our own exertions are to spring, I am not at this day enabled to give any assurance of our being prepared to coöperate with our allies in any great objects equal to their expectations or our own ability. I am sorry to acquaint your Excellency, that I have the best authority to assure you, that the court of France is much dissatisfied with

this want of vigor and exertion in the States, and with that disposition, which appears willing at least, if not desirous, to cast all the burthen of the American war upon them. Waving the injustice and impolicy of such a temper, which to me appear very conspicuous, how humiliating is the idea, that our dependence for support should rest on others, beyond the point which absolute necessity dictates; how discouraging to our allies, and how dishonorable to ourselves must be our want of vigor and utmost exertion, at a time when, if we are not wanting to ourselves, our prospects are the fairest that our wishes could extend to.

I find from the proceedings of the several States, that their calculation of deficiencies, formed on application to the several towns, which furnish the men, are greatly different from the returns sent from the army. I forbear mentioning many reasons, which might be assigned to produce this difference, and which in my opinion originate principally within the States, and will content myself with this one observation, that, should the States deceive themselves in this respect, and fail to furnish the expected force in the field, they will not only cast an essential injury upon the army, but the unhappy consequences of a failure in their expectations from a military operation will return upon themselves, whilst recrimination can have no effect towards alleviating our protracted misfortunes and distress.

Although money matters are not within the line of my duty, yet, as they are so intimately connected with all military operations; and being lately informed by the financier in answer to some small requisitions upon him, that he has not yet received one penny in money from any one State, upon the requisition of Congress for the eight millions of dollars, but that, on the contrary, some of the States are devising ways to draw

from him the small sums he has been able otherwise to establish, and that he is at this time barely able to feed the army, and that from hand to mouth; I cannot forbear to express my apprehensions from that quarter, and to urge, with the warmth of zeal and earnestness, the most pointed and effectual attention of your State to the actual raising and collecting of its proportion of the requisition. Upon the present plan of non-compliance with requisitions for men and supplies, let me seriously ask your Excellency, How is it possible for us to continue the war? How is it possible to support an army in money or recruits? To what a wretched state must we soon be reduced? How dangerous is it to suffer our affairs to run at hazard, and to depend upon contingencies? To what do the present measures tend, but to the utter ruin of that cause, which we have hitherto so long and nobly supported, and to crush all the fair hopes, which the present moment places before us, were we only to exert the power and abilities with which Providence has bountifully blessed this country? But if the States will not impose, or do not collect and apply, taxes for support of the war, the sooner we make terms the better; the longer we continue a feeble and ineffectual war, the greater will be our distress at the hour of submission. For my own part, I am fully convinced, that, without the means of execution, no officer, whoever he may be, who is placed at the head of the military department, can be answerable for the success of any plans he may propose or agree to.

Upon this subject I will only add, that, from past experience and from present prospects, I am persuaded, that, if the States would furnish the supplies agreeably to the late requisition, and would suffer the pay, clothing, and subsistence of the army to go through one

common channel, two thirds of their former expenses would be saved ; and many partialities, discontents, and jealousies, which now subsist, would be removed and cease, and an establishment of order, regularity, and harmony in our general affairs would be experienced, which cannot arise from the present disjointed and different systems of finance adopted by separate States.

While acting in my military capacity, I am sensible of the impropriety of stepping into the line of civil polity. My anxiety for the general good, and an earnest desire to bring this long protracted war to a happy issue, when I hope to retire to that peaceful state of domestic pleasures, from which the call of my country has brought me to take an active part, and to which I most ardently wish a speedy return, I trust will furnish my excuse with your Excellency and the legislature, while I request your pardon for this trespass. I have the honor to be, &c.

P. S. *May 8th.* — Since writing the above, I have been furnished with sundry New York papers, and an English paper, containing the last intelligence from England, with the debates of Parliament upon several motions made respecting the American war. Lest your Excellency may not have been favored with so full a sight of these papers as I have been, I take the liberty to mention, that I have perused these debates with great attention and care, with a view if possible to penetrate their real design ; and, upon the most mature deliberation I can bestow, I am obliged to declare it as my candid opinion, that the measures of the enemy in all their views, so far as they respect America, are merely delusory, (they having no serious intention to admit our independence upon its true principles), and are calculated to produce a change of min-

isters to quiet the minds of their own people, and reconcile them to a continuance of the war; while they are meant to amuse this country with a false idea of peace, to draw us off from our connexion with France, and to lull us into a state of security and inactivity, which having taken place, the ministry will be left to prosecute the war in other parts of the world with greater vigor and effect. Your Excellency will permit me on this occasion to observe, that, even if the nation and Parliament are really in earnest to obtain peace with America, it will undoubtedly be wisdom in us to meet them with great caution and circumspection, and by all means to keep our arms firm in our hands, and, instead of relaxing one iota in our exertions, rather to spring forward with redoubled vigor, that we may take the advantage of every favorable opportunity, until our wishes are fully obtained. No nation ever yet suffered in treaty by preparing, even in the moment of negotiation, most vigorously for the field.

The industry, which the enemy are using to propagate their pacific reports, appears to me a circumstance very suspicious; and the eagerness, with which the people as I am informed are catching at them, is in my opinion equally dangerous.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 5 May, 1782.

SIR,

If the enemy ever had any intention to evacuate Charleston, that idea, I believe, is now given up. Great revolutions in the British councils have lately taken place. The particulars, brought by the March packet, will be conveyed to you in the enclosed New York

Gazette, which I send for your perusal. General Robertson, who has for some time past been governor of New York, is lately appointed commander-in-chief in America. This information I have from his own letter.

Port Mahon, and the whole island of Minorca, are certainly surrendered to his Catholic Majesty's arms. This event is declared in New York; but I am possessed of but few particulars concerning the capitulation. My most cordial congratulations attend your Excellency, and the officers of your army, upon the favors, which you inform me have, with so much justice, been conferred by his Most Christian Majesty.* Be assured, Sir, I shall ever feel a most lively interest and pleasure in every event, which bestows honor or emolument on such deserving characters. The favorable mention, which the King is pleased to make of me, demands my warmest and most particular acknowledgments. This honor done me will form an additional tie to the gratitude, which already binds me to the person and interests of his Majesty.

Convinced that the works at Newport would be of no use to us, and that they might be of infinite importance to the enemy, should they have an intention to establish a post there, from a bare apprehension of such an event I have requested the governor of Rhode Island to have them levelled; pointing him at the same time to the necessity of preserving Butts's Hill, if possible. The plans for the campaign depending entirely upon the succours, which will be sent by his Most Christian Majesty, I can do nothing more than form opinions upon certain hypotheses. If we should have a naval superiority, and a force sufficient to attempt New York, and you have not secure means of transporting

* Some of them had received pensions, others a cross of the order of St. Louis, and others had been promoted.

your troops by water, for their greater ease, to the Head of Elk, the route you propose for their march by land is, I am persuaded, the best that can be. It is to be feared, that the manœuvre your Excellency suggests will hardly have its intended effect, as it will be performed in so short a space, as to give no time for its operation, before the deception you propose would be disclosed.

If your march should take place before our intended interview, the time of its commencement must be determined absolutely by your Excellency, in consequence of the advice you may receive from your court, and of knowing the time at which the succours may be expected on this coast. To delay it beyond this point would waste the campaign ; and to commence at an earlier period would disclose our plans and prepare the enemy for an approach. Every attention, consistent with my means, has been bestowed on the boats, and I hope to be tolerably provided with them.

I shall, by this opportunity, communicate your request for militia to Governor Harrison.* I persuade myself, that, knowing how expensive the militia are, and with what difficulty they are drawn out, you will be as moderate as possible in your requisition, and, that you will leave nothing, when it can well be avoided, to their protection. I am, &c.

TO GOVERNOR LIVINGSTON.

Head-Quarters, 6 May, 1782.

SIR,

On receiving information, by a representation from the inhabitants of Monmouth county, of the cruel mur-

* Governor of Virginia, and successor to Governor Nelson.

der of Captain Joshua Huddy, of the Jersey State troops, by a party of refugees from New York, I immediately informed the British commander-in-chief, that, unless he delivered up the perpetrators of that horrid deed, I should be reduced to the disagreeable necessity of retaliating.

In answer to my letter the British general informs me, that a court-martial is ordered for the trial of the persons complained of; but at the same time says, that those people offer, in justification of the fact, a number of instances of cruelty committed by us, and particularly in Monmouth county. Though this is by no means admitted, but on the contrary orders are given to designate and send to camp a British officer, who, if my demand is not complied with, will be executed; yet I cannot forbear observing to your Excellency, that, whilst I demand satisfaction from the enemy for the violences they commit, it becomes us to be particularly careful, that they have not a like claim on us; and I must beg you to make it known to all persons acting in a military capacity in your State, that I shall hold myself obliged to deliver up to the enemy, or otherwise to punish, such of them as shall commit any act, which is in the least contrary to the laws of war. I doubt not of your doing the same with those, who come under the civil power.

The enemy also complain of the detention of Hatfield and Badgely, who, they say, were out by direction of our commissary of prisoners under sanction of a flag. I must beg your Excellency to inform me, as soon as possible, of the circumstances attending their capture, and the causes of their detention. If those causes are not strictly just, I could wish they were sent in. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Head-Quarters, 8 May, 1782.

SIR,

I had the honor to receive your Excellency's favor of the 24th of April, enclosing a copy of your letter to Congress on the subject of American prisoners confined in England, with your sentiments on the necessity of retaliation.

I **am** sorry to inform your Excellency, that a meeting of commissioners, which had among other matters been concerted for the purposes of a general exchange, comprehending a release of our countrymen prisoners in Europe, as well as others, has unhappily been dissolved, without effecting any one of those benevolent purposes, which were the object, on our part, of their mission. This circumstance, I fear, will be a means of placing any future exchanges at a great distance. No measure, however, in my power shall be omitted to effect so desirable an event.

I have the honor to concur in sentiment with your Excellency on the subject of retaliation, and to inform you, that the circumstances attending the death of Captain Huddy are likely to bring that matter to a point. A demand has been made by me for the principal perpetrators of that horrid deed. The reply to this demand, received from General Robertson, is not satisfactory. I have therefore informed him, that orders are given to designate by lot a British officer of the rank of Captain Huddy for retaliation; that the time and place for his execution are fixed; and that nothing can stay my resolution from being carried into complete effect, but a strict compliance with my first requisition. General Robertson's answer will bring this ungrateful business to an issue. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 10 May, 1782.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed papers. They contain a continuance of the correspondence, which has been produced between me, General Robertson, and Sir Henry Clinton, in the case of Captain Huddy. That from Sir Henry did not come to hand till some days after the receipt of General Robertson's letter, and after my reply to the latter. I am in daily expectation of an answer from General Robertson, which I hope will bring this ungrateful business to a conclusion.

I take this opportunity to convey to Congress sundry English and New York newspapers, which have within a few days past been put into my hands. Their contents are new and interesting, and I take the earliest occasion to present them to Congress.

Although I view the debates, so far as they import proposals of pacification to America, to be idle and delusory, yet I cannot but express my fears for the effect they may have upon the exertions of the States, which are already too feeble and void of energy. The people, so far as I am informed, are catching at the idea of peace with great eagerness; and the industry which the enemy are using for its propagation is to me a very suspicious circumstance. For my own part, I view our situation such, that, instead of relaxing, we ought to improve the present moment as the most favorable to our wishes. The British nation appear to me to be staggered and almost ready to sink beneath the accumulating weight of debt and misfortune. If we follow the blow with vigor and energy, I think the game is our own.

Just as I was closing these despatches, I received a letter from Sir Guy Carleton, covering sundry printed papers, a copy of which, with the papers, I have now the honor to enclose to your Excellency, with the copy of my answer to him; and I flatter myself, that my conduct therein will be agreeable to the wishes of Congress.* I have the honor to be, &c.

* See Sir Guy Carleton's letter, dated May 7th, in the APPENDIX, No. IX. — The papers enclosed in the letter were printed copies of the proceedings of the House of Commons, on the 4th of March, 1782, respecting an address to the King in favor of peace; and also a copy of the bill reported in consequence thereof, enabling his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with the revolted colonies in North America.

The French cabinet were somewhat concerned as to the effect, which these movements of the British Parliament might have in America. As soon as they were known at Versailles, Count de Vergennes wrote to M. de la Luzerne expressing his apprehensions.

"The object of the British King," said he, "in acceding to these resolutions, is obvious. He would persuade the Americans, that he is sincerely disposed to a reconciliation, and would spare nothing to impress this persuasion by influencing their feelings towards England, and causing them to be unfaithful to France. On examining the comparative situation of England and America, one could hardly hesitate to decide what impression these resolutions should make; yet the strong propensity of the Americans to inactivity; their need of peace and the desire they manifest for it; the embarrassment as to their means of continuing the war; the great number of English partisans among them; all these causes united are enough to excite the fear, that the wishes of the people may prevail over the patriotism and zeal of Congress, and that this body will be forced to lend an ear to the pretended pacific overtures of the court of London. Such a step would of course be infinitely disagreeable to France, because it would effectually change the object and mode of prosecuting the war; it would augment the hostile resources of England, and would cause France to lose a great part of the fruit of her offensive efforts in carrying on the war for the independence of America. It is therefore of the highest importance, that the United States should continue of the same principles as heretofore, remain immovably attached to the alliance, and follow the example of France in refusing to listen to a separate peace with England. Every principle of honor and interest requires this conduct in the Americans.

"It should not be concealed from you, that the English ministry have recently sent a secret emissary to us, with propositions for a separate peace. The conditions, which he offered, were such as would have satisfied the King, if he had been without allies. He stipulated, among other

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 10 May, 1782.

SIR,

I had the honor last evening to receive your Excellency's letter of the 7th, with the several papers enclosed. Ever since the commencement of this unnatu-

things, the *uti possidetis*, the suppression of the English commission at Dunkirk, and advantages in India. But these offers did not move the King. His Majesty acknowledges no other rule, than that which is traced in his engagements; and he answered, that, however ardent might be his wishes for the reestablishment of peace, he could not commence a negotiation to that end without the participation of his allies. The English commissioner replied, that he perfectly understood this answer to refer to America, as well as Spain, but objected, that recognising the independence of the colonies did not enter into the system of England. I replied, that this was the basis of the system of the King. Upon this he asked, if there was no mode of treating with France without involving the affairs of America. I sent to him for answer the first pacific overtures, which we had communicated to the mediators. I added, that, whether England should treat of the affairs of America with us, or hold a direct negotiation with the United States, she could not avoid treating with the deputies of Congress; and thus she would be compelled to recognise the authority of that body. I cannot say whether any thing will result from this advance on the part of the English ministry, or whether it was meant as an apple of discord between us and our allies; but, whatever may have been the intention, the issue ought at least to be a new and strong proof to the Americans of the fidelity of the King to his engagements, and to convince them of the extreme injustice of deviating from his example."—*MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, March 23d, 1782.*

A few days afterwards, in writing again upon the same subject, Count de Vergennes said;

"Although we desire that Congress may neither open a direct negotiation, nor make a separate peace, yet we have no wish to prevent that body from following the system, which we ourselves have traced in our answer to the mediating courts. We are and always shall be disposed to consent, that the American plenipotentiaries in Europe shall treat, in conformity to their instructions, directly and without our intervention, with those from the court of London, while we shall be engaged in a negotiation on our part; provided that the two negotiations shall proceed with an equal progress, that the two treaties shall be signed at the same time, and that neither of them shall take effect without the other."—*MS. Letter, April 9th*

ral war, my conduct has borne invariable testimony against those inhuman excesses, which, in too many instances, have marked its various progress. With respect to a late transaction, to which I presume your Excellency alludes, I have already expressed my resolution, a resolution formed on the most mature deliberation, and from which I shall not recede. I have to inform your Excellency, that your request of a passport for Mr. Morgann, to go to Philadelphia, shall be conveyed to Congress by the earliest opportunity; and I will embrace the first moment, that I shall have it in my power, to communicate to you their determination thereon.

Many inconveniences and disorders having arisen from an improper admission of flags at various posts of the two armies, which have given rise to complaints on both sides; to prevent abuses in future, and for the convenience of communication, I have concluded to receive all flags, from within your lines, at the post of Dobbs's Ferry, and nowhere else, so long as the headquarters of the two armies remain as at present.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* This is the letter, which a British historian, of much repute in his own country, has called "stern and even savage."—ADOLPHUS's *History of England*, Vol. III. p. 446. We have already had occasion to remark, in reference to this writer, that prejudice, embittered feelings, and national antipathy are infirmities peculiarly unfortunate in a historian, whose high aim should be truth, candor, and justice.

It was decided by Congress, that the Commander-in-chief should be directed to refuse a passport for Mr. Morgann to bring despatches to Philadelphia.—*Journals*, May 14th. The advances of Sir Guy Carleton bore so strong a similarity, to those of the commissioners in 1778, which proved delusive and fruitless, that Congress deemed it advisable not to open any door for an intercourse through this channel, and more especially as the business of negotiating a peace was entrusted to the American commissioners in Europe.

Had the tenor of Sir Guy Carleton's instructions been known in America, it is probable that a more conciliating temper would have been

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAZEN.

Head-Quarters, 18 May, 1782.

SIR,

It was much my wish to take for the purpose of retaliation an officer, who was an unconditional prisoner of war. I am just informed by the secretary at war, that no one of that description is in our power.

shown by Congress. The late change of ministry had produced a change in the determinations of the British cabinet, and in the measures for prosecuting the war, wholly unexpected and as yet not even conjectured in the United States. This will appear by the following extracts from the directions of the new secretary at war to Sir Guy Carleton when he left England.

“The first object of your attention must be the withdrawing of the garrison, artillery, provisions, stores of all kinds, and every species of public property from New York and its dependencies to Halifax. The same steps are to be taken with reference to the garrisons of Charleston and Savannah. The garrison of St. Augustine you will determine upon according to circumstances on your arrival. The execution of the whole, both in point of mode and time, is left to your discretion. In case you should meet with obstructions by any attack supported by a formidable force, or from disappointments, so that it will not be in your power to effect the evacuation without great hazard of considerable loss, an early capitulation, which may secure the main object, is thought preferable to an obstinate defence of the place without hope of answering any national purpose by it.

“In the execution of his Majesty’s command you must always bear in recollection, that the removal and reservation of his Majesty’s troops for his service is the immediate object, to which all other considerations must give way. But you must likewise lose no time to avail yourself of the change of measures, which has lately taken place, for the purpose of reconciling the minds and affections of his Majesty’s American subjects, by such open and generous conduct, as may serve to captivate their hearts, and remove every suspicion of insincerity. With this view, it may be well worthy of your most serious consideration, whether, though you should not meet with the obstructions we have now too much reason to apprehend, it would not be best to take the part of communicating, immediately upon your arrival, the enclosed resolutions of the House of Commons, bearing as they do incontestable marks of the universal sense of the kingdom, and his Majesty’s resolution, in consequence, of withdrawing the troops. You may state every circumstance, if occasion offers, which has passed or is passing here, which can tend to revive old affec-

I am therefore under the disagreeable necessity to direct, that you immediately select, in the manner before prescribed, from among the British captains, who are prisoners either under capitulation or convention, one who is to be sent on as soon as possible, under the regulations and restrictions contained in my former instructions to you. I am, Sir, &c.

tions or extinguish late jealousies. You may observe, that the most liberal sentiments have taken root in the nation."—*MS. Instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, April 4th.*

It is obvious from these instructions, that Sir Guy Carleton had a very delicate and difficult task to perform, especially as in the present state of feeling in America it would have been impossible for him to make himself believed for a moment, if he had communicated the sentiments of the British ministry. Even the cautious course, which he found it necessary to adopt, excited suspicions of his sincerity, and an apprehension, that some design was at bottom, which required to be guarded against, as is manifest from Washington's letters and all the proceedings of Congress. No one had dreamed, that it was seriously the purpose of the British ministry at this time to evacuate all the maritime posts in the United States. The object of the ministry was a vigorous prosecution of the war in the West Indies against France and Spain, having already determined to concede the independence of the thirteen colonies.

The real intentions of the British cabinet, however, were early penetrated by Count de Vergennes. Within three weeks after the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from England, that minister wrote as follows to M. de la Luzerne.

"Every appearance indicates, that the British intend withdrawing their forces from the United States ; or, at least, that the war will not be prosecuted there any more. They are probably preparing to continue the war in the Islands against the House of Bourbon. Attempts are made for a separate peace. Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams will undoubtedly render an account of the proposals, which have been offered to them. Their language has been firm, and in the true principles of the alliance. In this respect we cannot applaud them too highly, and you may testify to Congress our entire satisfaction. If the English continue hostilities on the continent, it will be interesting to see in what manner the Americans will endeavour to render themselves useful to an ally, who has served them so largely. I do not expect from them much effective aid ; but I hope they will be sufficiently enlightened not to ascribe to the good-will of the new ministry that, which cannot and ought not to be considered in any other light, than as the effect of their weakness."—*MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, May 2d.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 22 May, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

A variety of circumstances at this time conspire to prevent an ultimate decision upon the operations of the campaign. Before this can reach you, a total change of men and measures, which has taken place in Great Britain, will be announced to you. What will be the consequences of this revolution, cannot with certainty be declared. Already Sir Guy Carleton has arrived at New York, charged, as he says, with a commission of peace, in conjunction with Admiral Digby. His terms of conciliation, which have been sent to me, bear the aspect of those brought by former commissioners, in the year 1780, merely ostensible and delusory.

As soon as our plan of operations is fixed, which I hope will soon be done, you will be informed of every measure necessary to be communicated to you. In the mean time I forbear entering into any particular detail. General St. Clair is not arrived at my camp. I shall defer making any reply to your proposed regulations of the army till I have seen him. I am very glad to hear of the safe arrival of Mrs. Greene at your quarters, and most sincerely give you joy of the event. Mrs. Washington joins me in cordial compliments to Mrs. Greene, and hearty good wishes for her and your health and happiness.

Within a few days the happy event of a birth of a Dauphin of France has been formally announced to Congress by the minister of France. Its celebration has been observed in Philadelphia, and is directed to be noticed in the army with such demonstrations of joy as are thought proper for the occasion. This will be done

here, and I now make the communication to you, that the officers of your army may take an opportunity to participate in the general joy. I am, &c.

TO COLONEL LEWIS NICOLA.

Newburg, 22 May, 1782.

SIR,

With a mixture of great surprise and astonishment, I have read with attention the sentiments you have submitted to my perusal. Be assured, Sir, no occurrence in the course of the war has given me more painful sensations, than your information of there being such ideas existing in the army, as you have expressed, and I must view with abhorrence and reprehend with severity. For the present the communication of them will rest in my own bosom, unless some further agitation of the matter shall make a disclosure necessary.

I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have given encouragement to an address, which to me seems big with the greatest mischiefs, that can befall my country. If I am not deceived in the knowledge of myself, you could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable. At the same time, in justice to my own feelings, I must add, that no man possesses a more sincere wish to see ample justice done to the army than I do; and, as far as my powers and influence, in a constitutional way, extend, they shall be employed to the utmost of my abilities to effect it, should there be any occasion. Let me conjure you, then, if you have any regard for your country, concern for yourself or posterity, or respect for me, to banish these thoughts from your mind, and never

communicate, as from yourself or any one else, a sentiment of the like nature. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAZEN.

Head-Quarters, 4 June, 1782.

SIR,

I have received your favor of the 27th of May, and am much concerned to find, that Captain Asgill has

* The above remarkable letter is a transcript from the first draft in Washington's handwriting. The following certificate is appended to it, and is also in the same handwriting, except the signatures, which are autographs of the signers.

"The foregoing is an exact copy of a letter, which we sealed and sent off to Colonel Nicola, at the request of the writer of it.

"D. HUMPHREYS, A. D. C.

"JONATHAN TRUMBULL, JUN., *Secretary.*"

The discontents among the officers and soldiers in the army, respecting the arrearages of their pay and their future prospects, had already increased to an alarming degree. Colonel Nicola, being a man of respectable character, somewhat advanced in life, and also on terms of intimacy with the Commander-in-chief, seems to have been much consulted by the other officers, and made a medium for communicating verbally their complaints, grievances, and apprehensions. To these Washington had listened with his usual complaisance, with an unfeigned expression of feeling for the distresses of the troops, and an unqualified declaration, that no efforts on his part should be wanting to procure for them the justice and remuneration, which their long services and sacrifices had merited.

In this stage of affairs, either of his own motion, or from the instigation of others, Colonel Nicola addressed to the Commander-in-chief a paper of an extraordinary tenor, which drew from him the above reply. After some general remarks on the deplorable condition of the army, and the little hope they could have of being properly rewarded by Congress, the Colonel proceeds to a political disquisition on the different forms of government, and comes to the conclusion, that republics are of all others the least susceptible of stability, and the least capable of securing the rights, freedom, and property of individuals. His inference is, that America can never prosper, or become a nation, under such a form. The English government he considers the most successful experiment, that has yet been tried. Then reverting somewhat in detail to the financial

been sent on, notwithstanding the information, which you had received, of there being two unconditional prisoners of war in our possession. I much fear, that the enemy, knowing our delicacy respecting the propriety of retaliating upon a capitulation officer in any case, and being acquainted that unconditional prisoners are within our power, will put an unfavorable construction upon this instance of our conduct. At least, under present circumstances, Captain Asgill's application to Sir Guy Carleton will, I fear, be productive of remonstrance and recrimination only, which may possibly tend to place the subject upon a disadvantageous footing.*

operations of the war, and to the multiplied and increasing burdens, which everywhere bore heavily upon the people, he added ;

"This must have shown to all, and to military men in particular, the weakness of republics, and the exertions the army have been able to make by being under a proper head. Therefore I little doubt, that, when the benefits of a mixed government are pointed out, and duly considered, such will be readily adopted. In this case it will, I believe, be uncontroverted, that the same abilities, which have led us through difficulties, apparently insurmountable by human power, to victory and glory, those qualities, that have merited and obtained the universal esteem and veneration of an army, would be most likely to conduct and direct us in the smoother paths of peace.

"Some people have so connected the ideas of tyranny and monarchy, as to find it very difficult to separate them. It may therefore be requisite to give the head of such a constitution, as I propose, some title apparently more moderate ; but, if all other things were once adjusted, I believe strong arguments might be produced for admitting the title of **KING**, which I conceive would be attended with some material advantages."

That this hint was well understood by Washington, is evident from the tone of his rebuke, which is stern, direct, and severe, and such as to preclude most effectually any further advances. Nor is it to be presumed, that Colonel Nicola was alone in the scheme thus put forward under the sanction of his name. There was unquestionably at this time, and for some time afterwards, a party in the army, neither small in number, nor insignificant in character, prepared to second and sustain a measure of this kind, which they conceived necessary to strengthen the civil power, draw out the resources of the country, and establish a durable government.

* *From General Hazen's Letter.* — "On the evening of the 25th instant I received your Excellency's letters of the 3d and 18th. As I had to collect the British captains, prisoners of war at this place and Yorktown,

To remedy, therefore, as soon as possible this mistake, you will be pleased immediately to order, that Lieutenant Turner, the officer you mention to be confined in York gaol, or any other prisoner, who falls within my description, may be conveyed to Philadelphia, under the same regulations and directions as were heretofore given, that he may take the place of Captain Asgill. In the mean time, lest any misinformation respecting Mr. Turner may have reached you, which

it was ten o'clock this morning before I could assemble those gentlemen together. At the drawing of lots, which was done in the presence of Major Gordon and all the British captains within the limits prescribed, the unfortunate lot has fallen on Captain Charles Asgill, of the guards, a young gentleman nineteen years of age; a most amiable character; the only son of Sir Charles Asgill; heir to an extensive fortune and an honorable title; and of course he has great interest in the British court and army. The British officers are highly enraged at the conduct of Sir Henry Clinton; they have solicited my leave to send an officer to New York on this occasion, or that I would intercede with the minister of war to grant it. Being fully convinced, that no inconvenience could possibly arise to our cause from this indulgence, but, on the contrary, that good policy and humanity dictate the measure, I was pleased at the application, and with cheerfulness have recommended to the minister of war to grant the honorable Captain Ludlow, son to the Earl of Ludlow, leave to carry the representations of those unfortunate officers, who openly declare they have been deserted by their general, and given up to suffer for the sins of the guilty. I must here beg leave to remark, that, since my command at this place, as far as I have been able to discover, those unfortunate officers have conducted with great propriety, and, as I sensibly feel for their disagreeable situation, I hold it as a part of my duty to endeavour to alleviate their distresses by such indulgences, as may not be prejudicial to our service." — *Lancaster, May 27th.*

Major Gordon, the principal officer among the British prisoners at Lancaster, wrote to Sir Guy Carleton as follows, after informing him of Captain Asgill's having been selected for retaliation.

"I have done all in my power to prevent it, which I hope will meet with your approbation. Lots were drawn by the captains of Lord Cornwallis's army present here, and when the unfortunate chance fell to Captain Asgill, he received it with that firm coolness, that would have reflected honor upon any officer in his Majesty's service. The delicate manner, in which General Hazen communicated his orders to the British officers, shows him to be a man of real feeling, and the mild treatment the prisoners have met with since we came to this place deserves the warmest acknowledgments of every British officer." — *MS. Letter, May 27th.*

might occasion further mistake and delay, Captain Asgill will be detained until I can learn the certainty of Lieutenant Turner's or some other officer's answering our purpose ; and, as their detention will leave the young gentleman now with us in a very disagreeable state of anxiety and suspense, I must desire, that you will be pleased to use every exertion in your power to make the greatest despatch in the execution of this order.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COLONEL ELIAS DAYTON.

Head-Quarters, 4 June, 1782.

SIR,

I am just informed by the secretary at war, that Captain Asgill, of the British guards, an unfortunate officer, who is destined to be the unhappy victim to atone for the death of Captain Huddy, had arrived in Philadelphia, and would set off very soon for the Jersey line, the place assigned for his execution. He will probably arrive as soon as this will reach you, and will be attended by Captain Ludlow, his friend, whom he wishes to be permitted to go into New York, with an address to Sir Guy Carleton in his behalf.

You will therefore give permission to Captain Ludlow to go by the way of Dobbs's Ferry into New York, with such representation as Captain Asgill shall please to make to Sir Guy Carleton. At the same time, I would wish you to intimate to the gentlemen, that, although I am deeply affected with the unhappy fate, to which Captain Asgill is subjected, yet, that it will be to no purpose for them to make any representation to Sir Guy Carleton, which may serve to draw on a discussion of the present point of retaliation ; that, in the

stage to which the matter has been suffered to run, all argumentation on the subject is entirely precluded on my part; that my resolutions have been grounded on so mature deliberation, that they must remain unalterably fixed. You will also inform the gentlemen, that, while my duty calls me to make this decisive determination, humanity prompts a tear for the unfortunate offering, and inclines me to say, that I most devoutly wish his life may be saved. This happy event may be attained; but it must be effected by the British Commander-in-chief. He knows the alternative, which will accomplish it; and he knows, that this alternative only can avert the dire extremity from the innocent, and that in this way alone the manes of the murdered Captain Huddy will be best appeased.

In the mean time, while this is doing, I must beg that you will be pleased to treat Captain Asgill with every tender attention and politeness (consistent with his present situation), which his rank, fortune, and connexions, together with his unfortunate state, demand.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COLONEL ELIAS DAYTON.

Head-Quarters, 11 June, 1782.

SIR,

You will inform me, as early as possible, of the present situation of Captain Asgill, the prisoner destined for retaliation, and what prospect he has of relief from his application to Sir Guy Carleton, which I have been informed he has made through his friend Captain Ludlow. I have heard nothing yet from New York in consequence of this application. His fate will be suspended till I can be informed of the decision of Sir

Guy Carleton; but I am impatient, lest this should be unreasonably delayed. The enemy ought to have learned before this, that my resolutions are not to be trifled with. I am, &c.

P. S. I am informed that Captain Asgill is at Chat-ham without guard, and under no constraint. This, if true, is certainly wrong. I wish to have the young gentleman treated with all the tenderness possible, consistent with his present situation; but, until his fate is determined, he must be considered as a close prisoner, and be kept in the greatest security. I request, therefore, that he be sent immediately to the Jersey line, where he is to be kept a close prisoner, in perfect security, till further orders.

TO ARCHIBALD CARY.

Newburg, 15 June, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have been honored with your favor of the 25th ultimo enclosing sundry resolutions of your Assembly, respecting the insidious manœuvres of the enemy, who, it is evident, cannot mean well, because they take indirect steps to obtain that, to which a plain road is opened, and which every good man is desirous of obtaining upon honorable terms. I thank you, my good Sir, for the resolves, which you did me the honor to enclose. They breathe a proper spirit, and with others of a like kind in the different assemblies will, it is to be hoped, convince the enemy, that it is both their interest and policy to be honest.

It gives me much pleasure to learn from so good authority as your pen, that the Assembly of Virginia

is better composed than it has been for several years. Much, I think, may be expected from it; the path we are to tread is certainly a plain one; the object is full in our view, but it will not come to us; we must work our way to it by proper advances, and the means of doing this are men and money. In vain is it to expect, that our aim is to be accomplished by fond wishes for peace; and equally ungenerous as fruitless will it be for one State to depend upon another to bring this to pass. If I may be allowed to speak figuratively, our assemblies, in politics, are to be compared to the wheels of a clock in mechanics. The whole, for the general purposes of war, should be set in motion by the great wheel, Congress; and, if all will do their parts, the machine will work easily; but a failure in one disorders the whole. Without the large one, which sets the whole in motion, nothing can be done. It is the united wisdom and exertions of the whole in Congress, that we are to depend upon. Without this we are no better than a rope of sand, and as easily broken asunder.

I write thus openly and freely to you, my dear Sir, because I pant for retirement, and am persuaded that an end of our warfare is not to be obtained but by vigorous exertions. The subjugation of America, so far at least as to hold it in a dependent state, is of too much importance for Great Britain to yield the palm to us whilst her resources exist, or our inactivity, want of system, and dependence upon other powers prevail. I can truly say, that the first wish of my soul is to return speedily into the bosom of that country, which gave me birth, and, in the sweet enjoyment of domestic happiness and the company of a few friends, to end my days in quiet, when I shall be called from this stage. With great truth and sincerity, I am, &c.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Head-Quarters, 17 June, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

When pressed by necessity to adopt a measure, a choice is scarcely left to us. In answer, therefore, to your letter of the 12th instant, I am obliged to observe, that the tardiness of the States will compel us to do that, which in my opinion policy forbids.

At this critical moment, inclination would not lead me to consent to disbanding any corps of the army. But if the States cannot, or, what is the same, will not recruit the regiments, which are assigned as their quotas, nor furnish the supplies necessary for their support, we must next consider what kind of troops under the present view of the matter can be dispensed with; in doing which, I cannot hesitate to declare, that cavalry, in present circumstances and the probable operations of the campaign, will be least useful, and for that reason ought to be the first to be reduced. But how to effect this purpose appears difficult, the corps being very much dispersed, and the sentiments of the officers quite unknown to me. I confess I am at a loss how to point out any particular mode. To make it a matter of arrangement with the officers to determine among themselves who should go out, and who should remain in service, would be a work of time. To select the best from among the whole, is not only an invidious business, but requires a perfect knowledge of each individual character, a knowledge, which, with a few exceptions, I confess myself not possessed of. And to retain the corps or officers by seniority may, and I am sure in some instances would, give the most indifferent officers in the whole line of the cavalry. Not being able to hit on any method, which is satisfactory to myself, I submit this point to your decision.

If the regiments of artillery, allotted to the States of Pennsylvania and Virginia, cannot be completed, an event of which I see but little prospect, however inconsistent it may be with policy, and whatever consequence it may involve, I readily subscribe to the opinion of blending the two into one. Nothing surely can be more inconsistent with every principle of economy, than to keep up whole corps of officers for the sake of a handful of men. There cannot, I think, be a doubt of the propriety of reducing Hazen's regiment. The Canadian part of it may be formed into one or more companies according to their number, and be employed as watermen, or in other services suited to their circumstances; the remainder may be turned over to the States to which they respectively belong.

What prospects the States south of the Delaware have of getting their regiments filled, under the several modes adopted by them, I know not; therefore I can give no opinion respecting them, but am certain that no regiment of infantry belonging to any State north of the Delaware ought to be reduced. Most of the staff departments of the army have undergone a recent change. Those, I presume, cannot want a revision. The quartermaster's department has been regulated without any participation of mine, and I know too little of its present constitution to form any judgment upon it. The same is the state of my knowledge respecting the clothier's department. I can only observe to you that, upon an application to me from the assistant clothier here for provisions, it appeared to me, that he had more persons employed under him than were necessary, and on that principle I refused to give him an order for his full request.

Thus, Sir, I have given you my sentiments on your queries. If they shall prove of any use in effecting

the salutary purposes you wish, I shall think myself happy in contributing in this way to the general weal.
I have the honor to be, &c.

TO JOHN DICKINSON, PRESIDENT OF DELAWARE.

Head-Quarters, 19 June, 1782.

SIR,

I feel myself much obliged by the friendly communication of your sentiments to me on the subject of retaliation, conveyed under your favor of the 30th of May, a subject truly disagreeable and distressing to me. The horrid circumstances of barbarity, which introduced the instance now attracting our particular attention, came to me under the representation of so respectable a body of citizens, that they could not but gain my notice and interposition; especially from a consideration, that, if it was not taken up in this line, the people, strongly provoked by their feelings, would probably have assumed the matter upon their own decision, and brought it to an issue under their own power, which mode of proceeding, if permitted, would have involved circumstances still more lamentable and calamitous.

In taking my resolutions, I also found myself supported by many repeated declarations of Congress on this subject. And, after my resolutions were taken, I had the satisfaction to receive the fullest and most decided approbation of that honorable body in this particular instance. But, under all these circumstances, although I never had a doubt on the general propriety of the measure, yet it was not my intention, could it be avoided, to take, as a subject of retaliation, an officer under sanction of capitulation or convention; and my

first orders were issued agreeably to that idea; but unfortunately it was reported to me, that no officer of an unconditional description was in our possession, which laid me under a necessity of giving further orders, exceeding my original intentions, in consequence of which the unhappy lot has fallen upon Captain Asgill, a prisoner under the capitulation of Yorktown.

I feel myself exceedingly distressed on this occasion; but, my resolutions having been taken upon the most mature deliberation, supported by the approbation of Congress, and grounded on the general concurrence of all the principal officers of the army, who were particularly consulted, they cannot be receded from. Justice to the army and the public, my own honor, and, I think I may venture to say, universal benevolence, require them to be carried into full execution. It rests, therefore, with the British commander-in-chief to prevent this unhappy measure from taking effect. An application is gone to Sir Guy Carleton from Captain Asgill, begging his interposition to avert his fate. The matter is now in agitation; and I am told that a strict inquiry is making into the conduct of Lippencot, who is charged as being the principal perpetrator of the cruel murder of Captain Huddy. Should this inquiry lead to a giving of satisfaction, by a compliance with my original demand to Sir Henry Clinton, my feelings will be greatly relieved, and I need not assure you, that I shall receive the highest pleasure from such an event. I am, &c.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 22 June, 1782.

SIR,

Your favor of the 20th of June I have had the honor to receive. Could I view your Excellency's proposal for a meeting, as intended to involve objects of a military nature, I should have no objection to complying with your request; but, if its purpose embraces (as would seem from your letter) only points of civil discussion, I conceive it wholly unnecessary for me to accede to it.*

* By the civil tribunals of New Jersey, two men, inhabitants of that State, who had joined the enemy after taking the oath of allegiance, and then were captured, had been condemned as guilty of treason. Sir Guy Carleton thought the proceeding very extraordinary, and a "measure of the most fatal extremity." On this subject he requested a passport for General Robertson to go out and hold an interview with General Washington, or with some person whom he might appoint for the purpose. See his letter of June 20th, in the APPENDIX, No. IX.

The British general continued to use his endeavours to produce a conciliatory feeling in the people of the United States, and to open the way for a separate peace. On this subject M. de la Luzerne wrote as follows.

"Sir Guy Carleton attempted to commence a correspondence with Congress, but that assembly wholly declined his advances. He then wrote to some of the governors of the States, but their answers were equally pointed and repulsive. He next addressed himself to the people, not directly, but through the channel of the newspapers in New York; exhorting them to change their leaders and recall their present members of Congress, and speaking of the new disposition for reconciliation and peace on the part of the mother country; but all without effect. Another attempt is to humiliate Congress by representing them to be under the influence of France, and particularly of the French minister in the United States. But he has used another instrument more powerful than these. He treats all the Americans, who fall into his hands, with extreme kindness; exhorts them not to bear arms against Great Britain; admits freely into New York the wives of the captains of vessels, which have been taken and brought into that harbour, and at their solicitation releases their husbands. And he has even written to General Washington, that he will send back the captured Carolinians in the King's ships and at the King's expense; and that he would do all in his power to cause them to

As I had the honor in my last * of transmitting the circumstances relating to Hatfield and Badgely, and of informing you, that, finding them entirely in the hands of the civil power, it was not within my line to say any thing further on the subject; so, from the tenor of your letter, it becomes necessary for me now to be very explicit in mentioning to your Excellency, that, in matters of civil resort, I am not authorized, in any case, to make the least interference. The civil laws, within the several States, having been passed without any agency of mine, I am equally excluded from any part in their execution; neither is it to be supposed, that they are under any control or influence from me. The civil power, therefore, of the States only being competent to the discussion of civil points, I shall leave them wholly to their consideration, being determined to confine myself to the proper line of my duty, which is purely military.

Previously, therefore, to closing with your proposal, I have to request, that your Excellency will be pleased to declare, whether it was your intention that the gentlemen, whom you wished to meet together, should be convened in a military capacity only, and be confined solely to the discussion of military points. If so, I shall immediately on receipt of your answer nominate one or more gentlemen, who shall be authorized to attend such persons as may be appointed on your part, at Dobbs's Ferry, and shall feel myself very happy, if, by a discussion of any military points, which may then be proposed, any measures can be adopted for humanizing,

forget their past injuries." — *MS. Letter from Luzerne to Vergennes, Philadelphia, June 14th.*

* A letter of the 10th, enclosing the report of Chief Justice Brearley, of New Jersey, in the case of Hatfield and Badgely. See Sir Guy Carleton's reply to that letter in the APPENDIX, No. IX.

as much as possible, the calamities attendant on a state of war. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Newburg, 24 June, 1782.

MY DEAR COUNT,

I have looked with anxious impatience for those despatches from your court, the arrival of which to you was to be the basis of our interview at Philadelphia. I have been in such daily expectation of this event, that I have not ventured more than fifteen miles from this place, lest your summons should arrive here in my absence.

The season for operating in this quarter is flying away rapidly ; and I am more and more embarrassed in determining on the measures, which are proper to be pursued. If the aids, which are designed for us by your generous nation, are sufficiently powerful, and arrive in season to warrant the enterprise against New York, not a moment should be lost in commencing your march this way. On the other hand, if the naval superiority, destined by his Most Christian Majesty for this coast, should be late in coming, or if, when it does arrive, our force should be judged inadequate to the siege of New York, and our arms are to be turned against Charleston, as the next object of importance, every step, which the French army under your Excellency's command might make this way, would not only serve to fatigue them, but the baggage, teams, and artillery horses, which are provided for the service of the campaign, would, by such a movement, be rendered unfit to perform a march to South Carolina, and every other expense incident to this manœuvre would be needlessly increased.

In this state of uncertainty, which may also be accompanied by unexpected embarrassments occasioned by the late events in the West Indies, I find myself at a loss to determine upon any thing, and could wish our interview to take place even under these circumstances, that we might, by a free intercourse of sentiments upon certain hypotheses, mature matters in such a manner, as to facilitate any operations to which our force shall be adjudged competent (having regard to the season), when the plans of your court are announced to us. If you approve of such a meeting before you receive your despatches, you have only to inform me of it, and I shall attend to your time at Philadelphia, or any other place, at the shortest notice.

I am at this moment on the point of setting out for Albany, on a visit to my posts in the vicinity of that place. My stay will not exceed eight or ten days, and will be shortened if any despatches should be received from you in the mean time.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head-Quarters, 9 July, 1782.

SIR,

In answer to your letter of yesterday's date, containing the following queries,

“Is the department of inspector-general necessary in the army, or is it not? Has this department been conducted during the course of five years agreeably to your wishes; and have the consequences resulting from my exertions as chief of the department answered your expectation?”

I give it as my clear opinion, that it has been of the

utmost utility, and continues to be of the greatest importance, for reasons too plain and obvious to need enumeration; but more especially for having established one uniform system of manœuvres and regulations in an army, composed of the troops of thirteen States (each having its local prejudices), and subject to constant interruptions and deviations from the frequent changes and dissolutions it has undergone.

It is equally just to declare, that the department, under your auspices, has been conducted with an intelligence, activity, and zeal, not less beneficial to the public than honorary to yourself, and that I have had abundant reason to be satisfied with your abilities and attention to the duties of your office, during the four years you have been in the service. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Newburg, 9 July, 1782.

SIR,

Having found a moment's leisure to examine, myself, into the situation of affairs on the frontiers of this State, I have lately made a journey up the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers as far as Saratoga and Schenectady. Just before my arrival there, a party of three or four hundred of the enemy, consisting of British, refugees, and savages, had made an incursion down the Mohawk, attacked, and captured (after a gallant defence) a small guard of Continental troops, who were stationed at the only remaining mill in the upper settlements, which they also destroyed.

By a deserter from this party we are informed, that the enemy are taking post at Oswego, and are either rebuilding the old, or erecting new fortifications there.

Whatever the design of the enemy may be by thus occupying a new post, and extending themselves on the frontier, I consider it my duty to inform Congress thereof, and have for that purpose taken the liberty to forward this by the earliest safe conveyance since my return from the northward.

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency copies and extracts of sundry letters, which have lately passed between the British commander-in-chief and myself. The subjects contained in them being principally of a civil nature, I must beg leave to submit them to the consideration and direction of Congress. I think it only necessary to remark, that, notwithstanding the plausibility of the terms on which Sir Guy Carleton proposes the exchange of American seamen for British soldiers, in his letter of the 7th instant, it must still be obvious, that it would amount to nearly the same thing to have the prisoners so exchanged employed against our allies in the West Indies, as it would to have them acting against ourselves on the continent.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Newburg, 9 July, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

Your letter of the 22d of April, also your two favors of the 19th of May with the returns of the army under your command, have been duly received; but, having been in momentary expectation, that intelligence

* See APPENDIX, No. IX.

The refusal of General Washington to correspond with Sir Guy Carleton on civil affairs met with the full approbation of Congress.—*Journals, August 12th.*

would arrive from Europe, or some other event turn up, which might disclose the intentions of the enemy, and give a clue for the final determination of the operations of the campaign, I have delayed for a few days giving you my answer. Notwithstanding I am at this hour as much in the dark as ever, I can defer no longer the pleasure I always experience from indulging myself in a free communication and interchange of sentiments with you. To participate and divide our feelings, hopes, fears, and expectations with a friend, is almost the only source of pleasure and consolation left us, in the present languid and unpromising state of our affairs.

It gives me infinite satisfaction to find, that, by your prudence and decision, you have put a period to the progress of a dangerous mutiny, and, by your example of patience and firmness, reclaimed the army amidst all their aggravated sufferings to that good disposition, which it has been your great merit to preserve in your command through the worst of times. Their distresses are truly deplorable; and, while the almost insurmountable difficulty of transporting clothing and the smaller supplies (which, General St. Clair reports, are still detained on the road for want of the means of conveyance) gives me the most sensible pain and anxiety, it but too clearly proves the impracticability of removing by land, under our present prospects of finance, the siege artillery and immense quantity of stores necessary for a serious operation against Charleston.

The disastrous event of the naval action in the West Indies may, indeed, and probably will now give a total alteration to the complexion of the campaign. This will, in all human probability, operate more than any other circumstance against the evacuation of the southern States; for what would have before been a very hazardous line of conduct, and would have exposed

the enemy to a fatal blow in case of a naval coöperation on this coast, may now be considered as a rational and prudent measure on their part. But the mode of defensive war (which the enemy affect to have adopted, in which I would however place but very little confidence), and especially the detachment from Charleston, which must have weakened them considerably, will, I hope, enable you at all events to hold your own ground until the southern and middle States shall have made some efforts for your reinforcement, and until the pecuniary affairs of the continent in general shall be put in a better situation. Some little, I flatter myself, will be done, although I must confess my expectations for the campaign are not very sanguine. I feel with you, my dear friend, all the regret and mortification, that can possibly be conceived, from a consideration that we shall be able to avail ourselves so imperfectly of the weakness and embarrassments of our enemy ; while, on the other hand, I think there is reason to apprehend from some late indications the enemy have given, by taking post at Oswego and extending themselves on the frontier, that they mean, availing themselves of our languor and looking forward to the hour of pacification, to occupy as much territory as they are able to do, before a negotiation shall be entered upon. I wish we may be in a capacity to counteract their designs.

I have given my opinion to Congress through the secretary at war, that it will be advisable to make a permanent incorporation of all the troops southward of the Delaware in the manner you propose ; but, as the observations did not apply to the other troops, these regiments ought to remain on their present establishment.

