

THE  
WRITINGS  
OF  
GEORGE WASHINGTON;

BEING HIS  
CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER  
PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE,

SELECTED AND PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS;

WITH  
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

NOTES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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BY JARED SPARKS.

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VOLUME VII.

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PART SECOND;  
(CONTINUED);  
COMPRISING  
CORRESPONDENCE  
AND  
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS  
RELATING TO  
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

THE GREAT

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 31 March, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose the report of the proceedings of the commissioners appointed to meet at Amboy, the 9th instant, for the purpose of settling a general cartel, by which Congress will perceive, that the present attempt has been as unsuccessful as all the former, and from the same cause. In January I was honored with a letter from the minister of France, informing me of his having received advice from Europe, that the court of London, on account of the difficulty they found in procuring men, had instructed their commander-in-chief here to treat with us on a national footing, rather than fail to obtain a reinforcement to their army by the release of their prisoners in our hands. He added, that he had communicated this intelligence to Congress, and that Congress had requested him to transmit it to me, as a matter which ought materially to influence the measures we were about to take on the subject of an exchange.

Though I was strongly persuaded beforehand, that there was a mistake in his Excellency's information, and that the advantages to be reaped by the enemy from the proposed exchange would not be a sufficient inducement to a step of the nature it imported, which I took the liberty to signify to him, yet I thought it my duty to make the experiment, as well from motives of respect to the communication, as from the possibility of its being well founded. I therefore directed our commissioners to take every method to ascertain the enemy's views on this head, and, if the British commissioners did not come with national powers, to decline doing any thing with them in an official capacity; but, after satisfying themselves that nothing was to be effected on a larger scale, they were instructed to enter into private conversation on the terms of particular exchange. Their letter will show what was done in consequence. Congress will perceive, that their proposal was not accepted by the gentlemen on the other side, who insisted on the exchange being at all events extended to one half of the second division of the convention troops. This was a departure from the plan concerted between General Phillips and Colonels Magaw and Mathews. If Congress think that humanity requires or policy permits us to accede to the enemy's ultimatum, I shall be happy to execute their orders; but it is a point of so much delicacy and importance, that I cannot forbear earnestly requesting that I may be excused from deciding in it. On the one hand, the acquisition of so many men will be of great moment to the enemy, if they meet with success at the southward; on the other, I see not how we shall be able to maintain our officers in captivity, and the expense is no trifling consideration. I think it necessary to observe, that if the enemy's proposal should be accepted, it may be



June before the prisoners can be delivered up; but perhaps it will be judged advisable to delay a determination till the probable issue of southern affairs is a little unfolded. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 31 March, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

I was about to fulfil the promise made to you in my last, of writing fully on the subject of your letter and other matters, when your obliging favor of the 22d came to hand. The hint contained in it was too seasonable and striking for me not to derive a lesson from

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\* It turned out, that the enemy had not the remotest idea of treating on national grounds. Perhaps it was not to be expected; and yet, as there could be no fair exchange except on terms of equality, it would seem that the difficulty lay more in the form of words, than in the substance of the thing. The national faith was as much plighted on one side as the other, and the King was as much bound in honor to confirm the contracts of his generals, as Congress was to sanction those of General Washington. The difference was, that Congress pledged themselves beforehand to abide by his acts, whereas the British commanders took care so to express all the instructions to their commissioners as to make it appear, that these instructions emanated from no higher authority than themselves. If a consent to treat on national grounds, as it was called, would seem to imply the political independence of the Americans, it should have been likewise considered, that the course pursued was a standing reproach upon them as rebels; and if the former was unpalatable to one party, the latter must have been equally so to the other. It was a case, therefore, which required mutual concessions, especially as both parties, in regard to the matter in hand, stood on equal grounds, had the same interests at stake, and would be equally benefited or injured by the result. It was not a subject in which political considerations ought to have interfered. Justice and humanity had superior claims. There might and should have been an explicit understanding, that agreements for the exchange of prisoners should have no bearing on the other relations between the parties, and that the great points at issue should rest on precisely the same foun-



it. I shall, therefore, as there is danger attending written communications of private sentiments, and my letters to the body of which you are a member will convey every occurrence and information of a public nature within my sphere of action, content myself with acknowledging and thanking you for the letters you may do me the favor to write.