As to the movement and disposition of the French army, I will tell you exactly my idea and plan respect-

ing it, and how the matter now rests. While we continued in the state of uncertainty, which has so long perplexed and prevented us from forming any projects whatever, I wished to have the corps of the Count de Rochambeau remain in a situation equally capable of looking either way, as circumstances might eventually require, being well persuaded in my own mind, that with their assistance (without the aid of a naval force) we should not at this time be able to do any thing effectual against New York, defended by its present garrison; and, presuming still greater difficulties would oppose themselves to an attempt against Charleston, I proposed to postpone my final resolution until we should hear from the other side of the Atlantic. For, allowing your army, in conjunction with the French troops, to be completely competent to the object, the transportation by land of heavy artillery stores and apparatus appeared to me an inevitable obstacle, which I have fully explained in my letter of the 23d of April last. Besides, the diminution of an army in so long a march, and the innumerable advantages the enemy must derive from the command of the water, were considerations with me. And, as I flattered myself we might be able to keep the enemy in check with our present force, both in the northern and southern departments, I therefore thought it expedient, that the select corps of our allies in Virginia should continue unimpaired as a *corps de reserve* in that State, until new information or circumstances should produce new orders from me; unless the Count de Rochambeau should first be apprized of some contingency or event, which should render a movement in his opinion proper; in which case the matter was left to his determination. I have this moment learned from his Excellency, the Minister of France, that the Count has already com-

menced his march northward. What circumstances have led to this, I am unable to say; but expect to see the Count himself in a few days (by appointment) at Philadelphia, where it is proposed to enter into a discussion of the possible objects and views of the campaign, so far as our general and imperfect knowledge of affairs will admit, and from whence I shall have the pleasure to inform you of any thing of moment, that may in the mean time take place, or ultimately be in contemplation.

Under an idea, that the French troops would certainly be withdrawn from Virginia at some moment of the campaign, and perhaps unexpectedly, I have long since written to Governor Harrison on that subject, and requested that a body of men might be in readiness for the defence of the State on that occasion. Indeed I have written almost incessantly to all the States, urging, in the most forcible terms I could make use of, the absolute necessity of complying with the requisitions of Congress in furnishing their contingents of men and money, and am unhappy to say the success of these applications has not been equal to my expectation.

I am happy to assure you there was no foundation for the report of my having had a narrow escape in passing the Clove. In return, we have had a similar account respecting yourself, which I hope was equally groundless. Believe me, my dear Sir, I shall always consider myself deeply interested in whatever concerns you, and shall ever rejoice at your health, safety, and felicity.

Mrs. Washington, who is just setting out for Virginia, joins me in most affectionate regards to Mrs. Greene and yourself. I am, dear Sir, with the most perfect esteem, &c.

P. S. Although the campaign does not promise much activity, yet I shall wish you to keep me as regularly and accurately informed of the state of your department as possible, noting the strength, movements, and position of your own army, and that of the enemy. It may also be essential for me to be made acquainted with the resources of the country and every thing of a military or political nature, which may be interesting to our future plans and operations.*

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.

Head-Quarters, 10 July, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

The last post brought me your letter of the 19th of May. I must confess, that I am not at all astonished

* According to the proposal of Count de Rochambeau, a conference was held at Philadelphia respecting the future operations of the campaign. The two commanders met there on the 15th of July. As no instructions had been received from the French court, it was not in the power of Count de Rochambeau to give any decided information as to the time a French fleet might be expected on the coast from the West Indies, or its strength when arrived. He had reason to suppose, however, that it would come to the northward; and, as the sickly season was approaching in Virginia, he had put his troops under marching orders about the 1st of July, and expected they would reach Baltimore before the end of the month. It was agreed, therefore, that the French army should remain a few days at Baltimore, till further instructions or intelligence should be received, and that, unless special reasons might appear to the contrary, the army should continue its march northwardly, and join the American forces on the Hudson. This plan was thought advisable, moreover, to prevent Sir Guy Carleton from sending detachments from New York to Jamaica, where they might be turned against the French in the West Indies.

An elaborate memoir, pointing out various plans of a campaign, was presented by General Washington to Count de Rochambeau, who forwarded it to the French court. Immediately after the interview General Washington returned to Newburg, where he arrived on the 27th of July.

at the failure of your plan. That spirit of freedom, which at the commencement of this contest would have gladly sacrificed every thing to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public, but private interest, which influences the generality of mankind, nor can the Americans any longer boast an exception. Under these circumstances, it would rather have been surprising if you had succeeded, nor will you I fear have better success in Georgia.*

At the present moment, there is very little prospect of the campaign being much more active in this quarter than in yours. However, little can be positively determined, till we have some advices from Europe, which I am anxiously waiting for. When they arrive, I shall be better able to tell you what we may expect. Sir Guy Carleton is using every art to soothe and lull our people into a state of security. Admiral Digby is capturing all our vessels, and suffocating as fast as possible in prison-ships all our seamen, who will not enlist into the service of his Britannic Majesty; and Haldimand, with his savage allies, is scalping and burning on the frontiers. Such is the line of conduct pursued by the different commanders, and such their politics. You have my best wishes, being always sincerely yours.

* The plan here mentioned, which Colonel Laurens was extremely anxious to carry into effect, was to raise a regiment of black levies in South Carolina. He brought the subject before the legislature of the State, and pursued it with all his zeal and influence, but the measure was not approved. "It was some consolation, however," said he, "to perceive that truth and philosophy had gained some ground, the suffrages in favor of the measure being twice as numerous as on a former occasion. Some hopes have been lately given me from Georgia; but I fear, when the question is put, we shall be outvoted there with as much disparity as we have been in this country." — *Bacon's Bridge, South Carolina, May 19th.*

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 30 July, 1782.

SIR,

In reply to your letter of the 25th, I have to inform your Excellency, that Major-General Heath, second in command, with two aids-de-camp, will have the honor of meeting an officer of equal rank, of your appointment, at the house of Mr. Phillips, on the 5th day of August next. At that time, General Heath will receive from your officer the proceedings of the court-martial on Captain Lippencot for the murder of Captain Huddy, together with such other documents as you shall think proper to communicate. The assurance, which your Excellency has given me of the fullest satisfaction in this matter, is as pleasing as it is interesting.*

Your Excellency's propositions, contained in your letter of the 7th, have been communicated to Congress, and are now under the consideration of that honorable body. As soon as I am favored with their determination, you may be assured I will do myself the honor to communicate it to you.

I have the honor to be, &c.

* The proposal to send a person to meet General Heath was declined by Sir Guy Carleton, on the ground that it was not expedient for an officer of his rank to come out merely to take papers, which he said he would forward by the usual conveyance of a flag. It was the request of Sir Guy, that a passport might be forwarded for Chief Justice Smith to go out with the papers, and make additional explanations. "I had further an intention," said he, "of desiring the like passports for Mr. Attorney-General Kempe, who I wished should accompany him, not only to this end, but for that of entering also into such explanations, as might tend to remove all reciprocal complaints in the province of New Jersey." This matter having no relation to the military department, General Washington refused to be in any manner concerned in it.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 30 July, 1782.

SIR,

In pursuance of an act of Congress, directing me "to remand immediately Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis to the United States, unless the Honorable Henry Laurens be forthwith released from his captivity, and furnished with passports to any part of Europe or America, at his option, or be admitted to a general parole," I have to request your Excellency, that orders for this purpose may be communicated to Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis by the first conveyance, informing him, that, as this order is strictly conformable to the tenor of his parole, I have the fullest expectation of his immediate return to the United States, unless the conditions mentioned in the act of Congress are speedily complied with.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* In reply to the above, after mentioning that he had just received advices from England, which would shortly be the subject of an important joint despatch from Admiral Digby and himself, Sir Guy Carleton said; "I may venture so far to anticipate, as to acquaint you, that Mr. Laurens has been for some time in perfect freedom, and has declared, that he considers Lord Cornwallis as exchanged; but I shall wish, in consequence of the communications to be made, to receive also your sentiments or those of Congress on so delicate a point." — *August 1st.*

Sir Guy Carleton had recently written to the ministry, that he had hitherto declined evacuating New York, for the want of victuallers and transports, and also on account of the difficulty of maintaining a defensive position while weakening his forces. Mr. Townshend, the secretary at war, wrote to him, that transports would be immediately supplied from Quebec, that Admiral Pigot was ordered to take from New York to the West Indies a part of the troops, and that the remainder were to be embarked for Halifax.

"His Majesty," said Mr. Townshend, "having more maturely considered the importance of the service in the West Indies, is determined that the war in that quarter shall be confided to you. I am, therefore, to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you embark for Barbadoes, and

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 6 August, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

In my last letter, I mentioned my expectation of soon meeting the Count de Rochambeau in Philadelphia, and my intention of writing to you from that place, in case any thing of moment should turn up in the mean while; but as our hopes, that public despatches would have arrived from France before our meeting, have been disappointed, I can only inform you, that matters now rest in the same situation as described in my former letters, except with regard to the negotiations, which are said to be carrying on by the belligerent powers in Europe.

Indeed, I hardly know what to think or believe of the disposition of the court of Britain. Certain it is, the new administration have made overtures of peace to the several nations at war, apparently with a design to detach some one or other of them from the general combination; but, not having succeeded in their efforts for a separate negotiation, how far the necessity of affairs may carry them in their wishes for a general pacification upon admissible terms, I cannot undertake to determine. From the former infatuation, duplicity, and perverse system of British policy, I confess I am induced to doubt every thing, to suspect every thing; otherwise I should suppose, from the subsequent extract of a letter from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to me, dated the 2d instant, that the prospects of, and negotiation for, a general peace would be very favorable.

take upon you the command of his forces in the West Indies." — *MS. Letter, August 14th.*

The speedy return of peace prevented the execution of this order, as well as that for the removal of the troops.

“We are acquainted, Sir, by authority, that negotiations for a general peace have already commenced at Paris, and that Mr. Grenville is invested with full powers to treat with all parties at war, and is now at Paris in the execution of his commission. And we are likewise, Sir, further made acquainted, that his Majesty, in order to remove all obstacles to that peace, which he so ardently wishes to restore, has commanded his ministers to direct Mr. Grenville, that the independency of the thirteen provinces should be proposed by him, in the first instance, instead of making it a condition of a general treaty; however, not without the highest confidence, that the loyalists shall be restored to their possessions, or a full compensation made them for whatever confiscations may have taken place.”

These communications, they say, had just arrived by a packet. They farther add, that Mr. Laurens was enlarged from all engagements, and that transports were prepared for conveying all American prisoners to this country to be exchanged here. Whatever the real intention of the enemy may be, I think the strictest attention and exertion, which have ever been practised on our part, instead of being diminished, ought to be increased thereby. Jealousy and precaution, at least, can do no harm. Too much confidence and supineness may be pernicious in the extreme.

There having been a vague report, that a small embarkation of cavalry and infantry was to take place at New York, to relieve part of the garrison of Charleston, I have made use of this occasion to desire the secretary at war to put Armand's legion immediately in motion to join you, and have requested he will use his endeavours to have the means afforded to facilitate and expedite the movement.

A mail has lately been intercepted by the enemy

between Philadelphia and Trenton, in which, I am informed, there were letters from you to me. These were probably of the same date as your despatches to Congress, wherein the correspondence between General Leslie and yourself was enclosed. I mention this circumstance, that you may forward duplicates in case you should judge it necessary.

You will, I imagine, have heard, before this reaches you, of the arrival of M. Vaudreuil with a fleet of thirteen ships of the line on this coast. I can give you no particulars, as I have no official account of his arrival. The army of the Count de Rochambeau, having, as I advised you in my last, marched towards the northward, it was concluded at our meeting in Philadelphia, upon a consideration of all circumstances, that this corps should proceed to join the army on the Hudson. They were at Baltimore by the last intelligence from that quarter.

Since the receipt of the letter from the commissioners, Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, I have seen a New York paper of the 3d instant, in which is a speech of General Conway, and some other articles, which appear to be designed to propose independence to America on certain conditions not admissible, namely, that the legislature of America should be totally independent of the Parliament of Great Britain, but that the King of England should have the same kind of supremacy here as in Ireland. I have not information sufficient to determine, whether this is the kind of independence alluded to in the letter of the commissioners, or not. I hope my suspicions, however, may be ill-founded. Wishing you all the success and happiness you can desire, I am, my dear Sir, with the highest sentiments of regard and esteem, &c.

TO GOVERNOR HANCOCK.

Head-Quarters, 10 August, 1782.

SIR,

Your Excellency will be informed by Brigadier-General Choisy, who does me the honor to be the bearer of this, that the Marquis de Vaudreuil, with a fleet of his Most Christian Majesty's ships of war, may be soon expected in the harbour of Boston.

By a correspondence, which has passed between the Marquis and the Count de Rochambeau, a copy of which I have been favored with by the latter, I am informed that the French admiral has it in contemplation to strike a *coup de main* upon the post of Penobscot, while his ships are to continue in your neighbourhood, requesting the opinion and advice of the Count upon the practicability of the enterprise. It appears also from the same communication, that the French general has given him a partial, yet pretty plain disapprobation of the attempt, and has referred him to my opinion on the subject, which the Count de Rochambeau in his letter to me particularly requests me to communicate to the Marquis on his arrival.

However desirable the object may be, to dispossess the enemy from that troublesome post, yet under present circumstances and prospects I have not judged the attempt to be advisable, and have therefore given the French admiral my opinion decidedly against it. My particular sentiments on the subject will be conveyed to you in the copy of my letter to the Marquis, which I do myself the honor to enclose to your Excellency for your own observation, and that of the executive of your State.

If, notwithstanding my sentiments and present appearances, other more favorable circumstances should

turn up, or prospects should so alter as to make the attempt appear practicable in the judgment of the French admiral and General de Choisy, as also in the opinion of your executive, I have no doubt that your State will afford every assistance, in the most expeditious manner, in men, cannon, mortars, and military stores, that may be found necessary to carry the operation into effect. The distance of the army from Boston, with other circumstances, will render it impossible to give any timely aid from this quarter.

I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Newburg, 11 August, 1782.

SIR,

Having been informed that Major-General Gates is in Philadelphia, and being now about to make my ultimate arrangements for the campaign, I take the liberty to request, that you will be pleased to inform me by the earliest conveyance whether he wishes to be employed in this army or not. As it is now in my power to give General Gates a command suitable to his rank, and as I have not heard from him since I wrote to him on the 18th of March last, I trouble you with this request, that I may be still made acquainted with his determination before the disposition of commands is finally concluded. I have the honor to be, &c.†

* The project was abandoned, although the executive of Massachusetts made some efforts to have it put in execution. The Marquis de Vaudreuil anchored his fleet in Nantasket Road on the 10th of August. It consisted of thirteen ships of the line (of which four were of eighty guns and the others of seventy-four), three frigates, and a cutter. On the passage from the West Indies, the fleet had captured six English transports bound for Jamaica.

† This notice was conveyed to General Gates, who answered; "Gen-

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Newburg, 16 August, 1782.

SIR,

Were we certain, that a pacification had advanced so far as your Excellency thinks it has, or could we be assured that the British ministry were really sincere in their offers, which have been communicated through their Commander-in-chief, Sir Guy Carleton, I should think you might, without any inconvenience or danger, await the orders of your court where you now are,* and dismiss all your wagons. But when we consider, that negotiations are sometimes set on foot merely to gain time, that there are yet no offers on the part of the enemy for a general cessation of hostilities, and that, although their commanders in this country are in a manner tied down by the resolves of their House of Commons to a defensive war only, yet they may be at liberty to transport part of their force to the West Indies, I think it highly necessary, for the good of the

eral Lincoln has acquainted me, that it is your Excellency's desire to know, if I wish to take command in the army this campaign. I beg your Excellency to believe, that I am always ready to obey your commands, and shall be most happy when I can execute them to your satisfaction. I have but to entreat, that no attention to me or my rank may interfere or break in upon any part of your arrangements. My zeal for the public interest makes me exceedingly anxious to be present at the great concluding stroke of this war."—*MS. Letter, Philadelphia, August 17th.*

Since the unfortunate battle of Camden, General Gates had been in retirement at his seat in Virginia. The court of inquiry, ordered by Congress to examine into that matter, had never been convened. The subject was at length brought forward anew, and it was resolved, "That the resolution of the 5th of October, 1780, directing a court of inquiry on the conduct of Major-General Gates be repealed; and that he take command in the army as the Commander-in-chief shall direct."—*Journals, August 14th.* This resolution passed with only three dissenting voices. He rejoined the army on the 5th of October, and took command of the right wing as senior officer.

* At Baltimore.

common cause, and especially to prevent the measure, which I have last mentioned, to unite our force upon the North River; and in this opinion I am confirmed by the sentiments contained in a letter from the minister of France to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, which he has been good enough to leave open for my inspection.

“From the different accounts I can collect,” says he, “it seems to be the design of England to make a general peace; but the demands on one side and the other will render a conclusion extremely difficult; and in such a case that power will spare nothing to effectuate a peace with the United States, and turn all their efforts against us. As to a separate peace with the United States it will not take place. I am certain they will not make peace but in concert with us.” The minister also says to me; “You will judge better than I can, whether it is proper to march the French army or not. It is certain, that it will be necessary, if the English show any disposition to detach a considerable force to the West Indies.” What are the intentions of the enemy in this respect, it is impossible for me precisely to determine. Accounts from New York, but not on very good authority, still continue to mention an embarkation for the West Indies. The garrison of Savannah has arrived at New York, and there are some grounds for believing that Charleston will be evacuated. Should that event take place, and the garrison also come to New York, they might without danger detach considerably, should our force continue divided.

Upon the whole, Sir, I hardly imagine you will think it prudent to dismiss your carriages under present appearances and circumstances; and, if you do not, the cattle will be as easily and cheaply subsisted upon a march as in a settled camp. Should an accommodation take place, and should the orders of your court

call you from the continent, your embarkation might be as easily made upon the Delaware or the Hudson, as upon the Chesapeake. I am of opinion, therefore, that no good consequences can result from your remaining at Baltimore, but that many advantages may attend your marching forward, and forming a junction with this army. Actuated by no motives, but those which tend to the general good, I have taken the liberty of giving my sentiments with that freedom, with which I am convinced you would ever wish me to deliver them. I beg leave to return my thanks for the attention you have paid to the exchange, not only of Colonel Laumoy, but of several others of our officers.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Head-Quarters, 18 August, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your private letter of the 12th instant. I cannot but think the conduct respecting the release of Lord Cornwallis very extraordinary. Is it reasonable that Mr. Laurens should be at full liberty, and acting as a commissioner in Europe, while Lord Cornwallis, for whose liberation he pledged his own honor, and consequently as a public man that of the States, is held bound by his parole? Either disavow the propriety of Mr. Laurens's conduct, and let him be remanded by the British ministry, or set Lord Cornwallis at equal liberty. I am placed in a very delicate situation. Sir Guy Carleton has given me official information of the transaction, and has called for a confirmation of Mr. Laurens's act. I have referred the matter to the proper place, and I can obtain no

answer. In my letters to General Carleton I am obliged to be for the present silent, but I certainly must expect to hear from him again. Do, my good Sir, endeavour to obtain a decision upon this matter.*

Your public letter of the 12th covers a resolve of the same date, authorizing me to propose a meeting of commissioners for establishing a cartel. Here again I am somewhat embarrassed, never having yet received either the approbation or disapprobation of Congress upon the proceedings of the former commissioners, General Knox and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, although they were transmitted so long ago as the 30th of April last. It appears by the report of those gentlemen, that the negotiation was broken off principally on account of the disposition, which plainly appeared on the part of the British commissioners to procure the exchange of their soldiers in our hands without settlement of accounts, or

* The letter from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to General Washington was referred by Congress to a committee, who, on the part relating to Mr. Laurens, "proposed and reported, that the General should be directed to empower his commissioners [for negotiating a cartel] to release Earl Cornwallis from his parole in return for the indulgence granted to Mr. Laurens; but Mr. Rutledge, one of the committee, inveighed against this with so much warmth and indignation, that it was rejected with a loud and general *No* from all parts of the House. Nothing was said on the proposition of exchanging soldiers for seamen. Congress deemed it inexpedient to touch upon that matter at present, or to do any thing that might serve as a pretext for refusing to settle a cartel; and apprehended, if a general cartel was established, provision might be made therein for a release of our seamen, as well as for preventing the capture of unarmed citizens." — *Charles Thomson's MS. Sketch of the Debate in Congress, August 12th.* For a view of the policy and objects of the different States at this time, growing chiefly out of local considerations, see a paper by Mr. Madison in the APPENDIX, No. X.

At the solicitation of Mr. Laurens after he was set at liberty, and after the return of Lord Cornwallis to England, Dr. Franklin sent to the latter a paper discharging him from his parole, but reserving to Congress the approbation or disallowance of the act. In consequence of this form of release, Lord Cornwallis considered himself at liberty, and took his seat in the House of Peers. — *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. III. pp. 362, 373.

making any payment, or giving any security for the payment, of the large sum which, we conceive, is due. Now Congress, in the resolve to which I have just referred, make no reference to any former transaction, but authorize me to settle a cartel, "taking care that the liquidation of accounts and settlement of the balance due for the maintenance of prisoners be provided for therein." From this it may possibly be inferred, that they do approve the former proceedings, and mean to make the settlement of accounts a preliminary; but this is an inference only, and may be a false one; and therefore I wish you to endeavour to find out the true meaning of the House, and to procure a determination upon the former proceedings.

The same commissioners will probably be appointed upon our part, and, could they be assured their former principles were thought good, they would proceed with more confidence upon a future occasion. I confess to you, that I have found so many difficulties thrown in the way of all former transactions of this nature, that I could ever wish Congress to be as full and explicit as possible, as to the points which they would have either conceded or demanded. I would prefer that mode on many accounts to unlimited powers, as you may easily conceive. But what I principally now want to be assured of is, whether they do or do not approve the conduct of the former commissioners, and the principles which they seemed desirous of establishing. With much truth and affection, I am, &c.*

* The subject of this letter was laid before Congress by the secretary at war, and was referred to a committee, who made a long report on the general principles to be followed in arranging a cartel. After considerable debate, the report was adopted, and the proceedings of the commissioners were approved. — *Journals, September 9th.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 19 August, 1782.

SIR,

Congress have been already furnished with copies of all letters, which had passed between the commanders-in-chief of the British forces in New York and myself, respecting the murder of Captain Huddy previous to the last of July. I have now the honor to enclose Sir Guy Carleton's letter of the 1st instant, in reply to mine of the 30th ultimo, and that of the 13th, which accompanied the proceedings of the general court-martial for the trial of Captain Lippencot. The proceedings, together with such other documents as relate to that unfortunate transaction, I also transmit by this opportunity.

As Sir Guy Carleton, notwithstanding the acquittal of Lippencot, reprobates the measure in unequivocal terms, and has given assurance of prosecuting a further inquiry, it has changed the ground I was proceeding upon, and placed the matter upon an extremely delicate footing.

It would be assuming in me to ascribe causes for actions different from those, which are ostensibly and plausibly assigned; but, admitting that General Carleton has no other object than to procrastinate, he has, by disavowing the act, by declaring that it is held in abhorrence, by not even sanctioning the motives, which appear to have influenced Lippencot to become the executioner of Huddy, and by giving the strongest assurances that further inquisition shall be made, so far manifested the appearance of an earnest desire to bring the guilty to punishment, that I fear an act of retaliation upon an innocent person before the result of his inquisition is known, would be considered by the

impartial and unprejudiced world in an unfavorable and perhaps an unjustifiable point of view; and more especially as the great end proposed by retaliation, which is to prevent a repetition of outrages, has been in a manner answered. For, you will please to observe, by the extract from General Clinton's letter of the 26th of April to Governor Franklin,* that he had expressly forbidden the Board of Directors to remove or exchange in future any prisoners of war in the custody of their commissary without having first obtained his approbation and orders.

The same reasons, which induced me to lay the first steps I took in this affair before Congress, urge me to submit it to them at its present stage. It is a great national concern, upon which an individual ought not to decide. I shall be glad to be favored with the determination of Congress as early as possible, as I shall suspend giving any answer to Sir Guy Carleton, until I am informed how far they are satisfied with his conduct hitherto.

I cannot close this letter without making a remark upon that part of Sir Guy Carleton's, in which he charges me with want of humanity in selecting a victim from among the British officers so early as I did. He ought to consider, that, by the usages of war and upon the principles of retaliation, I should have been justified in executing an officer of equal rank with Captain Huddy immediately upon receiving proofs of his murder, and then informing Sir Henry Clinton that I had done so. Besides, it was impossible for me to foresee, that it would be so very long before the matter would be brought to some kind of issue.†

I have the honor to be, &c.

* President of the Board of Directors of the Associated Loyalists.

† In the public offices of London I was favored with the perusal of all

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 28 August, 1782.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to inform your Excellency, that, in obedience to the resolve of Congress of the 12th instant, I proposed to Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby a meeting of commissioners, for the purpose of settling a general cartel, which has been acceded to upon their part. Previously to the meeting of the respective commissioners, and before I can instruct those, who shall be appointed in behalf of the United States, it is absolutely necessary that I should be made acquainted with the determination of Congress upon the following points; whether I am to confirm the exchange of Lord Cornwallis for Mr. Laurens; and whether it is their intention, that the proposal contained in the letter of Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, of the 2d of August, "to exchange soldiers for sailors," on the conditions mentioned by those gentlemen, should be acceded to. The latter, should we be fortunate enough to obtain a liquidation of accounts (and we must go prepared on the sup-

the communications of Sir Henry Clinton and Sir Guy Carleton to the ministry on this affair of Captain Huddy; and justice requires me to say, that those commanders expressed the strongest indignation and abhorrence at his execution, and used every possible effort to ascertain the offenders and bring them to punishment. Lippencot was arrested, and arraigned before a court-martial. He denied the jurisdiction of the court, and claimed a trial by the civil laws. The matter was then referred to the British chief justice in New York, who decided against this claim, and Lippencot was remanded to a court-martial and tried. The testimony did not confirm his guilt. It appeared, that he considered himself as acting under the authority of the Board of Directors of the Associated Loyalists, which screened him from responsibility in the act. Both Sir Henry Clinton and Sir Guy Carleton were extremely dissatisfied with the explanations attempted to be given by the Board; and the odium, if not the guilt, of the transaction must for ever remain a reproach to that body.

position that we shall be able to effect it), will be the great point in controversy ; and, as it is one of vast political importance, I wish to be explicitly instructed upon it by Congress. As I cannot proceed further in the business before I am favored with answers to the foregoing, I must request your Excellency to be kind enough to furnish me with them as soon as Congress shall have decided upon the several matters.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL KNOX.

Instructions.

SIR,

You are hereby appointed to the command of West Point and its dependencies. But, as the army will lie for some time upon Verplanck's Point, you will consider yourself as relieved till further orders from the care of attending to that post, Stony Point, and Dobbs's Ferry, which are part of the dependencies, except so far as relates to their being constantly supplied with the proper quantity of ordnance. I have so thorough a confidence in you, and so well am I acquainted with your ability and activity, that I think it needless to point out to you the great outlines of your duty. I recommend the following matters to your attention.

To visit the redoubts frequently ; to see that they are kept in proper order ; that the garrisons allotted to them are alert, and that they make it an invariable rule to sleep within the works. They should each be furnished constantly with ten days' wood and water ;

* See the resolves of Congress on the subject of this letter, in the *Journals*, September 9th. A copy of them was sent to Sir Guy Carleton.

and, if the contractors keep up such a magazine of salt provision upon the Point, as they ought to do by contract, the detached works should be provided with ten days' provision also. The rolls to be frequently called. No officer to be absent without your leave, and no non-commissioned officer or soldier without the leave of a field-officer.

The quarter-master having reported a scarcity of tents, you will be pleased to remove the tenth Massachusetts regiment into the barracks, that their tents may be delivered up. No buildings, either public or private, are to be erected without your knowledge; and, when applications are made to you for that purpose, you will, if they are admitted, direct the commanding engineer to point out the situations, that they may not interfere with the defences of the place. The public buildings now carrying on, and the alterations and repairs of the works, will engage your particular attention. You know the necessity of bringing them to a certain state before the frost sets in. Given at Head-Quarters, at Newburg, the 29th of August, 1782.*

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Head-Quarters, Verplanck's Point, 1 September, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

The late New York papers announce the evacuation of Charleston, as a matter which would certainly take

* The army moved from Newburg, on the 31st of August, to Verplanck's Point, where an encampment was established. This change was in consequence of an agreement with Count de Rochambeau to form a junction of the American and French armies at that place, and also to be nearer to the enemy in case any hostile attempts should be made from New York; although, from the inactivity and pacific declarations of Sir Guy Carleton, such attempts were not anticipated.

place soon after the 7th of August. I have, upon this information, written to Major-General Smallwood and Colonel Butler to send forward to this army the recruits of Maryland and Pennsylvania, who are at Annapolis and Carlisle. I enclose the letters under flying seals to you, that you may take the sense of Congress upon the matter, before the orders are carried into execution.

Congress having determined what troops should compose the southern army, I do not think myself absolutely at liberty to withdraw those, which are already there, or to stop the reinforcements intended for them, without first consulting Congress, which I mean to do through you. So long ago as the 18th of March last, I calculated from appearances upon the evacuation of the southern States; and I then wrote to General Greene to hold himself in readiness to march to the northward the moment such an event should seem certain. In my idea, the infantry apportioned to the two Carolinas and Georgia will be sufficient to be left in the southern quarter. The South Carolina regiment of artillery having been reformed, it may be thought necessary to leave the small remains of Harrison's and late Procter's there. It will be necessary, also, to consider what corps of horse shall remain. If Armand's legion have not yet removed from Charlottesville, they certainly ought not to proceed. After having consulted Congress, and made the proper arrangements, you will please to inform Major-General Greene of the result, that he may govern himself accordingly. The difficulty and enormous expense of supporting troops at the southward are sufficient inducements to draw as many from thence as we possibly can.

The whole army, the garrison at West Point excepted, which is left under the command of Major-

General Knox, moved down to this ground yesterday. I have sent Major-General Lord Stirling to Albany, to take the command of the two Continental regiments and the State troops upon the northern frontiers. The New York and Jersey lines have joined me here.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 8 September, 1782.

SIR,

I have the honor to reply to your Excellency's letter of the 23d of August, and to inform you, that Major-Generals Heath and Knox are nominated by me to meet Lieutenant-General Campbell and Mr. Elliot, as commissioners for the purpose of settling a general cartel for an exchange of prisoners. I propose, Sir, that the meeting be held at Tappan, as an intermediate and convenient place, and that it commence on the 18th day of this month, at which time my commissioners will attend, and will be accompanied by the commissary of prisoners.* Your Excellency's favor of the 29th, enclosing a copy of Governor Livingston's letter to you of the 10th, came in due time to my hands. I am at a loss to discover for what purpose it was communicated to me; especially as I have more than once observed to you, that in matters of civil resort I have ever avoided any interference, and have transmitted to you the approbation of the sovereign power of these United States for my so doing. And of this

* The commissioners met at Tappan on the 25th of September, but effected nothing. The powers of the British commissioners were not satisfactory to the other party, and they separated without commencing a negotiation. — HEATH'S *Memoirs*, p. 354.

nature appears to be the case of Ezekiel Tilton, who is the subject of your correspondence with the Governor.

I cannot help remarking, that your Excellency has several times lately taken occasion to mention, that "all hostilities stand suspended on your part." I must confess, that, to me, this expression wants explanation. I can have no conception of a suspension of hostilities, but that which arises from a mutual agreement of the powers at war, and which extends to naval as well as land operations. That your Excellency has thought proper, on your part, to make a partial suspension, may be admitted; but, whether this has been owing to political or other motives, it is not for me to decide. It is, however, a well known fact, that at the same time the British cruisers on our coasts have been more than usually alert; and, while Americans are admitted to understand their real interests, it will be difficult for them, when a suspension of hostilities is spoken of, to separate the idea of its extending to the sea as well as land.

I cannot ascribe the inroads of the savages upon our northwestern frontier to the causes, from which your Excellency supposes them to originate; neither can I allow, that they are committed without directions from the commander-in-chief in Canada. For by prisoners and deserters it is apparent, that those ravaging parties are composed of white troops, under the command of officers regularly commissioned, as well as savages; and it would be a solecism to suppose, that such parties could be out, without the knowledge of their commander-in-chief. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* Sir Guy Carleton had written;—"If these Indians come not solely to revenge the cruelties practised on their brethren, their motives are to me wholly unknown. To my knowledge, they cannot have directions from the commander-in-chief on that side; and these proceedings not only have my disapprobation, but I shall very willingly assist in restoring tranquillity on that frontier also."—*August 29th.*

TO JAMES MCHENRY.

Verplanck's Point, 12 September, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

Our prospects of peace are vanishing. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham has given a shock to the new administration, and disordered its whole system. Fox, Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Lord Keppel, and I believe others, have left it. Earl Shelburne takes the lead, as first lord of the treasury, to which office he was appointed by the King, the moment the vacancy happened by the death of Lord Rockingham. This nobleman declares, that the sun of Great Britain will set the moment American independence is acknowledged, and that no man has ever heard him give an assent to the measure. The Duke of Richmond, on the other hand, asserts, that the ministry, of which Lord Shelburne is one, came into office upon the express condition, and pledged to each other, that America should be declared independent; that he will watch him, and, the moment he finds him departing therefrom, he will quit the administration, and give it every opposition in his power.

That the King will push the war, as long as the nation will find men or money, admits not of a doubt in my mind. The whole tenor of his conduct, as well as his last proroguing speech, on the 11th of July, plainly indicates it, and shows in a clear point of view the impolicy of relaxation on our part. If we are wise, let us prepare for the worst. There is nothing, which will so soon produce a speedy and honorable peace, as a state of preparation for war; and we must either do this, or lay our account to patch up an inglorious peace, after all the toil, blood, and treasure we have spent. This has been my uniform opinion; a doctrine I have

endeavoured, amidst the universal expectation of an approaching peace, to inculcate, and which I am sure the event will justify. With much truth, I am, &c.*

TO THOMAS PAINE.

Head-Quarters, 18 September, 1782.

SIR,

I have the pleasure to acknowledge your favor, informing me of your proposal to present me with fifty copies of your last publication† for the amusement of the army. For this intention you have my sincere thanks, not only on my own account, but for the pleasure, which I doubt not the gentlemen of the army will receive from the perusal of your pamphlets.

* The first division of the French army, under Count de Rochambeau, arrived at King's Ferry from the south, on the 15th of September. The remainder followed, and the whole crossed the river, and formed a junction with the American army. Count de Rochambeau describes the event as follows.

"General Washington, wishing to testify his respect for France, and his recognition of the benefits she had rendered, caused us to pass between two lines of troops, clad, equipped, and armed with clothing and arms from France, and from the English magazines taken at Yorktown, which the French army had relinquished to the Americans. He ordered the drums to beat a French march during the whole review, and the two armies rejoined with the most lively demonstrations of reciprocal satisfaction." — *Mémoires de Rochambeau*, Tom. I. p. 309.

The French army encamped on the left of the American army near Crompond, about ten miles from Verplanck's Point.

† Probably one of the numbers of the *Crisis*. Paine was now writing a series of articles under that title, suited to the political state of the times. He had laid aside his pen for several months, when, in the February preceding, Mr. Robert Morris induced him to take it up again, and promised him a stipulated sum of money as a compensation for his services. This was done with the knowledge and approbation of General Washington, who was then in Philadelphia. The *Crisis* was accordingly revived, and continued to the end of the war. See on this subject an extract from Mr. Morris's *Diary*, in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XII. p. 95.

Your observations on the *period of seven years*, as it applies to British minds, are ingenious, and I wish it may not fail of its effects in the present instance.* The measures and the policy of the enemy are at present in great perplexity and embarrassment. But I have my fears, whether their necessities, the only operating motives with them, have yet arrived to that point, which must drive them unavoidably into what they will esteem disagreeable and dishonorable terms of peace; such, for instance, as an absolute, unequivocal admission of American independence, on the terms upon which we can accept it. For this reason, added to the obstinacy of the King, and the probable consonant principles of some of the chief ministers, I have not so full confidence in the success of the present negotiation for peace as some gentlemen entertain. Should

* *From Paine's Letter.* — "I fully believe we have seen our worst days over. The spirit of the war on the part of the enemy is certainly on the decline, full as much as we think for. I draw this opinion, not only from the difficulties we know they are in, and the present promiscuous appearance of things, but from the peculiar effect, which certain periods of time have more or less upon all men. The British have accustomed themselves to think of the term of *seven years* in a manner different from other periods of time. They acquire this partly by habit, by religion, by reason, and by superstition. They serve seven years apprenticeship; they elect their parliament for seven years; they punish by seven years' transportation, or the duplicate, or triplicate of that term; their leases run in the same manner; and they read that Jacob served seven years for one wife and seven years for another; and the same term, likewise, extinguishes all obligations (in certain cases) of debt, or matrimony; and thus this particular period, by a variety of concurrences, has obtained an influence in their minds superior to that of any other number.

"They have now had seven years' war, and are not an inch farther on the continent than when they began. The superstitious and the popular part will conclude that it is *not to be*; and the reasonable part will think they have tried an unsuccessful scheme long enough, and that it is in vain to try it any longer; and the obstinate part of them will be beaten out, unless, consistent with their former sagacity, they get over the matter at once, by passing a new declaratory act to *bind Time in all cases whatsoever*, or declare him a rebel." — *September 7th.*

events prove my jealousies to be ill founded, I shall make myself happy under the mistake, consoling myself with the idea of having erred on the safest side, and enjoying with as much satisfaction as any of my countrymen the pleasing issue of our severe contest.

I am, Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Verplanck's Point, 23 September, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

I hope before this reaches you, that you will be in possession of Charleston, and will have found a glorious end to your difficulties and distresses in the southern quarter.

An application from the government of South Carolina produced the resolve, of which the enclosed is a copy, and which, I doubt not, was immediately transmitted to you. From your being upon the spot, and from your thorough knowledge of southern affairs, I shall leave the execution of the resolve in a great measure to your own judgment. As you observe in your letter of the 12th of August, when my directions of the 18th of March last were given, they were upon a presumption, that the enemy might evacuate Charleston in such season, that the troops destined to return to the northward might be here time enough to render service before the close of the campaign; but, that not being the case, their immediate removal does not become so essential; and therefore I leave it with you, either to retain the corps, which you may ultimately determine to send northward, until the weather becomes favorable for marching in the spring, or to send them forward immediately as far as Virginia at least,

if you find their subsistence more difficult and expensive, than it would be in the middle States. I will just give you a hint, that I fear subsistence will be upon a very precarious footing here during the winter; and you know the inconvenience of having troops arrive at the cantonment late in the season.

The arrangement made by you for the distribution of the southern army agrees perfectly, in the main, with my own judgment. I think, for the following reason, that the first and third regiments of cavalry had best be left in Carolina. They both belong to Virginia, and will more than probably be incorporated the next year. Their separation, therefore, would render the incorporation difficult; and, as cavalry are of no great use in this quarter in offensive operations, and more easily subsisted southward than here, I am not anxious to have Lee's legion. But with this you will do as you think best. Armand's legion will not advance. I shall recommend their wintering in Virginia, as forage will be extremely scarce in all this country, owing to the severest drought ever known.

By the resolve before alluded to, I am directed to make the necessary inquiry into the circumstances of the southern States, and to employ such force therein as I may think proper, and to direct you, whilst in the southern department, to employ the troops under your command offensively or defensively in such manner as may be most conducive to the interest of the United States.

The execution of the foregoing, I must, for the reasons mentioned in the beginning of my letter, leave also to you. Should the enemy evacuate the southern States, I know of no offensive operations but against St. Augustine, or the savages. The former I believe is out of our power, even were we authorized to undertake

such an expedition; and the latter must depend upon contingencies. I do not apprehend much danger from the savages, when the British are expelled from the seacoast.

You will perceive it is the intention of Congress, that you should remain personally at the southward until further orders. You will, I doubt not, use every argument to induce those States to exert themselves in raising a permanent force for their own defence. They cannot expect, that, if the enemy evacuate the southern States, and keep a footing at New York, and at other places to the northward and eastward, the force of almost half the Union should be kept in the southern States for defence only.

The situation of politics, I mean European, is upon so precarious a footing, that I really know not what account to give of them. Negotiations were still going on at Paris in the middle of July; but the prospects of a peace were checked by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham. Dr. Franklin's laconic description of the temper of the British nation seems most apt. "They are," says he, "unable to carry on the war, and too proud to make peace." I am, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Head-Quarters, 24 September, 1782.

SIR,

Sundry accounts from New York having reached me, informing me, that the British were more than meditating an enterprise against the squadron of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, which they have learnt is at present in two detachments, in Boston and Portsmouth harbours, and that preparations were making for that

purpose, I have made the Marquis acquainted with this intelligence, and the probability of such an event. At the same time that I gave this information to the French admiral, I wrote a letter to Governor Hancock, requesting, that arrangements may be made with the militia of his State, in such a manner as to give immediate and effectual support, in aid and protection of his Most Christian Majesty's ships, in case an attempt should be made upon them. The like information I shall give to the governor of the State of New Hampshire, and request similar assistance from him, in case of the enemy approaching near Portsmouth. With the highest regard and esteem, &c.

TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

Verplanck's Point, 30 September, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

I shall be obliged to you, or some friend in Congress, to inform me what has been or is likely to be done with respect to my reference of the case of Captain Huddy. I cannot forbear complaining of the cruel situation, which I now am and oftentimes have been placed in, by the silence of Congress in matters of high importance, which the good of the service, and my official duty have obliged me to call upon them, as the sovereign power of these United States, to decide. It is only in perplexing and intricate cases, that I have requested their orders, being always willing to bear my proportion of public embarrassments, and take a full share of responsibility. Conscious that I have treated that honorable body, and all their measures, with as much deference and respect as any officer in the United States, I expected this aid.

Why, then, if policy forbids a decision upon the difficult points I have referred, I am not to be informed of it, is beyond my conception, unless I were to ascribe it to causes, which I flatter myself do not exist. When I refer a matter to Congress, every proceeding on my part is suspended, until their pleasure is transmitted ; and for this it is well known I have waited with unexampled patience. But when no notice is taken of my application ; when measures, which I might otherwise adopt, are suspended ; when my own feelings are wounded, and others perhaps are suffering by the delay, how is it possible for me to forbear expressing my disquietude ?

The particular cause of it at this time arises from two things. First, while I am totally silent to the public, waiting the decision of Congress on the case of Huddy, I see publications on this head (importing reflections) in one of the Pennsylvania papers, which no man could have made, that had not access to my official letter of the 19th of August to Congress ; and, secondly, because I feel exceedingly for Captain Asgill, who was designated by lot in retaliation for the death of Captain Huddy. While retaliation was apparently necessary, however disagreeable in itself, I had no repugnance to the measure. But, when the end proposed by it is answered, by a disavowal of the act, by a dissolution of the board of refugees, and by a promise (whether with or without meaning to comply with it, I shall not determine), that further inquisition should be made into the matter, I thought it incumbent upon me, before I proceeded any farther in the matter, to have the sense of Congress, who had most explicitly approved, and impliedly indeed ordered retaliation to take place. To this hour I am held in darkness.

The letter of Asgill, a copy of which I enclose, and

the situation of his father, which I am made acquainted with by the British prints, work too powerfully upon my humanity not to wish, that Congress would chalk a line for me to walk by in this business. To effect this, is the cause of the trouble you now receive from, dear Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.*

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 2 October, 1782.

SIR,

Your Excellency will have been informed, by your commissioners, of the causes which obstructed their proceeding upon business at the late meeting at Tappan. The commissioners on the part of the United States laid before those appointed by your Excellency and Admiral Digby a remonstrance, on the subject of the immense expense arising from the support of so great a number of British prisoners as we now have in our possession, without any present compensation or proper security for the payment hereafter. This remonstrance your commissioners did not think themselves at liberty to accept. I am, therefore, under the necessity of furnishing your Excellency with a copy of

* Captain Asgill had been for some time released from close confinement, and allowed to go at large on parole at Chatham and in the neighbourhood of that place. He wrote to General Washington, requesting permission to return to Europe, on account of the illness of his father, and the distressed state of his mother and sister in consequence of that event, and of their anxiety for the fate impending over the son and brother.

In writing to the secretary at war, a week after the above letter, General Washington said; "The delay of Congress places me not only in a very delicate, but a very awkward situation. Were I to give my private opinion respecting Asgill, I would pronounce in favor of his being released from his duress, and that he should be permitted to go to his friends in Europe." — *October 7th.*

it, and of assuring you, agreeably to my instructions, from the honorable the Congress of the United States, "that, if this, like former representations, should produce no effect, it will be high time to take measures, however disagreeable, for diminishing a burthen which is become intolerable." I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Head-Quarters, 2 October, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR,

Painful as the task is to describe the dark side of our affairs, it sometimes becomes a matter of indispensable necessity. Without disguise or palliation, I will inform you candidly of the discontents, which at this moment prevail universally throughout the army.

The evils, of which they complain, and which they suppose almost remediless, are the total want of money or the means of existing from one day to another, the heavy debts they have already incurred, the loss of credit, the distress of their families at home, and the prospect of poverty and misery before them. It is vain, Sir, to suppose, that military men will acquiesce contentedly with bare rations, when those in the civil walk of life, unacquainted with half the hardships they endure, are regularly paid the emoluments of office. While the human mind is influenced by the same passions and inclinations, this cannot be. A military man has the same turn for sociability as a person in civil life. He conceives himself equally called upon to live up to his rank, and his pride is hurt when circumstances restrain him. Only conceive, then, the mortifi-

* See Sir Guy Carleton's answer in the APPENDIX, No. IX.

cation they must suffer (even the general officers), when they cannot invite a French officer, a visiting friend, or a travelling acquaintance, to a better repast, than bad whiskey (and not always that) and a bit of beef without vegetables will afford them.

The officers also complain of other hardships, which they think might and ought to be remedied without delay ; such as the stopping of promotions, where there have been vacancies open for a long time ; the withholding of commissions from those, who are justly entitled to them, and have warrants or certificates of their appointments from the executives of their States ; and particularly the leaving of the compensation for their services in a loose, equivocal state, without ascertaining their claims upon the public, or making provision for the future payment of them.

While I premise, that no one I have seen or heard of appears opposed to the principle of reducing the army as circumstances may require, yet I cannot help fearing the result of the measure in contemplation, under present circumstances, when I see such a number of men, goaded by a thousand stings of reflection on the past and of anticipation on the future, about to be turned into the world, soured by penury and what they call the ingratitude of the public, involved in debts without one farthing of money to carry them home, after having spent the flower of their days, and many of them their patrimonies, in establishing the freedom and independence of their country, and suffered every thing that human nature is capable of enduring on this side of death. I repeat it, that when I consider these irritating circumstances, without one thing to soothe their feelings or dispel the gloomy prospects, I cannot avoid apprehending that a train of evils will follow, of a very serious and distressing nature. On the other

hand, could the officers be placed in as good a situation, as when they came into service, the contention, I am persuaded, would be, not who should continue in the field, but who should retire to private life.

I wish not to heighten the shades of the picture so far as the reality would justify me in doing it. I could give anecdotes of patriotism and distress, which have scarcely ever been paralleled, never surpassed in the history of mankind. But, you may rely upon it, the patience and long-suffering of this army are almost exhausted, and that there never was so great a spirit of discontent as at this instant. While in the field, I think it may be kept from breaking out into acts of outrage; but when we retire into winter-quarters, unless the storm is previously dissipated, I cannot be at ease respecting the consequences. It is high time for a peace.

To you, my dear Sir, I need not be more particular in describing my anxiety and the grounds of it. You are too well acquainted, from your own service, with the real sufferings of the army, to require a longer detail. I will, therefore, only add, that, exclusive of the common hardships of a military life, our troops have been and still are obliged to perform more services foreign to their proper duty, without gratuity or reward, than the soldiers of any other army; for example, the immense labors expended in doing the duty of the artificers in erecting fortifications and military works, the fatigue of building for themselves barracks or huts annually, and of cutting and transporting wood for the use of all our posts and garrisons without any expense whatever to the public.

Of this letter, which, from the tenor of it, must be considered in some degree of a private nature, you may make such use as you shall think proper, since the principal objects of it are, by displaying the merits, the hardships, the disposition, and critical state of the

army, to give information that may eventually be useful, and to convince you with what entire confidence and esteem, I am, my dear Sir, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 18 October, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

The death of Colonel Laurens I consider as a very heavy misfortune, not only as it affects the public at large, but particularly so to his family, and all his pri-

* To some of the topics of this letter General Lincoln replied, in his private capacity, as follows.

"You mention as a ground of complaint, that the compensation to the army for their services is left in a loose, equivocal state, and of this I am fully convinced; and from the knowledge I have of the temper of Congress, I have little expectation that the matter of half-pay, to which I suppose you allude, will be in a better situation than it now is, until it shall be recommended by Congress to the several States to provide for their own officers; which I am apprehensive will not be done unless Congress know in some way or other, that it is the wish of the officers that they should do it.

"You know, Sir, that no moneys can be appropriated but by the voice of nine States. There was not that number in favor of half-pay, when the vote to grant it passed, in Congress, which was a vote before the confederation was signed and practised upon, but is not now. I see little probability, that a sum equal to the half-pay will be appropriated to that purpose, and apportioned on the several States. Massachusetts is one of those States, which have always been opposed to the measure. Indeed, there is but one State east of this, which agreed to it. In the first place, there is too great a part of the Union opposed to the half-pay to think of carrying it through. The States in the opposition cannot be coerced. They say that they are willing to make a handsome compensation by compromise, and that they will give a sum which shall be just and honorable. From this it will be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade them to depart. I am myself fully of opinion, that it will be much the best for the army to be referred to their several States, and that their expectations will end in chagrin and disappointments if they look for half-pay from Congress. Let us for a moment reflect how Congress will avail themselves of money to discharge this debt. They cannot appropriate any part of the sum to this use, which shall be annually apportioned on

vate friends and connexions, to whom his amiable and useful character has rendered him peculiarly dear.*

The campaign in this quarter is coming to a close, without any events of great importance. The intentions of the enemy at New York still remain undecided. Their fleet continues in the harbour, making every preparation for sailing, which I fancy is delayed in expectation of the arrival of the packet, which is hourly looked for. It is not yet known, but strongly conjectured, that a detachment of troops will go from New York to the West Indies with the fleet. Sir Guy Carleton has called in most of his out-posts, contracted his lines near the city, and is making his gar-

the several States, for the reasons I mentioned before ; there are not nine States in favor of it. Should it be said, that it may be paid out of the revenue of some general tax, it will not remove the objection. The money arising from these general taxes must also be appropriated, if such taxes were passed. No one of those proposed has yet passed, and I see little probability that any of them will soon, if ever." — *October 14th.*

* The enemy in Charleston sent a detachment from that city to the Combahee River, at a place about fifty miles south of General Greene's camp, for the purpose of collecting rice. The party consisted of about five hundred infantry, with armed vessels and empty sloops and schooners.

Intelligence of this expedition being received in camp, General Gist with the light troops, in which Colonel Laurens had a command, was ordered to march and oppose the enemy. He arrived on the evening of the 25th of August near Combahee Ferry, where the British detachment had landed. General Gist caused a work to be thrown up at Cheshaw Neck, about twelve miles below the Ferry, to annoy the shipping when it returned. Colonel Laurens solicited the direction and command of that post, and in the evening of the 26th, about fifty infantry, and some matrosses with a howitz, were ordered to join him.

The enemy, disappointed in their principal object, reëmbarked at two o'clock in the morning of the 27th, and dropped silently down the river with the tide, undiscovered by the patrols till four o'clock, when the troops at the Ferry were put in motion to prevent their landing, and to support Colonel Laurens ; but before they arrived at the post, the enemy had landed, and brought on an action, in which that accomplished and gallant officer was killed. The only other person killed was a corporal. Two captains, one lieutenant, two sergeants, one corporal, and thirteen privates were wounded. — *MS. Letter, from General Gist to General Greene, August 27th.*

rison of New York as compact as possible. Many have flattered themselves, that an evacuation would take place before winter, but I have no such idea.

With much regard and esteem, &c.

TO BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

Head-Quarters, 18 October, 1782.

SIR,

I have been honored with two favors of your Excellency, one presented by the Count de Ségur,* of the 2d of April, the other delivered by the Prince de Broglie,† of the 8th, both of which were rendered doubly agreeable by the pleasure I had in receiving them from the hands of two such amiable and accomplished young gentlemen. Independently of my esteem for your Excellency, be assured, Sir, that my respect and regard for the French nation at large, to whom this country is under so great obligations, as well as the very favorable impressions I have conceived for their particular characters, will secure my warmest attention to the persons of these distinguished young noblemen.

I am much obliged by the political information, which you have taken the trouble to convey to me, but feel myself much embarrassed in my wish to make you a return in kind. Early in the season, the expectations

* Son of the Marquis de Ségur, minister at war. Count de Ségur was afterwards for several years French ambassador to the court of St. Petersburg.

† He came over to join the army of Count de Rochambeau. "He bears an excellent character here," said Dr. Franklin, "is a hearty friend to our cause, and I am persuaded you will have a pleasure in his conversation. I take leave, therefore, to recommend him to those civilities, which you are always happy to show to strangers of merit and distinction."

of America were much raised in consequence of the change of the British ministry, and the measures of Parliament ; but events have shown that our hopes have risen too high. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham, the advancement of the Earl of Shelburne, and the delays of negotiation, have given us very different impressions from those we at first received. We now begin again to reflect upon the persevering obstinacy of the King, the wickedness of his ministry, and the haughty pride of the nation, which recall to our minds very disagreeable recollections, and a probable continuance of our present troubles. The military operations of the campaign are drawing to a close without any very important events on this side of the water, unless the evacuation of Charleston, which is generally expected, but not yet known to me, should take place, and form a paragraph in the page of this year's history.

The British fleet from the West Indies still continues in New York. I have not been able yet to decide on the enemy's intentions there. It is generally thought, that a detachment of their troops will sail, when the fleet returns to the West Indies, where it is conjectured their efforts for the winter will be prosecuted with vigor. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 19 October, 1782.

SIR,

I have received your favor of the 15th instant with the enclosures ; and, though at the same time it is true, I have the general command of the allied army, as to all its movements and operations, yet I have never considered myself as having an absolute right to interfere

with the internal police and regulations of the French army, under the immediate orders of his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau; with which army it appears the persons mentioned in the papers contained in your letter are connected. I have, however, in order to produce an amicable settlement of the matter, communicated the contents to Colonel Wadsworth, and requested him to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any altercations and quarrels between the citizens of this State and the people employed by him. As he has engaged, that they will not impede the due execution of the civil authority, and as he writes to you by this conveyance, I cannot but hope matters will be explained to your satisfaction.*

For my own part I shall still continue to exert all my influence and authority to prevent the interruption of that harmony, which is so essential, and which has so generally prevailed between the army and the inhabitants of the country; and I need scarcely add, that in doing this I shall give every species of countenance and support to the execution of the laws of the land.

In the present quiet state of the frontiers, and with assurances from Sir Guy Carleton, that the incursions of the savages are stopped by authority, I have it in contemplation to withdraw the Continental troops from the northward. There are many reasons, which will make that measure eligible, unless the troops, who have been raised on purpose for the defence of the frontiers of this State, should be thought incompetent to the duty, even taking into consideration the inactivity of the sea-

* Colonel Wadsworth was the contractor for supplying the French army, and a deputy under him had refused to submit to a constable, who served upon him a justice's warrant. This was considered a contempt of the civil authority, and caused a complaint to be forwarded by the justice to the governor of the State.

son and the situation of affairs; for, indeed, I confess, I do not consider the late reports of the enemy's being in force at the Isle-au-Noix to indicate any thing farther than an attention to their own security. The severity of the approaching season, and every other circumstance, appear to me to militate against an attack upon our possessions this winter, and we shall not be at so great a distance, but that succour may be afforded as early in the spring as shall be necessary. At any rate, some measures must be immediately taken relative to the troops now there. I should be happy in receiving your sentiments as soon as may be, and am with great esteem and regard, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 25 October, 1782.

SIR,

I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the copy of two letters from Count de Vergennes, which were sent out in the packet from England, and have just come to my hands by a flag of truce from New York. They contain a very pathetic and affectionate interposition in favor of the life of Captain Asgill. I lose no time to forward them by a special messenger to Congress without any observations, being persuaded that Congress will not hesitate to give a very early decision respecting his further treatment.* The enclosed newspapers contain all the information I have been able to obtain since the arrival of the packet.

I have the honor to be, &c.

* One of the above letters was from Count de Vergennes to General Washington; see APPENDIX, No. XI. The other was from Lady Asgill to Count de Vergennes, soliciting him to intercede with General Wash-

TO CAPTAIN CHARLES ASGILL.

Head-Quarters, 13 November, 1782.

SIR,

It affords me singular pleasure, to have it in my power to transmit to you the enclosed copy of an act of Congress, of the 7th instant, by which you are released from the disagreeable circumstances in which you have so long been. Supposing that you would wish to go into New York as soon as possible, I also enclose a passport for that purpose.

Your letter of the 18th of October came regularly to my hands. I beg you to believe, that my not answering it sooner, did not proceed from inattention to you, or a want of feeling for your situation. I daily expected a determination of your case, and I thought it better to await that, than to feed you with hopes, that might, in the end, prove fruitless. You will attribute my detention of the enclosed letters, which have been in my hands about a fortnight, to the same cause.

I cannot take leave of you, Sir, without assuring you, that, in whatever light my agency in this unpleasant affair may be viewed, I was never influenced, through the whole of it, by sanguinary motives, but by what I conceived to be a sense of my duty, which loudly called upon me to take measures, however disagreeable, to prevent a repetition of those enormities, which have been the subject of discussion. And that this important end is likely to be answered, without the effusion of the blood of an innocent person, is not

ington for the release of her son. It is contained in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 107. These letters were taken into consideration by Congress, and it was resolved, "that the Commander-in-chief be and he is hereby directed to set Captain Asgill at liberty."—*Journals*, November 7th.

a greater relief to you, than it is to, Sir, your most obedient and humble servant.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 20 November, 1782.

SIR,

Your Excellency will have been informed, before this reaches you, of the liberation of Captain Asgill. I am, notwithstanding, directed to recall your attention to that part of your letter of the 3d of August last, in which you say, "I have given orders to the judge-advocate to make further inquisition, and to collect evidence for the prosecution of such other persons as may appear to have been criminal in this transaction." In full confidence, that measures have been taken to carry your Excellency's intentions into execution, I have to request the favor of you to inform me what probability there is, that the persons, who have been really guilty of the action, which has been the subject of former discussion, will be brought to a proper account. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 21 November, 1782.

SIR,

After I had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 29th of July,* I lost not a moment in transmitting it to Congress, who had then under deliberation the proceedings of the British court-martial up-

* See this letter in the APPENDIX, No. XI.

on Captain Lippencot for the murder of Captain Huddy, and the other documents relating to that inhuman transaction. What would otherwise have been the determination of that honorable body, I will not undertake to say ; but I think I may venture to assure your Excellency, that your generous interposition had no small degree of weight in procuring that decision in favor of Captain Asgill, which he had no right to expect from the very unsatisfactory measures, which had been taken by the British commander-in-chief to atone for a crime of the blackest dye, not to be justified by the practices of war, and unknown at this day amongst civilized nations. I however flatter myself, that our enemies have been brought to view this transaction in its true light, and that we shall not experience a repetition of the like enormity.

Captain Asgill has been released, and is at perfect liberty to return to the arms of an affectionate parent, whose pathetic address to your Excellency could not fail of interesting every feeling heart in her behalf. I have no right to assume any particular merit from the lenient manner in which this disagreeable affair has terminated. But I beg you to believe, Sir, that I most sincerely rejoice, not only because your humane intentions are gratified, but because the event accords with the wishes of his Most Christian Majesty, and his royal and amiable consort, who, by their benevolence and munificence, have endeared themselves to every true American. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* The army removed from the encampment at Verplanck's Point, crossed the Hudson at West Point, and, on the 28th of November, arrived at New Windsor, where they were cantoned in huts during the winter. The head-quarters of the Commander-in-chief were in the mean time reëstablished at Newburg.

TO THE BARON DE VIOMENIL.

Head-Quarters, 7 December, 1782.

SIR,

The Count de Rochambeau, who arrived here this morning, did me the honor to deliver to me your letter of the 29th of November. As your destination was not public, when I last had the pleasure of seeing you, I could not embrace the opportunity to express to you the very great regret I felt at the prospect of our separation. I must therefore beg you to accept this testimony of that regret, as well as the gratitude I feel, in common with every virtuous citizen, for the essential services you have assisted in rendering to this country. At the same time I must entreat you to believe, that the many great and amiable qualities, which you possess, have inspired me with the highest sentiments of esteem for your character, and that, wherever you may be, nothing will add to my happiness more, than to hear from you, and to communicate to you any thing that may occur in this part of the world worthy of your notice.

I have only now to assure you of my sincere wishes for your safe and speedy arrival at the place of your destination, and for your success and personal glory in whatever you may undertake.*

December 12th. — The reason, which prevented me

* The French army had received orders to proceed to Boston, and embark on board the fleet in that harbour, thence to be transported to the West Indies. They commenced their march from the encampment near Peekskill on the 22d of October, and went by the route of Hartford and Providence. Count de Rochambeau accompanied them to the latter place, where he took his leave of them, and returned to General Washington's head-quarters on his way to Philadelphia. The command of the army then devolved on Baron de Viomenil, who arrived with the troops in Boston during the first week of December.

from taking a public leave of your Excellency, operated equally against my signifying to the army now under your command not only the reluctance with which I parted with them, but the grateful sense, which I entertain, of the very essential services they have rendered to America. Your destination being no longer a secret, permit me to request the favor of your Excellency to make the necessary apologies for me; to express to both the officers and men how warmly I feel myself interested in whatever concerns their honor and glory; and to assure them it is my ardent wish, that victory may attend them wherever the orders of their sovereign may direct their arms. Accept my thanks for the very many polite marks of attention I have received from you, and believe me to be sincerely your Excellency's, &c.*

TO THE CHEVALIER DE CHASTELLUX.

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

MY DEAR CHEVALIER,

I felt too much to express any thing the day I parted from you. A sense of your public services to this country, and gratitude for your private friendship, quite overcame me at the moment of our separation. But I

* *Answer from the Baron de Viomenil.*—"The veneration with which this army was penetrated, from the first moment they had the honor of being presented to your Excellency by Count de Rochambeau, their confidence in your talents and the wisdom of your orders, the remembrance of your kindness and attention, and the example you set them in every critical circumstance, the approbation, regret, and wishes you have honored them with at their departure; these are considerations, by which you may be assured there is not an individual officer in this army, who is not as sensibly touched, as he is flattered by your approbation; or who does not exceedingly regret, that the secret of our destination deprived them of the pleasure of being again presented by Count de Rochambeau

should do violence to my feelings and inclination, were I to suffer you to leave this country without the warmest assurances of an affectionate regard for your person and character.

Our good friend, the Marquis de Lafayette, prepared me, long before I had the honor to see you, for those impressions of esteem, which opportunities and your own benevolent mind have since improved into a deep and lasting friendship; a friendship, which neither time nor distance can eradicate. I can truly say, that never in my life have I parted with a man, to whom my soul clave more sincerely than it did to you. My warmest wishes will attend you in your voyage across the Atlantic, to the rewards of a generous prince, the arms of affectionate friends; and be assured, that it will be one of my highest gratifications to keep up a regular intercourse with you by letter.

I regret exceedingly, that circumstances should withdraw you from this country before the final accomplishment of that independence and peace, which the arms of our good ally have assisted in placing before us in so agreeable a point of view. Nothing would give me more pleasure, than to accompany you in a tour through the continent of North America at the close of the war, in search of the natural curiosities with which it abounds, and to view the foundation of the rising empire. I have the honor to be, &c.

to pay their respects to your Excellency, and to express their feelings on the occasion.

“Having thus interpreted their sentiments to your Excellency, allow me, Sir, to embrace this opportunity to assure you, that the sentiments you have already permitted me to express to you will be as durable as the profound respect, with which I have the honor to be, &c.”—*MS. Letter, Boston, December 18th, 1782.*

The fleet set sail from Boston on the 24th of December, with all the troops (except Lauzun's legion) on board, the army having been in the United States two and a half years.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

I cannot, my dear General, permit you to depart from this country, without repeating to you the high sense I entertain of the services you have rendered to America, by the constant attention, which you have paid to the interest of it, by the exact order and discipline of the corps under your command, and by your readiness, at all times, to give facility to every measure, which the force of the combined armies was competent to.

To this testimony of your public character, I should be wanting to the feelings of my heart, were I not to add expressions of the happiness I have enjoyed in your private friendship, the remembrance of which will be one of the most pleasant circumstances of my life. My best wishes will accompany you to France, where I sincerely hope, and have no doubt, you will meet with the smiles and rewards of a generous prince, and the warmest embraces of affectionate friends. Adieu. I have the honor to be, with great personal attachment, respect, and regard, your obedient and most humble servant.*

* After Count de Rochambeau left the camp for Philadelphia, General Washington wrote to him as follows.

"It is with infinite satisfaction, that I embrace the earliest opportunity of sending to Philadelphia the cannon, which Congress were pleased to present to your Excellency, in testimony of their sense of the illustrious part you bore in the capture of the British army under Lord Cornwallis at York in Virginia. The carriages will follow by another conveyance. But, as they were not quite ready, I could not resist the pleasure, on that account, of forwarding these pieces to you previous to your departure, in hopes the inscription and devices, as well as the execution, may be agreeable to your wishes."—*December 29th.*

This letter was answered by Count de Rochambeau from Annapolis, in Maryland, just as he was on the point of sailing from that port to

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

DEAR SIR,

In the course of a few days, Congress will, I expect, receive an address from the army on the subject of their grievances. This address, though couched in very respectful terms, is one of those things, which, though unpleasing, is just now unavoidable. For I was very apprehensive once, that matters would take a more unfavorable turn, from the variety of discontents which prevail.

The temper of the army is much soured, and has become more irritable than at any period since the commencement of the war. This consideration alone prevented me (for every thing else seemed to be in a state of inactivity and almost tranquillity) from requesting leave to spend this winter in Virginia, that I might give some attention to my long-neglected private concerns. The dissatisfactions of the army had arisen to a great and alarming height, and combinations among the officers to resign at given periods in a body were beginning to take place, when, by some address and management, their resolutions have been converted into the form in which they will now appear before Congress. What that honorable body can or will do in the

France. "Though I was gone from Philadelphia," said he, "before the cannon arrived there, give me leave to observe, that your usual attention and politeness have been shown to the last moment, of which this is a fresh proof. I write to the Chevalier de la Luzerne to keep them till peace, when they may be carried over without danger of being taken. We are just getting under sail. In this moment I renew to your Excellency my sincere acknowledgments for your friendship, and am with the most inviolable personal attachment and respect your most obedient servant."—*January 11th, 1783.*

The Marquis de Chastellux and General de Choisy sailed in the same vessel with the Count de Rochambeau.

matter, does not belong to me to determine ; but policy, in my opinion, should dictate soothing measures ; as it is an uncontrovertible fact, that no part of the community has undergone equal hardships, and borne them with the same patience and fortitude, as the army has done.

Hitherto the officers have stood between the lower order of the soldiery and the public ; and in more instances than one, at the hazard of their lives, have quelled very dangerous mutinies. But if their discontents should be suffered to rise equally high, I know not what the consequences may be. The spirit of enthusiasm, which overcame every thing at first, is now done away. It is idle, therefore, to expect more from military men, than from those discharging the civil departments of government. If both were to fare alike, with respect to the emoluments of office, I would answer for it, that the military character should not be the first to complain. But it is an invidious distinction, and one that will not stand the test of reason or policy, that one set should receive all, and the other no part (or that which is next to it), of their pay. In a word, the experiment is dangerous ; and, if it succeeded, would only prove, that the one class are actuated by more zeal than the other, not that they have less occasion for their money. I am, with sincere esteem, &c.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON, SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Newburg, 8 January, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

The Marquis, in his letter to me, is not very explicit in his sentiments respecting the negotiations of peace,

but refers me to his official letter to you for his thoughts at large.* In general he holds up an idea, which perfectly accords with my opinion, that nothing will be concluded until the meeting of the British Parliament; and, if matters are not brought to a favorable issue in a month afterwards, that the war will rage in all its fury.

Ever since the secession of Mr. Fox and others from the administration, I have been decidedly of opinion, that peace would not take place before that epoch; that it would depend upon the strength of the contending parties and their influence on the nation, whether it would then happen or not; and that the intermediate space would be employed in intriguing, in an investigation of powers, in hearing propositions, and in probing the intentions of one another to the bottom. These I suppose would have been pretty well understood on all sides by the 26th of November,† as the ground on which Lord Shelburne is placed also would. It follows then, in my judgment, that the ministry would communicate to, and take the sense of Parliament on the terms upon which peace could be obtained; and leave it with the nation to accept them, or furnish the means of prosecuting the war vigorously. The power given to Mr. Oswald, to treat with any commissioner or commissioners properly authorized from the United States of America, is more than I expected would happen before the meeting of Parliament. But, as the gentlemen on the part of America could not treat with him unless such powers were given, it became an act of necessity to cede them to effect their other purposes. Thus I account for the indirect acknowledgment of our independence by the

* See this letter in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. X. p. 8.

† The day for the assembling of Parliament.

King, who, I dare say, felt some severe pangs at the time he put his hand to the letters patent. It is not, however, less efficacious or pleasing on that account; and breaking the ice is a great point gained. There can be but very little doubt, I believe, of the conclusion of the commercial treaty with Holland; but I have apprehensions, that that power will be the most difficult to satisfy at the general treaty of peace.

It is with great pain I hear of the repeal of the impost law in Virginia. What could induce it? What office is Mr. Jefferson appointed to, that he has, you say, lately accepted? If it is that of commissioner of peace, I hope he will arrive too late to have any hand in it.* My best respects to him when he arrives; and compliments to Mrs. Livingston, in which Mrs. Washington joins. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO BUSHROD WASHINGTON.†

Newburg, 15 January, 1783.

DEAR BUSHROD,

You will be surprised, perhaps, at receiving a letter from me; but if the end is answered for which it is written, I shall not think my time misspent. Your

* On the 15th of June, 1781, Mr. Jefferson had been appointed a commissioner with Adams, Franklin, Jay, and Laurens, to negotiate a treaty of peace, which was then expected to take place through the mediation of Russia and Austria. He declined at that time, but on the 13th of November, 1782, the appointment was renewed, and he accepted it. He was now in Philadelphia, making preparations for his departure; but, winter coming on, and the vessel in which he was to sail from Baltimore being frozen up in the harbour, the news of peace arrived in the mean time, and he did not undertake the voyage. — *Jefferson's Writings*, Vol. I. p. 41.

† The favorite nephew of General Washington, to whom he left the estate at Mount Vernon, and who was for many years one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

father, who seems to entertain a very favorable opinion of your prudence, and I hope you merit it, in one or two of his letters to me speaks of the difficulty he is under to make you remittances. Whether this arises from the scantiness of his funds, or the extensiveness of your demands, is matter of conjecture with me. I hope it is not the latter; because common prudence, and every other consideration, which ought to have weight in a reflecting mind, are opposed to your requiring more than his convenience and a regard to his other children will enable him to pay; and because he holds up no idea in the letter, which would support me in the conclusion. Yet when I take a view of the inexperience of youth, the temptations and vices of cities, and the distresses to which our Virginia gentlemen are driven by an accumulation of taxes and the want of a market, I am almost inclined to ascribe it in part to both. Therefore, as a friend, I give you the following advice.

Let the object, which carried you to Philadelphia, be always before your eyes. Remember, that it is not the mere study of the law, but to become eminent in the profession of it, that is to yield honor and profit. The first was your choice; let the second be your ambition. Dissipation is incompatible with both; the company, in which you will improve most, will be least expensive to you; and yet I am not such a stoic as to suppose that you will, or to think it right that you should, always be in company with senators and philosophers; but of the juvenile kind let me advise you to be choice. It is easy to make acquaintances, but very difficult to shake them off, however irksome and unprofitable they are found, after we have once committed ourselves to them. The indiscretions, which very often they involuntarily lead one into, prove equally distressing and disgraceful.

Be courteous to all, but intimate with few ; and let those few be well tried before you give them your confidence. True friendship is a plant of slow growth, and must undergo and withstand the shocks of adversity before it is entitled to the appellation.

Let your heart feel for the afflictions and distresses of every one, and let your hand give in proportion to your purse ; remembering always the estimation of the widow's mite, but, that it is not every one who asketh, that deserveth charity ; all, however, are worthy of the inquiry, or the deserving may suffer.

Do not conceive that fine clothes make fine men, any more than fine feathers make fine birds. A plain, genteel dress is more admired, and obtains more credit, than lace and embroidery, in the eyes of the judicious and sensible.

The last thing, which I shall mention, is first in importance ; and that is, to avoid gaming. This is a vice, which is productive of every possible evil ; equally injurious to the morals and health of its votaries. It is the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity, and the father of mischief. It has been the ruin of many worthy families, the loss of many a man's honor, and the cause of suicide. To all those who enter the lists, it is equally fascinating. The successful gamester pushes his good fortune, till it is overtaken by a reverse. The losing gamester, in hopes of retrieving past misfortunes, goes on from bad to worse, till grown desperate he pushes at every thing and loses his all. In a word, few gain by this abominable practice, while thousands are injured.

Perhaps you will say, "My conduct has anticipated the advice," and "Not one of the cases applies to me." I shall be heartily glad of it. It will add not a little to my happiness, to find those to whom I am so nearly connected pursuing the right walk of life. It

will be the sure road to my favor, and to those honors and places of profit, which their country can bestow; as merit rarely goes unrewarded. I am, dear Bushrod, your affectionate uncle.

TO LADY STIRLING.

Newburg, 20 January, 1783.

MY LADY,

Having been informed by a letter from Captain Sill, of the unspeakable loss which your Ladyship has experienced, I feel the sincerest disposition to alleviate by sympathy those sorrows, which I am sensible cannot be removed or effaced. For this purpose, I would also have suggested every rational topic of consolation, were I not fully persuaded, that the principles of philosophy and religion, of which you are possessed, had anticipated every thing that I could say on the subject.*

It only remains, then, as a small but just tribute to the memory of Lord Stirling, to express how deeply I share in the common affliction, on being deprived of the public and professional assistance, as well as the private friendship, of an officer of so high rank, with whom I had lived in the strictest habits of amity; and how much those military merits of his Lordship, which rendered him respected in his lifetime, are now regretted by the whole army. It will doubtless be a soothing consideration in the poignancy of your grief, to find, that the general officers are going into mourning for him.

Mrs. Washington joins me in requesting, that your Ladyship and Lady Kitty will be assured, that we feel

* Lord Stirling died at Albany, after a short illness, on the morning of the 14th of January.

the tenderest sensibility on this melancholy occasion. With sentiments of perfect esteem and respect, I am your Ladyship's most obedient and humble servant.

TO ELIAS BOUDINOT, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.*

Head-Quarters, 30 January, 1783.


SIR,

I should not have undertaken at this time to address myself through your Excellency to Congress, on the present state of our military and political affairs, which are so blended as scarcely to admit of separation in the discussion, did I not apprehend that my silence might perhaps be construed into remissness in my official duties or inattention to the public interests, and that some inconvenience might be experienced by the neglect or delay. Influenced by these motives, and an ardent desire to carry the wishes of Congress into effect, I shall hope to be excused, after suggesting a few things, for entreating to be made acquainted, so far as may be deemed expedient, with their sentiments and expectations relative to our future operations.

It scarcely needs be remarked here, as it is a fact of great notoriety, that the tranquillity, leisure, and inactivity of winter-quarters have ever been considered by all well informed warlike nations, when in a state of hostility, as the only proper season for taking into contemplation the probable operations of the ensuing campaign, and for making the best arrangements in their

* Mr. Boudinot was elected president of Congress on the 4th of November. After the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs went into operation, the correspondence of the Commander-in-chief with Congress passed chiefly through the hands of the secretaries, and his letters were directed to them.

power for carrying such projects as were finally determined upon into execution. It was not simply in conformity with this practice, but upon a perfect conviction of the propriety and expediency of it, that at the close of my former campaigns I have thought myself not only warranted, but impelled by the strongest dictates of reason and duty, to exert all my influence and abilities in endeavouring to augment our force, and to make the greatest possible provision in every department for enabling us to act with vigor at the opening of the next campaign ; and, in thus attempting to perform my duty, I derived no small share of satisfaction from a consciousness, that I should meet with the approbation and assistance of my country ; being at the same time so fully acquainted with the designs of the enemy on the one hand, and with the inclinations of Congress on the other, that I could not hesitate a moment in my own mind to decide what general system of measures was proper to be adopted. But, as the complexion of our political and military affairs is now entirely changed by the negotiations for peace, which are carrying on in Europe ; as Congress have determined by the reduction which has lately taken place, that the number of men engaged on the present establishment is adequate to the services before us ; and as that honorable body have much better opportunities, than any individual can have, for collecting and comparing the intelligence necessary to judge, with a degree of certainty, whether peace will be concluded in the course of the winter, so as to supersede the necessity of any further military preparations ; I could not think myself at liberty, without having recourse to their sentiments, to take the same measures and give the same orders, that I had on all former occasions deemed myself competent to do. On the contrary, I feared to delay any



longer to express my apprehensions, that very fair opportunities might be lost, and that very great, if not irreparable injuries might be experienced, (if the war should be continued, especially if it should begin to rage again,) in case we should not also on our part be in a state of preparation for such an event.

In addition to every other consideration of a foreign, a military, or political nature, the embarrassed state of our finances, the necessity of using the strictest economy and preventing every unnecessary expenditure of public money in conducting our military affairs, have in an especial manner prompted me to make this representation, that the sovereign power may determine, what is the proper line of conduct to be pursued under our present circumstances ; whether any and what preparations ought to be made during the winter ; and what our situation will be at the period proper for opening the campaign (supposing the war should continue and require any defensive operations on our part), unless many of the essential articles which are wanting, particularly in the quartermaster's department, should in the mean time be effectually and fully supplied. Amongst the most indispensable and yet most expensive of which, I must beg leave to mention the means of transportation, namely, horses for artillery, and teams and wheel-carriages for ordnance, stores, and baggage ; without which, it is well known, an army becomes perfectly harmless and perfectly helpless ; for, so far from being able to annoy and operate against its enemy, it is neither able to take the field, nor to advance or retire a single step, let the occasions or prospects be of a nature ever so pressing and important.

Notwithstanding the foregoing observations, I hope it will be clearly understood, that it is very far from being my wish or desire, that our military preparations should

be increased in the smallest degree beyond what the exigence of the circumstances may appear to demand. But, while I candidly confess, that I believe there is no man, who more earnestly wishes a speedy period may be put to the contest than myself, I must take the liberty to suggest, whether, in case a peace should not take place in consequence of the present negotiations, it would not be far more eligible in point of national policy and economy to attempt, by one great and decisive effort, to expel the enemy from the remaining part of their possessions in the United States, than to suffer them with their enfeebled force to hold a post and protract the war, until the accumulating expenses of our languid and defensive measures shall amount to such an aggregate sum, as would have furnished the means of attempting the siege of New York with a prospect of success?

In order that your Excellency and Congress may have a comprehensive and complete view of our efficient force, our military apparatus, and the principal articles, which would be required for a vigorous campaign, I have thought it expedient to forward the enclosed returns and estimates (the estimate of the engineer being omitted, because the articles in his department will be principally provided by the labors of the army); and I flatter myself it will be found, that the troops under my orders are at this moment as much collected and as well appointed, as could possibly be expected under our circumstances; and that all the means, which have been afforded, so far as depended on military arrangements, have been economized in the most prudent manner.* I wait with great solicitude to

* This letter was referred to a committee, of which Hamilton was chairman. In consequence of their report, the following resolves were adopted.

“That the Commander-in-chief be informed, that Congress, always

hear the sentiments, expectations, and final pleasure of Congress, on the several points contained in this letter; and, in the mean time,

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Newburg, 6 February, 1783.

MY DEAR SIR,

It is with a pleasure, which friendship only is susceptible of, that I congratulate you on the glorious end you have put to hostilities in the southern States. The honor and advantage of it, I hope and trust you will long live to enjoy. When this hemisphere will be equally free, is yet in the womb of time to discover. A little while, it is presumed, will disclose the determinations of the British senate with respect to peace or war, as it seems to be agreed on all hands, that the present premier, especially if he should find the opposition powerful, intends to submit the decision of these matters to Parliament. The speech, the addresses, and debates, for which we are looking in every direction,

happy to receive his sentiments either on the political or military affairs of these States, the utility of which they have upon so many occasions experienced, have paid all the attention to his letter of the 30th of January, which the importance of it demands.

"That, should the war continue another campaign, every motive of policy and economy would operate in favor of the enterprise suggested; but that, such are the present situation and prospects of these States, that it would be inexpedient at this time to determine upon the plan, or to enter upon the expensive preparations, which it would require.

"That the official accounts received by Congress, corresponding with other intelligence, afford appearances of an approaching peace.

"Ordered, that the secretary of foreign affairs make a confidential communication to the Commander-in-chief of the state of the negotiations for peace, when the last advices were received."—*Secret Journal*, Vol. I. p. 254.

will give data, from which the bright rays of the one or the gloomy prospect of the other may be discovered.

If historiographers should be hardy enough to fill the page of history with the advantages, that have been gained with unequal numbers, on the part of America in the course of this contest, and attempt to relate the distressing circumstances under which they have been obtained, it is more than probable, that posterity will bestow on their labors the epithet and marks of fiction; for it will not be believed, that such a force as Great Britain has employed for eight years in this country could be baffled in their plan of subjugating it, by numbers infinitely less, composed of men oftentimes half starved, always in rags, without pay, and experiencing at times every species of distress, which human nature is capable of undergoing.

I intended to write you a long letter on sundry matters; but Major Burnet came in unexpectedly at a time, when I was preparing for the celebration of the day, and was just going to a review of the troops, previous to the *feu de joie*.* As he is impatient, from an apprehension that the sleighing may fail, and as he can give you the occurrences of this quarter more in detail than I have time to do, I will refer you to him. I cannot omit informing you, however, that I let no opportunity slip to inquire after your son George at Princeton, and that it is with pleasure I hear he en-

* This day was the anniversary of the signing of the treaty of alliance between France and the United States, and the *feu de joie* was in commemoration of that event. The parole for the day, as entered in the Orderly Book, was "*America and France*"; and the countersigns, "*United*," "*For ever*." The following notice was also published in the general orders. "The Commander-in-chief, who wishes on the return of this auspicious day to diffuse the feelings of gratitude and pleasure as extensively as possible, is pleased to grant a full and free pardon to all military prisoners now in confinement."

joys good health and is a fine, promising boy. With great truth and sincerity, and every sentiment of friendship, I am, &c.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Newburg, 11 February, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

I am about to write you a letter on a subject equally important and delicate, which may be extensive in its consequences and serious in its nature. I shall confine myself to the recital of what I believe to be facts, and leave it with you to make deductions.

The printed remonstrance of Mr. Chittenden and his Council, addressed to the president of Congress and founded upon the resolves of the 5th of December last, contains a favorable recital in their own behalf, of what I suppose to be facts; but, if my memory serves me, it is an uncandid performance, inasmuch as it keeps out of view an important transaction of theirs, which was consequent on those resolves.* Be this as it may, matters seem to be approaching too fast to a disagreeable issue, for the quiet of my mind. The resolves on one hand, and the remonstrance on the other, unless it should be annulled by the legislature at their next meeting, which I do not expect, seem to leave little room for an amicable decision.

Affairs being thus situated, permit me to ask how far, and by what means, coercion is to be extended? The army, I presume, will be the answer to the latter. Circumstances (for there can be no determination after blood is once drawn) alone can prescribe bounds to the

* The remonstrance here mentioned is published, and the whole subject explained, in SLADE'S *Vermont State Papers*, pp. 176 - 186.

former. It has been said, but of this you can judge better than I, that the delegates from the New England States in Congress, or a majority of them, are willing to admit these people into the Federal Union, as an independent and sovereign State. Be this as it may, two things I am sure of, namely, that they have a powerful interest in those States, and pursued very politic measures to strengthen and increase it, long before I had any knowledge of the matter, and before the tendency of it was seen into or suspected, by granting upon very advantageous terms large tracts of land, in which, I am sorry to find, the army in some degree have participated.

Let me next ask, by whom is that district of country principally settled? And of whom is your present army (I do not confine the question to this part of it, but will extend it to the whole) composed? The answers are evident,—New England men. It has been the opinion of some, that the appearance of force would awe these people into submission. If the General Assembly ratify and confirm what Mr. Chittenden and his Council have done, I shall be of a very different sentiment; and, moreover, that it is not a trifling force that will subdue them, even supposing they derive no aid from the enemy in Canada; and that it would be a very arduous task indeed, if they should, to say nothing of a diversion, which may and doubtless would be made in their favor from New York, if the war with Great Britain should continue.

The country is very mountainous, full of defiles, and extremely strong. The inhabitants, for the most part, are a hardy race, composed of that kind of people, who are best calculated for soldiers; in truth, who *are* soldiers; for many, many hundreds of them are deserters from this army, who, having acquired property there, would be desperate in the defence of it, well

knowing that they were fighting with halters about their necks.

It may be asked, if I am acquainted with the sentiments of the army on the subject of this dispute. I readily answer, No, not intimately. It is a matter of too delicate a nature to agitate for the purpose of information. But I have heard many officers of rank and discernment, and have learned by indirect inquiries that others, express the utmost horror at the idea of shedding blood in this dispute; comparing it in its consequences, though not in its principles, to the quarrel with Great Britain, who thought she was only to hold up the rod and all would be hushed. I cannot at this time undertake to say, that there would be any difficulty with the army, if it were to be ordered upon this service, but I should be exceedingly unhappy to see the experiment. For, besides the reasons before suggested, I believe there would be a great and general unwillingness to embrue their hands in the blood of their brethren. I have to add, that almost at the same instant a number of the printed copies of the remonstrance were disseminated through the army. What effect it will have, I know not. The design is obvious.

I promised in the beginning of this letter, that I should content myself with a simple relation of facts. I shall only lament, therefore, that Congress did not in the commencement of this dispute act decidedly. This matter, as you well know, was much agitated last winter, and a committee of Congress, with whom I had the honor to be in conference, and of which I believe you were one, approved of my writing an answer to the effect it was given.* With great regard, I am, &c.

* See the letter to Mr. Chittenden, dated January 1st, 1782.

The effect of that letter is thus described in ALLEN'S *History of Vermont*.

“The universal confidence that the people of America placed in their

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 25 February, 1783.

SIR,

I am sorry to acquaint your Excellency, for the information of Congress, that a project, which I had formed for attacking the enemy's post at Oswego, as soon as the sleighing should be good and the ice of the Oneida Lake should have acquired sufficient thickness to admit the passage of the detachment, has miscarried. The report of Colonel Willett, to whom I had entrusted the command of the party, consisting of a part of the Rhode Island regiment, and the State troops of New York, in all about five hundred men, will assign reasons for the disappointment.

Although the expedition has not been attended with success, the officers and soldiers employed on it are entitled to great credit for the spirit, activity, and patience exhibited by them in the course of the attempt; and, I am certain, nothing that depended upon Colonel Willett to give efficacy to it was wanting.*

Major Tallmadge, whom I had placed contiguous to

Commander-in-chief, from the firm, steady, persevering, and able manner he had conducted the war; his known integrity, wisdom, and virtue, gave him more influence over the legislature of Vermont, than any other man in existence." p. 223.

* The expedition failed through the treachery or ignorance of an Indian guide. Colonel Willett approached with his party in the night within five miles of Fort Oswego, when his principal guide lost his way, and the darkness and extreme fatigue of walking on snow-shoes prevented their discovering the fort, till the morning dawned, and it was necessary to retire. In reply to Colonel Willett's letter reporting the result, General Washington said; "I cannot omit expressing to you the high sense I entertain of your persevering exertions and active zeal in this expedition, and begging you to accept my warmest thanks; and that you will be pleased to communicate my gratitude to the officers and men under your command for the share they took in that service." — *March 5th.*

the Sound, with the infantry of Sheldon's legion, for the purpose of interrupting as much as possible on that side the trade with New York, has been more successful, as will appear by his report, a copy of which is likewise enclosed. The zeal and activity of Major Tallmadge, and the promptness and bravery of the party acting under his orders on this occasion, have merited and received my thanks.* The detachments also belonging to the command of Brigadier-General Hazen, which are occasionally advanced to Bergen, Newark, and Elizabethtown, to intercept the illicit commerce in that quarter, appear to have been very alert, and they have succeeded in several instances. I flatter myself Congress will be persuaded, that nothing on my part has been omitted to carry fully into execution the resolution of the 30th of October last.† But at the same time I am under the necessity of declaring, in my own vindication, that, unless the civil powers of the different States will adopt the most energetic measures, and make the greatest exertions to carry them into effect, it will be impossible to put a stop to an evil, which has increased to an alarming height, and which, notwithstanding all our efforts, is still increasing, and, I am informed, prevails nowhere in such an uncontrolled manner as on the seacoast of Connecticut. I have the honor to be, &c.

* The enemy's armed vessels in the Sound were carrying on and protecting an illicit trade with the inhabitants along the coast. A privateer of this description, mounting eleven carriage-guns and four swivels, was boarded by a party sent by Major Tallmadge in a fast sailing vessel, and after a short but sharp conflict was captured. Major Tallmadge represented the enterprise as conducted with great courage and gallantry on the part of the assailants.

† Directing the Commander-in-chief to take the most effectual measures to prevent a clandestine intercourse between New Jersey and the city of New York, by which the enemy were supplied with provisions.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM S. SMITH.*

Newburg, 3 March, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

It is much to be regretted, that, while I am using every means in my power to comply with the orders of Congress, founded in my judgment on our true interest and policy, there should be such a counteraction as we daily experience from individuals. But lamentable indeed is our situation, when States, or the administration of them, are leaping over those bounds, which should ever be deemed the sacred barrier between us and the enemy, without which all opposition to their measures must soon cease, or dwindle into something ridiculous.

That the intercourse with New York by way of the Sound is in a manner without restriction, I have little doubt; and that the very boats, which are armed and commissioned for the purpose of cutting off the communication, are employed in facilitating the trade, I have a recent instance in one caught by Major Tallmadge in the act and with the goods on board. We have only to persevere, and with the means that we possess give all the checks to it in our power. Every officer, who exerts himself in this business, will meet all the support I can give, and will undoubtedly merit the approbation of Congress.

With respect to the other matters contained in your letter,† I have to entreat, that you will keep an atten-

* Now acting as commissary-general of prisoners, and stationed at Dobbs's Ferry. For an interesting anecdote respecting Colonel Smith's early zeal in the cause of his country, see *Recherches sur les Etats-Unis*, Tom. II. p. 190.

† Concerning a secret intercourse for purposes of trade, which was every day extending itself between the enemy and the people within the American lines, particularly on the southern borders of Connecti-

tive eye towards them, and that you may be able to give me the best information respecting them, when required, that the nature of the case will admit. Let the motives to these inquiries be hidden from those about you, and confined to your own breast. I have reasons for giving you this caution, but cannot entrust them to paper. I am, &c.

TO ALEXANDER HAMILTON, IN CONGRESS.*

Newburg, 4 March, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favor of February, and thank you for the information and observations which it has conveyed to me. I shall always think myself obliged by a free communication of sentiments, and have often thought, but suppose I thought wrong, as it did not accord with the practice of Congress, that the public interest might be benefited if the Commander-in-chief of the army were let more into the political and pecuniary state of our affairs than he is. Enterprises, and the adoption of military and other arrangements, that might be exceedingly proper in some circumstances, would be altogether improper in others. It follows, then, by a fair deduction, that, where there is a want of information, there must be a chance-medley; and a man may be upon the brink of a precipice before he is aware of his

cut, where the facilities for water communication were afforded through the Sound.

* Colonel Hamilton left the army after the capitulation at Yorktown, and took his seat in Congress as a delegate from the State of New York on the 25th of November, 1782. He had previously acted as receiver of the Continental taxes in the State of New York, under the appointment of the superintendent of finance. See *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XII. p. 203.

danger, when a little foreknowledge might enable him to avoid it. But this by the by.

The hint contained in your letter, and the knowledge I have derived from the public gazettes, respecting the non-payment of taxes, contains all the information which I have received of the danger, that stares us in the face on account of our funds; and, so far was I from conceiving, that our finances were in so deplorable a state at this time, that I had imbibed ideas from some source of information or other, that, with the prospect of a loan from Holland, we should be able to rub along yet a little further.

To you, who have seen the danger, to which the army has been exposed, of a political dissolution for want of subsistence, and the unhappy spirit of licentiousness, which it imbibed by becoming in one or two instances its own provider, no observations are necessary to evince the fatal tendency of such a measure; but I shall give it as my opinion, that it would at this day be productive of civil commotions and end in blood. Unhappy situation this! God forbid we should be involved in it.

The predicament, in which I stand as a citizen and soldier, is as critical and delicate as can well be conceived. It has been the subject of many contemplative hours. The sufferings of a complaining army on one hand, and the inability of Congress and tardiness of the States on the other, are the forebodings of evil, and may be productive of events, which are more to be deprecated than prevented. But I am not without hope, if there is such a disposition shown, as prudence and policy will dictate, to do justice, that your apprehensions in case of peace are greater than there is cause for. In this, however, I may be mistaken, if those ideas, which you have been informed are propa-

gating in the army, should be extensive ; the source of which may be easily traced, as the old leaven it is said, for I have no proof of it, is again beginning to work under a mask of the most perfect dissimulation and apparent cordiality.

Be these things as they may, I shall pursue the same steady line of conduct, which has governed me hitherto ; fully convinced, that the sensible and discerning part of the army cannot be unacquainted, although I never took pains to inform them, with the services I have rendered it on more occasions than one. This, and pursuing the suggestions in your letter, which I am happy to find coincide with my practice for several months past (which has turned the business of the army into the channel where it now is), leave me under no great apprehension of its exceeding the bounds of reason and moderation, notwithstanding the prevailing sentiment is, that the prospect of compensation for past services will terminate with the war.

The just claims of the army ought, and it is to be hoped will have their weight with every sensible legislature in the United States, if Congress point to their demands, and show, if the case is so, the reasonableness of them, and the impracticability of complying with them without their aid. In any other point of view, it would in my opinion be impolitic to introduce the army on the tapis, lest it should excite jealousy and bring on its concomitants. The States cannot surely be so devoid of common sense, common honesty, and common policy, as to refuse their aid on a full, clear, and candid representation of facts from Congress ; more especially if these should be enforced by members of their own body, who might demonstrate what the inevitable consequences of failure will lead to.

In my opinion it is a matter worthy of considera-

tion, how far an adjournment of Congress for a few months is advisable. The delegates in that case, if they are in union themselves respecting the great defects of our constitution, may represent them fully and boldly to their constituents. To me, who know nothing of the business which is before Congress, nor of the arcana, it appears that such a measure would tend to promote the public weal; for it is clearly my opinion, unless Congress have powers competent to all general purposes, that the distresses we have encountered, the expense we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt, will avail us nothing.

The contents of your letter are known only to myself. Your prudence will be at no loss to know what use to make of these sentiments.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 7 March, 1783.

SIR,

While applications are making in favor of others, I cannot refrain from mentioning to Congress the case of Colonel Armand with respect to promotion. Justice to that gentleman obliges me to express the esteem I have of him, as an intelligent, active, and very deserving officer; one who has been zealous in the service of the United States, and who, I am persuaded, has expended considerable sums for the establishment of his corps, which he probably will be a considerable time out of, if he expects to be refunded.

I take particular pleasure in pointing the attention of Congress to Colonel Armand, as his character and merits have gained my respect, and his promotion, I

think, may take place without inconvenience, he being among the oldest colonels in the service of the United States. I am, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 12 March, 1783:

SIR,

It is with inexpressible concern I make the following report to your Excellency. Two days ago, anonymous notifications were circulated in the army, requesting a general meeting of the officers the next day. A copy of one of these papers is enclosed. About the same time, another anonymous writing, purporting to be an address to the officers of the army, was handed about in a clandestine manner. It is also enclosed. To prevent any precipitate and dangerous resolutions from being taken at this perilous moment, while the passions were all inflamed, as soon as these things had come to my knowledge the next morning, I issued the enclosed order. In this situation the affair now rests.

As all opinion must be suspended until after the meeting on Saturday next, I have nothing further to add, except a wish that the measure I have taken to dissipate a storm, which had gathered so suddenly and unexpectedly, may be acceptable to Congress; and to assure them that, in every vicissitude of circumstances, still actuated with the greatest zeal in their service, I shall continue my utmost exertions to promote the

* This application in behalf of an officer, who had shown an earnest and constant zeal for the American cause throughout the war, had its just effect, and Colonel Armand was promoted, "for his merit and services," to the rank of brigadier-general.

welfare of my country, under the most lively expectation, that Congress have the best intention of doing ample justice to the army as soon as circumstances will possibly admit. I have the honor to be, &c.

P. S. Since writing the foregoing, another anonymous paper is put in circulation, and is enclosed.*

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Newburg, 12 March, 1783

DEAR SIR,

I have received your letter of the 26th ultimo, and thank you for your information and the freedom of your communications. My official letter to Congress of this date will inform you of what has happened in this quarter; in addition to which, it may be necessary that it should be known to you, and to such others as you may think proper, that the army, though very irritable on account of their long protracted sufferings, have been apparently extremely quiet while their business was depending before Congress, until four days past. In the mean time, it should seem, reports have been propagated in Philadelphia, that dangerous combinations were forming in the army; and this at a time, when there was not a syllable of the kind in agitation in camp.

It also appears, that, upon the arrival of a certain gentleman from Philadelphia in camp, whose name at present I do not incline to mention, such sentiments as these were immediately and industriously circulated; that it was universally expected the army would not

* The papers referred to in this letter are contained in the APPENDIX, No. XII.

disband until they had obtained justice ; that the public creditors looked up to them for redress of their grievances, would afford them every aid, and even join them in the field if necessary ; that some members of Congress wished the measure might take effect, in order to compel the public, particularly the delinquent States, to do justice ; with many other suggestions of a similar nature. From whence, and a variety of other considerations, it is generally believed, that the scheme was not only planned but also digested and matured in Philadelphia, and that some people have been playing a double game, spreading at the camp and in Philadelphia reports, and raising jealousies, equally void of foundation, until called into being by their vile artifices ; for, as soon as the minds of the army were thought to be prepared for the transaction, anonymous invitations were circulated, requesting a general meeting of the officers the next day. At the same instant many copies of the address to the officers of the army were scattered in every State line of it.*

So soon as I obtained a knowledge of these things, I issued the order of the 11th, transmitted to Congress, in order to rescue the foot, that stood wavering on the precipice of despair, from taking those steps, which would have led to the abyss of misery, while the passions were inflamed and the mind tremblingly alive with the recollection of past sufferings, and with present feelings. I did this upon the principle, that it is easier to divert from a wrong to a right path, than to recall the hasty and fatal steps, that have been already taken.