I am much indebted to you for your communications from the southward. I feel many anxious moments on account of the Carolinas, which are increased by the daily diminution of our force in this quarter, the little

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dation, as if no occurrences of this sort had taken place. Upon this basis there could never have been any substantial political obstacles in the way of an equitable exchange of prisoners. But there were reasons, perhaps, why neither party was inclined to propose such a basis, or even to adopt it if proposed.

Respecting the negotiation for a cartel at Amboy, mentioned above, General Phillips wrote as follows to Lord George Germain.

"This attempt for a general cartel and exchange has proved ineffectual, as every former one had done, founded on an objection to the powers given by Sir Henry Clinton; and your Lordship will directly observe the great object of the American Congress is to mark some public act, in which General Washington may be concerned with Sir Henry Clinton in character of equality with Great Britain, on principles of nation against nation at war; and the positive declaration of the American commissioners on this matter fully evinces the fact, and that a general cartel can never possibly take place on any other ground, which it may be imagined will never be suffered by Great Britain. In a number of attempts to release the troops of convention, the matter has broken off under several descriptions. At one time the American Congress would not exchange the troops in corps; at another they were willing to exchange private soldiers to a certain number, but it was never understood what number or in what manner. Interested as I have been, it has led me to hold conversations with a number of American officers, proving to them that the troops of convention stood under a particular description, and that exchanging the officers without the men against American officers prisoners of war could not be considered as equal, the American officers going to an immediate activity of service, and the convention officers not doing so, as the regiments to which they belonged would still be in captivity; and, however eligible and convenient for the officers themselves, it would be of no advantage to the King's service." — *New York, March 25th.*

prospect of getting it augmented in time to answer any valuable purpose, and other obvious embarrassments. We are now beginning to experience the fatal consequences of the policy, which delayed calling upon the States for their quotas of men to a period when they ought to have been joined, that there might have been time for arranging and preparing them for the duties of the field. What to do for the southern States, without involving consequences equally alarming in this quarter, I know not. The enemy are certainly preparing for another embarkation (from present appearances about two thousand five hundred men); but, as I expect a more particular account of this matter by to-morrow, I shall defer writing to Congress till then. With the most sincere regard and affection, I am, &c.\*

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\* In replying to this letter, General Schuyler related the following incident as having occurred in Congress.

"General Greene addressed Congress in a letter of the 3d instant, wishing for their sense of his general conduct in the quartermaster's department. A resolution was proposed, that Congress had full confidence in his integrity and ability, and requesting his future exertions. This brought on much debate. Amendments were moved, and the house got into heats, and an adjournment was deemed necessary to give the members time to cool. A member, more zealous for the general's reputation than prudent, observed that he was an officer in whom the Commander-in-chief had the highest confidence, that he was the first of all the subordinate generals in point of military knowledge and ability, that in case of an accident happening to General Washington he would be the properest person to command the army, and *that General Washington thought so too*. Another observed, that he had a very high opinion of General Greene's military abilities, that he believed the Commander-in-chief had too, but that he believed no person on earth was authorized to say as much as those words implied. I mention this, that your Excellency may guard against any misapprehension, which this may occasion with your officers. General Greene will inform you who delivered the imprudent speech." — *April 5th*.

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 2 April, 1780.

SIR,

I have received intelligence, which seems to place it beyond doubt, that the enemy are about to make a further embarkation of troops from New York, and the common opinion is, that they are going to reinforce Sir Henry Clinton. Lord Rawdon's brigade, said to consist of his own regiment and of Brown's, Fanning's, and another corps, two Hessian regiments, the forty-second and another British, estimated in the whole at about two thousand five hundred rank and file, are the troops that will, according to report, make the embarkation. This intelligence, the probability there seems to be that the enemy will endeavour to push their operations with vigor at the southward, the weak state of our force there, and unhappily in this quarter also, have laid me under great embarrassments with respect to the conduct that ought to be pursued. In considering the point, a choice of difficulties occurs to our view. The southern States, it is to be apprehended, may require much support; and, while we attempt to afford it from hence, we run a serious risk in this quarter, from the facility with which the enemy, by the help of their fleet, can unite their force at any point where they find us weak. Congress will the better conceive in how delicate a situation we stand, when I inform them, that our whole operating force present on this and on the other side of the North River amounts to only ten thousand four hundred rank and file, of which about two thousand eight hundred will have completed their term of service by the last of May (two thirds by the end of this month), while the enemy's regular force at New York and its dependencies must amount, upon



a moderate calculation, to about eleven thousand rank and file. I enclose to Congress a list of the corps at New York, after the detachment which sailed with Sir Henry Clinton, taken from *Gaine's Register*. Our situation too is the more critical, from the impossibility of concentrating our force, as well for want of the means of taking the field, as on account of the early period of the season.