* In a letter to General Washington recently received from Mr. Jones, the latter had written ; " Reports are freely circulated here, that there are dangerous combinations in the army ; and within a few days past it has been said, that they are about to declare they will not disband until their demands are complied with." — *Philadelphia, February 27th.*

It is commonly supposed, that, if the officers had met agreeably to the anonymous summons, resolutions might have been formed, the consequences of which may be more easily conceived than expressed. Now they will have leisure to view the matter more calmly and seriously. It is to be hoped, that they will be induced to adopt more rational measures, and wait a while longer for the settlement of their accounts, the postponing of which gives more uneasiness in the army than any other thing. There is not a man in it, who will not acknowledge that Congress have not the means of payment; but why not, say they one and all, liquidate the accounts and certify our dues? Are we to be disbanded and sent home without this? Are we afterwards to make individual applications for such settlements at Philadelphia, or any auditing office in our respective States; to be shifted perhaps from one board to another, dancing attendance at all, and finally postponed till we lose the substance in pursuit of the shadow? While they are agitated by these considerations, there are not wanting insidious characters, who tell them it is neither the wish nor the intention of the public to settle their accounts; but to delay this business under one pretext or another, until peace, which we are on the eve of, and a separation of the army takes place; when, it is well known, a general settlement never can be effected, and that individual loss in this instance becomes public gain.

However derogatory these ideas are to the dignity, honor, and justice of the government, yet when a matter so interesting to the army, and at the same time so easy to be effected by the public, as that of liquidating the accounts, is delayed without any apparent or obvious necessity, they will have their place in a mind that is soured and irritated. Let me entreat you, therefore,

my good Sir, to push this matter to an issue; and, if there are delegates among you, who are really opposed to doing justice to the army, scruple not to tell them, if matters should come to extremity, that they must be answerable for all the ineffable horrors, which may be occasioned thereby. I am most sincerely and affectionately yours.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 16 March, 1783.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform your Excellency, for the satisfaction of Congress, that the meeting of the officers, which was mentioned in my last, was held yesterday; and that it has terminated in a manner, which I had reason to expect, from a knowledge of that good sense and steady patriotism of the gentlemen of the army, which on frequent occasions I have discovered. The report of the meeting, with the other papers, which will be necessary to accompany it, I shall do myself the honor to transmit to Congress, as soon as they can possibly be prepared.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 18 March, 1783.

SIR,

The result of the proceedings of the grand convention of officers, which I have the honor of enclosing to your Excellency for the inspection of Congress, will, I flatter myself, be considered as the last glorious

proof of patriotism, which could have been given by men, who aspired to the distinction of a patriot army, and will not only confirm their claim to the justice, but will increase their title to the gratitude, of their country.*

Having seen the proceedings on the part of the army terminate with perfect unanimity, and in a manner entirely consonant to my wishes; being impressed with the liveliest sentiments of affection for those, who have so long, so patiently, and so cheerfully suffered and fought under my immediate direction; having from motives of justice, duty, and gratitude, spontaneously offered myself as an advocate for their rights; and having been requested to write to your Excellency, earnestly entreating the most speedy decision of Congress upon the subjects of the late address from the army to that honorable body; it now only remains for me to perform the task I have assumed, and to intercede in their behalf, as I now do, that the sovereign power will be pleased to verify the predictions I have pronounced, and the confidence the army have reposed in the justice of their country.

And here I humbly conceive it is altogether unnecessary, while I am pleading the cause of an army, which has done and suffered more than any other army ever did in the defence of the rights and liberties of human nature, to expatiate on their claims to the most ample compensation for their meritorious services; because they are perfectly known to the whole world, and because, although the topics are inexhaustible, enough has already been said on the subject.

To prove these assertions, to evince that my sentiments have ever been uniform, and to show what my

* See APPENDIX, No. XII.

ideas of the rewards in question have always been, I appeal to the archives of Congress, and call on those sacred deposits to witness for me; and, in order that my observations and arguments in favor of a future adequate provision for the officers of the army may be brought to remembrance again, and considered in a single point of view, without giving Congress the trouble of having recourse to their files, I will beg leave to transmit herewith an extract from a representation made by me to a committee of Congress, so long ago as the 29th of January, 1778, and also the transcript of a letter to the President of Congress, dated near Passaic Falls, October 11th, 1780.* That, in the critical and perilous moment when the last mentioned communication was made, there was the utmost danger that a dissolution of the army would take place, unless measures similar to these recommended had been adopted, will not admit a doubt. That the adoption of the resolution, granting half-pay for life, has been attended with all the happy consequences I had foretold, so far as respected the good of the service, let the astonishing contrast between the state of the army at this instant, and at the former period, determine; and that the establishment of funds and securities, for the payment of all the just demands of the army, will be the most certain means of preserving the national faith, and the future tranquillity of this extensive continent, is my decided opinion.

By the preceding remarks it will readily be imagined, that, instead of retracting and reprehending, from farther experience and reflection, the mode of compensation so strenuously urged in the enclosures, I am more

* The two letters here alluded to were published, and are contained in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. XVI. pp. 200, 202. — See also a series of documents in the *Journals* of Congress, under the date of *April 24th*.

and more confirmed in the sentiment ; and, if in the wrong, suffer me to please myself with the grateful delusion. For if, besides the simple payment of their wages, a farther compensation is not due to the sufferings and sacrifices of the officers, then have I been mistaken indeed. If the whole army have not merited whatever a grateful people can bestow, then have I been beguiled by prejudice, and built opinion on the basis of error. If this country should not in the event perform every thing, which has been requested in the late memorial to Congress, then will my belief become vain, and the hope, that has been excited, void of foundation. And if, as has been suggested, for the purpose of inflaming their passions, “the officers of the army are to be the only sufferers by this revolution ; if, retiring from the field, they are to grow old in poverty, wretchedness, and contempt ; if they are to wade through the vile mire of dependency, and owe the miserable remnant of that life to charity, which has hitherto been spent in honor ;” then shall I have learned what ingratitude is, then shall I have realized a tale, which will embitter every moment of my future life. But I am under no such apprehensions. A country, rescued by their arms from impending ruin, will never leave unpaid the debt of gratitude.

Should any intemperate or improper warmth have mingled itself in the foregoing observations, I must entreat your Excellency and Congress, that it may be attributed to the effusion of an honest zeal in the best of causes, and that my peculiar situation may be my apology ; and I hope I need not, on this momentous occasion, make any new protestations of personal disinterestedness, having ever renounced for myself the idea of pecuniary reward. The consciousness of having attempted faithfully to discharge my duty, and the

approbation of my country, will be a sufficient recompense for my services. I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, &c.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Newburg, 18 March, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

The storm, which seemed to be gathering with unfavorable prognostics when I wrote to you last, is dispersed, and we are again in a state of tranquillity. But do not suffer this appearance of tranquillity to relax your endeavours to bring the requests of the army to an issue. Believe me, the officers are too much pressed by their present wants, and rendered too sore by the recollection of their past sufferings, to be touched much longer upon the string of forbearance, in a matter wherein they can see no cause for delay; nor would I have further reliance placed upon any influence of mine to dispel other clouds, if any should arise from the causes of the last.

By my official letter to Congress, and the papers enclosed in it, you will have a full view of my assurances to, and the expectations of, the army; and I persuade myself, that the well-wishers to both and to their country will exert themselves to the utmost to eradicate the seeds of distrust, and give every satisfaction that justice requires, and the means which Congress possess will enable them to do.

In a former letter I observed to you, that a liquidation of accounts, in order that the balances might be ascertained, is the great object of the army; and certainly nothing can be more reasonable. To have the balances discharged at this or in any short time, how-

ever desirable, they know is impracticable, and do not expect it; although in the mean time they must labor under the pressure of these sufferings, which is felt more sensibly by a comparison of circumstances.

The situation of these gentlemen merits the attention of every thinking and grateful mind. As officers, they have been *obliged* to dress and appear in character, to effect which they have been *obliged* to anticipate their pay, or draw from their estates. By the former, debts have been contracted; by the latter, their patrimony is injured. To disband men, therefore, under these circumstances, before their accounts are liquidated and the balances ascertained, would be to set open the doors of the jails, and then to shut them upon seven years' faithful and painful services. Under any circumstances, which the nature of the case will admit, they must be considerable sufferers; because necessity will compel them to part with their certificates for whatever they will fetch, to avoid the evils I have mentioned above; and how much this will place them in the hands of unfeeling, avaricious speculators, a recurrence to past experience will sufficiently prove.

It may be said by those, who have no disposition to compensate the services of the army, that the officers have too much penetration to place dependence, in any alternative, upon the strength of their own arm. I will readily concede to those gentlemen, that no good could result from such an attempt; but I hope they will be equally candid in acknowledging, that much mischief may flow from it; and that nothing is to be expected from men, who conceive they are ungratefully and unjustly dealt by; especially too, if they can suppose that characters are not wanting to foment ev-

ery passion, which leads to discord, and that there are — but time shall reveal the rest.

Let it suffice, that the very attempt would imply a want of justice, and fix an indelible stain upon our national character; since the whole world, as well from the enemy's publications (without any intention to serve us), as our own, must be strongly impressed with the sufferings of this army from hunger, cold, and nakedness, in almost every stage of the war. Very sincerely and affectionately, I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 19 March, 1783.

SIR,

I have the honor to acknowledge your Excellency's favor of the 12th instant, and to thank you most sincerely for the intelligence you were pleased to communicate.* The articles of treaty between America and Great Britain are as full and as satisfactory as we had reason to expect; but, from the connexion in which they stand with a general pacification, they are very inconclusive and contingent. From this circumstance, compared with such other intelligence as I have been able to collect, I must confess, I have my fears that we shall be obliged to worry through another campaign before we arrive at that happy period, which is to crown all our toils.

* The packet Washington, commanded by Captain Barney, who sailed from L'Orient on the 17th of January, arrived in Philadelphia on the morning of the 12th of March, and brought the news of the *preliminary articles of peace* between Great Britain and the United States having been signed by the commissioners at Paris on the 30th of November. — *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. X. p. 117.

Any intelligence from your Excellency will be at all times very agreeable to me. But, should it be in your power to announce a general peace, you could not make me more happy than by the communication of such an event. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO GOVERNOR HARRISON.

Newburg, 19 March, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

About the first of this month I wrote you a long letter. I touched upon the state of the army and the situation of public creditors, and wished to know from you as a friend, what causes had induced the Assembly of Virginia to withdraw their assent to the impost law, and how the Continental creditors without adequate funds were to come at or obtain security for their money. I little expected at the time of writing that letter, that we were on the eve of an important crisis to this army, when the touchstone of discord was to be applied, and the virtue of its members to undergo the severest trial.

You have not been altogether unacquainted, I dare say, with the fears, the hopes, the apprehensions, and the expectations of the army, relative to the provision, which is to be made for them hereafter. Although a firm reliance on the integrity of Congress, and a belief that the public would finally do justice to all its servants and give an indisputable security for the payment of the half-pay of the officers, had kept them amidst a variety of sufferings tolerably quiet and contented for two or three years past; yet the total want of pay, the little prospect of receiving any from the unpromising state of the public finances, and the abso-

lute aversion of the States to establish any Continental funds for the payment of the debt due to the army, did at the close of the last campaign excite greater discontents, and threaten more serious and alarming consequences, than it is easy for me to describe or you to conceive. Happily for us, the officers of highest rank and greatest consideration interposed; and it was determined to address Congress in an humble, pathetic, and explicit manner.

While the sovereign power appeared perfectly well disposed to do justice, it was discovered that the States would enable them to do nothing; and in this state of affairs, and after some time spent on the business in Philadelphia, a report was made by the delegates of the army, giving a detail of the proceedings. Before this could be fully communicated to the troops, while the minds of all were in a peculiar state of inquietude and irritation, an anonymous writer, though he did not step forth and give his name boldly to the world, sent into circulation an address to the officers of the army, which, in point of composition, in elegance and force of expression, has rarely been equalled in the English language, and in which the dreadful alternative was proposed, of relinquishing the service in a body, if the war continued, or retaining their arms in case of peace, until Congress should comply with all their demands. At the same time, and at the moment when their minds were inflamed by the most pathetic representations, a general meeting of the officers was summoned by another anonymous production.

It is impossible to say what would have been the consequences, had the author succeeded in his first plans. But, measures having been taken to postpone the meeting, so as to give time for cool reflection and counteraction, the good sense of the officers has ter-

minated this affair in a manner, which reflects the greatest glory on themselves, and demands the highest expressions of gratitude from their country.

The proceedings have been reported to Congress, and will probably be published for the satisfaction of the people of these United States. In the mean time I thought it necessary to give you these particulars, principally with a design to communicate to you without reserve my opinion on this interesting subject. For, notwithstanding the storm has now passed over, notwithstanding the officers have in despite of their accumulated sufferings given the most unequivocal and exalted proofs of patriotism, yet I believe, unless justice shall be done, and funds effectually provided for the payment of the debt, the most deplorable and ruinous consequences may be apprehended. Justice, honor, gratitude, policy, every thing is opposed to the conduct of driving men to despair of obtaining their just rights, after serving seven years a painful life in the field. I say in the *field*, because they have not during that period had any thing to shelter them from the inclemency of the seasons but tents, and such houses as they could build for themselves.

Convinced of this, and actuated as I am, not by private and interested motives, but by a sense of duty, a love of justice, and all the feelings of gratitude towards a body of men, who have merited infinitely well of their country, I can never conceal or suppress my sentiments. I cannot cease to exert all the abilities I am possessed of, to show the evil tendency of procrastinated justice (for I will not suppose it is intended ultimately to withhold it), nor fail to urge the establishment of such adequate and permanent funds, as will enable Congress to secure the payment of the public debt, on such principles as will preserve the national

faith, give satisfaction to the army, and tranquillity to the public. With great esteem and regard, I am, &c.

P. S. The author of the anonymous address is yet behind the curtain; and, as conjecture may be grounded on error, I will not announce mine *at present*.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Head-Quarters, 19 March, 1783.

SIR,

I am exceedingly obliged to your Excellency for your communication of the 15th. The articles of treaty between America and Great Britain, as they stand in connexion with a general pacification, are so very inconclusive, that I am fully in sentiment with your Excellency, that we should hold ourselves in a hostile position, prepared for either alternative, peace or war. I shall confer with the Duke de Lauzun on the subjects you are pleased to mention; and, as I have ever viewed the practice of the States in supplying the enemy in New York with the means of subsistence as a very pernicious one in its tendency, both to ourselves and our allies, you may depend upon me to exert every measure in my power to prevent it.

I am at all times happy in receiving intelligence from your Excellency; and, should it be in your power to announce a general peace, you cannot make a more pleasing communication to me. Persuaded of the pure and benevolent intentions, which animate the breast of his Most Christian Majesty, I am assured, if that happy event should not result from the present negotiation, that the failure will not rest on his part.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Newburg, 23 March, 1783.

SIR,

In a letter, which I have lately received from the Marquis de Lafayette, he expresses a wish, that my sentiments respecting his absence may be communicated to Congress. To comply with his desire, and not because I conceive the testimony of my approbation is wanting, I give your Excellency the trouble of this letter. Congress have had too many unequivocal proofs of the zeal of this young nobleman, his attachment to the American cause, and his important services in it, to entertain a doubt of the propriety of his present absence. Sure I am, that his return will be as soon as he can make it subservient to the interests of his country. These being my sentiments, I communicate them without reserve.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Head-Quarters, 29 March, 1783.

SIR,

The news of a general peace, which your Excellency has been so good as to announce to me, has filled my mind with inexpressible satisfaction; and permit me to add, that the joy I feel on this great event is doubly enhanced by the very obliging manner in which you have been pleased to express your congratulations to me and to the army on this happy occasion.*

* The first intelligence of the signing of a *general treaty of peace* at Paris, on the 20th of January, was brought to America by the *Triumph*,

The part your Excellency has acted in the cause of America, and the great and benevolent share you have taken in the establishment of her independence, are deeply impressed in my mind, and will not be effaced from my remembrance, or that of the citizens of America. You will accept, Sir, my warmest acknowledgments and congratulations, with assurances that I shall always participate, with the highest pleasure, in every event, which contributes to your happiness and satisfaction.

The articles of the general treaty do not appear so favorable to France, in point of territorial acquisitions, as they do to the other powers. But the magnanimous and disinterested scale of action, which that great nation has exhibited to the world during this war, and at the conclusion of peace, will insure to the King and nation that reputation, which will be of more consequence to them than every other consideration.

Mrs. Washington begs your Excellency to accept her sincerest thanks for the joy you have communicated to her, and to receive a return of her congratulations on this most happy of all events.

I have the honor to be, &c.

a French armed vessel, sent by Lafayette from Count d'Estaing's squadron at Cadiz. It arrived in Philadelphia in the afternoon of the 23d of March. The following letter was received by the President of Congress from the Marquis de Lafayette.

"Cadiz, 5 February, 1783.

"SIR,

"Having been at some pains to engage a vessel to go to Philadelphia, I now find myself happily relieved by the kindness of Count d'Estaing. He is just now pleased to tell me, that he will despatch a French ship, and, by way of compliment on the occasion, he has made choice of the *Triumph*. So that I am not without hopes of giving Congress the first tidings of a general peace; and I am happy in the smallest opportunity of doing any thing, that may prove agreeable to America.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"LAFAYETTE."

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 30 March, 1783.

SIR,

Your Excellency will permit me, with the most lively sensations of gratitude and pleasure, to return you my warmest thanks for the communication, which you have been pleased to make to me and to the army, of the glorious news of a general peace; an event, which cannot fail to diffuse a general joy throughout the United States, but to none of their citizens more than to the officers and soldiers, who now compose the army. It is impossible for me to express the joy, with which I beg your Excellency to accept a return of my sincerest congratulations on this happiest of events. The commutation of the half-pay, and the measures adopted for the liquidation of their accounts, will give great satisfaction to the army; and will prove an additional tie to strengthen their confidence in the justice and benevolent intentions of Congress towards them. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO ALEXANDER HAMILTON, IN CONGRESS.

Newburg, 31 March, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

I have duly received your favors of the 17th and 24th ultimo. I rejoice most exceedingly that there is an end to our warfare, and that such a field is opening to our view, as will, with wisdom to direct the cultivation of it, make us a great, a respectable, and happy people; but it must be improved by other means than State politics, and unreasonable jealousies and prejudices, or it requires not the second sight to see, that

we shall be instruments in the hands of our enemies, and those European powers, who may be jealous of our greatness in union, to dissolve the confederation. But, to obtain this, although the way seems extremely plain, is not so easy.

My wish to see the union of these States established upon liberal and permanent principles, and inclination to contribute my mite in pointing out the defects of the present constitution, are equally great. All my private letters have teemed with these sentiments, and, whenever this topic has been the subject of conversation, I have endeavoured to diffuse and enforce them; but how far any further essay by me might be productive of the wished-for end, or appear to arrogate more than belongs to me, depends so much upon popular opinion, and the temper and dispositions of the people, that it is not easy to decide. I shall be obliged to you, however, for the thoughts, which you have promised me on this subject, and as soon as you can make it convenient.

No man in the United States is or can be more deeply impressed with the necessity of a reform in our present confederation than myself.* No man perhaps has felt the bad effects of it more sensibly; for to the defects thereof, and want of power in Congress, may justly be ascribed the prolongation of the war, and consequently the expenses occasioned by it. More than half the perplexities I have experienced in the course of my command, and almost the whole of the difficul-

* In his congratulations to General Greene on the news of peace, General Washington wrote; "It remains only for the States to be wise, and to establish their independence on the basis of an inviolable, efficacious union, and a firm confederation, which may prevent their being made the sport of European policy. May heaven give them wisdom to adopt the measures still necessary for this important purpose."—*March 31st.*

ties and distress of the army, have had their origin here. But still, the prejudices of some, the designs of others, and the mere machinery of the majority, make address and management necessary to give weight to opinions, which are to combat the doctrines of those different classes of men in the field of politics.

I would have been more full on this subject, but the bearer (in the clothing department) is waiting. I wish you may understand what I have written. I am, &c.

P. S. The enclosed extract of a letter to Mr. Livingston I give you in confidence. I submit it to your consideration, fully persuaded, that you do not want inclination to gratify the Marquis's wishes, as far as is consistent with our national honor.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 5 April, 1783.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

It is easier for you to conceive, than for me to express, the sensibility of my heart at the communications in your letter of the 5th of February from Cadiz. It is to these communications we are indebted for the only account yet received of a general pacification. My mind, upon the receipt of this intelligence, was instantly assailed by a thousand ideas, all of them contending for preëminence ; but, believe me, my dear friend, none could supplant, or ever will eradicate that gratitude, which has arisen from a lively sense of the conduct of your nation, and from my obligations to many of its

* Lafayette had requested to be sent by Congress to England, as the bearer of the ratification of the treaty between Great Britain and the United States.

illustrious characters (of whom, I do not mean to flatter, when I place you at the head), and from my admiration of the virtues of your august sovereign, who, at the same time that he stands confessed the father of his own people, and defender of American rights, has given the most exalted example of moderation in treating with his enemies.

We are now an independent people, and have yet to learn political tactics. We are placed among the nations of the earth, and have a character to establish; but how we shall acquit ourselves, time must discover. The probability is (at least I fear it), that local or State politics will interfere too much with the more liberal and extensive plan of government, which wisdom and foresight, freed from the mist of prejudice, would dictate; and that we shall be guilty of many blunders in treading this boundless theatre, before we shall have arrived at any perfection in this art; in a word, that the experience, which is purchased at the price of difficulties and distress, will alone convince us, that the honor, power, and true interest of this country must be measured by a Continental scale, and that every departure therefrom weakens the Union, and may ultimately break the band which holds us together. To avert these evils, to form a new constitution, that will give consistency, stability, and dignity to the Union, and sufficient powers to the great council of the nation for general purposes, is a duty incumbent upon every man, who wishes well to his country, and will meet with my aid as far as it can be rendered in the private walks of life.

The armament, which was preparing at Cadiz, and in which you were to have acted a distinguished part, would have carried such conviction with it, that it is not to be wondered at, that Great Britain should have been impressed with the force of such reasoning. To this

cause, I am persuaded, the peace is to be ascribed. Your going to Madrid from thence, instead of coming immediately to this country, is another instance, my dear Marquis, of your zeal for the American cause, and lays a fresh claim to the gratitude of her sons, who will at all times receive you with open arms.* As no official despatches are yet received, either at Philadelphia or New York, concerning the completion of the treaty, nor any measures taken for the reduction of the army, my detention with it is quite uncertain. Where I may be, then, at the time of your intended visit, is too uncertain even for conjecture ; but nothing can be more true, than that the pleasure, with which I shall receive you, will be equal to your wishes. I shall be better able to determine then, than now, on the practicability of accompanying you to France, a country to which I shall ever feel a warm affection ; and, if I do not pay it that tribute of respect, which is to be derived from a visit, it may be ascribed with justice to any other cause, than a want of inclination, or the pleasure of going there under the auspices of your friendship.

* Although the Spanish government, by the signature of the treaty of general peace at Paris, had assented to the independence of the United States, yet the King was not inclined to receive a person from America in a public diplomatic character at his court. After the declaration of peace, Mr. Carmichael, who had been secretary of legation under Mr. Jay, was appointed Chargé d'Affaires from the United States to Spain. He was already in Madrid, having remained there after Mr. Jay's departure. The Spanish court declined receiving him in his public capacity. He wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette, who was then at Cadiz, and requested his aid. The Marquis repaired to Madrid, had an interview with the King, and with the principal minister, Count de Florida Blanca, and, by prompt and forcible representations, succeeded in procuring an immediate recognition of Mr. Carmichael's powers as Chargé d'Affaires from the United States. The conduct of the Marquis de Lafayette on this occasion was highly approved by Congress, and was a proof equally of his discretion, good sense, and energy, and of his warm attachment to the interests of his adopted country. See *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. X. pp. 24 - 39.

I have already observed, that the determination of Congress, if they have come to any, respecting the army, is yet unknown to me. But, as you wish to be informed of every thing that concerns it, I do, for your satisfaction, transmit authentic documents of some very interesting occurrences, which have happened within the last six months. But I ought first to premise, that, from accumulated sufferings and little or no prospect of relief, the discontents of the officers last fall put on the threatening appearance of a total resignation, till the business was diverted into the channel, which produced the address and petition to Congress, which stand first on the file herewith enclosed. I shall make no comment on these proceedings. To one so well acquainted with the sufferings of the American army as you are, it is unnecessary. It will be sufficient to observe, that the more its virtue and forbearance are tried, the more resplendent it appears. My hope is, that the military exit of this valuable class of the community will exhibit such a proof of *amor patriæ*, as will do them honor in the page of history.

These papers, with my last letter, which was intended to go by Colonel Gouvion, containing extensive details of military plans, will convey to you every information. If you should get sleepy and tired of reading them, recollect, for my exculpation, that it is in compliance with your request I have run into such prolixity. I made a proper use of the confidential part of your letter of the 5th of February.

The scheme, my dear Marquis, which you propose as a precedent to encourage the emancipation of the black people in this country from that state of bondage in which they are held, is a striking evidence of the benevolence of your heart. I shall be happy to join you in so laudable a work; but will defer going into

a detail of the business, till I have the pleasure of seeing you.

Lord Stirling is no more. He died at Albany in January last, very much regretted. Colonel Barber was snatched from us, about the same time, in a way equally unexpected, sudden, and distressing; leaving many friends to bemoan his fate.*

Tilghman is on the point of matrimony with a namesake and cousin, sister to Mrs. Carroll of Baltimore. It only remains for me now, my dear Marquis, to make a tender of my respectful compliments, in which Mrs. Washington unites, to Madame de Lafayette, and to wish you, her, and your little offspring, all the happiness this life can afford. I will extend my compliments to the gentlemen in your circle, with whom I have the honor of an acquaintance. I need not add how happy I shall be to see you in America, and more particularly at Mount Vernon, or with what truth and warmth of affection I am, &c.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 9 April, 1783.

SIR,

I feel great satisfaction from your Excellency's despatches by Captain Stapleton, conveying to me the

* Colonel Francis Barber was accidentally killed, while riding near the camp, by a falling tree, which a soldier was cutting. He was buried at New Windsor, on the 13th of February, with every mark of respect from the Commander-in-chief and the army. He had served through the war, and acquired the reputation, not more of an intelligent and brave officer, than of a man of estimable private qualities, possessing the confidence and esteem of the superior officers, and the affectionate attachment of his associates. An intimacy and friendship had subsisted between him and Lafayette.

joyful annunciation of your having received official accounts of the conclusion of a general peace, and a cessation of hostilities.* Without official authority from Congress, but perfectly relying on your communication, I can at this time only issue my orders to the American out-posts, to suspend all acts of hostilities until further orders. This shall be instantly done; and I shall be happy in the momentary expectation of having it in my power to publish to the American army a general cessation of all hostilities between Great Britain and America.

To your observations respecting particular articles of the peace I am obliged to reply, that it rests with Congress to direct measures for the observance of all the articles contained in the provisional treaty. You may be assured, that, as soon as I receive my instructions from the sovereign power of the United States, I shall rejoice in giving every facility in my power to carry into complete execution that article of the treaty, which respects the restitution of all prisoners of war, being perfectly disposed to contribute to diffusing, as much as possible, the happy effects of this great event.

I thank your Excellency for the assurances you are pleased to express, of your readiness to cultivate that spirit of perfect good will and conciliation, which you wish would take place between the King of Great Britain and the United States, and the citizens and subjects of both countries; and I beg, Sir, that you will please to accept a tender from me of reciprocal good will and attention, accompanied with sincere congratulations on this joyful restoration of peace and general tranquillity, with an earnest wish, that, resting on

* See Sir Guy Carleton's letter, dated April 6th, in the APPENDIX, No. IX.

the firm basis of mutual interest and good will, it may prove as lasting as it is happy.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head-Quarters, 14 April, 1783.

MY DEAR BARON,

A committee of Congress is appointed to consider what arrangements it will be proper to adopt in the different departments with reference to a peace. Colonel Hamilton, who is chairman of this committee, has written to me on this subject, wishing to know my sentiments at large on such institutions of every kind for the interior defence of these States, as may be best adapted to their circumstances, and conciliate security with economy and with the principles of our government.

I wish, therefore, to be favored with your thoughts on this subject, as soon as possible, that I may compare them with my own, and be able to comply with the request of the committee, in as full a manner and with as little delay as can be. I am, &c.*

* The same request was communicated to all the principal officers of the army then in camp, and also to Governor Clinton. Several of them presented memoirs of considerable length, entering into comprehensive and detailed views of what was called a *peace establishment*. From these papers a letter was framed extending to twenty-five folio pages, which was forwarded by the Commander-in-chief to the committee of Congress.

The report handed in by Colonel Pickering, then quartermaster-general to the army, is interesting from the manner in which many topics are discussed, and particularly from the suggestions it contains respecting the establishment of a military seminary at West Point. After combating the idea of instituting academies for military purposes at the different arsenals in the United States, a scheme that had gained favor with some of the officers, he proceeds to say ;

“If any thing like a military academy in America be practicable at

TO ALEXANDER HAMILTON, IN CONGRESS.

Newburg, 16 April, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

My last letter to you was written in a hurry, when I was fatigued by the more public yet confidential letter, which, with several others, accompanied it. Possibly I did not on that occasion express myself, in what I intended as a hint, with so much perspicuity as I ought. Possibly, too, what I then dropped might have conveyed more than I intended, for I do not now recollect the force of my expressions.

My meaning, however, was only to inform you, that there were different sentiments in the army, as well as in Congress, respecting Continental and State funds, some wishing to be thrown upon their respective States, rather than the continent at large, for payment; and that, if an idea should generally prevail, that Congress, or part of its members or ministers, bent upon the lat-

this time, it must be grounded on the permanent military establishment for our frontier posts and arsenals, and the wants of the States, separately, of officers to command the defences on their seacoasts.

"On this principle it might be expedient to establish a military school, or academy, at West Point. And that a competent number of young gentlemen might be induced to become students, it might be made a rule, that vacancies in the standing regiment should be supplied from thence; those few instances excepted where it would be just to promote a very meritorious sergeant. For this end the number, which shall be judged requisite to supply vacancies in the standing regiment, might be fixed, and that of the students, who are admitted with an expectation of filling them, limited accordingly. They might be allowed subsistence at the public expense. If any other youth desired to pursue the same studies at the military academy, they might be admitted; only subsisting themselves. Those students should be instructed in what is usually called military discipline, tactics, and the theory and practice of fortification and gunnery. The commandant and one or two other officers of the standing regiment, and the engineers, making West Point their general residence, would be the masters of the academy; and the inspector-general superintend the whole."—*Newburg, April 22d.*

ter, should delay doing them justice, or hazard it in pursuit of their favorite object, it might create such divisions in the army, as would weaken rather than strengthen the hands of those, who were disposed to support Continental measures, and might tend to defeat the end they themselves had in view, by endeavouring to interest the army.

For these reasons I said, or meant to say, the army was a dangerous engine to work with, as it might be made to cut both ways ; and, considering the sufferings of it, would more than probably throw its weight into that scale, which seemed most likely to preponderate towards its immediate relief, without looking, under the pressure of necessity, to future consequences with the eyes of politicians. In this light, also, I meant to apply my observation to Mr. Morris, to whom, or rather to Mr. Gouverneur Morris, is ascribed in a great degree the groundwork of the superstructure, which was intended to be raised in the army by the anonymous addresser.*

That no man can be more opposed to State funds or local prejudices than myself, the whole tenor of my conduct has been one continual evidence of. No man, perhaps, has had better opportunities to see and feel the pernicious tendency of the latter than I have ; and I endeavour (I hope not altogether ineffectually) to inculcate this upon the officers of the army, upon all proper occasions ; but their feelings are to be attended to and soothed, and they must be assured, that, if Continental funds cannot be established, they will be recommended to their respective States for payment. Justice must be done them.

I should do injustice to report what I believe to be

* On this subject see SPARKS'S *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, Vol. I. p. 250.

the opinion of the army, were I not to inform you, that they consider you as a friend, zealous to serve them, and one who has espoused their interests in Congress upon every proper occasion. It is to be wished, as I observed in my letter to Colonel Bland, that Congress would send a committee to the army with plenipotentary powers. The matters requested of me in your letter, as chairman of a committee, and many other things, might then be brought to a close with more despatch and in a happier manner, than it is likely they will be by an intercourse of letters at the distance of a hundred and fifty miles, which takes our expresses a week at least to go and return. At this moment, being without any instructions from Congress, I am under great embarrassment with respect to the soldiers for the war, and shall be obliged more than probably, from the necessity of the case, to exercise my own judgment, without waiting for orders as to the discharge of them. If I should adopt measures, which events will approve, all will be well; if otherwise, "Why, and by what authority, did you do so?"

How far a strong recommendation from Congress to observe all the articles of peace as well as the*

may imply a suspicion of good faith in the people of this country, I pretend not to judge; but I am much mistaken if something of the kind will not be found wanting, as I already perceive a disposition to carp at and to elude such parts of the treaty, as affect different interests, although you do not find a man, who, when pushed, will not agree, that, upon the whole, it is a more advantageous peace than we could possibly have expected. I am, dear Sir, &c.

* Referring probably to some particular article. The blank is not filled in the draft.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 18 April, 1783.

SIR,

I find it a duty incumbent on me to communicate to your Excellency the present disposition and temper of part of the army. The accounts of peace, which have been received at different times, have raised an expectation in the minds of the men engaged for the war, that a speedy discharge must be the consequence. This idea has been so deeply impressed, that it has become difficult to hold them under that sense of discipline, which is necessary to bind together the subjects of an army. The dilatory manner, in which the intelligence of peace has arrived to us, has served to heighten this idea, and has led those men to some suspicion, that official despatches have not been forwarded, or official declarations of peace have been postponed through design, that they might be held beyond the term of their engagements; by which means they have in some instances scarcely been restrained from acts of excess. To such a description of men as the army is formed of, this idea is perhaps not an unnatural one.

In this situation the proclamation of Congress for a cessation of hostilities found us on its arrival yesterday. This act, being unaccompanied with any instructions for my conduct respecting the discharge of this part of the army if it should be found necessary, or any intimations of Congress upon that head, has thrown me into a most disagreeable situation. Knowing the temper of the *men for the war*, to suppress the publication would increase their suspicions; and knowing their expectations, to publish it to men, who have not learnt to distinguish between a proclamation for a cessation of

hostilities and a definitive declaration of peace, when they have authentic information that peace has already taken place, would serve to strengthen their ideas of immediate discharge, and stamp any claim to their further services with an appearance of injustice. In this dilemma, and being totally ignorant of the designs of the enemy in New York, who, from all I can collect, are making no show of an early evacuation of that city, I found it difficult to decide on the line of my duty. I therefore called a full council of the general officers of the army on the occasion. It was their unanimous judgment, that it would be equally impracticable and impolitic to attempt to suppress the proclamation, and that it should be issued in this day's orders. At the same time, the general officers are deeply impressed with an idea of the little remaining hold, which, after this publication, we may expect to have upon the *men for the war*, and of the absolute necessity there is, that Congress should come to some speedy determination upon this interesting point, as to what is to be the period of these men's service, and that they should give the earliest communication to me of their decision for my instruction towards effecting this important object.

It has been seriously motioned to me, that I should hint to Congress the propriety and expediency of their appointing a committee of their own body, with plenary powers, who may immediately repair to camp, and who may decide on the necessary arrangements for this important period. For my own part, I am fully in sentiment with this opinion, as such a measure would not only tend to quiet our present uneasiness, and help us over the difficulty of the moment, but would expedite the execution of many other arrangements, which will be found necessary, preparatory to our disbanding the present army. It might also serve to facilitate any ne-

gotiations, which it may be found expedient to enter into with Sir Guy Carleton, for his speedy evacuation of New York, an object which at present seems at too great a distance for our circumstances. Many other matters will undoubtedly present themselves which we cannot foresee, and which will occasion frequent references to Congress; and, as much time is lost in communications between the army and that sovereign body, a committee on the spot, who might give immediate decision, would be of great importance, and perhaps suppress many disagreeable consequences which might arise merely from delay. One circumstance has already occurred, as Congress will perceive by the enclosed petition from the troops of the New Jersey line; another I have this day heard of in the Connecticut line, extending to a claim of half-pay or commutation for the non-commissioned officers of that line. How far their ideas, if not suppressed by some lucky expedient, may proceed, it is beyond my power to divine.

Notwithstanding the length of this letter, I must beg the liberty to suggest to Congress an idea, which has been hinted to me, and which has affected my mind very forcibly. That is, that, at the discharge of the *men for the war*, Congress should suffer those men, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, to take with them as their own property, and as a gratuity, the arms and accoutrements they now hold. This act would raise pleasing sensations in the minds of those worthy and faithful men, who, from their early engaging in the war at moderate bounties, and from their patient continuance under innumerable distresses, have not only deserved nobly of their country, but have obtained an honorable distinction over those, who, with shorter times, have gained large pecuniary rewards. This, at a comparatively small expense, would be deemed an

honorable testimonial from Congress of the regard they bear to those distinguished worthies, and the sense they have had of their suffering virtues and services, which have been so happily instrumental towards the establishment and the security of the rights, liberties, and independence of this rising empire. These constant companions of their toils, preserved with sacred attention, would be handed down from the present possessors to their children, as honorary badges of bravery and military merit; and would probably be brought forth, on some future occasion, with pride and exultation, to be improved with the same military ardor and emulation in the hands of posterity, as they have been used by their forefathers in the present establishment and foundation of our national independence and glory.

Congress will suffer me to repeat my most earnest wish, that they will be pleased, either by themselves at large, or by their committee, to pay the earliest attention to the matters now referred to their consideration; for I can only add, that, unless the most speedy arrangements for the *war men* are adopted, I contemplate with anxiety the disagreeable consequences, which, I fear, will be the result of much longer delay.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* This letter was referred to a committee, in conformity with whose report, it was resolved, that, in the opinion of Congress, the time of service of the men engaged for the war did not expire till the ratification of the definitive articles of peace; that those continuing in the service till that time should be allowed their arms and accoutrements; but that, nevertheless, discretion should be left with the Commander-in-chief to grant furloughs, or discharges, to those men, as he should judge most expedient. — *Journals, April 23d.*

It was afterwards resolved, "That the Commander-in-chief be *instructed* to grant furloughs to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the United States enlisted to serve during the war, who shall be discharged as soon as the definitive treaty of peace is concluded, together with a proportionable number of commissioned officers of the different grades; and that the secretary at war and the Commander-in-chief take

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, 21 April, 1783.

SIR,

I have the satisfaction of enclosing to your Excellency a proclamation, which I have received from the sovereign power of the United States, ordering a general cessation of hostilities, as well by sea as land, with directions that the same should be published to all their subjects under my command. In compliance with these instructions, the same was made public in the American camp on the 19th, with my orders that it should be made known at all the out-posts of the American army as soon as possible.*

In consequence of this declaration, and in conformity to the articles of the treaty, Congress have been pleased to pass their resolutions of the 15th instant, directing arrangements to be formed for the liberation of all prisoners, and other purposes, which your Excellency will collect from the enclosed copy, which I transmit for your observation.

In a conference, which I had yesterday with the minister at war, agreeably to the terms of the above-

the proper measures for conducting those troops to their respective homes, in such a manner as may be most convenient to themselves and to the States through which they may pass; and that the men thus furloughed be allowed to take their arms with them."—*May 26th*.

* The proclamation for a cessation of hostilities was agreed upon and adopted in Congress on the 11th of April. It is observable, that it was published in camp precisely eight years from the date of the first act of hostility at Lexington. General Heath describes the ceremony as follows.

"*April 19th*. At noon the proclamation of Congress for a cessation of hostilities was proclaimed at the door of the New Building, followed by three huzzas; after which a prayer was made by the Reverend Mr. Ganno, and an anthem (*Independence*, from Billings,) was performed by vocal and instrumental music."—*Memoirs*, p. 371. The general orders issued on the occasion may be seen in the APPENDIX, No. XIII.

mentioned resolutions, it has been agreed between us, that the land prisoners should be liberated as soon as possible, and that orders should be immediately given for commencing their march towards New York. But as their situation, by being removed to the interior of the country, is far distant from New York, which will make their march disagreeable and long, we have agreed to submit it to your option, whether to have them marched the whole distance through the country, or to have them delivered at the nearest water, where it may be convenient for your ships to receive them. Should you choose the latter, the following arrangement has been determined. The prisoners, who are lodged at Fredericktown and Winchester, in the States of Virginia and Maryland, in number about fifteen hundred, including women and children, will begin their march on the route towards Baltimore, where they may arrive on the 10th of May; at which time, should your ships be ready to receive them there, they may be embarked, and proceed to New York. If ships are not directed to receive them at the time mentioned at Baltimore, they will proceed by land to the Delaware. The remainder of the prisoners, being in Pennsylvania, amounting to about four thousand five hundred, may all (except those at Reading, between three and four hundred,) be embarked at Philadelphia, and also those from Fredericktown and Winchester, should they not be received at Baltimore, provided your ships are there by the 5th of May at farthest. Should ships not be ordered by your Excellency to take them by water, they will be marched in convenient detachments, of about five hundred each, through the country to Elizabethtown, with all convenient expedition. In any case, those from Reading, being in the upper part of Pennsylvania, will march directly to Elizabethtown.

It is also submitted to your option to send or not, as you shall think proper, an additional number of officers to attend the march of the prisoners through the country, and to prevent any irregularities that disorderly persons may be disposed to commit.

In either alternative respecting the receipt of the prisoners, you will be pleased to give the earliest information, to the minister at war in Philadelphia, of your determinations, that he may be able to make the necessary and timely dispositions to pay all proper attention to your choice. To expedite this purpose, and for the convenience of transportation, I enclose a passport for such officers as you shall think proper to charge with your despatches on this occasion.

Respecting the other subjects contained in the enclosed resolution of Congress, as they may be discussed with more precision and despatch by a personal interview between your Excellency and myself, at some convenient time and intermediate place, such as may be agreed upon between your Excellency and Colonel Humphreys, my aid-de-camp, who will have the honor to deliver this letter, I would only suggest, that, in point of time, the earliest day you can name will be most agreeable to me. Should an interview be consented to on your part, the governor of this State, being particularly interested in any arrangements, which respect the restitution of the post of New York, will attend me on this occasion. I am, &c.*

* To the principal points in this letter, Sir Guy Carleton wrote in reply ;

“Considering the quantity of tonnage necessary for the evacuation of this place, and that most part of what we have at hand is now actually employed in this business, and in the removing of incumbrances, which must be sent off previous to our departure, I am reduced to the necessity of adopting the march of those prisoners by land ; and I shall accordingly avail myself of your Excellency’s passport, and acquaint the minister at war of the choice I am obliged to make, and the reasons of it. I cannot

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 3 May, 1783.

SIR,

I take the liberty to mention to your Excellency, that, in attending to the resolutions of Congress of the 15th of April, respecting the posts in the United States occupied by the British troops, I find it necessary to apply for some more particular explanation of the intentions of Congress than is there expressed.*

Taking it for granted, that the northern and western posts are included within the ideas of Congress, as well as New York, arrangements for receiving possession of those posts are to be made with General Haldimand, who commands in the district of Canada. As our communication will be distant and take much time, previous to commencing this correspondence it will be necessary that I should be as fully instructed as circumstances will admit, as to the intentions of Congress respecting these frontier posts; particularly what footing they will determine to place them upon in their peace establishment, and what number of men shall be sent to maintain them. Congress will also be impressed with the necessity of adopting the earliest measures

decline the personal interview proposed by your Excellency, and purpose being in a frigate as near Tappan as may be, where I understand you mean to lodge. If I hear nothing from you to occasion an alteration, I intend being up, on the 5th of May, accompanied by a smaller vessel or two, for the accommodation of Lieutenant-Governor Elliot, Chief Justice William Smith, and part of my family." — *New York, April 24th.*

* By a resolve of the 15th of April, the Commander-in-chief was instructed to make arrangements with the British commander for receiving possession of the posts held by the British troops in the United States, and for obtaining the delivery of all negroes and other property, which by the treaty were to be given up. It was also resolved, that the secretary at war, in conjunction with the Commander-in-chief, should concert measures for liberating all the land prisoners. They had recently met at Ringwood for this purpose.

possible for procuring the men, who will be necessary for garrisoning the forts. Whether this shall be effected by detaching the three years' men of the present army, or raising them in some other manner, will be also to be determined.

The posts should certainly be occupied by United States troops the moment they are evacuated by the British. Should this be neglected, I have my fears, that they may be burned or destroyed by the Indians, or some other evil-minded persons, whose disaffection to the government of the United States may lead them to such enormities.

Arrangements for transporting the necessary artillery, stores, ammunition, and provisions, will take time, and will need immediate attention. The season for doing this is now at hand; and if suffered to pass off, it will be exceedingly difficult if not impracticable to effect their transportation, particularly through the small water communications, which at the present season will be found very convenient, but which the summer heats will render so low, as to become almost impassable.

Persuaded that Congress will view these subjects in the same important light that I do, I promise myself that I shall be favored with their instructions at the earliest moment possible. I am, &c.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Orangetown, 6 May, 1783.

SIR,

In my letter of the 21st of April, I enclosed to your Excellency a copy of a resolution of Congress of the 15th, instructing me in three points, which appeared necessary for carrying into effect the terms of the

treaty between Great Britain and the United States of America; and I informed you, that such part as rested upon my decision, and which regarded the release of prisoners, had been determined, and was then ordered to be carried into execution. Upon the other two points, as they respected the receiving possession of the posts in occupation of the British troops, and the carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, and both being within your control, I had the honor to propose a personal interview with your Excellency, that the subject might be freely discussed, and that measures might be agreed upon, for carrying into execution those points of the seventh article of the treaty, agreeably to their true intent and spirit.

Having been favored this day with a personal conference, I have now, to prevent misapprehension or misconstruction, and that I may be enabled to fulfil my instructions with fidelity and with candor, the honor to propose, agreeably to our conversation, that your Excellency will be pleased to give me in writing information as to what measures are adopting, on your part, for carrying into execution that point of the treaty, which regards the evacuation of the posts now in possession of the British troops and under your Excellency's command; and also at what time it is probable those posts, or any of them, may be relinquished, and the fleets and armies of his Britannic Majesty withdrawn.

Respecting the other point of discussion, in addition to what I mentioned in my communication of the 21st ultimo, I took occasion in our conference to inform your Excellency, that, in consequence of your letter of the 14th of April to Robert R. Livingston, Esquire, Congress had been pleased to make a further reference

to me of that letter, and had directed me to take such measures as should be found necessary for carrying into effect the several matters mentioned by you therein.* In the course of our conversation on this point, I was surprised to hear you mention, that an embarkation had already taken place, in which a large number of negroes had been carried away. Whether this conduct is consonant to, or how far it may be deemed an infraction of the treaty, is not for me to decide. I cannot, however, conceal from you, that my private opinion is, that the measure is totally different from the letter and spirit of the treaty. But, waving the discussion of the point, and leaving its decision to our respective sovereigns, I find it my duty to signify my readiness, in conjunction with your Excellency, to enter into any agreement, or to take any measures, which may be deemed expedient, to prevent the future carrying away of any negroes, or other property of the

* In the letter here mentioned, Sir Guy Carleton had requested, that Congress would empower some person or persons to go into New York, and assist such persons as he should appoint to inspect and superintend the embarkation of persons and property, in fulfilment of the seventh article of the provisional treaty, and "that they would be pleased to represent to him every infraction of the letter or spirit of the treaty, that redress might be immediately ordered." — *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. XI. p. 335. The commissioners appointed by General Washington for this purpose were Egbert Benson, William S. Smith, and Daniel Parker. Their instructions were dated the 8th of May.

Soon after the commissioners arrived in New York, General Washington sent to Colonel Smith a list of the titles of books, which he had selected from a catalogue published by a bookseller in a gazette, and which he requested Colonel Smith to purchase for him. The reader may be curious to know the kind of works to which his thoughts were at this time directed. They were the following. Life of Charles the Twelfth; Life of Louis the Fifteenth; Life and Reign of Peter the Great; Robertson's History of America; Voltaire's Letters; Vertot's Revolution of Rome, and Revolution of Portugal; Life of Gustavus Adolphus; Sully's Memoirs; Goldsmith's Natural History; Campaigns of Marshal Turenne; Chambaud's French and English Dictionary; Locke on the Human Understanding; Robertson's Charles the Fifth.

American inhabitants. I beg the favor of your Excellency's reply, and have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE DUKE DE LAUZUN.

Head-Quarters, 10 May, 1783.

SIR,

I had not the honor of receiving your favor of the 1st instant until the 7th. Being at that time at Orangetown on a conference with Sir Guy Carleton, it had a circuitous route to make before it reached me. This circumstance you will be so good as to admit as an apology for my not giving an earlier reply.

I have now the honor to mention to you, as I did some time ago to the minister of France, that, viewing the peace so near a final conclusion, I could not hold myself justified in a desire to detain the troops under your command from the expectations of their sovereign, or to prevent their own wishes of a return to their native country and friends.

Nor can I omit, on this occasion, to express to you, Sir, and to all the brave officers and soldiers of your corps, the high esteem I have for them, and the regard I shall ever entertain for their services in the cause of the United States, to whose independence and establishment as a nation they have contributed a noble share.

Your particular services, Sir, with the politeness, zeal, and attention, which I have ever experienced from you, have made a deep and lasting impression on my mind, and will serve to endear you to my remembrance. It would have been a great satisfaction to me

* See Sir Guy Carleton's answer, dated May 12th, in the APPENDIX, No. IX.

to have had further opportunity to give you, in person, the assurances of my regard, could your orders have admitted your longer continuance in the country. But my regret at parting with you will be somewhat softened by the flattering hope you are pleased to give me, that I may have the satisfaction of embracing you again in America; where you may be assured I shall ever most sincerely rejoice in an opportunity of having it in my power to convince you of the very particular esteem and attachment, with which I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL PUTNAM.

Head-Quarters, 2 June, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

Your favor of the 20th of May I received with much pleasure; for I can assure you, that, among the many worthy and meritorious officers, with whom I have had the happiness to be connected in service through the course of this war, and from whose cheerful assistance and advice I have received much support and confidence, in the various and trying vicissitudes of a complicated contest, the name of Putnam is not forgotten; nor will it be but with that stroke of time, which shall obliterate from my mind the remembrance of all those toils and fatigues, through which we have struggled for

* The French troops under the Duke de Lauzun, being part of Count de Rochambeau's army that remained after the departure of the main body at Boston, sailed from the Capes of Delaware on the 12th of May. They had been cantoned recently at Wilmington, in the State of Delaware. Some of these remaining troops had also been stationed at Baltimore under General Lavalette, being the detachment left by Count de Rochambeau at Yorktown to effect the removal of the French artillery and stores from that place.

the preservation and establishment of the rights, liberties, and independence of our country.

Your congratulations on the happy prospects of our peace and independent security, with their attendant blessings to the United States, I receive with great satisfaction ; and beg that you will accept a return of my congratulations to you on this auspicious event ; an event, in which, great as it is in itself, and glorious as it will probably be in its consequences, you have a right to participate largely, from the distinguished part you have contributed towards its attainment.

But while I contemplate the greatness of the object for which we have contended, and felicitate you on the happy issue of our toils and labors, which have terminated with such general satisfaction, I lament that you should feel the ungrateful returns of a country, in whose service you have exhausted your bodily health, and expended the vigor of a youthful constitution. I wish, however, that your expectations of returning sentiments of liberality may be verified. I have a hope, that they may ; but, should they not, your case will not be a singular one. Ingratitude has been experienced in all ages, and republics in particular have ever been famed for the exercise of that unnatural and sordid vice.

The secretary at war, who is now here, informs me that you have been considered as entitled to full pay since your absence from the field ; and that you will be still considered in that light till the close of the war, at which period you will be equally entitled to the same emoluments of half-pay or commutation as other officers of your rank. The same opinion is also given by the paymaster-general, who is now with the army, empowered by Mr. Morris for the settlement of all their accounts, and who will attend to yours whenever you shall think proper to send on for the purpose ; which it will probably be best for you to do in a short time.

I anticipate with pleasure the day, and that I trust not far off, when I shall quit the busy scenes of a military employment, and retire to the more tranquil walks of domestic life. In that, or in whatever other situation Providence may dispose my future days, the remembrance of the many friendships and connexions I have had the happiness to contract with the gentlemen of the army will be one of my most grateful reflections. Under this contemplation, and impressed with the sentiments of benevolence and regard, I commend you, my dear Sir, my other friends, and with them the interests and happiness of our dear country, to the keeping and protection of Almighty God.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 6 June, 1783.

SIR,

Before I make a reply to the subject of the address of the generals and officers, commanding the regiments and corps of this army, presented by yourself yesterday, I entreat that those gentlemen will accept my warmest acknowledgment for the confidence they have been pleased to repose in me. They may be assured it shall never be abused; and I beg they will be persuaded, that, as no man can possibly be better acquainted than I am with the past merits and services of the army, so no one can possibly be more strongly impressed with their present ineligible situation, feel a keener sensibility at their distresses, or more ardently desire to alleviate or remove them. But it would be

* In December, 1779, General Putnam had become disabled by a paralytic affection, and he never joined the army afterwards.

unnecessary, perhaps, to enter into a detail of what I have done, and what I am still attempting to do, in order to assist in the accomplishment of this interesting purpose. Let it be sufficient to observe, that I do not yet despair of success; for I am perfectly convinced that the States cannot, without involving themselves in national bankruptcy and ruin, refuse to comply with the requisitions of Congress; who, it must be acknowledged, have done every thing in their power to obtain ample and complete justice for the army; and whose great object in the present measure undoubtedly was, by a reduction of expense, to enable the financier to make the three months' payment to the army, which on all hands has been agreed to be absolutely and indispensably necessary. To explain this matter, I beg leave to insert an extract of a letter from the superintendent of finance, dated the 29th ultimo.

"It is now a month since the committee conferred with me on that subject, and I then told them no payment could be made to the army, but by means of a paper anticipation; and, unless our expenditures were immediately and considerably reduced, even that could not be done. Our expenditures have nevertheless been continued, and our revenues lessen, the States growing daily more and more remiss in their collections. The consequence is, that I cannot make payment in the manner first intended. The notes issued for this purpose would have been payable at two, four, and six months from the date, but at present they will be at six months, and even that will soon become impracticable, unless our expenses be immediately curtailed.

"I shall cause such notes to be issued for three months' pay to the army; and I must entreat, Sir, that every influence be used with the States to absorb them, together with my other engagements, by taxation."

Three days ago, a messenger was despatched by me to urge the necessity of forwarding these notes with the greatest possible expedition. Under this state of circumstances, I need scarcely add, that the expense of every day, in feeding the whole army, will increase very considerably the inability of the public to discharge the debts already incurred, at least for a considerable time to come. Although the officers of the army very well know my official situation, that I am only a servant of the public, and that it is not for me to dispense with orders, which it is my duty to carry into execution; yet, as furloughs in all services are considered as a matter of indulgence, and not of compulsion; as Congress, I am persuaded, entertain the best disposition towards the army; and as I apprehend in a very short time the two principal articles of complaint will be removed; I shall not hesitate to comply with the wishes of the army, under these reservations only, that officers sufficient to conduct the men, who choose to receive furloughs, will attend them, either on furlough or by detachment. The propriety and necessity of this measure must be obvious to all; it need not, therefore, be enforced; and, with regard to the non-commissioned officers and privates, such, as from a peculiarity of circumstances wish not to receive furloughs at this time, will give in their names by twelve o'clock to-morrow to the commanding officers of their regiments, that, on a report to the adjutant-general, an equal number of men, engaged for three years, may be furloughed, which will make the saving of expenses exactly the same to the public.

I cannot but hope the notes will soon arrive, and that the settlement of accounts may be completed, by the assistance of the paymasters, in a very few days. In the mean time, I shall have the honor of laying the

sentiments of the generals and officers, commanding regiments and corps, before Congress; they are expressed in such a decent, candid, and affecting manner, that I am certain every mark of attention will be paid to them. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Newburg, 7 June, 1783.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency the copy of an address to me, from the generals and officers commanding regiments and corps, together with my answer to it. These enclosures will explain the distresses, which resulted from the measures now carrying into execution, in consequence of the resolution of the 26th of May; but the sensibility occasioned by a parting scene under such peculiar circumstances will not admit of description.

The two subjects of complaint with the army appear to be, the delay of the three months' payment, which had been expected, and the want of a settlement of accounts. I have thought myself authorized to assure them, that Congress had attended and would attend particularly to their grievances, and have made some little variations respecting furloughs from what was at first proposed. The secretary at war will be able to explain the reason and propriety of this alteration.

While I consider it a tribute of justice on this occasion, to mention the temperate and orderly behaviour of the whole army, and particularly the accommodating spirit of the officers in arranging themselves to the command of the battalions, which will be composed of the three years' men, permit me to recall to mind

all their former sufferings and merits, and to recommend their reasonable request to the early and favorable notice of Congress. I am, &c.*

CIRCULAR LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNORS OF
ALL THE STATES ON DISBANDING THE ARMY.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 8 June, 1783.

SIR,

The great object, for which I had the honor to hold an appointment in the service of my country, being accomplished, I am now preparing to resign it into the hands of Congress, and to return to that domestic retirement, which, it is well known, I left with the greatest reluctance; a retirement for which I have never ceased to sigh, through a long and painful absence, and in which (remote from the noise and trouble of the world) I meditate to pass the remainder of life, in a state of undisturbed repose. But before I carry this resolution into effect, I think it a duty incumbent on me to make this my last official communication; to congratulate you on the glorious events which Heaven has been pleased to produce in our favor; to offer my sentiments respecting some important subjects, which appear to me to be intimately connected with the tranquillity of the United States; to take my leave of your Excellency as a public character; and to give my final blessing to that country, in whose service I have spent the prime of my life, for whose sake I have consumed

* Congress approved of the mode adopted by the Commander-in-chief in giving furloughs to the troops, and sent a copy of the above letter, and of the papers enclosed, to the several States, recommending to them "to facilitate the punctual payment of the notes issued to the army."
— *Journals*, June 19th.

so many anxious days and watchful nights, and whose happiness, being extremely dear to me, will always constitute no inconsiderable part of my own.

Impressed with the liveliest sensibility on this pleasing occasion, I will claim the indulgence of dilating the more copiously on the subjects of our mutual felicitation. When we consider the magnitude of the prize we contended for, the doubtful nature of the contest, and the favorable manner in which it has terminated, we shall find the greatest possible reason for gratitude and rejoicing. This is a theme that will afford infinite delight to every benevolent and liberal mind, whether the event in contemplation be considered as the source of present enjoyment or the parent of future happiness; and we shall have equal occasion to felicitate ourselves on the lot which Providence has assigned us, whether we view it in a natural, a political, or moral point of light.

The citizens of America, placed in the most enviable condition, as the sole lords and proprietors of a vast tract of continent, comprehending all the various soils and climates of the world, and abounding with all the necessities and conveniences of life, are now, by the late satisfactory pacification, acknowledged to be possessed of absolute freedom and independency. They are, from this period, to be considered as the actors on a most conspicuous theatre, which seems to be peculiarly designated by Providence for the display of human greatness and felicity. Here they are not only surrounded with every thing, which can contribute to the completion of private and domestic enjoyment; but Heaven has crowned all its other blessings, by giving a fairer opportunity for political happiness, than any other nation has ever been favored with. Nothing can illustrate these observations more forcibly, than a rec-

ollection of the happy conjuncture of times and circumstances, under which our republic assumed its rank among the nations. The foundation of our empire was not laid in the gloomy age of ignorance and superstition; but at an epocha when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly defined, than at any former period. The researches of the human mind after social happiness have been carried to a great extent; the treasures of knowledge, acquired by the labors of philosophers, sages, and legislators, through a long succession of years, are laid open for our use, and their collected wisdom may be happily applied in the establishment of our forms of government. The free cultivation of letters, the unbounded extension of commerce, the progressive refinement of manners, the growing liberality of sentiment, and, above all, the pure and benign light of Revelation, have had a meliorating influence on mankind and increased the blessings of society. At this auspicious period, the United States came into existence as a nation; and, if their citizens should not be completely free and happy, the fault will be entirely their own.

Such is our situation, and such are our prospects; but, notwithstanding the cup of blessing is thus reached out to us; notwithstanding happiness is ours, if we have a disposition to seize the occasion and make it our own; yet it appears to me there is an option still left to the United States of America, that it is in their choice, and depends upon their conduct, whether they will be respectable and prosperous, or contemptible and miserable, as a nation. This is the time of their political probation; this is the moment when the eyes of the whole world are turned upon them; this is the moment to establish or ruin their national character for ever; this is the favorable moment to give such a tone to our

federal government, as will enable it to answer the ends of its institution, or this may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the cement of the confederation, and exposing us to become the sport of European politics, which may play one State against another, to prevent their growing importance, and to serve their own interested purposes. For, according to the system of policy the States shall adopt at this moment, they will stand or fall; and by their confirmation or lapse it is yet to be decided, whether the revolution must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse; a blessing or a curse, not to the present age alone, for with our fate will the destiny of unborn millions be involved.

With this conviction of the importance of the present crisis, silence in me would be a crime. I will therefore speak to your Excellency the language of freedom and of sincerity without disguise. I am aware, however, that those who differ from me in political sentiment, may perhaps remark, that I am stepping out of the proper line of my duty, and may possibly ascribe to arrogance or ostentation, what I know is alone the result of the purest intention. But the rectitude of my own heart, which disdains such unworthy motives; the part I have hitherto acted in life; the determination I have formed, of not taking any share in public business hereafter; the ardent desire I feel, and shall continue to manifest, of quietly enjoying, in private life, after all the toils of war, the benefits of a wise and liberal government, will, I flatter myself, sooner or later convince my countrymen, that I could have no sinister views in delivering, with so little reserve, the opinions contained in this address.

There are four things, which, I humbly conceive, are essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say, to

the existence of the United States, as an independent power.

First. An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head.

Second. A sacred regard to public justice.

Third. The adoption of a proper peace establishment; and,

Fourth. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions, which are requisite to the general prosperity; and, in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community.

These are the pillars on which the glorious fabric of our independency and national character must be supported. Liberty is the basis; and whoever would dare to sap the foundation, or overturn the structure, under whatever specious pretext he may attempt it, will merit the bitterest execration, and the severest punishment, which can be inflicted by his injured country.

On the three first articles I will make a few observations, leaving the last to the good sense and serious consideration of those immediately concerned.

Under the first head, although it may not be necessary or proper for me, in this place, to enter into a particular disquisition on the principles of the Union, and to take up the great question which has been frequently agitated, whether it be expedient and requisite for the States to delegate a larger proportion of power to Congress, or not; yet it will be a part of my duty, and that of every true patriot, to assert without reserve, and to insist upon, the following positions. That, unless the States will suffer Congress to exercise those

prerogatives they are undoubtedly invested with by the constitution, every thing must very rapidly tend to anarchy and confusion. That it is indispensable to the happiness of the individual States, that there should be lodged somewhere a supreme power to regulate and govern the general concerns of the confederated republic, without which the Union cannot be of long duration. That there must be a faithful and pointed compliance, on the part of every State, with the late proposals and demands of Congress, or the most fatal consequences will ensue. That whatever measures have a tendency to dissolve the Union, or contribute to violate or lessen the sovereign authority, ought to be considered as hostile to the liberty and independency of America, and the authors of them treated accordingly. And lastly, that unless we can be enabled, by the concurrence of the States, to participate of the fruits of the revolution, and enjoy the essential benefits of civil society, under a form of government so free and uncorrupted, so happily guarded against the danger of oppression, as has been devised and adopted by the articles of confederation, it will be a subject of regret, that so much blood and treasure have been lavished for no purpose, that so many sufferings have been encountered without a compensation, and that so many sacrifices have been made in vain.

Many other considerations might here be adduced to prove, that, without an entire conformity to the spirit of the Union, we cannot exist as an independent power. It will be sufficient for my purpose to mention but one or two, which seem to me of the greatest importance. It is only in our united character, as an empire, that our independence is acknowledged, that our power can be regarded, or our credit supported, among foreign nations. The treaties of the European powers with the

United States of America will have no validity on a dissolution of the Union. We shall be left nearly in a state of nature; or we may find, by our own unhappy experience, that there is a natural and necessary progression from the extreme of anarchy to the extreme of tyranny, and that arbitrary power is most easily established on the ruins of liberty, abused to licentiousness.

As to the second article, which respects the performance of public justice, Congress have, in their late address to the United States, almost exhausted the subject; they have explained their ideas so fully, and have enforced the obligations the States are under, to render complete justice to all the public creditors, with so much dignity and energy, that, in my opinion, no real friend of the honor and independency of America can hesitate a single moment, respecting the propriety of complying with the just and honorable measures proposed. If their arguments do not produce conviction, I know of nothing that will have greater influence; especially when we recollect, that the system referred to, being the result of the collected wisdom of the continent, must be esteemed, if not perfect, certainly the least objectionable of any that could be devised; and that, if it shall not be carried into immediate execution, a national bankruptcy, with all its deplorable consequences, will take place, before any different plan can possibly be proposed and adopted. So pressing are the present circumstances, and such is the alternative now offered to the States.

The ability of the country to discharge the debts, which have been incurred in its defence, is not to be doubted; an inclination, I flatter myself, will not be wanting. The path of our duty is plain before us; honesty will be found, on every experiment, to be the best

and only true policy. Let us then, as a nation, be just; let us fulfil the public contracts, which Congress had undoubtedly a right to make for the purpose of carrying on the war, with the same good faith we suppose ourselves bound to perform our private engagements. In the mean time, let an attention to the cheerful performance of their proper business, as individuals and as members of society, be earnestly inculcated on the citizens of America; then will they strengthen the hands of government, and be happy under its protection; every one will reap the fruit of his labors, every one will enjoy his own acquisitions, without molestation and without danger.

In this state of absolute freedom and perfect security, who will grudge to yield a very little of his property to support the common interest of society, and insure the protection of government? Who does not remember the frequent declarations, at the commencement of the war, that we should be completely satisfied, if, at the expense of one half, we could defend the remainder of our possessions? Where is the man to be found, who wishes to remain indebted for the defence of his own person and property to the exertions, the bravery, and the blood of others, without making one generous effort to repay the debt of honor and of gratitude? In what part of the continent shall we find any man, or body of men, who would not blush to stand up and propose measures, purposely calculated to rob the soldier of his stipend, and the public creditor of his due? And were it possible, that such a flagrant instance of injustice could ever happen, would it not excite the general indignation, and tend to bring down upon the authors of such measures the aggravated vengeance of Heaven? If, after all, a spirit of disunion, or a temper of obstinacy

and perverseness should manifest itself in any of the States; if such an ungracious disposition should attempt to frustrate all the happy effects that might be expected to flow from the Union; if there should be a refusal to comply with the requisitions for funds to discharge the annual interest of the public debts; and if that refusal should revive again all those jealousies, and produce all those evils, which are now happily removed, Congress, who have, in all their transactions, shown a great degree of magnanimity and justice, will stand justified in the sight of God and man; and that State alone, which puts itself in opposition to the aggregate wisdom of the continent, and follows such mistaken and pernicious counsels, will be responsible for all the consequences.

For my own part, conscious of having acted, while a servant of the public, in the manner I conceived best suited to promote the real interests of my country; having, in consequence of my fixed belief, in some measure pledged myself to the army, that their country would finally do them complete and ample justice; and not wishing to conceal any instance of my official conduct from the eyes of the world, I have thought proper to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed collection of papers, relative to the half-pay and commutation granted by Congress to the officers of the army. From these communications, my decided sentiments will be clearly comprehended, together with the conclusive reasons which induced me, at an early period, to recommend the adoption of the measure, in the most earnest and serious manner. As the proceedings of Congress, the army, and myself, are open to all, and contain, in my opinion, sufficient information to remove the prejudices and errors, which may have been entertained by any, I think it unnecessary to say any

thing more than just to observe, that the resolutions of Congress, now alluded to, are undoubtedly as absolutely binding upon the United States, as the most solemn acts of confederation or legislation.

As to the idea, which, I am informed, has in so many instances prevailed, that the half-pay and commutation are to be regarded merely in the odious light of a pension, it ought to be exploded for ever. That provision should be viewed, as it really was, a reasonable compensation offered by Congress, at a time when they had nothing else to give to the officers of the army for services then to be performed. It was the only means to prevent a total dereliction of the service. It was a part of their hire. I may be allowed to say, it was the price of their blood, and of your independency; it is therefore more than a common debt, it is a debt of honor; it can never be considered as a pension or gratuity, nor be cancelled until it is fairly discharged.

With regard to a distinction between officers and soldiers, it is sufficient that the uniform experience of every nation of the world, combined with our own, proves the utility and propriety of the discrimination. Rewards, in proportion to the aids which the public derives from them, are unquestionably due to all its servants. In some lines, the soldiers have perhaps generally had as ample compensation for their services, by the large bounties which have been paid to them, as their officers will receive in the proposed commutation; in others, if, besides the donation of lands, the payment of arrearages of clothing and wages (in which articles all the component parts of the army must be put upon the same footing), we take into the estimate the bounties many of the soldiers have received, and the gratuity of one year's full pay, which is promised to all, possibly their situation (every circumstance being duly consid-

ered) will not be deemed less eligible than that of the officers. Should a further reward, however, be judged equitable, I will venture to assert, no one will enjoy greater satisfaction than myself, on seeing an exemption from taxes for a limited time, (which has been petitioned for in some instances,) or any other adequate immunity or compensation granted to the brave defenders of their country's cause; but neither the adoption nor rejection of this proposition will in any manner affect, much less militate against, the act of Congress, by which they have offered five years' full pay, in lieu of the half-pay for life, which had been before promised to the officers of the army.

Before I conclude the subject of public justice, I cannot omit to mention the obligations this country is under to that meritorious class of veteran non-commissioned officers and privates, who have been discharged for inability, in consequence of the resolution of Congress of the 23d of April, 1782, on an annual pension for life. Their peculiar sufferings, their singular merits, and claims to that provision, need only be known, to interest all the feelings of humanity in their behalf. Nothing but a punctual payment of their annual allowance can rescue them from the most complicated misery; and nothing could be a more melancholy and distressing sight, than to behold those, who have shed their blood or lost their limbs in the service of their country, without a shelter, without a friend, and without the means of obtaining any of the necessities or comforts of life, compelled to beg their daily bread from door to door. Suffer me to recommend those of this description, belonging to your State, to the warmest patronage of your Excellency and your legislature.

It is necessary to say but a few words on the third

topic which was proposed, and which regards particularly the defence of the republic; as there can be little doubt that Congress will recommend a proper peace establishment for the United States, in which a due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. If this should be the case, I would beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the strongest terms. The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accoutrements, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed.

If, in treating of political points, a greater latitude than usual has been taken in the course of this address, the importance of the crisis, and the magnitude of the objects in discussion, must be my apology. It is, however, neither my wish nor expectation, that the preceding observations should claim any regard, except so far as they shall appear to be dictated by a good intention, consonant to the immutable rules of justice, calculated to produce a liberal system of policy, and founded on whatever experience may have been acquired by a long and close attention to public business. Here I might speak with the more confidence, from my actual observations; and, if it would not swell this letter (already too prolix) beyond the bounds I had prescribed to myself, I could demonstrate,

to every mind open to conviction, that in less time, and with much less expense, than has been incurred, the war might have been brought to the same happy conclusion, if the resources of the continent could have been properly drawn forth ; that the distresses and disappointments, which have very often occurred, have, in too many instances, resulted more from a want of energy in the Continental government, than a deficiency of means in the particular States ; that the inefficacy of measures arising from the want of an adequate authority in the supreme power, from a partial compliance with the requisitions of Congress in some of the States, and from a failure of punctuality in others, while it tended to damp the zeal of those, who were more willing to exert themselves, served also to accumulate the expenses of the war, and to frustrate the best concerted plans ; and that the discouragement occasioned by the complicated difficulties and embarrassments, in which our affairs were by this means involved, would have long ago produced the dissolution of any army, less patient, less virtuous, and less persevering, than that which I have had the honor to command. But, while I mention these things, which are notorious facts, as the defects of our federal constitution, particularly in the prosecution of a war, I beg it may be understood, that, as I have ever taken a pleasure in gratefully acknowledging the assistance and support I have derived from every class of citizens, so shall I always be happy to do justice to the unparalleled exertions of the individual States on many interesting occasions.

I have thus freely disclosed what I wished to make known, before I surrendered up my public trust to those who committed it to me. The task is now accomplished. I now bid adieu to your Excellency as the chief magistrate of your State, at the same time

I bid a last farewell to the cares of office, and all the employments of public life.

It remains, then, to be my final and only request, that your Excellency will communicate these sentiments to your legislature at their next meeting, and that they may be considered as the legacy of one, who has ardently wished, on all occasions, to be useful to his country, and who, even in the shade of retirement, will not fail to implore the Divine benediction upon it.

I now make it my earnest prayer, that God would have you, and the State over which you preside, in his holy protection; that he would incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a spirit of subordination and obedience to government; to entertain a brotherly affection and love for one another, for their fellow citizens of the United States at large, and particularly for their brethren who have served in the field; and finally, that he would most graciously be pleased to dispose us all to do justice, to love mercy, and to demean ourselves with that charity, humility, and pacific temper of mind, which were the characteristics of the Divine Author of our blessed religion, and without an humble imitation of whose example in these things, we can never hope to be a happy nation.

I have the honor to be, with much esteem and respect, Sir, your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant.*

* The legislatures, that were sitting when this letter was received, passed resolves highly honorary to the Commander-in-chief; and the governors of the States wrote letters to him expressing thanks and gratitude for his long, devoted, and successful services in the cause of his country.

TO REUBEN HARVEY.

Head-Quarters, 23 June, 1783.

SIR,

I was yesterday favored with your letter of the 12th of February, and this day I transmitted the papers, which accompanied it, to the President of Congress, with a letter of which the enclosed is a copy.

Your early attachment to the cause of this country, and your exertions in relieving the distresses of such of our fellow citizens, as were so unfortunate as to be prisoners in Ireland, claim the regard of every American, and will always entitle you to my particular esteem. I shall always be happy in rendering you every service in my power, being with great truth, Sir, your very obedient servant.*

* Mr. Harvey was a merchant of Cork in Ireland, who had done many acts of humanity and kindness for the American prisoners during the war. He sent certain papers to General Washington on this subject, who forwarded them to Congress, and wrote to the President as follows.

"The early part this gentleman appears to have taken in the cause of this country, and his exertions in relieving those of our fellow citizens, whom the fortune of war threw into the hands of the enemy, entitle him to the esteem of every American, and will doubtless have due weight in recommending him to the notice of Congress."

On receiving this letter and the papers, Congress passed a vote of thanks, which was communicated to Mr. Harvey with the following letter from General Washington.

"Head-Quarters, 10 August, 1783.

"SIR,

"I am honored with the care of transmitting to you the enclosed resolution of Congress, expressing the sense, which that august body entertains of your goodness to the American prisoners in Ireland. Impressed, as I am, with sentiments of gratitude to you for this expression of your benevolence, I feel a very particular gratification in conveying to you the thanks of the sovereign power of the United States of America, on an occasion, which, while it does honor to humanity, stamps a mark of particular distinction on you. Wishing you the enjoyment of health, with every attendant blessing, I beg you to be persuaded, that I am, &c."

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 24 June, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

Previous to your departure from the army, I wished to take an opportunity of expressing my sentiments of your services, my obligations for your assistance, and my wishes for your future felicity. Our object is at last obtained; the arrangements are almost completed, and the day of separation is now at hand. Permit me, therefore, to thank you for the trouble you have lately taken in the arrangement of the corps under your orders, as well as for all your former cheerful and able exertions in the public service. Suffer me to offer this last testimony of my regard for your merits; and give me leave, my dear Sir, to assure you of the real affection and esteem with which I am, and shall, at all times and under all circumstances continue to be, your sincere friend and very humble servant.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Newburg, 24 June, 1783.

SIR,

It was not until three o'clock this afternoon, that I had the first information of the infamous and outrageous mutiny of a part of the Pennsylvania troops. It was then I received your Excellency's letter of the 21st by your express, and, agreeably to your request contained in it, I instantly ordered three complete regiments of infantry and a detachment of artillery to be put in motion as soon as possible. This corps, which, you will observe by the return, is a large proportion of our whole

force, will consist of upwards of fifteen hundred effectives. As all the troops, who composed this gallant little army, as well those who are furloughed, as those who remain in service, are men of tried fidelity, I could not have occasion to make any choice of corps; and I have only to regret, that there exists a necessity, that they should be employed on so disagreeable a service. I dare say, however, they will on this and all other occasions perform their duty, as brave and faithful soldiers.

While I suffer the most poignant distress, in observing that a handful of men, contemptible in numbers, and equally so in point of service (if the veteran troops from the southward have not been seduced by their example), and who are not worthy to be called soldiers, should disgrace themselves and their country as the Pennsylvania mutineers have done, by insulting the sovereign authority of the United States and that of their own, I feel an inexpressible satisfaction, that even this behaviour cannot stain the name of the American soldiery. It cannot be imputable to, or reflect dishonor on, the army at large; but on the contrary, it will, by the striking contrast it exhibits, hold up to public view the other troops in the most advantageous point of light. Upon taking all the circumstances into consideration, I cannot sufficiently express my surprise and indignation at the arrogance, the folly, and the wickedness of the mutineers; nor can I sufficiently admire the fidelity, the bravery, and the patriotism, which must for ever signalize the unsullied character of the other corps of our army. For, when we consider, that these Pennsylvania levies, who have now mutinied, are recruits and soldiers of a day, who have not borne the heat and burden of the war, and who can have in reality very few hardships to complain of; and when we

at the same time recollect, that those soldiers, who have lately been furloughed from this army, are the veterans who have patiently endured hunger, nakedness, and cold, who have suffered and bled without a murmur, and who, with perfect good order, have retired to their homes without a settlement of their accounts, or a farthing of money in their pockets; we shall be as much astonished at the virtues of the latter, as we are struck with horror and detestation at the proceedings of the former; and every candid mind, without indulging ill-grounded prejudices, will undoubtedly make the proper discrimination.

I intended only to wait until the troops were collected, and had occupied their new camp, in order to make a full report to Congress of the measures, which have been taken in consequence of the resolution of the 26th of May. Notwithstanding the option, which was given in my answer to the address of the generals and officers commanding regiments and corps, which has been already sent to your Excellency, no soldiers, except a very few, whose homes are within the enemy's lines, and a very small number of officers, have thought proper to avail themselves of it, by remaining with the army. A list of those who remain is herewith transmitted. The men engaged to serve three years were then formed into regiments and corps in the following manner; namely, the troops of Massachusetts compose four regiments; Connecticut, one regiment; New Hampshire, five companies; Rhode Island, two companies; Massachusetts artillery, three companies; and New York artillery, two companies. The total strength will be seen by the weekly state, which is also forwarded.

The army being thus reduced to merely a competent garrison for West Point, that being the only object

of importance in this quarter, and it being necessary to employ a considerable part of the men in building an arsenal and magazines at that post, agreeably to the directions given by the secretary at war, the troops accordingly broke up the cantonment yesterday, and removed to that garrison, where Major-General Knox still retains the command. The detachment, which marches for Philadelphia, will be under the orders of Major-General Howe, Major-General Heath having, at his own particular request, retired from the field. The brigadiers now remaining with the army are Paterson, Huntington, and Greateon, besides the adjutant-general. Thus have I given the present state of our military affairs, and I hope the arrangements will be satisfactory to Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.

P. S. Should any thing turn up, which may prevent the necessity of the troops proceeding to Philadelphia, I am to request your Excellency will send the earliest intimation to the commanding officer, that the detachment may return immediately. The route will be by Ringwood, Pompton, Morristown, Princeton, and Trenton, on which your express may meet the corps.*

* In consequence of the mutinous temper and menacing conduct of armed soldiers in Philadelphia, Congress resolved, "that the secretary at war be directed to communicate to the Commander-in-chief the state and disposition of the said troops, in order that he may take measures to despatch to this city such force as he may judge expedient for suppressing any disturbances that may ensue." — *Journals, June 21st.* Congress adjourned the same day, and reassembled at Princeton, in New Jersey, on the 30th. The causes of this change of residence, and the particulars concerning the mutiny, are explained in a report of a committee entered in the *Journals, July 1st.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Instructions.

SIR,

You are to take the command of the detachment, ordered to march to Philadelphia, in consequence of the letter of the President of Congress of the 21st instant. You will move with as much expedition as you can, consistently with the health and comfort of the troops. This corps will be absolutely light and unencumbered with baggage, having only two pieces of field-artillery. You will make arrangements with the quartermaster-general for the transportation, and with the contractors for a supply of provisions and rum. Your route will be by way of Ringwood, Pompton, Morristown, and Princeton to Trenton, where it would be most convenient, if you could make arrangements for embarking the troops, to proceed from thence by water to Philadelphia; but this must depend upon circumstances, and will require circumspection to prevent the mutineers from taking advantage and annoying your landing.

The object of your command is to suppress a mutiny, which has taken place amongst a part of the Pennsylvania troops; in the accomplishment of which you will be governed by your own discretion, until you can receive the orders of Congress. Should the tumult have subsided, you will meet directions from the President, countermanding your march. You will then return by easy movements.

In all cases you will be pleased to pay particular attention to the order and discipline of the troops, and you will regulate your marches early in the morning or at evening, in such manner that the men may rest in the heat of the day; and be as conveniently ac-

commodated in every respect as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Given at Head-Quarters, this 25th day of June, 1783.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 30 June, 1783.

SIR,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's favor of the 26th, and to thank you for the information contained in it.

If Congress should have already taken up, or should they be about to determine on the subject of receiving possession of the posts on the western frontier, which was mentioned in my letters of the 3d of May and 7th of June, I would take the liberty to recommend Major-General the Baron Steuben, who will have the honor of delivering this letter, as a gentleman very much acquainted with military dispositions, as well as with the language commonly spoken in Canada; and on those accounts particularly calculated to make the arrangements, which may be necessary on this occasion. The Baron will not hesitate to undertake the negotiation with General Haldimand, if it should be agreeable to the sentiments of Congress; and I need only add, that, from the zeal and intelligence he has always manifested in the public service, a judgment may be formed of the attention and fidelity, which may be expected of him in the performance of this or any other duty, which shall be committed to his charge. I have the honor to be, &c.

* When General Howe arrived at Princeton, he was ordered by Congress with his detachment to Philadelphia, where some of the leaders of the mutiny had been arrested, and were to be tried by a court-martial.

TO MAJOR ELLIS.*

Head-Quarters, State of New York, 10 July, 1783.

SIR,

You profess not to be a panegyrist, while you are bestowing the most exalted praise; but, compliments apart, I received your very polite letter of the 25th of March with much pleasure. It recalled to my remembrance some of the pleasing occurrences of my past life, and reminded me of the acquaintances I had formed in it; for whom, though separated by time, distance, and political sentiments, I retain the same friendship.

I was opposed to the policy of Great Britain, and became an enemy to her measures; but I always distinguished between a cause and individuals; and, while the latter supported their opinions upon liberal and generous grounds, personally I never could be an enemy to them.

I have only to request, therefore, that you will suffer me to retain that place in your friendship, which you assure me I now hold; and that you will accept my sincere thanks for the favorable sentiments you have been pleased to express of me, and will do me the justice to believe, that, with great esteem and regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

* An officer in the British army, who had written to General Washington a letter of compliments and friendship from England, reminding him of their former acquaintance, and of his continued respect and esteem.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HALDIMAND, COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH TROOPS IN CANADA.

Head-Quarters, on Hudson's River, 12 July, 1783.

SIR,

The Congress of the United States having instructed me to make the proper arrangements with the Commander-in-chief of the British forces in America, for receiving possession of the posts in the United States occupied by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and from which his Majesty's troops are to be withdrawn, agreeably to the seventh article of the provisional treaty, I have to inform your Excellency, that I have desired Major-General the Baron Steuben, who will have the honor to deliver this letter, to proceed for that purpose into Canada; and I have fully empowered and authorized him to form every arrangement with your Excellency, which may be found necessary, for receiving possession of the posts and fortresses on the north-western and western frontier of the territory of the United States, now under your direction; and I beg you to be persuaded, that whatever agreements this officer shall form with your Excellency, respecting this business, will be punctually observed on the part of the United States.

Baron Steuben is instructed to visit the posts within the boundary of the United States upon the River St. Lawrence and the Lakes above, and to report to me his opinion of the measures necessary for the garrisoning and support of them. In this tour, and in the execution of this business, I flatter myself he will receive the necessary passports from your Excellency, and derive such aids as will enable him to fulfil the objects of his commission.

As a foreigner, and an officer of rank and reputa-

tion, I beg leave to recommend the Baron to your Excellency's particular notice and attention. As a gentleman, you will find him every way worthy of your civilities. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO BARON STEUBEN.

Instructions.

In consequence of powers in me invested for that purpose, I do hereby authorize and desire you to proceed, with such despatch as you shall find convenient, into Canada, and there concert with General Haldimand, or other British commander-in-chief in that province, all such measures as you shall find necessary for receiving possession of the posts now under his command within the territory ceded to the United States, and at present occupied by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and from which his said Majesty's troops are to be withdrawn, agreeably to the seventh article of the provisional treaty between his said Majesty and the United States of America.

In accomplishing this negotiation, you will obtain, if possible, from General Haldimand his assurances and orders for the immediate possession, by the United States, of the posts in question, or at least a cession of them at an early day. But if this cannot be done, you will endeavour to procure from him positive and definitive assurances, that he will, as soon as possible, give information of the time that shall be fixed on for the evacuation of those posts, and that the troops of his Britannic Majesty shall not be drawn therefrom, until sufficient previous notice shall be given of that event, that the troops of the United States may be

ready to occupy the fortresses as soon as they shall be abandoned by those of his Britannic Majesty.

You will propose to General Haldimand, an exchange of such artillery and stores now in the posts as you shall think proper, and which you shall judge will be of benefit to the United States, agreeing with the British commander-in-chief, that an equal number of cannon, and an equal quantity and kind of stores, to what he may consent to exchange, shall be replaced to his Britannic Majesty by the United States, at such time and place as shall be fixed on by you for the purpose.

Having formed your arrangements with General Haldimand, you will be pleased to proceed, in such manner as you shall think best, to visit the several posts and fortresses on the frontier territory of the United States as far as Detroit. View their different situation, strength, and circumstances; and, forming your judgment of their relative position, and probable advantages to the United States, you will report the same to me, with your opinion of such of them as you shall think it most expedient for the United States to retain and occupy. In passing Lake Champlain you will critically observe the width of the waters at the northern extremity, and the nature of the ground adjoining; with a view to determine whether there is any spot south of the 45th degree of north latitude, and near our extreme boundary, on which it will be convenient, should Congress judge it expedient, to erect fortifications, which would command the entrance from Canada into that lake.

At Detroit you will find a very considerable settlement, consisting mostly of French people from Canada. To these you will please to intimate in the fullest manner the good disposition of Congress and the inhabitants of the United States for their welfare and

protection; expressing at the same time to them our expectations of finding the like disposition in them towards us, and the post which we may establish there, and any future settlement which may be formed in their neighbourhood by the subjects of the United States. As the advanced season, or other unforeseen accidents, may render it difficult to get a detachment of American troops to that place before it may be convenient for the British garrison to be withdrawn from that post, you will do well to engage, in this case, some one or more of the respectable and well disposed inhabitants of the district to provide a company of militia (if there be any) or others, at the expense of the United States, to take charge of the works and buildings of the fortress, assuring them such reasonable pay as shall be deemed adequate to their service, or as you may condition for. You will also make particular inquiry, whether the farmers or merchants at Detroit are able or willing to supply an American garrison at that post with provisions and other necessaries, and upon what terms.

You will please to keep me informed as fully as you can, and as often as opportunity will permit, of the progress you shall make in executing the business committed to your conduct.

Confiding perfectly in your general knowledge, your sense, judgment, and discretion, in the fulfilment of this commission, I forbear any further detail of instructions; but wish you success in your negotiations, with pleasure and security in the prosecution of your tour. Given at Head-Quarters, Newburg, this 12th day of July, 1783.*

* In compliance with these instructions, Baron Steuben proceeded to Canada. He reached Chamblee on the 2d of August, and thence sent forward his aid-de-camp, Major North, to Quebec, with a message to

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

Head-Quarters, Newburg, 15 July, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

I have always entertained a great desire to see the northern part of this State, before I returned to the southward. The present irksome interval, while we are waiting for the definitive treaty, affords an opportunity of gratifying this inclination. I have therefore concerted with Governor Clinton to make a tour to reconnoitre those places, where the most remarkable posts were established, and the ground which became famous by being the theatre of action in 1777. On our return from thence, we propose to pass across the Mohawk River, in order to have a view of that tract of country, which is so much celebrated for the fertility of its soil and the beauty of its situation. We shall set out by water on Friday the 18th, if nothing should intervene to prevent our journey.

Mr. Dimler, assistant quartermaster-general, who will have the honor of delivering this letter, precedes us to make arrangements, and particularly to have some light boats provided and transported to Lake George, that we may not be delayed on our arrival there.

I pray you, my dear Sir, to be so good as to ad-

General Haldimand announcing the object of his mission. General Haldimand was just on the eve of his departure for the upper country, and he met Baron Steuben at Sorel, on the 8th of August. In regard to the first point of the instructions, General Haldimand said that he had not received orders for making any arrangements to evacuate the posts, nor for any other object than a cessation of hostilities, with which he had strictly complied. A request for passports to visit the posts, on the part of Baron Steuben, was likewise refused by General Haldimand, upon the same ground of want of orders. In short, he did not feel himself authorized to enter into any negotiations whatever, respecting the objects for which Baron Steuben had come to Canada, and the latter returned from Sorel to the American army.

wise Mr. Dimler in what manner to proceed in this business, to excuse the trouble I am about to give you, and to be persuaded that your kind information and direction to the bearer will greatly increase the obligations, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 16 July, 1783.

SIR,

The enclosed memorial was handed to me from some officers of Hazen's regiment, refugees from Canada. Anxious for their relief from the most distressing situation, and finding myself without the means or the power of doing it, I beg leave to refer their circumstances to the particular attention and regard of Congress. These, with many others, they will say, are the men who have left their country, their friends, their substance, their all, in support of the liberties of America; and have followed our fortunes through the various scenes of a distressing contest, until they find it to have terminated in the happiest manner for all but themselves. Some provision is certainly due to those people, who now are exiled from their native country and habitations, without any mention made of them in the treaty, any stipulation for their return, or any means for their subsistence, in a country which their arms have contributed to secure and establish. When Congress recollect the encouragements, the promises, and assurances, which were published by them and by their orders in Canada in the years 1775 and 1776, I am persuaded they will take into their most serious consideration the case of those unhappy persons, who placed confidence in those proclamations, and make ample amends by

some effectual provision for their sufferings, patience, and perseverance.

I would not presume to dictate ; but, if Congress cannot procure funds for their compensation and subsistence from the ample confiscations, which are making within the different States, I should think a grant could be made to them from the unlocated lands in the interior part of our territory, and some means advanced to place them on such a tract. This perhaps might prove satisfactory, and would enable them to form a settlement, which may be beneficial to themselves, and useful to the United States. I will say no more, but repeat my recommendation of their case to the grateful remembrance of Congress, and beg, that a speedy attention may be given to the application, which I have advised them to make without delay.

Finding myself in most disagreeable circumstances here, and likely to be, so long as Congress are pleased to continue me in this awkward situation, anxiously expecting the definitive treaty ; without command, and with little else to do, than to be teased with troublesome applications and fruitless demands, which I have neither the means nor the power of satisfying ; in this distressing tedium I have resolved to wear away a little time, in performing a tour to the northward, as far as Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and perhaps as far up the Mohawk River as Fort Schuyler. I shall leave this place on Friday next, and shall probably be gone about two weeks, unless my tour should be interrupted by some special recall. One gentleman of my family will be left here to receive any letters or commands, and to forward to me any thing that shall be necessary. With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

TO JAMES MCHENRY, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 6 August, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

After a tour of at least seven hundred and fifty miles, performed in nineteen days, I returned to this place yesterday afternoon, where I found your favor of the 31st ultimo, intimating a resolution of Congress for calling me to Princeton, partly, as it would seem, on my own account, and partly for the purpose of giving aid to Congress; but the President not having sent on the resolution, I am left ignorant of the particular objects Congress have in view, any further than can be collected from the expressions of his and your letters. So far then, as they may relate to a peace establishment, my sentiments in the fullest manner have been communicated to a committee, of which Colonel Hamilton was chairman. If the principal object in view, by my attendance, respects Congress, I cannot hesitate a moment to make the earliest compliance in my power. But, if the resolution is calculated for my own convenience, I cannot say, that it will render my situation more eligible than the present, especially taking into consideration the inconvenience of a removal for so small a distance, and a new establishment of a household, which must be formed in consequence of breaking up the menial part of my family here.

My principal intention, in my letter of the 16th ultimo, was to express the disagreeableness of my present situation, waiting as I am, with little business and less command, for the definitive treaty, when I have so anxious a desire of retiring from public business, and reëstablishing myself in domestic life, where my private concerns call loudly for my presence.

I wish you, therefore, my dear Sir, to transmit to

me by the earliest opportunity a copy of the resolution, with an explanation of the particular reasons and principal motives, which have influenced Congress to pass it, that I may be enabled to regulate my conduct accordingly. I am, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 6 August, 1783.

SIR,

Your Excellency's several favors of the 17th, 24th, and 31st of July, were received at head-quarters during my absence, and have been presented to me on my return last evening, which I effected by water from Albany.

My tour having been extended as far northward as Crown Point, and westward to Fort Schuyler and its district, and my movements having been pretty rapid, my horses, which are not yet arrived, will be so much fatigued, that they will need some days to recruit. This circumstance, with some arrangements that will

* Congress had passed a resolve requesting the attendance of General Washington as soon as should be convenient, after his return from the northward. — *Journals, July 28th*. No reason had been assigned for this request, nor any explanation given as to the purposes for which his presence was desired. On this point Mr. McHenry replied as follows.

"The first motive for bringing you here was to get you out of a disagreeable situation to one less disagreeable. The second was to get your assistance and advice in the arrangements for peace. It may be necessary, besides, to consult you respecting promotions, and on a variety of military subjects. I believe, on the whole, that your being near Congress will be a public good. I send you the address to be made to you from the chair, which will serve to explain the intentions of Congress." — *Princeton, August 11th*.

A house, suitably furnished, was engaged by Congress for the use of General Washington, situated at Rocky Hill, between three and four miles from Princeton.

be necessary previous to my leaving this place, will prevent my complying with the pleasure of Congress, intimated in yours of the 31st, so soon perhaps as may be expected. In the mean time, your Excellency will have an opportunity to transmit to me the resolution mentioned, that I may be acquainted with the objects Congress have in view, by my attendance at Princeton, and that I may prepare myself to fulfil their expectations to the utmost of my power.

Another Letter of the same date. — I was the more particularly induced by two considerations to make the tour, which, in my letter of the 16th ultimo, I informed Congress I had in contemplation, and from which I returned last evening. The one was an inclination to see the northern and western posts of this State, with those places which have been the theatre of important military transactions; the other, a desire to facilitate, as far as is in my power, the operations, which will be necessary for occupying the posts which are ceded by the treaty of peace, as soon as they shall be evacuated by the British troops.

Aware of the difficulties we shall have to encounter in accomplishing the last mentioned object, on account of the advanced season, and the want of money to give vigor to our movements, I inserted a clause in the instructions to Baron Steuben, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose, authorizing him, in case those difficulties should be insurmountable, or in case the arrival of the definitive treaty should be delayed beyond expectation, to agree with some of the respectable and well affected inhabitants of Detroit to preserve the fortifications and public buildings at that place, until such time as a garrison could be sent with provisions and stores sufficient to take and hold possession of them. The propriety of this measure has appeared

in a more forcible point of light, since I have been up the Mohawk River, and taken a view of the situation of things in that quarter; for, upon a careful inquiry I find it is the opinion of those, who are best acquainted with the distances and communications, that nothing short of the greatest exertions, and a sum adequate to the transportation, can even at this season furnish us with boats, and enable us to forward provisions and stores sufficient for a garrison to be supported at Detroit during the ensuing winter; and, that without an immediate supply of money, it would be in vain to make the attempt.

Influenced by this information, believing there was not a moment to be lost, and apprehending that Baron Steuben might be retarded in his progress by some unforeseen event, I engaged at Fort Rensselaer a gentleman, whose name is Cassaty, formerly a resident at Detroit, and who is well recommended, to proceed without loss of time, find out the disposition of the inhabitants, and make every previous inquiry, which might be necessary for the information of the Baron on his arrival, that he should be able to make such final arrangements, as the circumstances might appear to justify. This seemed to be the best alternative on failure of furnishing a garrison of our own troops; which, for many reasons, would be infinitely the most eligible mode, if the season and your means would possibly admit.

I have at the same time endeavoured to take the best preparatory steps in my power for supplying all the garrisons on the western waters by the provision contract. I can only form my magazine at Fort Herkimer, on the German Flats, which is thirty-two miles by land and almost fifty by water from the carrying-place between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek.

The route by the former is impracticable in its present state for carriages ; and by the other extremely difficult for batteaux, as the river is very much obstructed with fallen and floating trees, from the long disuse of the navigation. That nothing, however, which depends upon me, might be left undone, I have directed ten months' provision for five hundred men to be laid up at Fort Herkimer, and have ordered Colonel Willett, an active and good officer commanding the troops of this State, to repair the roads, remove the obstructions in the river, and, as far as can be effected by the labors of the soldiers, build houses for the reception of the provisions and stores at the carrying-place, in order that the whole may be in perfect readiness to move forward, so soon as the arrangement shall be made with General Haldimand. I shall give instructions to Major-General Knox, to have such ordnance and stores forwarded to Albany, as in the present view of matters may be judged necessary for the western posts ; and I will also write to the quartermaster-general, by this conveyance, on the subject of batteaux and the other articles, which may be required from his department. However, as I before observed, without money to provide some boats, and to pay the expense of transportation, it will be next to impossible to get these things even to Niagara. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* While this letter was writing, the members of Congress had under consideration a mode of conferring new honors on the man, who had rendered such distinguished services to his country ; and the next day the following resolves were passed.

" Resolved unanimously, (ten States being present,) that an equestrian statue of General Washington be erected at the place where the residence of Congress shall be established.

" Resolved, that the statue be of bronze ; the General to be represented in a Roman dress, holding a truncheon in his right hand, and his head encircled with a laurel wreath ; the statue to be supported by a marble pedestal, on which are to be represented, in *basso-relievo*, the

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 14 August, 1783.