The want also of a magazine of flour and salt provisions at West Point renders it the more necessary, that our covering force should be respectable; as, from this unlucky circumstance, which could not be prevented, the post in case of investiture might be exposed to great risk, at least if its relief depended much on a force to be collected. But, notwithstanding these objections, perhaps something should be hazarded here, relying on the internal strength of the country, for the purpose of giving further succour to the southern States, where there is not the same dependence. I shall therefore put the Maryland line, and the Delaware regiment, which acts with it, under marching orders immediately, and have directed provision to be made for transporting them as far as Philadelphia; and I propose that their march, if practicable, should commence on the sailing of the detachment from New York. But before the measure is carried into execution, I shall be happy to know the sense of Congress on its expediency. The consequences may be very important either way, and I wish to have their instructions for my government.

In case the detachment is to march, its ulterior proceedings and route from Philadelphia will depend on the orders, which Congress, or the Board of War by their directions, shall give; for it is impossible for me, under our circumstances, to give directions upon this

occasion. The quartermaster and commissary general are both in Philadelphia, and will exert themselves, I am persuaded, to carry into execution any plan for the transportation and accommodation of the troops, that may be judged most eligible, as far as it may be in their power. Baron de Kalb, who is now at the head of the Maryland division, will command the detachment in case it proceeds, and will set out to-morrow or the next day for Philadelphia, to assist and expedite the arrangements for its future movements. If the troops could embark without delay at the Head of Elk, and arrive safe in James River, it would not only be a great ease to them, but it would expedite their arrival at the southward, and prevent many desertions, which will probably happen if they march through their State. But how far this mode of proceeding may be eligible, I will not pretend to determine; as the enemy, in case they should be advised of it, which every precaution of secrecy would be necessary to prevent, might by sending armed vessels into the bay attempt to intercept them in their passage.

Major Lee's corps is under marching orders for the southward, of which I have advised the Board of War; and the commanding officer is directed to proceed with it, as soon as he adjusts with them the proper arrangements. I enclose to your Excellency an extract from Robertson's New York *American Gazette*. The intelligence, if true, is very important and interesting. I have the honor to be, &c.



TO BARON STEUBEN.

Morristown, 2 April, 1780.

MY DEAR BARON,

The propositions made by you to Congress for the arrangement of the army this campaign appear to me, upon the whole, best adapted to our circumstances, and especially since so much of the season has elapsed without entering upon it. I am glad the proposed incorporation has been suspended. I doubt, however, the practicability at this time of augmenting the cavalry or recruiting the additional men, from the circumstance you mentioned, the extreme distress of the treasury, which seems to be totally exhausted, and without sufficient resources for the current demands of the service. The present crisis is indeed perplexing beyond description, and it is infinitely difficult to prescribe a remedy.

When I approve your plan for the additional regiments, it is with one condition; that Congress can find means to provide for the officers, so as to put them upon an equal footing with the other parts of the army. If this cannot be done, they cannot continue in the service. I have incessant applications to this effect, and have just written again to Congress on the subject. If the situation of the officers cannot be made more tolerable, it will be preferable to dissolve those corps, incorporate the men with the State lines, and let the officers retire to be entitled to pay, subsistence, and the emoluments decreed at the end of the war. This will be a very bad expedient, if it cannot be avoided; but it is better than to leave the officers in such a state, that they must be miserable while they stay in the army; obliged in a little time, the greatest part of them, to

quit, while the corps for want of care will rapidly decline, and a number of good men be lost to the service.