SIR,

By the last post I was honored with your Excellency's favor of the 1st instant, enclosing the resolve of Congress directing my attendance at Princeton.

Notwithstanding my horses had arrived but a day or two before, I should have set out immediately, had it not been for the indisposition of Mrs. Washington, who had been seized with a fever during my absence, has had a return of it since, and is now very weak and low. This circumstance, together with a desire of packing my papers and making arrangements for a final remove, (being uncertain of the objects Congress have in view, or how long I may be detained at Princeton,) will, I hope, avail as an excuse for my delay.

I propose to set out on Monday next, provided

following principal events of the war, in which General Washington commanded in person; namely, the evacuation of Boston; the capture of the Hessians at Trenton; the battle of Princeton; the action of Monmouth; and the surrender of York. On the upper part of the front of the pedestal to be engraved as follows, '*The United States, in Congress assembled, ordered this statue to be erected in the year of our Lord 1783, in honor of George Washington, the illustrious Commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States of America during the war, which vindicated and secured their liberty, sovereignty, and independence.*'

"Resolved, that a statue conformable to the above plan be executed by the best artist in Europe, under the superintendence of the minister of the United States at the court of Versailles, and that money to defray the expense of the same be furnished from the treasury of the United States.

"Resolved, that the secretary of Congress transmit to the minister of the United States at the court of Versailles the best resemblance of General Washington, that can be procured, for the purpose of having the above statue erected, together with the fittest description of the events, which are to be the subject of the *basso-rilievo*." — *Journals, August 7th.*

Mrs. Washington's health will admit, or I should have nothing from Congress in the mean time, which should prevent the execution of my intentions. I am, &c.*

ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS.†

Princeton, 26 August, 1783.

MR. PRESIDENT,

I am too sensible of the honorable reception I have now experienced, not to be penetrated with the deepest feelings of gratitude.

* *From the Orderly Book.*—"The Commander-in-chief, having been requested by Congress to give his attendance at Princeton, proposes to set out for that place to-morrow; but he expects to have the pleasure of seeing the army again before he retires to private life. During his absence, Major-General Knox will retain the command of the troops, and all reports are to be made to him accordingly."—*August 17th.*

This is the last record entered in the Orderly Book. General Washington arrived at Princeton, and had a formal public audience of Congress on the 26th of August.

† When General Washington entered the hall of Congress, he was attended and introduced by two members, and the following *Address* (to which the above was a reply) was made to him by the President.

"Sir,

"Congress feel a particular pleasure in seeing your Excellency, and in congratulating you on the success of a war, in which you have acted so conspicuous a part.

"It has been the particular happiness of the United States, that, during a war so long, so dangerous, and so important, Providence has been graciously pleased to preserve the life of a general, who has merited and possessed the uninterrupted confidence and affection of his fellow citizens. In other nations, many have performed eminent services, for which they have deserved the thanks of the public. But to you, Sir, peculiar praise is due. Your services have been essential in acquiring and establishing the freedom and independence of your country. They deserve the grateful acknowledgments of a free and independent nation. Those acknowledgments Congress have the satisfaction of expressing to your Excellency.

"Hostilities have now ceased; but your country still needs your

Notwithstanding Congress seem to estimate the value of my life beyond any services I have been able to render the United States, yet I must be permitted to consider the wisdom and unanimity of our national councils, the firmness of our citizens, and the patience and bravery of our troops, which have produced so happy a termination of the war, as the most conspicuous effect of the Divine interposition, and the surest presage of our future happiness.

Highly gratified by the favorable sentiments, which Congress are pleased to express of my past conduct, and amply rewarded by the confidence and affection of my fellow citizens, I cannot hesitate to contribute my best endeavours towards the establishment of the national security, in whatever manner the sovereign power may think proper to direct, until the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace, or the final evacuation of our country by the British forces; after either of which events, I shall ask permission to retire to the peaceful shades of private life.

Perhaps, Sir, no occasion may offer more suitable than the present, to express my humble thanks to God, and my grateful acknowledgments to my country, for the great and uniform support I have received in every vicissitude of fortune, and for the many distinguished honors, which Congress have been pleased to confer upon me in the course of the war.

services. She wishes to avail herself of your talents in forming the arrangements, that will be necessary for her security in the time of peace. For this reason your attendance at Congress has been requested. A committee is appointed to confer with your Excellency, and to receive your assistance in preparing and digesting plans relative to those important objects."

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM S. SMITH.

Rocky Hill, 31 August, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

I received your favor of the 26th, and am much obliged by your attention in procuring the articles I had requested. I am also glad to find there is at length a prospect, that the British will in reality soon take their departure from the United States.

Whatever my private sentiments as an individual may be respecting the violent policy, which seems in some instances to be adopted, it is not for us, as military characters, to dictate a different line of conduct. But I should suppose the encouragement you have given to those British and foreign soldiers, who have been discharged, that they would be permitted to remain in the country, was very unexceptionable and proper. The same indulgence, however, cannot be extended to such natives of the country as have served in their new corps, without the particular interference of the States to which they belong. And I think it necessary you should be advised, that granting passports to citizens, of any description, for the purpose of giving protection in coming from New York into the country, may not only be considered as an assumption beyond the limits of any commission, which has been derived from Congress, but will probably be productive of altercations with the civil powers, and at the same time involve us in very disagreeable consequences in many other respects. I am, dear Sir, with very great esteem yours, &c.*

* It was the opinion of Colonel Smith, that there were not less than fifteen thousand persons in New York, who wished to remain, and were not conscious of any other crime, than that of residing within the British lines, but who would be driven from the country if rigid laws

TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

Rocky Hill, 7 September, 1783.

SIR,

I have carefully perused the papers, which you put into my hands, relative to Indian affairs. My sentiments, with respect to the proper line of conduct to be observed towards these people, coincide precisely with those delivered by General Schuyler, so far as he has gone, in his letter of the 29th of July to Congress (which, with the other papers, is herewith returned), and for the reasons he has there assigned; a repetition of them therefore by me would be unnecessary. But, independent of the arguments made use of by him, the following considerations have no small weight in my mind.

To suffer a wide-extended country to be overrun with land jobbers, speculators, and monopolizers, or even with scattered settlers, is in my opinion inconsistent with that wisdom and policy, which our true interest dictates, or which an enlightened people ought to adopt; and, besides, it is pregnant of disputes both with the savages and among ourselves, the evils of which are easier to be conceived than described. And for what, but to aggrandize a few avaricious men, to the prejudice of many and the embarrassment of government? For the people engaged in these pursuits, without contributing in the smallest degree to the support of government, or considering themselves as amenable

were put in execution against them; "in consequence of which," said he, "upon the evacuation we shall find a city destitute of inhabitants, and settlements made on our frontiers by a people, who (their minds being soured by the severity of their treatment,) will prove troublesome neighbours, and perhaps lay the foundation of future contests, which I suppose it would be for the interest of our country to avoid."

to its laws, will involve it, by their unrestrained conduct, in inextricable perplexities, and more than probably in a great deal of bloodshed.

My ideas, therefore, of the line of conduct proper to be observed, not only towards the Indians but for the government of the citizens of America, in their settlement of the western country, which is intimately connected therewith, are simply these.

First, and as a preliminary, that all prisoners, of whatever age or sex, among the Indians, shall be delivered up.

That the Indians should be informed, that, after a contest of eight years for the sovereignty of this country, Great Britain has ceded all the lands to the United States within the limits described by the article of the provisional treaty.

That as they (the Indians), maugre all the advice and admonition that could be given them at the commencement and during the prosecution of the war, could not be restrained from acts of hostility, but were determined to join their arms to those of Great Britain and to share their fortunes, so consequently, with a less generous people than Americans, they would be made to share the same fate, and be compelled to retire along with them beyond the Lakes. But, as we prefer peace to a state of warfare; as we consider them as a deluded people; as we persuade ourselves that they are convinced, from experience, of their error in taking up the hatchet against us, and that their true interest and safety must now depend upon *our* friendship; as the country is large enough to contain us all; and as we are disposed to be kind to them and to partake of their trade, we will, from these considerations and from motives of compassion, draw a veil over what is past, and establish a boundary line between them and us, beyond which we

will endeavour to restrain our people from hunting or settling, and within which they shall not come but for the purposes of trading, treating, or other business unexceptionable in its nature.

In establishing this line, in the first instance, care should be taken neither to yield nor to grasp at too much ; but to endeavour to impress the Indians with an idea of the generosity of our disposition to accommodate them, and of the necessity we are under, of providing for our warriors, our young people who are growing up, and strangers who are coming from other countries to live among us ; and if they should make a point of it, or appear dissatisfied with the line we may find it necessary to establish, compensation should be made to them for their claims within it.

It is needless for me to express more explicitly, because the tendency of my observations evinces it is my opinion, that, if the legislature of the State of New York should insist upon expelling the Six Nations from all the country they inhabited previous to the war, within their territory, as General Schuyler seems to be apprehensive, it will end in another Indian war. I have every reason to believe from my inquiries, and the information I have received, that they will not suffer their country (if it were our policy to take it before we could settle it) to be wrested from them without another struggle. That they would compromise for a part of it, I have very little doubt ; and that it would be the cheapest way of coming at it, I have no doubt at all. The same observations, I am persuaded, will hold good with respect to Virginia, or any other State, which has powerful tribes of Indians on its frontiers ; and the reason of my mentioning New York is because General Schuyler has expressed his opinion of the temper of its legislature, and because I have been more in the way of learning

the sentiments of the Six Nations on the subject, than of any other tribes of Indians.

The limits being sufficiently extensive, in the new country, to comply with all the engagements of government, and to admit such emigrations as may be supposed to happen within a given time, not only from the several States of the Union but from foreign countries, and, moreover, of such magnitude as to form a distinct and proper government; a proclamation, in my opinion, should issue, making it felony (if there is power for the purpose, if not, imposing some very heavy restraint) for any person to survey or settle beyond the line; and the officers commanding the frontier garrisons should have pointed and peremptory orders to see that the proclamation is carried into effect.

Measures of this sort would not only obtain peace from the Indians, but would, in my opinion, be the surest means of preserving it; and would dispose of the land to the best advantage, people the country progressively, and check land jobbing and monopolizing, which are now going forward with great avidity, while the door would be open and the terms known for every one to obtain what is proper and reasonable for himself, upon legal and constitutional ground.

Every advantage, that could be expected or even wished for, would result from such a mode of procedure. Our settlements would be compact, government well established, and our barrier formidable, not only for ourselves but against our neighbours; and the Indians, as has been observed in General Schuyler's letter, will ever retreat as our settlements advance upon them, and they will be as ready to sell, as we are to buy. That it is the cheapest, as well as the least distressing way of dealing with them, none, who is acquainted with the nature of Indian warfare, and has ever been at the

trouble of estimating the expense of one, and comparing it with the cost of purchasing their lands, will hesitate to acknowledge.

Unless some such measures, as I have here taken the liberty of suggesting, are speedily adopted, one of two capital evils, in my opinion, will inevitably result, and is near at hand ; either the settling, or rather over-spreading, of the western country will take place by a parcel of banditti, who will bid defiance to all authority, while they are skimming and disposing of the cream of the country at the expense of many suffering officers and soldiers, who have fought and bled to obtain it, and are now waiting the decision of Congress to point them to the promised reward of their past dangers and toils ; or a renewal of hostilities with the Indians, brought about more than probably by this very means.

How far agents for Indian affairs are indispensably necessary, I shall not take upon me to decide ; but, if any should be appointed, their powers should be circumscribed, accurately defined, and themselves rigidly punished for every infraction of them. A recurrence to the conduct of these people, under the British administration of Indian affairs, will manifest the propriety of this caution, as it will there be found that self-interest was the principle by which their agents were actuated ; and to promote this by accumulating lands and passing large quantities of goods through their hands, the Indians were made to speak any language they pleased by their representation, and were pacific or hostile as their purposes were most likely to be promoted by the one or the other. No purchase under any pretence whatever should be made by any other authority than that of the sovereign power, or the legislature of the State in which such lands may happen to be ; nor should the agents be permitted directly or indirectly

to trade, but have a fixed and ample salary allowed them, as a full compensation for their trouble.

Whether in practice the measure may answer as well as it appears in theory to me, I will not undertake to say ; but I think, if the Indian trade was conducted on government account, and with no greater advance than what would be necessary to defray the expense and risk, and bring in a small profit, that it would supply the Indians on much easier terms than they usually are, engross their trade, and fix them strongly in our interest, and would be a much better mode of treating them, than that of giving presents, where a few only are benefited by them. I confess there is a difficulty in getting a man, or set of men, in whose abilities and integrity there can be a perfect reliance, without which the scheme is liable to such abuse as to defeat the salutary ends, which are proposed from it. At any rate, no person should be suffered to trade with the Indians without first obtaining a license, and giving security to conform to such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed, as was the case before the war.

In giving my sentiments in the month of May last (at the request of a committee of Congress) on a peace establishment, I took the liberty of suggesting the propriety, which in my opinion there appeared, of paying particular attention to the French and other settlers at Detroit and other parts within the limits of the western country. The perusal of a late pamphlet, entitled "Observations on the Commerce of the American States with Europe and the West Indies," impresses the necessity of it more forcibly than ever on my mind. The author of that piece strongly recommends a liberal change in the government of Canada ; and, though he is too sanguine in his expectations of the benefits arising from it, there can be no doubt of the good policy of

the measure. It behoves us, therefore, to counteract them by anticipation. These people have a disposition towards us susceptible of favorable impressions ; but, as no arts will be left unattempted by the British to withdraw them from our interest, the present moment should be employed by us to fix them in it, or we may lose them for ever, and with them the advantages consequent on the choice they may make. From the best information and maps of that country it would appear, that the territory from the mouth of the Great Miami River, which empties into the Ohio, to its confluence with the Mad River, thence by a line to the Miami fort and village on the other Miami River, which empties into Lake Erie, and thence by a line to include the settlement of Detroit, would, with Lake Erie to the northward, Pennsylvania to the eastward, and the Ohio to the southward, form a government sufficiently extensive to fulfil all the public engagements, and to receive moreover a large population by emigrants ; and to confine the settlement of the new State within these bounds would, in my opinion, be infinitely better, even supposing no disputes were to happen with the Indians, and that it was not necessary to guard against these other evils that have been enumerated, than to suffer the same number of people to roam over a country of at least five hundred thousand square miles, contributing nothing to the support, but much perhaps to the embarrassment, of the federal government.

Were it not for the purpose of comprehending the settlement of Detroit within the jurisdiction of the new government, a more compact and better shaped district for a State would be, for the line to proceed from the Miami fort and village along the river of that name to Lake Erie ; leaving in that case the settlement of Detroit, and all the territory north of the rivers Miami

and St. Joseph's between the Lakes Erie, St. Clair, Huron, and Michigan to form hereafter another State equally large, compact, and water-bounded.

At first view it may seem a little extraneous, when I am called on to give an opinion upon the terms of a peace proper to be made with the Indians, that I should go into the formation of new States. But the settlement of the western country, and making a peace with the Indians, are so analogous, that there can be no considerations of the one, without involving those of the other ; for, I repeat it again, and I am clear in my opinion, that policy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their country ; which, as we have already experienced, is like driving the wild beasts of the forest, which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end, and fall perhaps upon those that are left there ; when the gradual extension of our settlements will as certainly cause the savage, as the wolf, to retire ; both being animals of prey, though they differ in shape. In a word, there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian war, but the soil they live on, and this can be had by purchase at less expense, and without that bloodshed and those distresses, which helpless women and children are made partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them.

If there is any thing in these thoughts, which I have fully and freely communicated, worthy of attention, I shall be happy, and am, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Rocky Hill, 11 September, 1783.

MY DEAR SIR,

It was with great concern I heard of your indisposition. Later accounts say you were on the recovery, and nothing would give me more pleasure, than the confirmation of it, from under your own hand.

I am not able to give you any information on the point you requested at our parting. Congress have come to no determination yet, respecting a peace establishment, nor am I able to say when they will. I have lately had a conference with a committee on this subject, and have reiterated my former opinions, but it appears to me, that there is not a sufficient representation to discuss great national points; nor do I believe there will be, while that honorable body continue their sessions at this place. The want of accommodation, added to a disinclination in the southern delegates to be further removed than they formerly were from the centre of the empire, and an aversion in the others to give up what they conceive to be a point gained by the late retreat to this place, keep matters in an awkward situation, to the very great interruption of national concerns. Seven States, it seems, by the articles of confederation, must agree, before any place can be fixed upon for the seat of the federal government; and seven States, it is said, never will agree; consequently, as Congress came here, here they are to remain to the dissatisfaction of the majority and a great let to business, having none of the public offices about them, nor any places to accommodate them, if they were brought up; and the members, from this or some other cause, are eternally absent. With the sincerest esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO LUND WASHINGTON.

Rocky Hill, 20 September, 1783.

DEAR LUND,

Mrs. Custis has never suggested in any of her letters to Mrs. Washington (unless ardent wishes for her return, that she might then disclose it to her, can be so construed) the most distant attachment to D. S.; but, if this should be the case, and she wants advice upon it, a father and mother, who are at hand and competent to give it, are at the same time the most proper to be consulted on so interesting an event. For my own part, I never did, nor do I believe I ever shall, give advice to a woman, who is setting out on a matrimonial voyage; first, because I never could advise one to marry without her own consent; and, secondly, because I know it is to no purpose to advise her to refrain, when she has obtained it. A woman very rarely asks an opinion or requires advice on such an occasion, till her resolution is formed; and then it is with the hope and expectation of obtaining a sanction, not that she means to be governed by your disapprobation, that she applies. In a word, the plain English of the application may be summed up in these words; "I wish you to think as I do; but, if unhappily you differ from me in opinion, my heart, I must confess, is fixed, and I have gone too far *now* to retract."

If Mrs. Custis should ever suggest any thing of this kind to me, I will give her my opinion of the *measure*, not of the *man*, with candor, and to the following effect. "I never expected you would spend the residue of your days in widowhood; but in a matter so important, and so interesting to yourself, children, and connexions, I wish you would make a prudent choice. To do which, many considerations are necessary; such as the family

and connexions of the man, his fortune (which is not the *most* essential in my eye), the line of conduct he has observed, and the disposition and frame of his mind. You should consider what prospect there is of his proving kind and affectionate to you ; just, generous, and attentive to your children ; and how far his connexions will be agreeable to you ; for when they are once formed, agreeable or not, the die being cast, your fate is fixed." Thus far, and no farther, I shall go in my opinions. I am, dear Lund, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Rocky Hill, 2 October, 1783.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a letter I have received from Colonel Kosciuszko, on the subject of his promotion. The general promotion now before Congress, should it take place, would have included him ; but this does not seem to be his wish. As a foreigner, I suppose a particular promotion would be more consonant to his views and interest ; and from my knowledge of his merit and services, and the concurrent testimony of all who know him, I cannot but recommend him as deserving the favor of Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* This letter was referred to a committee, in consequence of whose report it was resolved, "that the secretary at war transmit to Colonel Kosciuszko the brevet commission of brigadier-general, and signify to that officer, that Congress entertain a high sense of his long, faithful, and meritorious services." — *Journals*, October 13th.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE CHASTELLUX.

Princeton, 12 October, 1783.

MY DEAR CHEVALIER,

I have not had the honor of a line from you since the 4th of March last ; but I will ascribe my disappointment to any cause, rather than to a decay of your friendship.

Having the appearance, and indeed the enjoyment of peace, without a final declaration of it, I, who am only waiting for the ceremonials, or till the British forces shall have taken leave of New York, am placed in an awkward and disagreeable situation, it being my anxious desire to quit the walks of public life, and to seek those enjoyments and that relaxation, which a mind, that has been constantly upon the stretch for more than eight years, stands so much in need of.

I have fixed this epoch at the arrival of the definitive treaty, or the evacuation of my country by our newly acquired friends. In the mean while, at the request of Congress I spend my time with them at this place, where they came in consequence of the riots at Philadelphia, of which you have doubtless (for it is not a very recent transaction) been fully apprized. They have lately determined to make a choice of some convenient spot near the Falls of the Delaware for the permanent residence of the sovereign power of these United States ; but where they will hold their sessions till they can be properly established at that place, is yet undecided.

I have lately made a tour through the Lakes George and Champlain, as far as Crown Point. Thence returning to Schenectady, I proceeded up the Mohawk River to Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix), and crossed over to Wood Creek, which empties into the

Oneida Lake, and affords the water communication with Ontario. I then traversed the country to the head of the eastern branch of the Susquehanna, and viewed the Lake Otsego, and the portage between that Lake and the Mohawk River at Canajoharie. Prompted by these actual observations, I could not help taking a more extensive view of the vast inland navigation of these United States, from maps and the information of others ; and could not but be struck with the immense extent and importance of it, and with the goodness of that Providence, which has dealt its favors to us with so profuse a hand. Would to God we may have wisdom enough to improve them. I shall not rest contented, till I have explored the western country, and traversed those lines, or great part of them, which have given bounds to a new empire. But when it may, if it ever shall, happen, I dare not say, as my first attention must be given to the deranged situation of my private concerns, which are not a little injured by almost nine years' absence and total disregard of them. With every wish for your health and happiness, and with the most sincere and affectionate regard, I am, my dear Chevalier, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL DUPORTAIL.

Rocky Hill, 19 October, 1783

DEAR SIR,

General Laumoy and Colonel Gouvion did me justice in mentioning the regret I feel at your intention of leaving this country. The personal attachment, which naturally grows out of such a length of service together, had I no other motive, would occasion a regret at parting ; but it is considerably heightened by your

quitting the service, and thereby depriving me of the hope of seeing you return to benefit the country by your abilities and experience in your profession, if such an establishment, as this great empire ought to adopt for the peace of it, should be finally agreed to, but which at this moment is undecided.

It would afford me much pleasure to tell you this personally before your departure; but if I should not have this satisfaction, I beg you to be assured that you carry with you every good wish I can form for you, and that I shall ever retain a grateful sense of the aids I have derived from your knowledge and advice, and more especially for the repeated testimonials I have received of your friendship and attachment to me.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Rocky Hill, 23 October, 1783.

DEAR SIR,

I was extremely glad to hear by a letter from Colonel Varick, that though not yet restored to your usual state of health, you were recovering it daily. From many circumstances I think it now pretty evident, that the British will leave New York in all next month. Sir Guy Carleton has informed me verbally, through Mr. Parker, that he expects to evacuate the city by the 20th, and that, when the transports, which were gone to Nova Scotia, returned, he should be able to fix the day of his departure. In consequence of this intelligence, and fearful lest I should not have timely notice, I have this day written to General Knox, desiring him to confer with your Excellency, and make every necessary arrangement for taking possession of the city the mo-

ment the British quit it. An extract from that letter I do myself the honor to enclose. With great esteem and respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

P. S. I was just on the point of closing this, when I received your Excellency's letter of the 14th instant, and I am sorry to learn from it that you are still in such a low state of health. The propriety of putting the troops, who may move towards the city, under your Excellency's direction, strikes me very forcibly, and I have mentioned it in a postscript to the letter to General Knox. It will accordingly form part of the arrangement, which you may both agree on. I shall with pleasure comply with your wishes, in sending you by express the first notice I get of the day intended for the evacuation.

FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

Rocky Hill, near Princeton, 2 November, 1783.

The United States in Congress assembled, after giving the most honorable testimony to the merits of the federal armies, and presenting them with the thanks of their country for their long, eminent, and faithful services, having thought proper, by their proclamation bearing date the 18th day of October last, to discharge such part of the troops as were engaged for the war, and to permit the officers on furloughs to retire from service, from and after to-morrow; which proclamation having been communicated in the public papers for the information and government of all concerned, it only remains for the Commander-in-chief to address himself once more, and that for the last time, to the armies of

the United States (however widely dispersed the individuals who composed them may be), and to bid them an affectionate, a long farewell.

But before the Commander-in-chief takes his final leave of those he holds most dear, he wishes to indulge himself a few moments in calling to mind a slight review of the past. He will then take the liberty of exploring with his military friends their future prospects, of advising the general line of conduct, which, in his opinion, ought to be pursued; and he will conclude the address by expressing the obligations he feels himself under for the spirited and able assistance he has experienced from them, in the performance of an arduous office.

A contemplation of the complete attainment (at a period earlier than could have been expected) of the object, for which we contended against so formidable a power, cannot but inspire us with astonishment and gratitude. The disadvantageous circumstances on our part, under which the war was undertaken, can never be forgotten. The singular interpositions of Providence in our feeble condition were such, as could scarcely escape the attention of the most unobserving; while the unparalleled perseverance of the armies of the United States, through almost every possible suffering and discouragement for the space of eight long years, was little short of a standing miracle.

It is not the meaning nor within the compass of this address, to detail the hardships peculiarly incident to our service, or to describe the distresses, which in several instances have resulted from the extremes of hunger and nakedness, combined with the rigors of an inclement season; nor is it necessary to dwell on the dark side of our past affairs. Every American officer and soldier must now console himself for any unpleasant

circumstances, which may have occurred, by a recollection of the uncommon scenes in which he has been called to act no inglorious part, and the astonishing events of which he has been a witness ; events, which have seldom, if ever before, taken place on the stage of human action ; nor can they probably ever happen again. For who has before seen a disciplined army formed at once from such raw materials ? Who, that was not a witness, could imagine, that the most violent local prejudices would cease so soon ; and that men, who came from the different parts of the continent, strongly disposed by the habits of education to despise and quarrel with each other, would instantly become but one patriotic band of brothers ? Or who, that was not on the spot, can trace the steps by which such a wonderful revolution has been effected, and such a glorious period put to all our warlike toils ?

It is universally acknowledged, that the enlarged prospects of happiness, opened by the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, almost exceed the power of description. And shall not the brave men, who have contributed so essentially to these inestimable acquisitions, retiring victorious from the field of war to the field of agriculture, participate in all the blessings, which have been obtained ? In such a republic, who will exclude them from the rights of citizens, and the fruits of their labor ? In such a country, so happily circumstanced, the pursuits of commerce and the cultivation of the soil will unfold to industry the certain road to competence. To those hardy soldiers, who are actuated by the spirit of adventure, the fisheries will afford ample and profitable employment ; and the extensive and fertile regions of the West will yield a most happy asylum to those, who, fond of domestic enjoyment, are seeking for personal independence. Nor

is it possible to conceive, that any one of the United States will prefer a national bankruptcy, and a dissolution of the Union, to a compliance with the requisitions of Congress, and the payment of its just debts ; so that the officers and soldiers may expect considerable assistance, in recommencing their civil occupations, from the sums due to them from the public, which must and will most inevitably be paid.

In order to effect this desirable purpose, and to remove the prejudices, which may have taken possession of the minds of any of the good people of the States, it is earnestly recommended to all the troops, that, with strong attachments to the Union, they should carry with them into civil society the most conciliating dispositions, and that they should prove themselves not less virtuous and useful as citizens, than they have been persevering and victorious as soldiers. What though there should be some envious individuals, who are unwilling to pay the debt the public has contracted, or to yield the tribute due to merit ; yet let such unworthy treatment produce no invectives, nor any instance of intemperate conduct. Let it be remembered, that the unbiassed voice of the free citizens of the United States has promised the just reward and given the merited applause. Let it be known and remembered, that the reputation of the federal armies is established beyond the reach of malevolence ; and let a consciousness of their achievements and fame still incite the men, who composed them, to honorable actions ; under the persuasion that the private virtues of economy, prudence, and industry, will not be less amiable in civil life, than the more splendid qualities of valor, perseverance, and enterprise were in the field. Every one may rest assured, that much, very much, of the future happiness of the officers and men, will depend upon the wise and

manly conduct, which shall be adopted by them when they are mingled with the great body of the community. And, although the General has so frequently given it as his opinion in the most public and explicit manner, that, unless the principles of the Federal Government were properly supported, and the powers of the Union increased, the honor, dignity, and justice of the nation would be lost for ever; yet he cannot help repeating, on this occasion, so interesting a sentiment, and leaving it as his last injunction to every officer and every soldier, who may view the subject in the same serious point of light, to add his best endeavours to those of his worthy fellow citizens towards effecting these great and valuable purposes, on which our very existence as a nation so materially depends.

The Commander-in-chief conceives little is now wanting, to enable the soldiers to change the military character into that of the citizen, but that steady and decent tenor of behaviour, which has generally distinguished, not only the army under his immediate command, but the different detachments and separate armies, through the course of the war. From their good sense and prudence he anticipates the happiest consequences; and, while he congratulates them on the glorious occasion, which renders their services in the field no longer necessary, he wishes to express the strong obligations he feels himself under for the assistance he has received from every class and in every instance. He presents his thanks in the most serious and affectionate manner to the general officers, as well for their counsel on many interesting occasions, as for their ardor in promoting the success of the plans he had adopted; to the commandants of regiments and corps, and to the other officers, for their great zeal and attention in carrying his orders promptly into execution; to the

staff, for their alacrity and exactness in performing the duties of their several departments; and to the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, for their extraordinary patience and suffering, as well as their invincible fortitude in action. To the various branches of the army, the General takes this last and solemn opportunity of professing his inviolable attachment and friendship. He wishes more than bare professions were in his power; that he were really able to be useful to them all in future life. He flatters himself, however, they will do him the justice to believe, that whatever could with propriety be attempted by him has been done.

And being now to conclude these his last public orders, to take his ultimate leave in a short time of the military character, and to bid a final adieu to the armies he has so long had the honor to command, he can only again offer in their behalf his recommendations to their grateful country, and his prayers to the God of armies. May ample justice be done them here, and may the choicest of Heaven's favors, both here and hereafter, attend those, who, under the Divine auspices, have secured innumerable blessings for others. With these wishes and this benediction, the Commander-in-chief is about to retire from service. The curtain of separation will soon be drawn, and the military scene to him will be closed for ever.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Rocky Hill, 6 November, 1783.

SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d of October, acquainting me with the arrangements your

Excellency had made for the removal of the troops and stores of his Britannic Majesty from the post of Penobscot.

In consequence of the information, given by your Excellency to Congress some time past, that you had received orders for the evacuation of New York, and of the verbal message you were pleased to send by Mr. Parker to me, respecting the period of embarkation, I am now induced to request, that you will be so obliging as to inform me of the particular time, or even the certain day, if possible, when this event will happen.

This information would be extremely interesting for my private as well as public arrangements. Indeed, I should not have troubled your Excellency with the request, but for my peculiar circumstances and the advanced season, which render it essential for me to be ascertained of the period of your embarkation, as early as may be convenient; and which, I entreat, may be considered as my apology for the present application.

Colonel Cobb, one of my aids-de-camp, will have the honor of delivering this letter, and of bearing your answer to me. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

West Point, 14 November, 1783.

SIR,

I had the honor yesterday to receive, by Major Beckwith, your Excellency's favor of the 12th. To-day I will see the governor of this State, and concert

* As a step preparatory to taking possession of New York, General Washington went to West Point, where the part of the Continental army that still remained in service was stationed, under the command of General Knox.

with him the necessary arrangements for taking possession of the city of New York, and the other posts mentioned in your letter, at the times therein specified. For the information of which, you will please to accept my thanks. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

West Point, 18 November, 1783.

SIR,

I have at length the pleasure to inform your Excellency and Congress, that Sir Guy Carleton has fixed upon the time at which he proposes to evacuate the city of New York. The particulars are more fully explained in his letter of the 12th instant,† a copy of which, together with my answer, is enclosed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Haerlem, 22 November, 1783.

SIR,

I have been honored with your Excellency's letter of the 19th instant; and for a reply to the proposition

* In consequence of the interview above suggested, between General Washington and Governor Clinton, the latter issued a proclamation, dated the 15th of November, giving notice of the day appointed by Sir Guy Carleton for evacuating the city, and summoning the several members of the council of New York to convene at East Chester, on the 21st, with a view of immediately establishing civil government in the districts of the State hitherto occupied by the British troops; and at the same time enjoining and requiring the inhabitants of such parts to yield due obedience to the laws of the State, and to be vigilant in preserving the public peace and good order.

† See APPENDIX, No. IX.

contained in it, I must beg leave to refer you to his Excellency Governor Clinton, who will inform you by this conveyance, that the council instituted for the temporary government of the State have acceded to your réservations, in full confidence that the embarkation will be expedited as much as the circumstances will admit.

With regard to the införmation, that a deliberate combination has been formed to plunder the city of New York, I have to observe, that the intelligence appears to me not to be well-founded ; at least, no intimations of the kind had ever before come to my knowledge ; and I can assure your Excellency, that such arrangements have been made, as will, in my opinion, not only utterly discountenance, but effectually prevent, any outrage or disorder, unless the évacuation should be delayed until a much larger number of people shall be collected from the country, than have been assembled as yet for the purpose of going into town on its being relinquished by your troops ; in which case the difficulty of establishing civil government and maintaining good order may be greatly increased.

Lieutenant-Colonel Walker will have the honor to deliver this letter to your Excellency, and to assure you of the respectful consideration with which

I am, Sir, &c.*

* In the morning of the 25th of November, the troops, who had come down from West Point, marched from Haerlem to the Bowery, in the upper part of the city of New York. Here they remained till about one o'clock, when the British troops left the posts in that quarter, and the American troops immediately marched into the city in the following order.

1. A corps of dragoons.
2. Advanced guard of light infantry.
3. A corps of artillery.
4. A battalion of light infantry.
5. A battalion of Massachusetts troops.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

New York, 2 December, 1783.

SIR,

I have received your favor of yesterday's date, announcing the time of your departure, and sincerely wish that your Excellency, with the troops under your orders, may have a safe and pleasant passage.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THOMAS MIFFLIN, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.*

New York, 3 December, 1783.

SIR,

In my last letter to your Excellency, I had the honor to acquaint Congress with the arrangement Sir Guy Carleton had made for the evacuation of New York

6. Rear guard.

The troops having thus taken possession of the city, General Washington and Governor Clinton made a public entry in the following manner.

1. The General and Governor with their suites on horseback.

2. The Lieutenant-governor, and the members of the Council, for the temporary government of the southern district of the State, four abreast.

3. Major-General Knox, and the officers of the army, eight abreast.

4. Citizens on horseback, eight abreast.

5. The speaker of the Assembly, and citizens on foot, eight abreast.

The Governor and Commander-in-chief were escorted by a body of Westchester light-horse, commanded by Captain Delavan.

Tranquillity and order prevailed throughout the day. The Governor gave a public dinner, at which were present the Commander-in-chief, and the other general officers of the army.—See *Rivington's Gazette*, for November 26th.

* Chosen president of Congress on the 15th of November. Congress had adjourned on the 4th of November, to meet at Annapolis, in Maryland, on the 26th. A number of members, however, sufficient to proceed to business, did not assemble at that place till the 13th of December.

on the 23d ultimo. I have now to inform you, that the embarkation was postponed two days on account of the badness of the weather.

On the 25th of November the British troops left this city, and a detachment of our army marched into it. The civil power was immediately put in possession, and I have the happiness to assure you, that the most perfect regularity and good order have prevailed ever since; on which pleasing events I congratulate your Excellency and Congress. A copy of the last letter I have received from Sir Guy Carleton is enclosed.*

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Annapolis, 20 December, 1783.

SIR,

I take the earliest opportunity to inform Congress of my arrival in this city, with the intention of asking leave to resign the commission I have the honor of holding in their service. It is essential for me to know their pleasure, and in what manner it will be most proper to offer my resignation, whether in writing, or at an audience. I shall therefore request to be honored with the necessary information, that, being apprized of the sentiments of Congress, I may regulate my conduct accordingly. I have the honor to be, &c.

* Shortly after the evacuation of New York, General Washington left that city and repaired to Annapolis, at which place the members of Congress were then assembling. An affecting account of the manner in which he took leave of the officers, who had so long been his associates in arms, is contained in MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*, Vol. IV. p. 619. In all the principal towns through which he passed, he was met with the congratulations of his fellow-citizens, and addresses were presented to him by many public bodies, including the legislatures of New Jersey

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Annapolis, 21 December, 1783.

SIR,

In my last despatch to your Excellency, I had the honor to inform Congress, that the American troops had taken possession of the city of New York, and had delivered it to the government of the State; and that the British troops had retired to Staten and Long Islands. I had also the honor to enclose to you Sir Guy Carleton's last letter, informing me of his intention to take his final departure from the continent, with the troops under his command, on the 4th of this month.

As there was no longer a necessity for retaining so many troops in service for the posts at present in our possession, and as the terms of service of the men were expiring so fast, that fifteen hundred or two thousand would have been discharged by June next, I thought it most consistent with the state of our public affairs to lessen the expense as soon as possible; and I therefore gave directions to Major-General Knox before I left New York, to reduce the whole of the troops to one battalion of infantry of five hundred rank and file, and about one hundred artillery, and these to be of the men, who had the longest time to serve.

To carry this arrangement into effect, and to collect and put into a state of preservation the ordnance and other valuable military stores belonging to the United States, it was necessary that there should be some officer of rank and abilities; and, as the latter business was in the particular line of General Knox, and none understood or could attend to it so well, I directed

Pennsylvania, and Maryland; the American Philosophical Society and the University of Pennsylvania; the citizens of towns in their corporate capacity; religious societies; and various incorporated associations.

that officer to continue in command, until the further pleasure of Congress should be made known to him.*

Among the officers of the army, who have been obliged to retire at the conclusion of the war, are many, who, from various motives, are desirous of being arranged on any peace establishment that may take place. I take the liberty to lay before Congress the several applications, that have been made to me on the subject; and in addition to the testimony, which accompanies them, I can only add mine, that most of the gentlemen whose names are on the list are personally known to me, as some of the best officers who were in the army. I am, &c.

TO BARON STEUBEN.

Annapolis, 23 December, 1783.

MY DEAR BARON,

Although I have taken frequent opportunities, both in public and private, of acknowledging your great zeal, attention, and abilities, in performing the duties of your office; yet I wish to make use of this last moment of my public life to signify, in the strongest terms, my entire approbation of your conduct, and to express my sense of the obligations the public is under to you, for your faithful and meritorious services.

I beg you will be convinced, my dear Sir, that I should rejoice if it could ever be in my power to serve you more essentially, than by expressions of regard and affection; but, in the mean time, I am persuaded you will not be displeased with this farewell token of my sincere friendship and esteem for you.

* The troops under General Knox returned to West Point, where he continued his head-quarters.

This is the last letter I shall write, while I continue in the service of my country. The hour of my resignation is fixed at twelve to-day; after which, I shall become a private citizen on the banks of the Potomac, where I shall be glad to embrace you, and testify the great esteem and consideration with which I am, my dear Baron, &c.

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS ON
RESIGNING HIS COMMISSION.*

Annapolis, 23 December, 1783.

MR. PRESIDENT,

The great events, on which my resignation depended, having at length taken place, I have now the honor of offering my sincere congratulations to Congress, and of presenting myself before them, to surrender into their hands the trust committed to me, and to claim the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country.

Happy in the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, and pleased with the opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a respectable nation, I resign with satisfaction the appointment I accepted with diffidence; a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so arduous a task, which, however, was superseded by a confidence in the rectitude of our cause, the support of the supreme power of the Union, and the patronage of Heaven.

The successful termination of the war has verified the most sanguine expectations; and my gratitude for the interposition of Providence, and the assistance I

* The reply of the President of Congress to this address may be seen in the APPENDIX, No. XIV.

have received from my countrymen, increases with every review of the momentous contest.

While I repeat my obligations to the army in general, I should do injustice to my own feelings not to acknowledge, in this place, the peculiar services and distinguished merits of the gentlemen, who have been attached to my person during the war. It was impossible that the choice of confidential officers to compose my family should have been more fortunate. Permit me, Sir, to recommend in particular those, who have continued in service to the present moment, as worthy of the favorable notice and patronage of Congress.

I consider it an indispensable duty to close this last solemn act of my official life, by commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty God, and those who have the superintendence of them to his holy keeping.

Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theatre of action; and, bidding an affectionate farewell to this august body, under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life.



APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I. p. 11.

MARCH OF THE DETACHMENT UNDER THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE TO VIRGINIA.

THE original object of the detachment to Virginia, under the Marquis de Lafayette, was, in conjunction with Baron Steuben, commanding in that State, to coöperate with M. de Tilly's French squadron for the purpose of capturing Arnold and the British forces in the Chesapeake. Activity and despatch were essential to the success of the enterprise. In this respect Lafayette was so fortunate in his march from the North River, although at an unfavorable season for military movements, that he arrived with his troops at the Head of Elk on the 3d of March, being three or four days earlier than had been anticipated. He there received information from the Commander-in-chief, that the squadron under M. de Tilly had returned to Newport, but that another naval detachment would be sent from that place by M. Destouches to coöperate with the land forces in the Chesapeake.

As nothing could be done till this squadron should arrive in the Bay, Lafayette resolved to transport his troops to Annapolis, leave them there, and proceed in person to the head-quarters of Baron Steuben, where he would be able to ascertain in the shortest time the arrival of the French vessels, and be prepared for ordering his troops immediately down the Bay.

LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

“ Williamsburg, 23 March, 1781.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,

“ By former letters your Excellency has been acquainted with my motions, from my arrival at the Head of Elk to the time of my landing at this place. The march of the detachment to Elk had

been very rapid, and performed in the best order. Owing to the activity of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, a train of artillery had been provided at Philadelphia; and, notwithstanding some disappointments, particularly that relating to the want of vessels, no delay should have been imputed to us in this coöperation.

“Having received your letter, by which the sailing of the French fleet became a matter of certainty, I determined to transport the detachment to Annapolis, and did it for many essential reasons. The navigation of the Bay is such, that the going in and out of Elk River requires a different wind from that which is fair for going up and down the Bay. Our stopping at Annapolis, and making some preparations on the route to Carolina, might be of use to deceive the enemy; but, above all, I thought with your Excellency, that it was important both to the success of the operation and the honor of our arms, that the detachment might be down to coöperate; and, from the time when the French were to sail, and the winds that blew for some days, I had no doubt that our allies would be in the Chesapeake before we could arrive at Annapolis.

“Owing to the good dispositions of Commodore Nicholson, whom I requested to take charge of our small fleet, the detachment was safely lodged in the harbour of Annapolis; and, in the conviction that my presence here was necessary, not so much for preparations (which Baron Steuben provided), as for settling our plans with the French, and obtaining an immediate convoy for the detachment, I thought it better to run some personal risk, than to neglect any thing that could forward the success of the operation, and the glory of the troops under my command.

“On my arrival at this place, I was surprised to hear, that no French fleet had appeared, but attributed it to delays and chances so frequent in naval battles. My first object was to request, that nothing should be taken for this expedition, which could have been intended for, or useful to, the southern army, whose welfare appeared to me more interesting than our success. My second object was, to examine what had been prepared, to gather and forward every requisite for a vigorous coöperation; and, besides a number of militia that would have amounted to five thousand, I can assure you, that nothing would have been wanting to ensure a complete success.

“As the position of the enemy had not yet been reconnoitred, I went to General Muhlenberg's camp near Suffolk; and, after he had taken a position nearer to Portsmouth, we marched down with some troops to view the enemy's works. This brought on a trifling

skirmish, during which we were enabled to see something; but the insufficiency of ammunition, which had been expected for many days, prevented my engaging too far to push the enemy's out-posts, and our reconnoitring was postponed to the 21st. But, on the 20th, Major McPherson, an officer for whom I have the highest confidence and esteem, sent me word from Hampton, where he was stationed, that a fleet had come to anchor within the Capes. So far was it probable, that this fleet was that of M. Destouches, that Arnold himself appeared to be in great confusion, and his vessels, notwithstanding many signals, durst not for a long time venture down. An officer of the French navy bore down to them from York, and nothing could equal my surprise on hearing from Major McPherson, that the fleet announced by a former letter certainly belonged to the enemy.

"Upon this intelligence, the militia were removed to their former position, and I requested Baron Steuben (from whom out of delicacy I would not take the command, until the coöperation was begun, or the Continental troops arrived,) to take such measures as would put out of the enemy's reach the several articles that had been prepared. On my return to this place, I could not hear more particular accounts of the fleet. Some people think they have come from Europe, but I believe them to be the fleet from Gardiner's Bay. They are said to be twelve sail in all, frigates included. I have sent spies on board, and shall forward their report to head-quarters.

"Having certain accounts that the French sailed on the 8th, with a favorable wind, I must think that they are coming to this place, or were beaten in an engagement, or are gone somewhere else. In either of these three cases, I think it my duty to stay here until I hear something more, which must be in a little time. But, as you will certainly recall a detachment composed of the flower of each regiment, whose loss would be immense for the army under your immediate command, and as my instructions are to march them back as soon as we lose the naval superiority in this quarter, I have sent them orders to move at the first notice from me (which I will send to-morrow or the day after), or upon the arrival of a letter from your Excellency, which my aid-de-camp is empowered to open. Had I not been on the spot, I am sure that I should have waited a long time before I should have known what to think of this fleet, and my presence at this place was the speediest means of forwarding the detachment, either to Hampton, or back to your Excellency's immediate army."

Soon after writing this letter, Lafayette returned to Annapolis, and proceeded thence with his troops to the Head of Elk.

LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"Head of Elk, 8 April, 1781. — Your Excellency's letters of the 5th and 6th instant have just come to hand; and, before I answer their contents, I beg leave to give you a summary account of the measures I have lately taken. As to the part of my conduct you have been acquainted with, I am happy, my dear General, to find that it has met with your approbation.

"When the return of the British fleet put it out of doubt, that nothing could be undertaken for the present against Portsmouth, I sent pressing orders to Annapolis, in order to have every thing in readiness, and even to move the troops by land to the Head of Elk. I hastened back to Maryland; but I confess I could not resist the ardent desire I have long had of seeing your relations, and above all your mother, at Fredericksburg. For that purpose I went some miles out of the way; and, in order to conciliate my private happiness to duties of a public nature, I recovered, by riding in the night, those few hours, which I had consecrated to my satisfaction. I had also the pleasure of seeing Mount Vernon, and was very unhappy that my duty and my anxiety for the execution of your orders prevented my paying a visit to Mr. Custis.

"On my arrival at Annapolis, I found that our preparations were far from promising a speedy departure. The difficulty of getting wagons and horses is immense. There are not boats sufficient to cross over the ferries. The State were very desirous of keeping us as long as possible, as they were scared by the apparition of the Hope, of twenty guns, and the Monk, of eighteen guns, which blockaded the harbour, and which, as appeared from intercepted letters, were determined to oppose our movements. In these circumstances, I thought it better to continue my preparations for a journey by land, which, I am told, would have lasted ten days on account of ferries; and, in the mean while, I had two eighteen-pounders put on board a small sloop, which appeared ridiculous to some, but proved to be of great service.

"On the morning of the 6th, Commodore Nicholson went out with the sloop, and another vessel full of men. Whether the sound of eighteen-pounders, or the fear of being boarded, operated upon the enemy, I am not able to say; but, after some manœuvres, they retreated so far as to render it prudent for us to sail for this place.

Every vessel with troops and horses came here in the night with the Commodore, to whom I am vastly obliged ; and, having brought up the rear with the sloop and another vessel, I arrived this morning at Elk. It is reported, that the ships have returned to their station. If it is so, they must have been reinforced, and their commander had already applied for an augmentation of force."

Lafayette had scarcely landed at the Head of Elk, when he received directions from Washington to march with his detachment to the south, and put himself under the orders of General Greene. As the men were mostly from the north, and had expected but a short absence from the main army, and were also clad in winter clothing, which was now becoming oppressive to them on account of the increasing warmth of the season, they were extremely reluctant to return to the south; and it required no common share of good management to reconcile them to such a movement. This was effected, however, with so much promptitude and prudence, that, four days after the arrival of the troops at the Head of Elk, they commenced their march by land, and on the 13th of April crossed the Susquehanna on their route to Baltimore. Many inconveniences were experienced, and some delay was occasioned, by the want of supplies and other aids for such a march. The privations and disappointment of the troops caused disquietude and desertions. These formidable obstacles were at length happily overcome by the address and fertile resources of the commander, as will appear from the following details.

LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

" *Baltimore, 18 April, 1781.*—Every one of my letters has been written in so lamentable a tone, that I am happy to give you a pleasanter prospect. The anxiety I feel to relieve your mind from a small part of those many solitudes and cares, which our circumstances conspire to gather upon you, is the reason of my sending this letter by the chain,* and with a particular recommendation.

" When I left Susquehanna Ferry, it was the general opinion, that we could not have six hundred men by the time we should arrive at our destination. This, and the shocking situation of the men, afforded the more gloomy prospects, as the Board of War have confessed their total inability to afford us relief. Under these circumstances, I have employed every personal exertion, and have

* The chain of expresses?

the pleasure to inform you, that I hope an end has been put to desertion.

“On my arrival on this side of the Susquehanna, I issued an order to the troops, wherein I endeavoured to throw a kind of infamy upon desertion, and particularly to influence their affections. Since that, desertion has been lessened. Two deserters have been taken up, one of whom is hanged to-day, and the other (being an excellent soldier) will be forgiven, but dismissed from the corps, as well as another soldier, who behaved amiss. To these measures I have added one, which my feelings for the sufferings of the soldiers, and the peculiarity of their circumstances, have prompted me to adopt.

“The merchants of Baltimore have lent me a sum of about two thousand pounds, which will procure some shirts, linen over-alls, shoes, and a few hats. The ladies will make up the shirts, and the over-alls will be made by the detachment, so that our soldiers have a chance of being a little more comfortable. The money is lent upon my credit, and I become security for the payment in two years' time, when, by the French laws, I may better dispose of my estate. But before that time I am to use my influence with the French court, in order to have as soon as possible this sum of money added to any loan Congress will have been able to obtain from them.

“In case you are told, my dear General, that my whole baggage has been taken in the Bay, I am sorry I cannot discountenance the report; but, when the mention of papers and maps shall be made, do not apprehend any thing bad to my papers, nor to the maps you have put in my possession. Nothing has been lost but writing-paper and printed maps. The fact is this. When at York, I had some Continental soldiers and my baggage to send up in a safe barge and an unsafe boat. I of course gave the barge to the soldiers, who lately went to Annapolis. The baggage was put into the boat, and has not been since heard of; but, being aware of the danger, I took with me by land every article, that, on the public account, was in the least valuable.

“By a letter from Baron Steuben, dated Chesterfield Court-House, the 10th of April, I find that General Phillips has at Portsmouth fifteen hundred or two thousand men added to the force under Arnold. Proper allowance being made for exaggerations, I apprehend that his whole army amounts to two thousand five hundred men, which obliges me to hasten my march to Fredericksburg and Richmond, where I expect to receive orders from General

Greene. The importance of celerity, the desire of lengthening the way home, and immense delays that would stop me for an age, have determined me to leave our tents and artillery under a guard, with orders to follow as fast as possible ; while the rest of the detachment, by forced marches, and with impressed wagons and horses, will hasten to Fredericksburg or Richmond, and thus derange the calculations of the enemy. We shall set off to-morrow, and this rapid mode of travelling, added to my other precautions, will, I hope, keep up our spirits and satisfaction. With the highest respect, and tender affection, I have the honor to be, &c.

“P. S. The word *lessened* does not convey a sufficient idea of what experience has proved to be true, to the honor of our excellent soldiers. It had been announced in general orders, that the detachment was intended to fight an enemy far superior in numbers, under difficulties of every sort ; that the general was for his part determined to encounter them, but that such of the soldiers, as had an inclination to abandon him, might dispense with the dangers and crime of desertion, as every one of them, who should apply to head-quarters for a pass to join their corps in the north, should be sure to obtain it immediately.”

“*Alexandria, 23 April, 1781.* — With the help of some wagons and horses, we got in two days from the camp near Baltimore to this place. We halted yesterday, and, having made a small bargain for a few shoes, are marching to Fredericksburg. No official account from Phillips, but I am told they are removing stores from Richmond and Petersburg. I am surprised nobody writes to me ; and hope soon to receive intelligence. Our men are in high spirits ; their honor having been interested in this affair, they have made it a point to come with us, and discontent as well as desertion is entirely out of fashion.

“The Chevalier de la Luzerne writes to me, that Count de Rochambeau is going to join you, so that both armies will coöperate. I had rather remain in Virginia than go to Carolina. This I mention because orders are to come from General Greene ; but if the detachment is to go more southerly, I will get there as fast as I can.”

By a rapid march from Alexandria, Lafayette arrived with his detachment at Richmond on the 29th of April, where he was joined by the Continental troops under Baron Steuben and General Muhlenberg, and the Virginia militia commanded by General Nelson.

“He conducted the campaign,” says Mr. Everett, “with a vigor,

discretion, and success, which saved the State of Virginia, and proved himself to be endowed with the highest qualities of generalship. While Lord Cornwallis, to whom he was opposed, a person not less eminent for talent and experience, than for rank and political influence, was boasting, in derision of his youthful adversary, that 'the boy should not escape him,' the boy was preparing a pit, into which his Lordship plunged with all his forces.

"My limits do not allow me to sketch to you the history of this great campaign, nor even of its final glorious consummation, the closing scene of the war. But I may, with propriety, pause to say, that it evinced on the part of our venerable Washington, now at length favored with an opportunity of acting with ample means on a broad scale, a power of combination and a reach of mind, with a promptitude and vigor of execution, which, exhibited at the head of mighty armies, gave to Napoleon his reputation, as the greatest captain of the age. I cannot but think, that, in the manœuvres by which Lord Cornwallis was detained in Virginia, by which Sir Henry Clinton was persuaded in New York, that a siege of that city was the great object of Washington, by which the French forces were brought up from Rhode Island, the armies of Washington and Rochambeau moved by a forced march across the country to Yorktown, at the moment that the French squadron from Newport under the Count de Barras, and the great fleet under the Count de Grasse, effected their junction in the Chesapeake, there is displayed as much generalship, as in any series of movements in the wars of the last thirty years. The operations of Lafayette in Virginia in the preceding summer were the basis of them all; as his untiring efforts in France, the preceding season, had mainly occasioned the despatch of the army of Count de Rochambeau, without which the great exploit at Yorktown could not have been achieved." — EVERETT'S *Eulogy on Lafayette*, p. 31.

No. II. p. 54.

SUBSTANCE OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WASHINGTON AND COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU AT WEATHERSFIELD, MAY 22, 1781.

The object of the interview at Weathersfield, between the American and French commanders, was to concert a plan of operations for the campaign. Facts and propositions were stated by Count de Rochambeau, in the form of queries, which were answered by General Washington, with such remarks as the topics suggested.

ROCHAMBEAU. — Concerning a project of employing the squadron at Newport to transport the French army to the Chesapeake Bay, he consulted Count de Barras, who deemed it impracticable, chiefly on account of the inferiority of his naval force to that of the enemy. The objections were mentioned in detail.*

WASHINGTON. — “However desirable such an event might have been, the reasons assigned by Count de Barras are sufficient to prove its impracticability.”

ROCHAMBEAU. — Should the French army march to the North River, will the squadron be safe at Newport under a guard of militia? By his secret instructions he is not permitted to separate his army, except for detachments of a short duration. Count de Barras thinks the squadron would not be secure, if the enemy should take possession of Rhode Island; and, moreover, he has been instructed, that, in case the army should march into the country, his fleet should proceed to Boston.

WASHINGTON. — “It is General Washington’s opinion, that the plan of the campaign will render it necessary for the French army to march from Newport towards the North River as soon as possible, and that consequently it will be advisable for the Count de Barras (agreeably to his instructions in that case provided) to seek the first favorable moment of removing the squadron under his command to Boston.”

ROCHAMBEAU. — In that case what does General Washington propose about Rhode Island? Does he intend it should be kept by a general officer and a body of American militia? It is to be observed, that, if in the hurricane months the French fleet should come to the coast, the harbour of Rhode Island might be of use

* The substance only of Count de Rochambeau’s propositions and queries is here stated. The replies and remarks of Washington are printed in full, as transcribed from the records

to the operations of the squadrons, either for a union to act against New York, or as a place of retreat in case of misfortune.

WASHINGTON. — "As the harbour of Rhode Island may be useful to the fleets of his Most Christian Majesty, it is General Washington's opinion, that a force should be left for the security of Newport; but, as the enemy will not be in a condition, from the present circumstances of their affairs, to detach any considerable body of men to repossess the Island, it is agreed between Count de Rochambeau and General Washington, that five hundred militia under a good officer will be sufficient as a guard for the works; but, in case of an enterprise against them, a greater force should be called in for their defence."

ROCHAMBEAU. — If General Washington resolves that Rhode Island shall be left, and the works destroyed, does he consider the siege artillery, powder, magazines, and heavy stores, which cannot follow the French army in a land march, as safe at Providence under two hundred French troops and the militia? For such an object the English may attempt an enterprise to seize these stores. Would they not be more secure, if taken with the fleet to Boston?

WASHINGTON. — "In the former communications between Count de Rochambeau and General Washington, it was understood, that the French fleet was to remain in the harbour of Newport after the removal of the army; and therefore Providence was fixed upon as a safe and proper deposit for the heavy artillery and spare stores. It now being determined, that the fleet shall embrace the first opportunity of going round to the harbour of Boston, it is to be wished, that the heavy artillery and spare stores should be sent round also. But, General Washington being informed by Count de Rochambeau, that they have been already deposited at Providence, and that it will be impossible, under the present circumstances of the fleet and want of transportation, to remove them to Boston, he is of opinion, that they may safely remain there under the guard of two hundred French troops, who will be aided by the militia of the country in case of need. The possession of Newport will add to their security."

ROCHAMBEAU. — Should the squadron from the West Indies arrive in these seas, an event that will probably be announced by a frigate beforehand, what operations will General Washington have in view, after a union of the French army with his own?

WASHINGTON. — "The enemy, by several detachments from New York, having reduced their force at that post to less than

one half of the number, which they had at the time of the former conference at Hartford in September last, it is thought advisable to form a junction of the French and American armies upon the North River, as soon as possible, and move down to the vicinity of New York, to be ready to take advantage of any opportunity, which the weakness of the enemy may afford. Should the West India fleet arrive upon the coast, the force thus combined may either proceed in the operation against New York, or may be directed against the enemy in some other quarter, as circumstances shall dictate. The great waste of men, which we have found from experience in the long marches to the southern States, the advanced season in which such a march must be commenced, and the difficulties and expense of land transportation thither, with other considerations too well known to Count de Rochambeau to need detailing, point out the preference, which an operation against New York seems to have in the present circumstances over an attempt to send a force to the southward."

No. III. p. 112.

EXTRACTS FROM INTERCEPTED LETTERS WRITTEN BY
LORD GEORGE GERMAIN TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.*

Whitehall, 7 February, 1781.

— It gives his Majesty particular satisfaction to find, that you had determined to replace Major-General Leslie's detachment in Elizabeth River by one under Brigadier-General Arnold, with positive orders to establish a permanent post there. I learn with great pleasure from private letters of the 22d of December, that you were preparing a very considerable body of troops for immediate embarkation, which I flatter myself, from an expression in one of your letters to Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, will be employed in conjunction with the Loyal Associators of Maryland and Pennsylvania, in reducing those provinces to the King's obedience, while Lord Cornwallis and Brigadier-General Arnold subdue Virginia; for such is beyond all doubt the low condition of the Congress's authority and finances, and so weak is the state of Washington's army, that

* The letters, from which these extracts are taken, were captured at sea on board a packet ship from Falmouth, and were transmitted to Congress.

little opposition is to be expected in that quarter, and none that can resist such a force as, without the least hazard to New York or Charleston, may be assembled there. You were perfectly right in your interpretation of the Vice-Admiral's orders for detaching five ships to the West Indies, and I was happy to find he acquiesced in your judgment upon that occasion.

The return of the people of Vermont to their allegiance is an event of the utmost importance to the King's affairs, and at this time, if the French and Washington really meditate an irruption into Canada, may be considered as opposing an insurmountable bar to the attempt. General Haldimand, who had the same instructions with you to draw over those people, and give them support, will, I doubt not, push up a body of troops to act in conjunction with them to secure all the avenues from their country into Canada, and, when the season admits, take possession of the upper parts of Hudson and Connecticut Rivers, and cut off the communication between Albany and the Mohawk country. How far they may be able to extend themselves to the southward and eastward, must depend upon their number and the disposition of the inhabitants; but, if Albany should take part with them, the inducement to attempt to open a communication with them by Hudson's River will appear irresistible to people here.

I am sorry I cannot inform you, that the transports with the recruits are sailed from Cork, where the three regiments are in readiness to join them, but a long continuance of easterly winds first prevented the ships from getting round to Portsmouth, and now the westerly winds detain them there; but they are all at Spithead with their convoy, ready to put to sea the moment the wind will permit them to sail. The ordnance store-ship, which has five thousand stands of arms on board for Carolina, being still in the river, I have ordered three thousand stands to be sent by land-carriage to Portsmouth, and there distributed on board the transports, as I understand they are much wanted among the loyalists. They are addressed to the commander of the forces in South Carolina.

Whitehall, 7 March, 1781.

SIR,

Since my letter to you of the 7th of February, I have received your despatches, and laid them before the King.

The revolt of the Pennsylvania line and Jersey brigade, though not attended with all the good consequences that might have been expected, are certainly events of very great importance, and must

have very extensive effects, both in reducing Washington's present force, and preventing its being recruited by new levies; and, as I doubt not you will avail yourself of his weakness, and your own great superiority, to send a considerable force to the head of the Chesapeake as soon as the season will permit operations to be carried on in that quarter, I flatter myself the southern provinces will be recovered to his Majesty's obedience before the long promised succours, none of which are yet sailed, can arrive from France; and that Mr. Washington, unable to draw subsistence for his troops from the west side of Hudson's River, will be compelled to cross it and take refuge in the eastern provinces.

I am very anxious to hear of Lord Cornwallis's progress since General Leslie joined him. I have no doubt his movements will be rapid and decisive, for his Lordship appears to be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of vigorous exertions in the service of this country in its present circumstances. The success of General Arnold's enterprise up James River, which the rebel newspapers confirm, must greatly facilitate his Lordship's operations, by cutting off Greene's supplies and obliging the militia to return to take care of their own property. Indeed, so very contemptible is the rebel force now in all parts, and so vast is our superiority everywhere, that no resistance on their part is to be apprehended, that can materially obstruct the progress of the King's arms in the speedy suppression of the rebellion; and it is a pleasing, though at the same time a mortifying reflection, when the duration of the rebellion is considered, which arises from a view of the returns of the provincial forces you have transmitted, that the American levies in the King's service are more in number, than the whole of the enlisted troops in the service of the Congress.

I am very glad to find you have commissioned a Board of Directors of the Refugees, and I hope the admiral will have been able to spare them shipping to carry on their operations on the seacoast of the New England provinces. Many of those within the lines, who are unfit for military service, are desirous of being settled in the country about Penobscot, and require only to be supplied with provisions for the first year, some tools for husbandry, and iron-work for their buildings; and, as it is proposed to settle that country, and this appears a cheap method of disposing of these loyalists, it is wished you would encourage them to go there under the protection of the Associated Refugees, and assure them that a civil government will follow them in due time; for I hope, in the course of the summer, the admiral and you will be able to spare a force

sufficient to effect an establishment at Casco Bay, and reduce that country to the King's obedience.

I am very glad to find, by the list of the officers released, that the exchanges have been carried so far; but, as it appears from Mr. Washington's last letter to you, that they will not be carried on further, the measure of enlisting their prisoners for service in the West Indies should be adopted immediately; and, indeed, such has been the mortality from sickness among the troops there, that I do not see any other means of recruiting them.

I am sorry to acquaint you, that the general prevalence of westerly winds for these last two months has prevented the Warwick and Solebay, with their convoy, from getting further than Plymouth, where they are still detained. —

No. IV. p. 135.

LETTER FROM COUNT DE GRASSE TO
COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

At the Cape (St. Domingo), 8 July, 1781.

SIR,

I have seen with regret the distress, which prevails on the continent, and the necessity of the prompt succours you solicit. I have conferred with M. de Lillancourt, who took command of the government here on the day of my arrival, and engaged him to furnish from the garrison of St. Domingo a detachment from the regiments of Gatinois, Agenois, and Tourraine, amounting in all to three thousand men, one hundred artillery, one hundred dragoons, ten pieces of field ordnance, and several of siege artillery and mortars. The whole will be embarked in vessels of war, from twenty-five to twenty-nine in number, which will depart from this colony on the 13th of August, and proceed directly to the Chesapeake Bay, which place seems to be indicated by yourself, General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and Count de Barras, as the best point of operation for accomplishing the object proposed.

I have likewise done all in my power to procure for you the sum of twelve hundred thousand livres, which you say is absolutely necessary. This colony is not in a condition to afford you such a supply; but I shall obtain it from Havana, whither a frig-

ate will be sent for the purpose, and you may depend on receiving that amount.

As neither myself, nor the troops commanded by the Marquis de St. Simon, can remain on the continent after the 15th of October, I shall be greatly obliged to you if you will employ me promptly and effectually within that time, whether against the maritime or land forces of our enemy. It will not be possible for me to leave the troops with you beyond that period; first, because part of them are under the orders of the Spanish generals, and have been obtained only on the promise, that they shall be returned by the time they will be wanted; and, secondly, because the other part are destined to the garrison of St. Domingo, and cannot be spared from that duty by M. de Lillancourt. The entire expedition, in regard to these troops, has been concerted only in consequence of your request, without even the previous knowledge of the ministers of France and Spain. I have thought myself authorized to assume this responsibility for the common cause; but I should not dare so far to change the plans they have adopted, as to remove so considerable a body of troops.

You clearly perceive the necessity of making the best use of the time, that will remain for action. I hope the frigate, which takes this letter, will have such despatch, that every thing may be got in readiness by the time of my arrival, and that we may proceed immediately to fulfil the designs in view, the success of which I ardently desire. I have the honor to be, &c.

COUNT DE GRASSE.

No. V. p. 147.

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN AFFLECK TO GENERAL WASHINGTON
RESPECTING MARINE PRISONERS.

New York, 30 August, 1781.

SIR,

I intend not either to deny or to assert, for it will neither facilitate business nor alleviate distress. The subject of your letter seems to turn upon two points, namely, the inconveniences and distresses, which the American prisoners suffer from the inadequacy of room in the prison-ships, which occasions the death of many of them, as you are told; and that a commissary-general

of prisoners from you shall have liberty to visit the ships, inspect the situation of the prisoners, and make a report from an actual survey.

I take leave to assure you, that I feel for the distresses of mankind as much as any man; and, since my coming to the naval command in this department, one of my principal endeavours has been to regulate the prison and hospital ships. The government having made no other provision for naval prisoners than shipping, it is impossible that the greater inconvenience, which people confined on board ships experience beyond those confined on shore, can be avoided, and a sudden accumulation of people often aggravates the evil. But I assure you, that every attention is shown that is possible, and that the prison-ships are under the very same regulations here, that have been constantly observed towards the prisoners of all nations in Europe. Tables of diet are publicly affixed, officers visit every week, redress and report grievances, and the numbers are thinned as they can provide shipping, and no attention has been wanting.

The latter point cannot be admitted in its full extent; but, if you think fit to send an officer of character to the lines for that purpose, he will be conducted to me, and he shall be accompanied by an officer, and become a witness of the manner in which we treat the prisoners. And I shall expect to have my officer visit the prisoners detained in your jails and dungeons in like manner, as well as in the mines, where I am informed many an unhappy victim languishes out his days. I must remark, had Congress ever been inclined, they might have contributed to relieve the distresses of those we are under the necessity of holding as prisoners, by sending in all in their possession towards the payment of the large debt they owe us on that head, which might have been an inducement towards liberating many now in captivity.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with due respect, &c.

EDM. AFFLECK.

No. VI. p. 150.

LETTERS FROM COUNT DE VERGENNES TO
THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Versailles, 10 March, 1781.

SIR,

I have received the letter, which you did me the honor to write to me on the 16th of last December, and have deferred answering it, because the subject required deliberations, which we have been obliged from various circumstances to delay.

The King has just determined on the succours of different kinds, with which the Americans are to be furnished for the ensuing campaign. I shall not give you a detailed account of them, as I am transmitting one to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, I have no doubt, will communicate it to you.* I have reason to believe, that General Washington will be satisfied with our efforts for the support of the American cause, and that, on his part, he will do every thing in his power to render them available. I beg that you will assure him of the entire confidence, which we place in his zeal, patriotism, and talents, and that we shall sincerely rejoice when he shall have acquired the glory of having delivered his country and secured her liberties.

I hope that the disturbance in the American army has been entirely quelled, as a renewal of the scenes acted in the Pennsylvania

* Among other aids for the year 1781, the French King resolved to grant to the United States a subsidy of six millions of livres. The ministry, designing this money for a special succour to the army, proposed, that, after a certain portion had been paid for military articles purchased in Europe, the remainder should be at the disposal of General Washington, and disbursed in such a manner as he should think best for the general good. This idea was expressed to Dr. Franklin, and he communicated it to Congress. The jealousy and fears of that body were immediately alarmed. They were not satisfied that the head of the army should possess such an agent, in addition to his military power. M. de la Luzerne was at first a little concerned at this uneasiness, as it was mingled with latent suspicions of the design of the French court, in making this disposition of the money; but luckily he discovered in Count de Vergennes's letter to him, that General Washington, "or some other person," was indicated. He immediately removed the anxieties of Congress by communicating this fact, and informing them that the money was within their control. Not long afterwards he saw General Washington, who thanked him cordially for his interference, and for thus relieving him from a very responsible task, which he had no desire to perform, and which would excite the jealousy of his enemies.

line would be very dangerous, and would probably frustrate the most vigorous and best concerted plans. Clothing for your troops will arrive, and I trust you will also receive a further supply. This article appears to me the most important, as well as the most urgent. I have the honor to be, &c.

VERGENNES.

Versailles, 19 April, 1781.

SIR,

Your description of the situation of the Americans is very distressing, and, from the previous accounts of the Chevalier de la Luzerne, we have felt the immediate necessity of affording them further assistance. You may confide to General Washington, that the King has determined to pledge himself for a loan of ten millions, which is about to be negotiated in Holland in favor of the United States. Thus, Sir, by the close of this year, his Majesty will have given, or lent to the Americans, the sum of twenty millions. I venture to believe, that the General will feel the extent and importance of such a service, especially when he takes into consideration, as he should do, the maintenance of a squadron and a body of troops, which the King has placed at his disposal, and the heavy expenses of a war, which we sustain only for the sake of the Americans.

Congress had fixed their wants and their demands at twenty-five millions. I am willing to admit the correctness of this estimate; but the King must consider, on his side, the compass of his means. You may easily conceive, that they are absorbed by the great expenses demanded by our efforts for the American cause. I beg you to impress on General Washington the force of this idea. He is too enlightened not to perceive it strongly, or to admit any other sentiments than those of gratitude. I have done all in my power to awaken these in his aid-de-camp, but without success. Mr. Laurens is not without zeal, but I confess that he has hardly manifested it in the manner required by his commission. We have taken no exception at it, because we have attributed the conduct of Mr. Laurens merely to his inexperience in affairs. I think it necessary to speak of this officer, because it is possible, that, displeased at not having obtained all that he demanded, or rather exacted, namely, arms, clothing, ammunition, and twenty-five millions besides, he may be somewhat partial in the account he gives to his General; and I think it my duty to afford you the means of counteracting any prejudices, which he might receive from it. For the rest, Mr. Laurens has been well received by all the ministers of the

King, and I believe that he will in this respect express himself perfectly satisfied.*

The ample supplies, with which the King furnishes the Americans, authorize him to expect, that they will exert the greatest energy in the operations of the approaching campaign. I beg that you will mention to General Washington, that his Majesty has in this respect the greatest confidence in his experience, activity, and patriotism. I have nothing to add to the communications in my last letter concerning our operations. Our arrangements will remain as I have transmitted them to the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

Finally, Sir, if the war, as appears probable, is prolonged beyond the present campaign, I hope that we shall not be called on with similar demands. I forewarn you, that it would be quite impossible to satisfy them. France is by no means an inexhaustible mine.

I have the honor to be, &c.

VERGENNES.

Versailles, 11 May, 1781.

SIR,

I had forgotten to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 4th of last October. My letter of the 19th of April replies to nearly all the points on which it touches. Mr. Laurens is on the eve of his departure. He has converted a part of the money, given by his Majesty, into arms, clothing, and ammunition. We are waiting the result of a loan of ten millions, negotiating in Holland. It cannot be obtained in the name of the Americans, and the King, to attain his desire of obliging them, has resolved to come forward as principal negotiator. I beg that you will acquaint General Washington with this circumstance.

Notwithstanding the great efforts we are making for the United States, Mr. Laurens is not satisfied. This officer has treated me with great neglect since I announced to him the determination of

* The zeal of Colonel Laurens, and the ardor of his character, induced him to press his demands with more pertinacity, and with less regard to forms, than is usual in diplomatic intercourse. M. de la Luzerne conversed with him on the subject after his return to America. "He appeared," said that minister, "to be sensible of his mistake, and said he was a soldier, little acquainted with the usages of courts, but warmly attached to his country; and that this sentiment may have led him beyond the bounds, which he ought to have prescribed to himself. He has suffered none of the complaints to escape him here, in which he indulged at Paris." — *MS. Letter from Luzerne to Vergennes, September 25th, 1781.*

All the official papers relating to Colonel Laurens's mission to France are contained in the *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. IX. p. 199 *et seq.*

his Majesty. I know that his complaints have been highly indiscreet, and I apprehend that he will do every thing in his power to prejudice his General. I beg you to inform the latter of this, and to induce him to advise his aid-de-camp, and above all, to impress him with the necessity of rendering to Congress the most exact account of the mission in France, which has been confided to him. I trust that we shall not again receive similar messages. France is not inexhaustible, and it would be impossible to attend to them. We are doing much for the Americans, but they must also exert themselves. We are waiting with great impatience for news from your quarter. We have learnt as yet only by the English gazettes, that a naval combat has taken place off the Capes of Virginia; but they do not mention whether our troops have disembarked, nor what has become of M. Destouches. It is affirmed, that you are blockaded at Annapolis by several frigates. I am very anxious to hear that this intelligence is without foundation, and that you have reached your destination in safety. Finally, I have nothing new to add to the information of my preceding letters, respecting the operations of the ensuing campaign. God grant that the Americans may at length put forth all the energy of which they are capable. It will be the surest means of obtaining a speedy peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

VERGENNES.

No. VII. p. 163.

LETTER FROM COUNT DE GRASSE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON, CONCERNING OPERATIONS IN THE CHESAPEAKE.

Cape Henry, 23 September, 1781.

SIR,

The intelligence, which your Excellency has sent to me by the aid-de-camp of Count de Rochambeau, is most distressing. I know but little of the evil and the progress, which this operation may effect, but I perceive that our position is changed by the arrival of Admiral Digby.

The enemy is now nearly equal to us in strength, and it would be imprudent in me to place myself in a situation, that would prevent my attacking them, should they attempt to afford succour. I have the honor, therefore, to propose to your Excellency that I should leave two vessels at the mouth of York River, and draw around me

all the rest, excepting the corvettes and frigates, which have been blockading James River since my arrival, and which are the Charlotte, the Cormorant, the Sandwich, and one other frigate. The rest I shall bring together, in order to sail and keep the sea, that in case the enemy attempt to force the passage, I may attack them in a less disadvantageous position. But it is possible, that the issue of the combat may force us to leeward, and deprive us of the power of returning. Under these circumstances, what could you do, what would be your resources? I cannot sacrifice the army under my command, and my present position is neither favorable for attacking, nor secure in case of a gale.

The anchorage at York, on which we were agreed, does not appear more suitable, considering the maritime forces of the enemy; because it would place me in a very unfavorable position, and would have no effect in preventing the reinforcement from entering. I see no resource but the offing, and possibly that may not leave me free to return within the Capes. I shall wait impatiently for your answer, and that of M. de Rochambeau, to whom this letter is addressed in common with you. I beg you to communicate it to him, and to send your advice and opinions on the subject.

If my troops, or those of M. de St. Simon, remain with you, the two vessels and the corvettes at James River will be sufficient for you. I will sail with my forces towards New York, and I may possibly do more for the common cause than by remaining here an idle spectator. If the enemy do not come out, it is evidently because they dare not. We shall then consider what course to take. In the mean time you will push Cornwallis vigorously, and we will act in concert, each on his own side. I have the honor to be, with respectful consideration, &c.

COUNT DE GRASSE.

No. VIII. p. 182.

CAPITULATION AT YORKTOWN.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

York, 17 October, 1781.

SIR,

I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, and that two officers may be appointed by each side, to meet at Mr. Moore's house, to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester. I have the honor to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

Camp, before York, 17 October, 1781.

MY LORD,

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of this date.

An ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood will readily incline me to listen to such terms for the surrender of your posts of York and Gloucester, as are admissible.

I wish, previously to the meeting of commissioners, that your Lordship's proposals in writing may be sent to the American lines, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities, during two hours from the delivery of this letter, will be granted.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

York, half past four o'clock, P. M., 17 October, 1781.

SIR,

I have this moment been honored with your Excellency's letter dated this day.

The time limited for sending my answer will not admit of entering into the detail of articles; but the basis of my proposals will be, that the garrisons of York and Gloucester shall be prisoners of war, with the customary honors. And, for the convenience of the individuals whom I have the honor to command, that the British shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, under engagement not to serve against France, America, or their allies, until released or regularly exchanged. That all arms and

public stores shall be delivered up to you; but that the usual indulgence of side-arms to officers, and of retaining private property, shall be granted to officers and soldiers, and that the interest of several individuals, in civil capacities and connected with us, shall be attended to.

If your Excellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension of hostilities will be necessary, to transmit your answer, I shall have no objection to the hour that you may propose.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

Camp, before York, 18 October, 1781.

MY LORD,

To avoid unnecessary discussion and delays, I shall at once, in answer to your Lordship's letters of yesterday, declare the general basis upon which a definitive treaty and capitulation must take place. The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, as you propose, will be received prisoners of war. The condition annexed, of sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe to which they respectively belong, is inadmissible. Instead of this, they will be marched to such parts of the country as can most conveniently provide for their subsistence; and the benevolent treatment of prisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will be extended to them. The same honors will be granted to the surrendering army as were granted to the garrison of Charleston. The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their guns, stores, tackling, furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered in their present state to an officer of the navy, appointed to take possession of them.

The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired to the heads of the departments, to which they respectively belong.

The officers will be indulged in retaining their side-arms; and the officers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects; with this reserve, that property taken in the country will be reclaimed.

With regard to individuals in civil capacities, whose interest your Lordship wishes may be attended to, until they are more particularly described, nothing definitive can be settled.

I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be supplied with their own hospital stores, and be attended by British surgeons, particularly charged with the care of them.

Your Lordship will be pleased to signify your determination, either to accept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hours from the delivery of this letter, that commissioners may be appointed to digest the articles of capitulation, or a renewal of hostilities may take place.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

York, 18 October, 1781.

SIR,

I agree to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of the garrisons of York and Gloucester, including seamen, being prisoners of war, without annexing the condition of their being sent to Europe; but I expect to receive a compensation in the articles of capitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present state of defence.

I shall in particular desire, that the Bonetta sloop-of-war may be left entirely at my disposal, from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry my despatches to Sir Henry Clinton. Such soldiers as I may think proper to send as passengers in her, to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted to sail without examination, when my despatches are ready; engaging on my part, that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if she escapes the dangers of the sea, that the crew and soldiers shall be accounted for in future exchanges, that she shall carry off no officer without your consent, nor public property of any kind; and I shall likewise desire, that the traders and inhabitants may preserve their property, and that no person may be punished or molested for having joined the British troops.

If you choose to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shall appoint two field-officers of my army to meet two officers from you, at any time and place that you think proper, to digest the articles of capitulation. I have the honor to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.*

* Commissioners met accordingly, and arranged the articles of capitulation. Colonel Laurens and the Viscount de Noailles were the commissioners on the part of General Washington; and Colonel Dundas and Major Ross, on that of Earl Cornwallis.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION

Settled between his Excellency General Washington, Commander-in-chief of the combined Forces of America and France; his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, Lieutenant-General of the Armies of the King of France, Great Cross of the royal and military Order of St. Louis, commanding the auxiliary Troops of his Most Christian Majesty in America; and his Excellency the Count de Grasse, Lieutenant-General of the Naval Armies of his Most Christian Majesty, Commander of the Order of St. Louis, Commander-in-chief of the Naval Army of France in the Chesapeake, on the one Part; and the Right Honorable Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General of his Britannic Majesty's Forces, commanding the Garrisons of York and Gloucester; and Thomas Symonds, Esquire, commanding his Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces in York River in Virginia, on the other Part.

ARTICLE I. — The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the officers and seamen of his Britannic Majesty's ships, as well as other mariners, to surrender themselves prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and France. The land troops to remain prisoners to the United States, the navy to the naval army of his Most Christian Majesty.

Granted.

ARTICLE II. — The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired to the heads of departments appointed to receive them.

Granted.

ARTICLE III. — At twelve o'clock this day the two redoubts on the left flank of York to be delivered, the one to a detachment of American infantry, the other to a detachment of French grenadiers.

Granted.

The garrison of York will march out to a place to be appointed in front of the posts, at two o'clock precisely, with shouldered arms, colors cased, and drums beating a British or German march. They are then to ground their arms, and return to their encampments, where they will remain until they are despatched to the places of their destination. Two works on the Gloucester side will be delivered at one o'clock to a detachment of French and American troops appointed to possess them. The garrison will march out at three o'clock in the afternoon; the cavalry with their swords drawn, trumpets sounding, and the infantry in the manner prescribed for

the garrison of York. They are likewise to return to their encampments until they can be finally marched off.

ARTICLE IV. — Officers are to retain their side-arms. Both officers and soldiers to keep their private property of every kind ; and no part of their baggage or papers to be at any time subject to search or inspection. The baggage and papers of officers and soldiers taken during the siege to be likewise preserved for them.

Granted.

It is understood that any property obviously belonging to the inhabitants of these States, in the possession of the garrison, shall be subject to be reclaimed.

ARTICLE V. — The soldiers to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible, and supplied with the same rations of provisions as are allowed to soldiers in the service of America. A field-officer from each nation, to wit, British, Anspach, and Hessian, and other officers on parole, in the proportion of one to fifty men to be allowed to reside near their respective regiments, to visit them frequently, and be witnesses of their treatment ; and that their officers may receive and deliver clothing and other necessities for them, for which passports are to be granted when applied for.

Granted.

ARTICLE VI. — The general, staff, and other officers not employed as mentioned in the above articles, and who choose it, to be permitted to go on parole to Europe, to New York, or to any other American maritime posts at present in the possession of the British forces, at their own option ; and proper vessels to be granted by the Count de Grasse to carry them under flags of truce to New York within ten days from this date, if possible, and they to reside in a district to be agreed upon hereafter, until they embark. The officers of the civil department of the army and navy to be included in this article. Passports to go by land to be granted to those to whom vessels cannot be furnished.

Granted.

ARTICLE VII. — Officers to be allowed to keep soldiers as servants, according to the common practice of the service. Servants not soldiers are not to be considered as prisoners, and are to be allowed to attend their masters.

Granted.

ARTICLE VIII. — The Bonetta sloop-of-war to be equipped, and navigated by its present captain and crew, and left entirely at the disposal of Lord Cornwallis from the hour that the capitulation is

signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry despatches to Sir Henry Clinton; and such soldiers as he may think proper to send to New York, to be permitted to sail without examination. When his despatches are ready, his Lordship engages on his part, that the ship shall be delivered to the order of the Count de Grasse, if she escapes the dangers of the sea. That she shall not carry off any public stores. Any part of the crew that may be deficient on her return, and the soldiers passengers, to be accounted for on her delivery.

ARTICLE IX.—The traders are to preserve their property, and to be allowed three months to dispose of or remove them; and those traders are not to be considered as prisoners of war.

The traders will be allowed to dispose of their effects, the allied army having the right of preëmption. The traders to be considered as prisoners of war upon parole.

ARTICLE X.—Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country, at present in York or Gloucester, are not to be punished on account of having joined the British army.

This article cannot be assented to, being altogether of civil resort.

ARTICLE XI.—Proper hospitals to be furnished for the sick and wounded. They are to be attended by their own surgeons on parole; and they are to be furnished with medicines and stores from the American hospitals.

The hospital stores now at York and Gloucester shall be delivered for the use of the British sick and wounded. Passports will be granted for procuring them further supplies from New York, as occasion may require; and proper hospitals will be furnished for the reception of the sick and wounded of the two garrisons.

ARTICLE XII.—Wagons to be furnished to carry the baggage of the officers attending the soldiers, and to surgeons when travelling on account of the sick, attending the hospitals at public expense.

They are to be furnished if possible.

ARTICLE XIII.—The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their stores, guns, tackling, and apparel, shall be delivered up in their present state to an officer of the navy appointed to take possession of them, previously unloading the private property, part of which had been on board for security during the siege.

Granted.

ARTICLE XIV.—No article of capitulation to be infringed on pretence of reprisals; and if there be any doubtful expressions in

it, they are to be interpreted according to the common meaning and acceptation of the words.

Granted.

Done at Yorktown, in Virginia, October 19th, 1781.

CORNWALLIS,

THOMAS SYMONDS.

Done in the Trenches before Yorktown, in Virginia, October 19th, 1781.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Le Comte de ROCHAMBEAU.

Le Comte de BARRAS,

En mon nom & celui du

Comte de GRASSE.

No. IX. p. 294.

LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS FROM SIR GUY CARLETON
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Head-Quarters, New York, 7 May, 1782.

SIR,

Having been appointed by his Majesty to the command of the forces on the Atlantic Ocean, and joined with Admiral Digby in the commission of peace, I find it proper in this manner to apprise your Excellency of my arrival at New York.

The occasion, Sir, seems to render this communication proper, but the circumstances of the present time render it also indispensable; as I find it just to transmit herewith to your Excellency certain papers, from the perusal of which your Excellency will perceive what dispositions prevail in the government and people of England towards those of America, and what further effects are likely to follow. If the like pacific dispositions should prevail in this country, both my inclination and duty will lead me to meet it with the most zealous concurrence. In all events, Sir, it is with me to declare, that, if war must prevail I shall endeavour to render its miseries as light to the people of this continent, as the circumstances of such a condition will possibly permit.

I am much concerned to find, that private and unauthorized persons have on both sides given way to those passions, which ought to have received the strongest and most effectual control, and

which have begot acts of retaliation, which, without proper preventions, may have an extent equally calamitous and dishonorable to both parties, though, as it should seem, more extensively pernicious to the natives and settlers of this country.

How much soever, Sir, we may differ in other respects, upon this one point we must perfectly concur, being alike interested to preserve the name of Englishmen from reproach, and individuals from experiencing such unnecessary evils, as can have no effect upon a general decision. Every proper measure, which may tend to prevent these criminal excesses in individuals, I shall ever be ready to embrace; and, as an advance on my part, I have, as the first act of my command, enlarged Mr. Livingston,* and have written to his father upon the subject of such excesses as have passed in New Jersey, desiring his concurrence in such measures as, even under the conditions of war, the common interests of humanity require.

I am further to acquaint you, Sir, that it was my intention to have sent this day a similar letter of compliment to Congress, but am informed it is previously necessary to obtain a passport from your Excellency, which I therefore hope to receive, if you have no objection, for the passage of Mr. Morgann to Philadelphia for the above purpose. I have the honor to be, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

Head-Quarters, New York, 20 June, 1782.

SIR,

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th of June † with two enclosures, containing the report of Chief Justice Brearley concerning the capture and detention of Hatfield and Badgely in New Jersey, and extracts of letters from your Excellency to Lieutenant-General Robertson, and from Governor Livingston to you.

Before I received your letter, I had written to Governor Livingston concerning the detention of these men, as also of two others, who I am informed are lately condemned in New Jersey, upon some new provincial law of high treason, to suffer death, and even the day of their execution appointed. To this letter I have

* Colonel Henry Brockholst Livingston, son of Governor Livingston of New Jersey. On his passage from Cadiz to America, he was captured by a British frigate, and brought into New York.

† This letter was merely intended to communicate the enclosures, without expressing any opinion in regard to them. On that head General Washington referred to his letter to General Robertson, dated May 4th.

as yet received no answer; but I trust it will be admitted, that executions upon this ground, whether with or without the formalities of law, are measures of the most fatal extremity. In a civil war between people of one empire, there can, during the contest, be no treason at all; or each party, assuming the other to be traitors, shall be able, by the same or different laws, some made even during the very contest, to effect more carnage than by the sword, producing the most horrid refinements in ill, under the disguise of law; and one law no doubt is or can be made as sharp as another, and chief justices may be found on both sides equally sanguinary. "Those men," says the chief justice of Jersey in the report enclosed by your Excellency, "who were charged with high treason, I committed to prison; of this description were the said Hatfield and Badgely, who had joined the enemy long since the passing of the treason act, and whose persons by the law of nations are not protected by flags of truce." What shall be said, Sir, when a man of learning, as by profession this gentleman ought to be, can go this length? Shall those who oppose the separation of the whole empire become traitors to a part, and be condemned by new laws, even during the contest, for their attachment to the old? And shall the plea of sincerity and conscience, which is the vindication of some, be yet of no avail? I have at present a purpose of establishing a court of criminal law in this town, for reasons which certain difficult questions have lately pressed upon me, and not, your Excellency may be assured, as an instrument of civil war. Yet it is manifest, that, if I were capable of making retaliations in legal form, either retaliations must beget each other without end, to the disgrace of humanity, or the local laws of partial treason, lately passed in the Provinces, must be done away.

But I think it impossible we should be of different minds on this subject. There must be some mistake in the way, which I do not understand. To prevent delay, and the imperfections of this sort of explanation, General Robertson, to whom I have communicated your letters, has voluntarily offered personally to wait on your Excellency, and endeavour to place these questions, for the future, on ground of some mutual good understanding. I am therefore to desire your Excellency's passports, for this purpose, for Lieutenant-General Robertson, an aid-de-camp, and George D. Ludlow, Esquire, either to wait on your Excellency, or to meet other persons empowered, at any place you may be pleased to appoint.

I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 7 July, 1782.

SIR,

However convinced of your Excellency's disposition, yet it gave me much satisfaction to be confirmed therein by your letter of the 22d of June, wherein you say, that it would make you happy if any measures can be adopted for humanizing as much as possible the calamities attendant on a state of war. But you are also pleased to say, resort must be had to the civil power, the laws complained of having been passed without your agency, and not being under your control. I feel the full force of this argument, and shall be content to take any means, which can procure the desired end. I must observe, however, that, as these laws are considered by me, and in fact are, mere instruments of war, so I think, Sir, that on occasion of any conference with the civil power on this subject, it will be necessary (as the army is so deeply engaged in the question), that you should at least have some confidential officer to assist in the attainment of a purpose, which I am persuaded we both with equal earnestness desire, nor can I apprehend any difficulty in the attainment.

There are questions, which require only that they should be proposed to men of sound judgment and dispassionate minds, that they may be assented to. The difficulties with me, Sir, are as to the mode; and I see no reason why I should not frankly call upon you for assistance. Am I, Sir, to apply to Congress, that persons appointed by me may be admitted to conferences at Philadelphia? Or can any deputation be sent by Congress to your camp for this purpose, to be there met by persons empowered by me? Or will you, Sir, undertake to manage our common interest? All I wish for is, that an end, in which our common honor and humanity are engaged, may be substantially obtained.

I shall take this opportunity to inform your Excellency, that I have learned within these few days, that clergymen, physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, have been considered as prisoners of war, and paroled accordingly. This I am sure requires only the bare mention of it to be reformed. These paroles, if your Excellency concurs, may in public orders be discharged, and in future forbid as erroneous and contrary to the customs of war.

I am further to inform you, Sir, that the court-martial upon Lippencot for the murder of Huddy has given in its judgment, and the minutes of the trial, which ere long I shall order to be copied and sent to your Excellency accompanied by some other documents.

I have just learned from a letter written by your commissary-

general of prisoners, that your objection to an exchange of land for naval prisoners is, that it would give us a great and permanent strength for which you could receive no adequate compensation. To remove this objection, I propose, that (all exchanges of men of the same description being exhausted) sailor and soldier shall be immediately exchanged, and the soldier so received by us shall not serve in nor against the thirteen Provinces for one year, a period which I trust will extend beyond our present contentions. This I think throws the advantage entirely into your hands; but I do not think this inequality of importance enough to weigh against the imprisonment of so many men on both sides; for imprisonment itself, attended with its necessary conditions, is, in this season especially, a calamity which ought not to be imposed or protracted for political niceties. I am, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 2 August, 1782.

SIR,

The pacific disposition of the Parliament and people of England towards the thirteen Provinces has already been communicated to you, and the resolutions of the House of Commons of the 27th of February last have been placed in your Excellency's hands, and intimations given at the same time, that further pacific measures were likely to follow. Since which, until the present time, we have had no direct communications from England; but a mail is now arrived, which brings us very important information.

We are acquainted, Sir, by authority, that negotiations for a general peace have already commenced at Paris, and that Mr. Grenville is invested with full powers to treat with all parties at war, and is now at Paris in the execution of his commission. And we are likewise, Sir, further made acquainted, that his Majesty, in order to remove all obstacles to that peace, which he so ardently wishes to restore, has commanded his ministers to direct Mr. Grenville, that the independency of the thirteen Provinces should be proposed by him in the first instance, instead of making it a condition of a general treaty; however, not without the highest confidence, that the Loyalists shall be restored to their possessions, or a full compensation made to them for whatever confiscations may have taken place.

With respect to Mr. Laurens, we are to acquaint you, that he has been enlarged and discharged from all engagements without any conditions whatever; after which he declared of his own accord, that he considered Lord Cornwallis as freed from his parole. Upon

this point we are to desire your Excellency's sentiments, or those of Congress.

We are further acquainted, that transports have been prepared in England for conveying all the American prisoners to this country, to be exchanged here; and we are directed to urge by every consideration of humanity the most speedy exchange, a measure in which not only the comforts but the rights of individuals are concerned. To obtain this end, a proposition has already been made, that (all exchanges of men of the same description being exhausted) sailor and soldier should be immediately exchanged, man for man against each other, with this condition annexed, that your sailors should be at liberty to serve the moment they were exchanged, and that the soldiers so received by us should not serve in nor against the thirteen Provinces for one year. And from this proposition, however unequal the conditions, we do not now wish to recede. We have the honor to be, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

ROBERT DIGBY.

New York, 25 October, 1782.

SIR,

I am much at a loss how to answer the declarations of Congress communicated to me by your Excellency's letter of the 2d instant, nor do I fully comprehend their import. I understand, that the practice has been for nations at war to provide at the conclusion of a peace for the liquidation of all demands, made reciprocally for the maintenance of prisoners; at which time the whole has either been compendiously settled, or further time given to collect an account of expenses of maintenance from all parts where they have been incurred; but we, Sir, on our part can have no objection to appoint commissaries at this period for the purpose of liquidation, if Congress earnestly desire that such liquidation shall be so prematurely made, but it has not been usual I think since the barbarous ages to use any menaces, however obscure, towards prisoners, and still less to practise towards them any barbarity.

There is an easy and honorable way for Congress to diminish the burthen, which our prisoners occasion. Let those, who, agreeably to the terms of their surrender, should have been restored to their country five years ago, be now delivered up; let a number of our prisoners, equal to those we have liberated, be returned under the condition, that where soldiers are given for seamen, those soldiers are not to serve in or against the thirteen Provinces for twelve months, as has been formerly proposed; let the remainder

be given up for an equitable ransom, as is practised by all civilized people.

While on our side so strong a desire of peace is manifested, your prisoners liberally and in confidence returned to their Provinces, I cannot but lament to find such indications as make me apprehend Congress is determined, not only to reject all peace, but to bring the war to the last extremities of rage, and, as far as in them lies, to transmit it down to posterity with all its horrors. Their refusing to release our prisoners for those we have sent in is in the nature of an injunction upon us not in future to release any more; so that, in passing sentence on British prisoners, Congress should recollect, that it is passing the like sentence on those of America, who are or may fall into our hands, unless indeed it shall in the event be found, that the American prisoners may experience the greatest share of tenderness and regard from those they call their enemies. I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 6 April, 1783.

SIR,

A packet from England arrived in this port last night, by which I have despatches from Mr. Townshend, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, communicating official intelligence, that preliminary articles of peace with France and Spain were signed at Paris on the 20th of January last, and that the ratifications have been since exchanged at the same place.

The King, Sir, has been pleased in consequence of these events, to order proclamations to be published, declaring a cessation of arms, as well by sea as land; and his Majesty's pleasure signified, that I should cause the same to be published in all places under my command, in order that his Majesty's subjects may pay immediate and due obedience thereto; and such proclamation I shall accordingly cause to be made on Tuesday next, the 8th instant. In consequence thereof, and in conformity to the articles of peace, all our prisoners of war are to be set at liberty and restored with all convenient despatch, entertaining no doubt that similar measures will be taken on the part of the United States of America. In like manner no doubt can be entertained, that Congress, in conformity to the fifth article of the provisional treaty, will lose no time in earnestly recommending to the legislatures of the respective States to provide for the restitution of confiscated estates, and to reconsider and revise all laws of confiscation, that they may be ren-

dered perfectly consistent, not only with justice and equity, but with that spirit of conciliation, which, on the return of the blessings of peace, should universally prevail.

And I am further to inform your Excellency, that, an instrument of accession to the suspension of hostilities by the States-General of the United Provinces having been received in England, a cessation of arms with those States has been thereupon included in the proclamation.

Upon this great occasion, Sir, I am to offer my strongest assurances, that, during the short period of my command here, I shall be ready and earnest to cultivate that spirit of perfect good will, which, between the United States of America and the King of Great Britain, and the subjects and citizens of both countries, will, I trust, always remain. I am with much consideration, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 12 May, 1783.

SIR,

I can have no objection to the giving of your Excellency, in writing, full information of the measures taken for the evacuation of this place, nor should I have had any to the noting of the whole of our conversation and preserving it in minutes. Mistakes or misconstruction might thereby be prevented.

Very soon after the orders for a cessation of hostilities were received here, letters were written both to Europe and the West Indies, to require that all the shipping, which could be procured, might be sent to assist in the evacuation of this place. About the same time all the prisoners of war in our hands were released.

An embarkation was in much forwardness previous to the official information of peace. Soon after, I wrote to the minister of foreign affairs to request, that Congress would be pleased to empower any person or persons in behalf of the United States to be present at New York, and to assist such persons as should be appointed by me to inspect and superintend all embarkations, which the evacuation of this place might require; and that they would represent to me every infraction of the letter or spirit of the treaty, that redress might be immediately ordered. In the mean time, to prevent abuse or delay, and until I could learn the determination of Congress, I requested of Daniel Parker, Esquire, one of the contractors for supplying your army with provisions, and of Major Hopkins, late deputy commissary of prisoners, that they would undertake the business with other persons whom I appointed, which they did accordingly, and executed with much diligence.