Your anxiety on the score of southern affairs cannot exceed mine. The measure of collecting the whole force for the defence of Charleston ought no doubt to have been well considered before it was determined. It is putting much to hazard; but at this distance we can form a very imperfect judgment of its propriety or necessity. I have the greatest reliance on General Lincoln's prudence; but I cannot forbear dreading the event. Ill as we can afford a diminution of our force here, and notwithstanding the danger we run from the facility with which the enemy can concentrate their force at our weak points, besides other inconveniences, I have recommended to Congress to detach the Maryland division to reinforce the southern States. Though this detachment cannot in all probability arrive in season to be of any service to Charleston, it may assist to arrest the progress of the enemy and save the Carolinas.

My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond too much with yours. The prospect, my dear Baron, is gloomy, and the storm threatens. Not to have the anxieties you express, at the present juncture, would be not to feel that zeal and interest in our cause, by which all your conduct shows you to be actuated. But I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring every thing to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to difficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon them with more tranquillity than formerly. Those, which now present themselves, no doubt require vigorous exertions to overcome them, and I am far from despairing of doing it. Though I shall be happy to have the honor of seeing the French minister in camp, as soon as it may

be convenient to him, your reasons for persuading him to defer his journey awhile were good. I wish it were in my power to save him the trouble of the journey by paying him my respects in Philadelphia; but our present military situation, joined to other reasons, will not permit me to have that honor. I am very sensible, my dear Baron, to the obliging assurances of your regard, and I entreat you to believe there is a perfect reciprocity of sentiments, and that I am, with great consideration and the truest esteem, &c.

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## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS:

Head-Quarters, 3 April, 1780.

SIR,

I have frequently had the honor to address Congress on the subject of those corps, which are unconnected with the lines of particular States. Satisfied of the numerous perplexities under which they labor, it is with pain and reluctance I trouble them with repeated representations of the same nature; but in the present case it is so indispensable that something should be done, that I cannot forbear the repetition, however disagreeable. The situation of the officers of these corps is absolutely insupportable. Unless something effectual can be done to make it more comfortable, it is impossible they can remain in the service. The resolutions of Congress for making them part of the State quotas has partial operation, and the benefit resulting to a few has only served to establish a contrast that embitters the sufferings of the rest. Nothing can be conceived more chagrining, than for an officer to see himself destitute of every necessary, while another, not only in the service of the same government, engaged in defending the



same cause, but even in the same regiment, and sometimes standing by his side in the same company, is decently if not amply provided. Enthusiasm alone can support him in a moment's perseverance; but even this principle must give way to a necessity so continued and hopeless. Daily applications are made to me to know whether there is a prospect of relief, always accompanied with a declaration, that it is impossible any longer to endure the extremities to which they are driven.

I entreat the attention of Congress to this matter. If there is no way to make provision for the officers, it would be better to dissolve the corps, incorporate the men with the regiments belonging to the State lines, and let the officers retire with pay and subsistence, and such other emoluments as may be enjoyed by others after the war. In their present state, they are actually suffering every inconvenience, in fruitless expectations of a remedy that will perhaps never come; those who have less resource, less zeal, or less fortitude, are resigning from day to day. A relaxation from care in the interior of the regiments must be a necessary consequence; and many valuable men will be gradually lost to the service, who might be saved. It is much better, therefore, that the expedient suggested should be adopted, than that things should remain as now circumstanced. But if it were possible to obviate this necessity, it were much to be wished, as it would preserve many of our best officers to the army, who would with infinite reluctance quit the field, while the defence of their country called for their services.

Before I conclude, I think it my duty to touch upon the general situation of the army at this juncture. It is absolutely necessary that Congress should be apprized of it, for it is difficult to foresee what may be the

result; and, as very serious consequences are to be apprehended, I should not be justified in preserving silence. There never has been a stage of the war, in which the dissatisfaction has been so general or alarming. It has lately, in particular instances, worn features of a very dangerous complexion. A variety of causes has contributed to this; the diversity in the terms of enlistments, the inequality of the rewards given for entering into the service, but still more the disparity in the provisions made by the several States for their respective troops. The system of State supplies, however dictated in the commencement by necessity, has proved in its operation pernicious beyond description. An army must be raised, paid, subsisted, and regulated upon an equal and uniform principle, or the confusion and discontents are endless. Little less than the dissolution of the army would have been long since the consequence of a different plan, had it not been for a spirit of patriotic virtue, both in officers and men, of which there are few examples, seconded by the unremitting pains that have been taken to compose and reconcile them to their situation. But these will not be able to hold out much longer against the influence of causes constantly operating, and every day with some new aggravation.