This fleet sailed about the 27th of April, for different parts of Nova Scotia, and, including the troops, carried about seven thousand persons with all their effects; also some artillery and public stores; so that you will perceive the evacuation began sooner, and was in greater forwardness, than could have been expected. Your Excellency will also perceive, from what I have said, that at present it is impossible to tell when the evacuation of this city can be completed. In truth, I cannot guess the quantity of shipping that will be sent to me, nor the number of persons that will be forced to abandon this place. The evacuation of Penobscot will require considerably less tonnage, and I should think may soon be effected. If it is most eligible to you that I should give a preference to this object, I shall immediately give orders for its being carried into most speedy execution.

I enclose a copy of an order, which I have given out to prevent the carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants. I understand from the gentlemen therein named, that they visited the fleet bound to Nova Scotia, and ordered on shore whatever came clearly under the above description. There appeared to be but little difference of opinion, except in the case of negroes who had been declared free previous to my arrival. As I have no right to deprive them of that liberty I found them possessed of, an accurate register was taken of every circumstance respecting them, so as to serve as a record of the name of the original proprietor of the negro, and as a rule by which to judge of his value. By this open method of conducting the business, I hoped to prevent all fraud, and whatever might admit of different constructions is left open for future explanation or compensation. Had these negroes been denied permission to embark, they would, in spite of every means to prevent it, have found various methods of quitting this place, so that the former owner would no longer have been able to trace them, and of course would have lost, in every way, all chance of compensation.

The business carried on in this public manner, and the orders nominating persons to superintend embarkations published in the gazette, I had no reason to think either the embarkation, or any circumstances attending it, could have been matter of surprise to your Excellency on the 6th of May. I then however learned with concern, that the embarkation, which had already taken place, and in which a large number of negroes had been conveyed away, appeared to your Excellency as a measure totally different from the letter and spirit of the treaty.

The negroes in question, I have already said, I found free when I arrived at New York. I had therefore no right, as I thought, to prevent their going away to any part of the world they thought proper.

I must confess, that the mere supposition that the King's minister could deliberately stipulate in a treaty an engagement to be guilty of a notorious breach of the public faith, towards people of any complexion, seems to denote a less friendly disposition than I could wish, and I think less friendly than we might expect. After all, I only give my own opinion. Every negro's name is registered, and the master he formerly belonged to, with such other circumstances as served to denote his value, that it may be adjusted by compensation, if that was really the intention and meaning of the treaty. Restoration, where inseparable from a breach of public faith, is, as all the world I think must allow, utterly impracticable. I know of no better method of preventing abuse, and the carrying away of negroes or other American property, than that I proposed to the minister of foreign affairs in my letter of the 14th of April, the naming of commissioners to assist those appointed by me to inspect all embarkations; and I am pleased to find your Excellency has approved of this method, and appointed Egbert Benson, Esquire, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and Daniel Parker, Esquire, one of the contractors for supplying your army with provisions, commissioners on your part for this purpose. I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 12 November, 1783.

SIR,

The preparations for withdrawing his Majesty's troops from this place are so far advanced, that, unless some untoward accident should intervene, I hope it may be accomplished some days before the 'end of the present month. At all events, I propose to relinquish the posts at Kingsbridge, and as far as McGowan's Pass inclusive on this Island, on the 21st instant; to resign the possession of Herrick's and Hampstead with all to the eastward on Long Island, on the same day; and, if possible, to give up this city with Brooklyn, on the day following; and Paulus Hook, Dennis's, and Staten Island, as soon after as may be practicable. Your Excellency, however, will see the necessity of my making a reserve respecting the city of New York, that, if any of our ships should happen to want repairs after the town is evacuated, we shall still have a free and uninterrupted use of the Ship-yard, under the di-

rection of such officer as the admiral shall appoint, as long as it may be requisite for that purpose.

Major Beckwith, my eldest aid-de-camp, who has the honor to be the bearer of this letter, will communicate such other particulars as may be necessary for your Excellency's further information.

I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 19 November, 1783.

SIR,

His Majesty's troops will retire from Kingsbridge and McGowan's Pass on this Island, on the 21st instant, as notified to your Excellency in my letter of the 12th; and I shall resign the possession of Herrick's and Hampstead, with all to the eastward on Long Island, the same day. Paulus Hook will be relinquished on the day following; but, though every exertion has been made with a view to evacuate this city at the same time, which it was my hope and intention to do, I now find it impracticable. Yet, notwithstanding the winds have lately been very unfavorable, if I have proper assurances that we shall retain a free and uninterrupted use of the Ship-yard and Hallet's Wharf in New York, and the Brewery and Bake-house on Long Island, (which the admiral represents as indispensably necessary for the shipping and sick seamen,) until we can be ready to take our final departure, I shall retire from this city and from Brooklyn on Tuesday next at noon, or as soon after as wind and weather may permit; only retaining (in addition to the reservations above specified) Staten Island, with Dennis's, New Utrecht, and the circumjacent district on Long Island, for such time as may be found absolutely requisite for the troops, that may then remain unprovided with transports.

I have received repeated information, the substance of which I enclose, that a deliberate combination has been formed to plunder this town whenever the King's troops shall be withdrawn; and, as I doubt not but your Excellency is, with me, desirous to prevent every species of enormity on this interesting occasion, I give you this intimation, which I have reason to think is well founded, and shall endeavour to persuade the informant to wait on you in person, which he seems not averse to, though greatly apprehensive of the resentment of those concerning whom he has given information. I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

New York, 24 November, 1783.

SIR,

Agreeably to the notification given you in my letter of the 19th instant, I purpose to withdraw from this place to-morrow at noon, by which time I conclude your troops will be near the barrier. The guards from the redoubts and on the East River shall be first withdrawn; but an officer will be sent out to give information to your advanced guard when the troops move.

A packet from England is this morning arrived. I transmit a letter addressed to your Excellency, which came enclosed in my despatches. I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

Ceres, off Staten Island, 1 December, 1783.

SIR,

If wind and weather permit, I hope we shall be able to embark the remainder of his Majesty's troops from Long Island and Staten Island, and take our final departure on the 4th instant.

I am, Sir, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

No. X. p. 334.

A SKETCH OF THE STATE OF OPINIONS IN THE OLD
CONGRESS, DRAWN UP BY MR. MADISON.*

The two great objects, which predominate in the politics of Congress at this juncture are *Vermont* and the *Western Territory*.

I. The independence of Vermont and its admission into the confederacy are patronized by the eastern States (New Hampshire excepted), first, from an ancient prejudice against New York; secondly, the interest which citizens of those States have in lands granted by Vermont; thirdly, but principally, from the accession of weight they will derive from it in Congress. New Hampshire, having gained its main object by the exclusion of its territory east

* This paper, dated May 1st, 1782, was presented to me by Mr. Madison, and was written by him while in Congress at the time of its date. It exhibits an interesting view of two important topics, which then engaged the deliberations of that body, and the policy of the different States, as growing out of local and other causes.

of Connecticut River from the claims of Vermont, is already indifferent to its independence, and will probably soon combine with other eastern States in its favor.

The same patronage is yielded to the pretensions of Vermont by Pennsylvania and Maryland, with the sole view of reinforcing the opposition to claims of western territory, particularly those of Virginia, and by New Jersey and Delaware with the additional view of strengthening the interests of the little States. Both of these considerations operate also on Rhode Island, in addition to those above mentioned.

The independence of Vermont and its admission into the Union are opposed by New York for reasons obvious and well known.

The like opposition is made by Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. The grounds of this opposition are, first, an habitual jealousy of a predominance of eastern interests; secondly, the opposition expected from Vermont to western claims; thirdly, the inexpediency of admitting so unimportant a State to an equal vote in deciding on peace, and all the other grand interests of the Union now depending; fourthly, the influence of the example on a premature dismemberment of the other States. These considerations influence the four States last mentioned in different degrees. The second and third, to say nothing of the fourth, ought to be decisive with Virginia.

II. The territorial claims, particularly those of Virginia, are opposed by Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. Rhode Island is influenced in her opposition, first, by a lucrative desire of sharing in the vacant territory as a fund of revenue; secondly, by the envy and jealousy naturally excited by superior resources and importance. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland are influenced partly by the same considerations, but principally by the intrigues of their citizens, who are interested in the claims of land companies. The decisive influence of this last consideration is manifest from the peculiar and persevering opposition made against Virginia, within whose limits those claims lie.

The western claims, or rather a final settlement of them, are also thwarted by Massachusetts and Connecticut. This object with them is chiefly subservient to that of Vermont, as the latter is with Pennsylvania and Maryland to the former. The general policy and interests of these two States are opposed to the admission of Vermont into the Union; and, if the case of the western territory were once removed, they would instantly divide from the

eastern States in the case of Vermont. Of this Massachusetts and Connecticut are not insensible, and therefore find their advantage in keeping the territorial controversy pending. Connecticut may likewise conceive some analogy between her claim to the western country and that of Virginia; and that the acceptance of the cession of the latter would influence her sentiments in the controversy between the former and Pennsylvania.

The western claims are opposed by Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and New York, all of these States being interested therein. South Carolina is the least so. The claim of New York is very extensive, but her title very flimsy. She urges it more with the hope of obtaining some advantage or credit by its cession, than of ever maintaining it. If her cession should be accepted, and the affair of Vermont terminated, as these are the only ties which unite her with the southern States, she will immediately connect her policy with that of the eastern States, as far at least as the remains of former prejudices will permit.

No. XI. p. 361.

LETTER FROM COUNT DE VERGENNES TO GENERAL WASHINGTON, RESPECTING CAPTAIN ASGILL.

Versailles, 29 July, 1782.

SIR,

It is not in quality of a King, the friend and ally of the United States, (though with the knowledge and consent of his Majesty) that I now have the honor to write to your Excellency. It is as a man of sensibility and a tender father, who feels all the force of paternal love, that I take the liberty to address to your Excellency my earnest solicitations in favor of a mother and family in tears. Her situation seems the more worthy of notice on our part, as it is to the humanity of a nation at war with her own, that she has recourse, for what she ought to receive from the impartial justice of her own generals.

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency a copy of a letter, which Lady Asgill has just written me. I am not known to her, nor was I acquainted that her son was the unhappy victim, destined by lot to expiate the odious crime that a formal denial of justice obliges you to avenge. Your Excellency will not read this letter

without being extremely affected; it had that effect upon the King and Queen, to whom I communicated it. The goodness of their Majesties' hearts induces them to desire, that the inquietudes of an unfortunate mother may be calmed, and her tenderness reassured. I felt, Sir, that there are cases where humanity itself exacts the most extreme rigor; perhaps the one now in question may be of the number; but, allowing reprisals to be just, it is not less horrid to those who are the victims; and the character of your Excellency is too well known, for me not to be persuaded that you desire nothing more than to be able to avoid the disagreeable necessity.

There is one consideration, Sir, which, though it is not decisive, may have an influence on your resolution. Captain Asgill is doubtless your prisoner, but he is among those whom the arms of the King contributed to put into your hands at Yorktown. Although this circumstance does not operate as a safeguard, it however justifies the interest I permit myself to take in this affair. If it is in your power, Sir, to consider and have regard to it, you will do what is agreeable to their Majesties; the danger of young Asgill, the tears, the despair of his mother, affect them sensibly; and they will see with pleasure the hope of consolation shine out for those unfortunate people.

In seeking to deliver Mr. Asgill from the fate which threatens him, I am far from engaging you to secure another victim; the pardon, to be perfectly satisfactory, must be entire. I do not imagine it can be productive of any bad consequences. If the English general has not been able to punish the horrible crime you complain of, in so exemplary a manner as he should, there is reason to think he will take the most efficacious measures to prevent the like in future.

I sincerely wish, Sir, that my intercession may meet success; the sentiment which dictates it, and which you have not ceased to manifest on every occasion, assures me, that you will not be indifferent to the prayers and to the tears of a family, which has recourse to your clemency through me. It is rendering homage to your virtue to implore it.

I have the honor to be, with the most perfect consideration, Sir, yours, &c.

VERGENNES.

No. XII. p. 393.

NEWBURG ADDRESSES.

After the army had marched from their encampment at Verplanck's Point, and gone into winter-quarters at Newburg, they had leisure to reflect upon their situation and prospects. The anticipation of a speedy peace, and the long arrearages of their pay, while their claims were unadjusted, their accounts unsettled, and no efficient security was provided for a future liquidation of them, were causes of much excitement and uneasiness. In the month of December they came to a serious determination to address Congress on the subject of their grievances. A memorial was accordingly drawn up, which was agreed to by the principal officers, and was understood to express the sense of the army. A committee was appointed to carry this memorial to Philadelphia, and lay it before Congress, with such verbal representations to the several members as would fully explain its import, and the condition, feelings, and expectations of the army. This committee consisted of General McDougall, Colonel Ogden, and Colonel Brooks. They proceeded to Philadelphia, and a few days after their arrival Congress passed the following resolutions, on the 25th of January, 1783.

"The grand committee, consisting of a member from each State, report, that they have considered the contents of a memorial presented by the army, and find that they comprehend five different articles ;

"1. Present pay.

"2. A settlement of accounts of the arrearages of pay, and security for what is due.

"3. A commutation of the half-pay allowed by different resolutions of Congress for an equivalent in gross.

"4. A settlement of the accounts of deficiencies of rations and compensation.

"5. A settlement of the accounts of deficiencies of clothing and compensation.

"Whereupon, Resolved, as to the first, that the superintendent of finance be directed, conformably to the measures already taken for that purpose, as soon as the state of the public finances will permit, to make such payment and in such manner as he shall think proper, till the further order of Congress.

"Resolved, With respect to the second article, so far as relates

to the settlement of accounts, that the several States be called upon to complete without delay the settlements with their respective lines of the army, up to the 1st day of August, 1783, and that the superintendent of finance be directed to take such measures as shall appear to him most proper for effecting the settlement from that period.

“As to what relates to the providing security for what shall be found due on such settlement ;

“Resolved, That the troops of the United States, in common with all creditors of the same, have an undoubted right to expect such security ; and that Congress will make every effort in their power to obtain, from the respective States, substantial funds, adequate to the object of funding the whole debt of the United States, and will enter upon an immediate and full consideration of the nature of such funds, and the most likely mode of obtaining them.

“Ordered, That the remainder of the report be referred to a committee of five.”

General Knox had been appointed on the part of the army to correspond with the committee respecting the objects of their commission, and he received from them the following report.

“Philadelphia, 8 February, 1783

“DEAR SIR,

“The army has, no doubt, been anxious to hear from us, and we should have had as much pleasure in communicating to them any success of our application for them, as they in receiving it ; but nothing of any moment has yet been decided for them. We spent the first week after our arrival in conversing with the members of Congress on the subject of the address, to prepare them for the reception of it before it was read, lest the want of information should retard a favorable resolution on it. On its being read, a committee was appointed to confer with us, consisting of a member from each State but Georgia, which was unrepresented, and had no member attending. The financier attended at this meeting. To this committee we communicated the condition of the army, and we dilated very diffusely on all the subjects stated in the address ; indeed, truth and decency were the only bounds observed in our conference with them. The reason of our applying to Congress to determine on a compensation for half-pay was also minutely detailed.

“The result as to present pay will be communicated to you by Colonel Brooks. On this subject we can only commit to paper, that a month's pay in notes to the officers, and one to the non-commissioned and privates, as weekly payments of half a dollar

per week to the latter is all that can be now obtained. This grand committee appointed a sub-committee to converse with us, as occasion should require, if any new matter occurred to us; and to inspect critically into the principles of annuities, in order to determine on an equivalent for the half-pay.

“In about ten days they reported to the grand committee, that twelve years was a mean life of the ages of the officers of the army, and that six whole years’ pay was equal, to the country and the army, to the half-pay for life. The committee then reported to Congress, which produced the resolutions which have been transmitted to the Commander-in-chief. That part of the report, which respected the value of the half-pay, was recommitted to a smaller committee, the number of years being considered too many.

“This committee took up some time to examine calculations on annuities, and two days ago they reported five years’ whole pay as equal to the half-pay for life; but nine States would not approve the report, Georgia, Maryland, and Delaware unrepresented. We advised our friends not to press for a determination, if they could not carry the question; as the sense of Maryland and Delaware were known to be favorable to us, and their delegates were daily expected in town. On discussion in Congress, some of the members opposed to the commutation, and equally so to half-pay, expressed a desire to put off the question, to give them time for more consideration; it was accordingly granted. Thus stands the matter of commutation.

“Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North and South Carolina were for the equivalent; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Jersey were against it. There is some prospect of getting one more of these States to vote for the commutation. If this is accomplished, with Maryland and Delaware, the question will be carried; whenever it is, as the report now stands, it will be at the election of a line, as such, to accept of the commutation or retain their claim to the half-pay, Congress being determined, that no alteration shall take place in the emolument held out to the army but by their consent.

“This rendered it unnecessary for us to consult the army on the equivalent for the half-pay. The zeal of a great number of members of Congress to get Continental funds, while a few wished to have us referred to the States, induced us to conceal what funds we wished, or expected, lest our declaration for one or the other might retard a settlement of our accounts, or a determination on the equivalent for half-pay. Indeed, some of our best friends in

Congress declared, however desirous they were to have our accounts settled, and the commutation fixed, as well as to get funds, yet they would oppose referring us to the States for a settlement and security, till all prospect of obtaining Continental funds was at an end.

“ Whether this is near or not, as commutation for the half-pay was one of the principal objects of the address, the obtaining of that is necessary, previous to our particularizing what fund will be most agreeable to us; this must be determined by circumstances. If Congress get funds we shall be secured. If not, the equivalent settled, a principle will be established, which will be more acceptable to the eastern States than half-pay, if application must be made to them. As it is not likely that Congress will be able to determine soon on the commutation (for the reasons above-mentioned), it is judged necessary that Colonel Brooks return to the army, to give them a more particular detail of our prospects than can be done in the compass of a letter. It is however thought proper, that General McDougall should remain in Philadelphia, to endeavour at a proper time to bring on the determination of Congress on the important question, as well as to quicken the accomplishment of the other points contained in the address. In the mean time Colonel Ogden visits his family, as well as to do some business which will greatly promote the object of our being sent here. Colonel Ogden will, however, return, if it should be judged necessary. We conceive it expedient to make the army this general report, and beg leave to refer you to Colonel Brooks for a more particular one.

“ We are, Sir, with great truth, your affectionate humble servants.

“ ALEX. MCDUGALL.

“ M. OGDEN.”

The representations thus communicated, in the resolves of Congress and the report of the committee, were by no means satisfactory to all the officers of the army, if indeed to any. Further measures to make known their sentiments and enforce their claims were by some of them thought necessary. In the opinion of these persons a fit occasion was now presented “ for assembling the officers, not in mass, but by representation; and for passing a series of resolutions, which, in the hands of their committee, and of their auxiliaries in Congress, would furnish a new and powerful lever for operating on the two dissenting States. But to this end, there was yet wanting the interposition of a hand, which should touch with some ability the several chords of sympathy and feeling that be-

longed to the case, and thus secure to the deliberations and their result that tone and energy, without which they would be a dead letter." The person designated for writing an address to the army, suited to this object, was Major Armstrong (since General Armstrong), then a young man and General Gates's aid-de-camp. In compliance with "the solicitations of his friends," he undertook and executed the task.* On the 10th of March were circulated anonymously in the army the following Notification and Address.

ANONYMOUS NOTIFICATION.

"A meeting of the general and field-officers is requested at the Public Building on Tuesday next at eleven o'clock. A commissioned officer from each company is expected, and a delegate from the medical staff. The object of this convention is, to consider the late letter from our representatives in Philadelphia, and what measures (if any) should be adopted, to obtain that redress of grievances which they seem to have solicited in vain."

FIRST ANONYMOUS ADDRESS TO THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

"GENTLEMEN,

"A fellow-soldier, whose interest and affections bind him strongly to you, whose past sufferings have been as great, and whose future fortunes may be as desperate as yours, would beg leave to address you.

"Age has its claims, and rank is not without its pretensions to advice; but, though unsupported by both, he flatters himself, that the plain language of sincerity and experience will neither be unheard nor unregarded.

"Like many of you he loved private life, and left it with regret. He left it, determined to retire from the field with the necessity that called him to it, and not till then; not till the enemies of his country, the slaves of power, and the hirelings of injustice were compelled to abandon their schemes, and acknowledge America as terrible in arms as she had been humble in remonstrance. With this object in view he has long shared in your toils, and mingled in your dangers; he has felt the cold hand of poverty without a murmur, and has seen the insolence of wealth without a sigh. But too much under the direction of his wishes, and sometimes weak enough to mistake desire for opinion, he has till lately, very

* See an article in the *United States Magazine*, for January, 1823, (p. 41,) understood to have been written by General John Armstrong, and containing a brief history of the transactions, in which it is declared that he was the author of the NEWBURG ADDRESSES.

lately, believed in the justice of his country. He hoped, that, as the clouds of adversity scattered, and as the sunshine of peace and better fortune broke in upon us, the coldness and severity of government would relax; and that more than justice, that gratitude, would blaze forth upon those hands, which had upheld her in the darkest stages of her passage from impending servitude to acknowledged independence.

“But faith has its limits as well as temper; and there are points, beyond which neither can be stretched without sinking into cowardice or plunging into credulity. This, my friends, I conceive to be your situation; hurried to the very verge of both, another step would ruin you for ever. To be tame and unprovoked, when injuries press hard upon you, is more than weakness; but to look up for kinder usage, without one manly effort of your own, would fix your character, and show the world how richly you deserve those chains you broke. To guard against this evil, let us take a review of the ground upon which we now stand, and from thence carry our thoughts forward for a moment into the unexplored field of expedient.

“After a pursuit of seven long years, the object for which we set out is at length brought within our reach. Yes, my friends, that suffering courage of yours was active once; it has conducted the United States of America through a doubtful and bloody war; it has placed her in the chair of independency, and peace returns again to bless — whom? A country willing to redress your wrongs, cherish your worth, and reward your services? A country courting your return to private life, with tears of gratitude and smiles of admiration, longing to divide with you that independency which your gallantry has given, and those riches which your wounds have preserved? Is this the case? Or is it rather a country, that tramples upon your rights, disdains your cries, and insults your distresses? Have you not more than once suggested your wishes, and made known your wants to Congress, wants and wishes, which gratitude and policy should have anticipated, rather than evaded? And have you not lately, in the meek language of entreating memorials, begged from their justice what you could no longer expect from their favor? How have you been answered? Let the letter, which you are called to consider to-morrow, make reply!

“If this then be your treatment, while the swords you wear are necessary for the defence of America, what have you to expect from peace, when your voice shall sink, and your strength dissipate by division; when those very swords, the instruments and companions

of your glory, shall be taken from your sides, and no remaining mark of military distinction left but your wants, infirmities, and scars? Can you then consent to be the only sufferers by this revolution, and, retiring from the field, grow old in poverty, wretchedness, and contempt? Can you consent to wade through the vile mire of dependency, and owe the miserable remnant of that life to charity, which has hitherto been spent in honor? If you can, go, and carry with you the jest of Tories, and the scorn of Whigs; the ridicule, and what is worse, the pity of the world! Go, starve and be forgotten! But if your spirits should revolt at this; if you have sense enough to discover and spirit sufficient to oppose tyranny, under whatever garb it may assume, whether it be the plain coat of republicanism, or the splendid robe of royalty; if you have yet learned to discriminate between a people and a cause, between men and principles; awake, attend to your situation, and redress yourselves! If the present moment be lost, every future effort is in vain; and your threats then will be as empty as your entreaties now.

“I would advise you, therefore, to come to some final opinion upon what you can bear, and what you will suffer. If your determination be in any proportion to your wrongs, carry your appeal from the justice to the fears of government. Change the milk-and-water style of your last memorial. Assume a bolder tone, decent, but lively, spirited, and determined; and suspect the man, who would advise to more moderation and longer forbearance. Let two or three men, who can feel as well as write, be appointed to draw up your *last remonstrance*, for I would no longer give it the suing, soft, unsuccessful epithet of *memorial*. Let it represent in language, that will neither dishonor you by its rudeness, nor betray you by its fears, what has been promised by Congress, and what has been performed; how long and how patiently you have suffered; how little you have asked, and how much of that little has been denied. Tell them, that, though you were the first, and would wish to be last, to encounter danger, though despair itself can never drive you into dishonor, it may drive you from the field; that the wound, often irritated and never healed, may at length become incurable; and that the slightest mark of indignity from Congress now must operate like the grave, and part you for ever; that, in any political event, the army has its alternative. If peace, that nothing shall separate you from your arms but death; if war, that courting the auspices, and inviting the direction of your illustrious leader, you will retire to some unsettled country, smile in your turn, ‘and mock when

their fear cometh on.' But let it represent, also, that should they comply with the request of your late memorial, it would make you more happy and them more respectable; that, while war should continue, you would follow their standard into the field; and when it came to an end, you would withdraw into the shade of private life, and give the world another subject of wonder and applause; an army victorious over its enemies, victorious over itself."

In consequence of the circulation of these papers, the subsequent orders were issued on the 11th of March.

GENERAL ORDERS.

"The Commander-in-chief, having heard that a general meeting of the officers of the army was proposed to be held this day at the New Building, in an anonymous paper, which was circulated yesterday by some unknown person, conceives, (although he is fully persuaded that the good sense of the officers would induce them to pay very little attention to such an irregular invitation,) his duty, as well as the reputation and true interest of the army, requires his disapprobation of such disorderly proceedings; at the same time he requests, that the general and field officers, with one officer from each company, and a proper representation of the staff of the army, will assemble at twelve o'clock on Saturday next at the New Building, to hear the report of the committee of the army to Congress.

"After mature deliberation they will devise what further measures ought to be adopted, as most rational, and best calculated to attain the just and important object in view.

"The senior officer in rank present will be pleased to preside, and report the result of their deliberations to the Commander-in-chief."

SECOND ANONYMOUS ADDRESS TO THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

"GENTLEMEN,

"The author of a late address, anxious to deserve, though he should fail to engage your esteem, and determined at every risk to unfold your duty and discharge his own, would beg leave to solicit the further indulgence of a few moments' attention.

"Aware of the coyness with which his last letter would be received, he feels himself neither disappointed nor displeased with the caution it has met. He well knew, that it spoke a language, which till now had been heard only in whispers; and that it contained some sentiments, which confidence itself would have breathed with distrust. But their lives have been short, and their obser-

vation imperfect indeed, who have yet to learn, that alarms may be false; that the best designs are sometimes obliged to assume the worst aspect; and that, however synonymous surprise and disaster may be in military phrase, in moral and political meaning they convey ideas as different as they are distinct. Suspicion, detestable as it is in private life, is the loveliest trait of political characters. It prompts you to inquiry, bars the door against design, and opens every avenue to truth. It was the first to oppose a tyrant here, and still stands sentinel over the liberties of America. With this belief, it would ill become me to stifle the voice of this honest guardian; a guardian, who (authorized by circumstances digested into proof) has herself given birth to the address you have read, and now goes forth among you, with a request to all, that it may be treated fairly; that it be considered, before it be abused, and condemned, before it be tortured; convinced that, in a search after error, truth will appear; that apathy itself will grow warm in the pursuit, and, though it will be the last to adopt her advice, it will be the first to act upon it.

“The General Orders of yesterday, which the weak may mistake for disapprobation, and the designing dare to represent as such, wears in my opinion a very different complexion, and carries with it a very opposite tendency.

“Till now, the Commander-in-chief has regarded the steps you have taken for redress with good wishes alone; his ostensible silence has authorized your meetings, and his private opinion has sanctified your claims. Had he disliked the object in view, would not the same sense of duty, which forbade you from meeting on the third day of the week, have forbidden you from meeting on the seventh? Is not the same subject held up for your discussion, and has it not passed the seal of office, and taken all the solemnity of an order? This will give system to your proceedings, and stability to your resolves. It will ripen speculation into fact; and, while it adds to the unanimity, it cannot possibly lessen the independency of your sentiments. It may be necessary to add upon this subject, that, from the injunction with which the General Orders close, every man is at liberty to conclude, that the report to be made to Head-Quarters is intended for Congress. Hence will arise another motive for that energy, which has been recommended. For can you give the lie to the pathetic descriptions of your representations, and the more alarming predictions of our friends?

“To such, as make a want of signature an objection to opinion, I reply, that it matters very little who is the author of sentiments,

which grow out of your feelings, and apply to your wants ; that in this instance diffidence suggested what experience enjoins ; and that, while I continue to move on the high road of argument and advice, which is open to all, I shall continue to be the sole confidant of my own secret. But should the time come, when it shall be necessary to depart from this general line, and hold up any individual among you as an object of the resentment or contempt of the rest, I thus publicly pledge my honor as a soldier, and veracity as a man, that I will then assume a visible existence, and give my name to the army, with as little reserve as I now give my opinions."

Conformably to the notification given in the general orders of the 11th, a meeting of the officers was held on the 15th, at the hour and place appointed. General Gates, as the senior officer, presided. The meeting was opened by the Commander-in-chief, who read the following

ADDRESS TO THE OFFICERS ASSEMBLED.

'GENTLEMEN,

"By an anonymous summons an attempt has been made to convene you together. How inconsistent with the rules of propriety, how unmilitary, and how subversive of all good order and discipline, let the good sense of the army decide.

"In the moment of this summons, another anonymous production was sent into circulation ; addressed more to the feelings and passions, than to the reason and judgment of the army. The author of the piece is entitled to much credit for the goodness of his pen, and I could wish he had as much credit for the rectitude of his heart ; for, as men see through different optics, and are induced by the reflecting faculties of the mind to use different means to obtain the same end, the author of the address should have had more charity, than to mark for suspicion the man, who should recommend moderation and longer forbearance, or in other words, who should not think as he thinks, and act as he advises. But he had another plan in view, in which candor and liberality of sentiment, regard to justice, and love of country, have no part ; and he was right to insinuate the darkest suspicion, to effect the blackest designs.

"That the address is drawn with great art, and is designed to answer the most insidious purposes, that it is calculated to impress the mind with an idea of premeditated injustice in the sovereign power of the United States, and rouse all those resentments, which

must unavoidably flow from such a belief; that the secret mover of this scheme, whoever he may be, intended to take advantage of the passions, while they were warmed by the recollection of past distresses, without giving time for cool, deliberate thinking, and that composure of mind, which is so necessary to give dignity and stability to measures, is rendered too obvious, by the mode of conducting the business, to need other proof than a reference to the proceeding.

“ Thus much, Gentlemen, I have thought it incumbent on me to observe to you, to show upon what principles I opposed the irregular and hasty meeting, which was proposed to be held on Tuesday last, and not because I wanted a disposition to give you every opportunity, consistent with your own honor and the dignity of the army, to make known your grievances. If my conduct heretofore has not evinced to you, that I have been a faithful friend to the army, my declaration of it at this time would be equally unavailing and improper. But, as I was among the first, who embarked in the cause of our common country; as I have never left your side one moment, but when called from you on public duty; as I have been the constant companion and witness of your distresses, and not among the last to feel and acknowledge your merits; as I have ever considered my own military reputation as inseparably connected with that of the army; as my heart has ever expanded with joy, when I have heard its praises, and my indignation has arisen, when the mouth of detraction has been opened against it; it can scarcely be supposed, at this late stage of the war, that I am indifferent to its interests. But how are they to be promoted? The way is plain, says the anonymous addresser; if war continues, remove into the unsettled country; there establish yourselves, and leave an ungrateful country to defend itself. But whom are they to defend? Our wives, our children, our farms and other property, which we leave behind us? Or, in the state of hostile separation, are we to take the two first (the latter cannot be removed) to perish in a wilderness with hunger, cold, and nakedness? If peace takes place, never sheathe your swords, says he, until you have obtained full and ample justice. This dreadful alternative, of either deserting our country in the extremest hour of distress, or turning our arms against it, which is the apparent object, unless Congress can be compelled into instant compliance, has something so shocking in it, that humanity revolts at the idea. My God! What can this writer have in view by recommending such measures? Can he be a friend to the army? Can he be a friend to this country? Rather

is he not an insidious foe? Some emissary, perhaps from New York, plotting the ruin of both by sowing the seeds of discord and separation between the civil and military powers of the continent? And what a compliment does he pay to our understandings, when he recommends measures, in either alternative, impracticable in their nature?

"But here, Gentlemen, I will drop the curtain, because it would be as imprudent in me to assign my reasons for this opinion, as it would be insulting to your conception to suppose you stood in need of them. A moment's reflection will convince every dispassionate mind of the physical impossibility of carrying either proposal into execution.

"There might, Gentlemen, be an impropriety in my taking notice, in this address to you, of an anonymous production; but the manner in which that performance has been introduced to the army, the effect it was intended to have, together with some other circumstances, will amply justify my observations on the tendency of that writing. With respect to the advice given by the author to suspect the man, who shall recommend moderate measures and longer forbearance, I spurn it, as every man who regards that liberty, and reveres that justice, for which we contend, undoubtedly must. For, if men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on a matter, which may involve the most serious and alarming consequences, that can invite the consideration of mankind, reason is of no use to us; the freedom of speech may be taken away, and, dumb and silent, we may be led away like sheep to the slaughter.

"I cannot, in justice to my own belief, and what I have great reason to conceive is the intention of Congress, conclude this address, without giving it as my decided opinion, that that honorable body entertain exalted sentiments of the services of the army, and, from a full conviction of its merits and sufferings, will do it complete justice. That their endeavours to discover and establish funds for this purpose have been unwearied, and will not cease, till they have succeeded, I have no doubt; but, like all other large bodies, where there is a variety of different interests to reconcile, their deliberations are slow. Why then should we distrust them; and, in consequence of that distrust, adopt measures, which may cast a shade over that glory, which has been so justly acquired, and tarnish the reputation of an army, which is celebrated through all Europe for its fortitude and patriotism? And for what is this done? To bring the object we seek nearer? No! Most certainly, in my opinion, it will cast it at a greater distance.

“For myself (and I take no merit in giving the assurance, being induced to it from principles of gratitude, veracity, and justice), a grateful sense of the confidence you have ever placed in me, a recollection of the cheerful assistance and prompt obedience I have experienced from you, under every vicissitude of fortune, and the sincere affection I feel for an army I have so long had the honor to command, oblige me to declare in this public and solemn manner, that, in the attainment of complete justice for all your toils and dangers, and in the gratification of every wish, so far as may be done consistently with the great duty I owe to my country, and those powers we are bound to respect, you may freely command my services to the utmost extent of my abilities.

“While I give you these assurances, and pledge myself in the most unequivocal manner to exert whatever ability I am possessed of in your favor, let me entreat you, Gentlemen, on your part, not to take any measures, which, in the calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained. Let me request you to rely on the plighted faith of your country, and place a full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress, that, previous to your dissolution as an army, they will cause all your accounts to be fairly liquidated, as directed in their resolutions, which were published to you two days ago, and that they will adopt the most effectual measures in their power to render ample justice to you for your faithful and meritorious services. And let me conjure you in the name of our common country, as you value your own sacred honor, as you respect the rights of humanity, and as you regard the military and national character of America, to express your utmost horror and detestation of the man, who wishes, under any specious pretences, to overturn the liberties of our country, and who wickedly attempts to open the flood-gates of civil discord, and deluge our rising empire in blood.

“By thus determining and thus acting, you will pursue the plain and direct road to the attainment of your wishes; you will defeat the insidious designs of our enemies, who are compelled to resort from open force to secret artifice; you will give one more distinguished proof of unexampled patriotism and patient virtue, rising superior to the pressure of the most complicated sufferings; and you will, by the dignity of your conduct, afford occasion for posterity to say, when speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to mankind, ‘Had this day been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of perfection, to which human nature is capable of attaining.’”

After reading the address the Commander-in-chief retired, and the following resolutions were adopted.

“On motion made by General Knox, and seconded by General Putnam,

“Resolved, That the unanimous thanks of the officers of the army be presented to his Excellency, the Commander-in-chief, for his excellent address, and the communications he has been pleased to make to them; and to assure him, that the officers reciprocate his affectionate expressions, with the greatest sincerity of which the human heart is capable.

“The address from the army to Congress, the report of the committee from the army, and the resolutions of Congress of the 25th of January being read, on a motion by General Putnam, seconded by General Hand,

“Voted, That a committee be appointed immediately to draw up some resolutions expressive of the business before us, and report in half an hour; that the committee consist of one general, one field-officer, and one captain.

“That General Knox, Colonel Brooks, and Captain Howard, compose the said committee.

“The report of the committee having been brought in and fully considered,

“Resolved unanimously, That at the commencement of the present war, the officers of the American army engaged in the service of their country from the purest love and attachment to the rights and liberties of human nature; which motives still exist in the highest degree; and that no circumstance of distress or danger shall induce a conduct, that may tend to sully the reputation and glory, which they have acquired at the price of their blood and eight years' faithful services.

“Resolved unanimously, That the army continue to have an unshaken confidence in the justice of Congress and their country; and are fully convinced, that the representatives of America will not disband or disperse the army until their accounts are liquidated, the balances accurately ascertained, and adequate funds established for payment. And, in this arrangement, the officers expect that the half-pay, or commutation of it, should be efficaciously comprehended.

“Resolved unanimously, That his Excellency the Commander-in-chief be requested to write to his Excellency the President of Congress, earnestly entreating the more speedy decision of that honorable body upon the subjects of our late address, which was

forwarded by a committee of the army, some of whom are waiting upon Congress for the result. In the alternative of peace or war, this event would be highly satisfactory, and would produce immediate tranquillity in the minds of the army, and prevent any further machinations of designing men to sow discord between the civil and military powers of the United States.

“Resolved unanimously, That the officers of the American army view with abhorrence, and reject with disdain, the infamous propositions contained in a late anonymous address to the officers of the army, and resent with indignation the secret attempts of some unknown persons to collect the officers together in a manner totally subversive of all discipline and good order.

“Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of the officers of the army be given to the committee, who presented to Congress the late address of the army, for the wisdom and prudence with which they have conducted that business; and that a copy of the proceedings of this day be transmitted by the President to Major-General McDougall, and that he be requested to continue his solicitations at Congress until the objects of his mission are accomplished.”

These proceedings were signed by General Gates, as president of the meeting, and on the 18th the approbation of General Washington was expressed in public orders as follows.

“The Commander-in-chief is highly satisfied with the report of the proceedings of the officers assembled on the 15th instant, in obedience to the orders of the 11th. He begs his inability to communicate an adequate idea of the pleasing feelings, which have been excited in his breast by the affectionate sentiments expressed towards him on that occasion, may be considered as an apology for his silence.”

The result of the proceedings and the above papers were transmitted to Congress, and the doings of that body on the subject of the complaints of the army may be seen in the *Journals*, under the date of March 22d, 1783.

The anonymous notification and addresses were circulated among the officers in manuscript. The originals were carried by a major, who was a deputy inspector under Baron Steuben, to the adjutant-general's office, where were every morning assembled aids-de-camp, majors of brigades, and adjutants of regiments, all of whom, that chose to do so, took copies and circulated them.

Among the transcribers was the adjutant of the General's guard, who probably furnished the copies, that were transmitted to Congress. By this process some slight errors doubtless slipped into the transcripts; but it has never been said, that the sense of the original was altered. They are here reprinted from the copies contained in the Journals of Congress, which, as they were published under the sanction of that body, must be considered as having all the authenticity, that the nature of the case admits. They also agree very exactly with the copies preserved among the papers of the Commander-in-chief, there being no other variation than a change in two or three unimportant words, apparently through negligence in transcribing or printing.

Whatever may have been thought by General Washington at the time, as to the character and objects of the NEWBURG ADDRESSES, it appears by the following letter, that he was afterwards led to form a different opinion of the motives of the author from that expressed in his Address to the Officers.

GEORGE WASHINGTON TO JOHN ARMSTRONG.

“ Philadelphia, 23 February, 1797.

“ SIR,

“ Believing that there may be times and occasions, on which my opinion of the anonymous letters and their author, as delivered to the army in the year 1783, may be turned to some personal and malignant purpose, I do hereby declare, that I did not, at the time of writing my address, regard you as the author of the said letters; and further, that I have since had sufficient reason for believing, that the object of the author was just, honorable, and friendly to the country, though the means suggested by him were certainly liable to much misunderstanding and abuse.

“ I am, Sir, with great regard, your most obedient servant,

“ GEORGE WASHINGTON.”

No. XIII. p. 425.

ORDERS ISSUED BY GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE ARMY,
ANNOUNCING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

Head-Quarters, 18 April, 1783.

The Commander-in-chief orders the cessation of hostilities, between the United States of America and the King of Great Britain, to be publicly proclaimed to-morrow at twelve at the New Building; and that the proclamation, which will be communicated herewith, be read to-morrow evening at the head of every regiment and corps of the army; after which the chaplains with the several brigades will render thanks to Almighty God for all his mercies, particularly for his overruling the wrath of man to his own glory, and causing the rage of war to cease among the nations.

Although the proclamation before alluded to extends only to the prohibition of hostilities, and not to the annunciation of a general peace, yet it must afford the most rational and sincere satisfaction to every benevolent mind, as it puts a period to a long and doubtful contest, stops the effusion of human blood, opens the prospect to a more splendid scene, and, like another morning star, promises the approach of a brighter day than has hitherto illuminated the western hemisphere. On such a happy day, which is the harbinger of peace, a day which completes the eighth year of the war, it would be ingratitude not to rejoice; it would be insensibility not to participate in the general felicity.

The Commander-in-chief, far from endeavouring to stifle the feelings of joy in his own bosom, offers his most cordial congratulations on the occasion to all the officers of every denomination, to all the troops of the United States in general, and in particular to those gallant and persevering men, who had resolved to defend the rights of their invaded country so long as the war should continue. For these are the men, who ought to be considered as the pride and boast of the American army; and who, crowned with well-earned laurels, may soon withdraw from the field of glory to the more tranquil walks of civil life.

While the General recollects the almost infinite variety of scenes through which we have passed, with a mixture of pleasure, astonishment, and gratitude; while he contemplates the prospect before us with rapture, he cannot help wishing that all the brave men (of whatever condition they may be), who have shared in the toils

and dangers of effecting this glorious revolution, of rescuing millions from the hand of oppression, and of laying the foundation of a great empire, might be impressed with a proper idea of the dignified part they have been called to act (under the smiles of Providence) on the stage of human affairs. For happy, thrice happy, shall they be pronounced hereafter, who have contributed any thing, who have performed the meanest office, in erecting this stupendous *fabric of freedom and empire* on the broad basis of independency; who have assisted in protecting the rights of human nature, and establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions.

The glorious task for which we first flew to arms being thus accomplished; the liberties of our country being fully acknowledged and firmly secured by the smiles of Heaven on the purity of our cause, and the honest exertions of a feeble people determined to be free, against a powerful nation disposed to oppress them; and the character of those, who have persevered through every extremity of hardship, suffering, and danger, being immortalized by the illustrious appellation of the *patriot army*, nothing now remains but for the actors of this mighty scene to preserve a perfect unvarying consistency of character through the very last act, to close the drama with applause, and to retire from the military theatre with the same approbation of angels and men, which has crowned all their former virtuous actions. For this purpose no disorder or licentiousness must be tolerated. Every considerate and well-disposed soldier must remember, it will be absolutely necessary to wait with patience until peace shall be declared, or Congress shall be enabled to take proper measures for the security of the public stores. As soon as these arrangements shall be made, the General is confident there will be no delay in discharging, with every mark of distinction and honor, all the men enlisted for the war, who will then have faithfully performed their engagements with the public. The General has already interested himself in their behalf, and he thinks he need not repeat the assurances of his disposition to be useful to them on the present and every other proper occasion. In the mean time, he is determined that no military neglects or excesses shall go unpunished while he retains the command of the army.

No. XIV. p. 504.

ORDER OF THE PUBLIC AUDIENCE OF GENERAL WASHINGTON IN CONGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S ANSWER TO HIS ADDRESS ON RESIGNING HIS COMMISSION.

A committee, consisting of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Gerry, and Mr. McHenry, was appointed by Congress to make suitable arrangements for the last public audience of General Washington. In conformity with their report it was resolved, on the 22d of December, that the ceremony should be conducted as follows.

"1. The President and members are to be seated and covered, and the Secretary to be standing by the side of the President.

"2. The arrival of the General is to be announced by the messenger to the Secretary, who is thereupon to introduce the General, attended by his aids, into the Hall of Congress.

"3. The General, being conducted to a chair by the Secretary, is to be seated, with an aid on each side standing, and the Secretary is to resume his place.

"4. After a proper time for the arrangement of spectators, silence is to be ordered by the Secretary if necessary, and the President is to address the General in the following words. 'Sir; The United States in Congress assembled are prepared to receive your communications.' Whereupon the General is to arise and address Congress; after which he is to deliver his commission and a copy of his address to the President.

"5. The General having resumed his place, the President is to deliver the answer of Congress, which the General is to receive standing.

"6. The President having finished, the Secretary is to deliver the General a copy of the answer, and the General is then to take his leave. When the General rises to make his address, and also when he retires, he is to bow to Congress, which they are to return by uncovering without bowing."

According to this order General Washington was introduced to Congress, and pronounced his address. He then advanced and delivered to the President his commission and a copy of his address, and having resumed his place, the President returned the following answer.

"SIR,

"The United States, in Congress assembled, receive with emotions too affecting for utterance, the solemn resignation of the authorities under which you have led their troops with success through a perilous and a doubtful war. Called upon by your country to defend its invaded rights, you accepted the sacred charge, before it had formed alliances, and whilst it was without funds or a government to support you. You have conducted the great military contest with wisdom and fortitude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through all disasters and changes. You have, by the love and confidence of your fellow citizens, enabled them to display their martial genius, and transmit their fame to posterity. You have persevered, till these United States, aided by a magnanimous King and nation, have been enabled under a just Providence to close the war in freedom, safety, and independence; on which happy event we sincerely join you in congratulations.

"Having defended the standard of liberty in this new world, having taught a lesson useful to those who inflict, and to those who feel oppression, you retire from the great theatre of action with the blessings of your fellow citizens; but the glory of your virtues will not terminate with your military command, it will continue to animate remotest ages.

"We feel with you our obligations to the army in general, and will particularly charge ourselves with the interests of those confidential officers, who have attended your person to this affecting moment.

"We join you in commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty God, beseeching him to dispose the hearts and minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded them of becoming a happy and respectable nation. And for you we address to him our earnest prayers, that a life so beloved may be fostered with all his care, that your days may be happy as they have been illustrious, and that he will finally give you that reward, which this world cannot give."

No. XV.

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S EXPENSES WHILE ACTING AS
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES.

According to his declaration when he accepted his commission, General Washington never received any pecuniary compensation for his services. He kept exact accounts of all his expenditures; and, after the cessation of hostilities, he drew up with his own hand a detailed statement of these accounts, extending to more than sixty folio pages. This statement, with the original vouchers, was deposited in the Treasury Department, where it is still preserved. A *fac-simile* of the whole paper has been published; and it affords a memorable proof of the strict regard, which he paid to the public interest in the minutest particulars. The following abstract and remarks are taken from the original, dated July 1st, 1783, as exhibited in his own handwriting, and expressed in lawful money, or the old currency of Massachusetts and Virginia.

Household expenses, exclusive of the provisions had from the commissaries and contractors, and liquors, &c. from them and others,	£3387 14 4
Expended for secret intelligence,	1982 10
Expended in reconnoitring and travelling,	1874 8 8
Miscellaneous charges,	2952 10 1
One hundred and sixty thousand and seventy-four dollars, extended in lawful money, according to the scale of depreciation,	6114 14
Expenditures of eight years	£16311 17 1
Mrs. Washington's travelling expenses in coming to and returning from his winter-quarters, the money to defray which being taken from his private purse and brought with her from Virginia,	1064 1 0
Expenditure from July 1st to the time of resigning his commission,	1930 13 8
Total, Virginia currency,	£19306 11 9
Or sterling,	£14479 18 9½
Or dollars, at 4s. 6d. sterling each,	\$ 64,355.30

In addition to this amount he charged to the government £288, lawful money, as the interest on £599 19 11, which was the balance due to him on the 31st of December, 1776, the amount having been applied from his private funds for public objects during

the preceding year. On this item, and the one respecting Mrs. Washington's travelling expenses, he made the following remarks at the foot of the account.

"Although I kept memoranda of these expenditures, I did not introduce them into my public accounts as they occurred. The reason was, it appeared at first view in the commencement of them to have the complexion of a private charge. I had my doubts, therefore, of the propriety of making it. But, as the peculiar circumstances attending my command, and the embarrassed situation of our public affairs, obliged me (to the no small detriment of my private interest) to postpone the visit I every year contemplated to make my family between the close of one campaign and the opening of another; and as this expense was incidental thereto, and consequent of my self-denial, I have, as of right I think I ought, with due consideration, adjudged the charge as just with respect to the public, as it is convenient with respect to myself.

"And I make it with the less reluctance, as I find upon the final adjustment of these accounts (which have, as will appear, been long unsettled), that I am a considerable loser; my disbursements falling a good deal short of my receipts and the money I had upon hand of my own. For, besides the sum I carried with me to Cambridge in 1775, and which exceeded the aforementioned balance of £599 19 11, I received moneys afterwards on private account in 1777 and since, which, except small sums that I had occasion now and then to apply to private uses, were all expended in the public service; and which, through hurry, I suppose, and the perplexity of business, (for I know not how else to account for the deficiency,) I have omitted to charge, whilst every debit against me is here credited."



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