Some States, from their internal abilities and local advantages, furnish their troops pretty amply, not only with clothing, but with many little comforts and conveniences; others supply them with some necessaries, but on a more contracted scale; while others have it in their power to do little or nothing at all. The officers and men in the routine of duty mix daily and compare circumstances. Those, who fare worse than others, of course are dissatisfied, and have their resentment excited, not only against their own State, but against the



Confederacy. They become disgusted with a service that makes such injurious distinctions. The officers resign, and we have now scarcely a sufficient number left to take care even of the fragments of corps which remain. The men have not this resource. They murmur, brood over their discontent, and have lately shown a disposition to enter into seditious combinations.

A new scene is now opening, which I fear will be productive of more troublesome effects, than any thing that has hitherto taken place. Some of the States have adopted the measure of making good the depreciation of the money to their troops, as well for the past as for the future. If this does not become general, it is so striking a point, that the consequences must be unspeakably mischievous. I enter not into the propriety of this measure in the view of finance, but confine myself to its operation on the army. Neither do I mean to insinuate, that the liberality of particular States has been carried to a blamable length. The evil I mean to point out is the inequality of the different provisions, and this is inherent in the present system. It were devoutly to be wished, that a plan could be devised by which every thing relating to the army could be conducted on a general principle, under the direction of Congress. This alone can give harmony and consistence to our military establishment, and I am persuaded it will be infinitely conducive to public economy. I hope I shall not be thought to have exceeded my duty in the unreserved manner in which I have exhibited our situation.\* Congress, I flatter myself, will have the

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\* In consequence of this letter, a committee of three persons was appointed by Congress, invested with very extensive powers, and instructed to proceed to head-quarters, and, in conjunction with the Commander-in-chief, to effect such reforms and changes in all the departments of the army, as its present condition required. They were authorized, with the

goodness to believe, that I have no other motives than a zeal for the public service, a desire to give them every necessary information, and an apprehension for the consequences of the evils now experienced.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE BARON DE KALB.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 4 April, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have, in consequence of the opinion of the last Council of War, left it with Congress finally to determine upon the march of the Maryland division to the

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advice of General Washington, "to reduce, incorporate, or unite to State lines, the several additional corps;" to inquire into and regulate the clothier's, quartermaster's, commissary's, and medical departments; to visit the different posts and see that such regulations as they should adopt were carried into execution; "to abolish unnecessary posts, to erect others, to discharge useless officers, to stop rations improperly issued, and to exercise every power requisite to effect a reformation of abuses, and the general arrangement of those departments, which were in any wise committed to their charge;" and to inform Congress from time to time of the measures they had taken. The committee was chosen by ballot, and consisted of Schuyler, Mathews, and Peabody.—*Journals, April 6th, 12th, 13th.*

M. de la Luzerne communicated to Count Vergennes the following particulars respecting the proceedings of Congress on this subject.

"A committee of three was proposed. Warm debates ensued. It was said, that this would be putting too much power in a few hands, and especially in those of the Commander-in-chief; that his influence was already too great; that even his virtues afforded motives for alarm; that the enthusiasm of the army, joined to the kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the United States at his mercy; that it was not expedient to expose a man of the highest virtues to such temptations. It was then proposed, that the committee should consist of one member from each State. This proposition failed, on the ground that the operations of so large a number would be subject to all the delays, which had been complained of in Congress. After a long and animated debate, the motion for a committee of three prevailed."—*MS. Letter, April 16th.*

southward. That no time may be lost in the transportation of the troops, should Congress agree in sentiment with the Council, I am to desire you to proceed immediately to Philadelphia, and, if you find upon your arrival there, that the troops are to move, concert with the Board of War and the commissary and quartermaster general the necessary arrangements for their provision and accommodation. But should it be determined, that the march of the body of men alluded to is at this time either inexpedient or unnecessary, you will be pleased, after completing your private business, to return to your command in the army. If you proceed to the southward, I wish you a safe and expeditious march, and every success that you can possibly desire; as I am, with very great respect and esteem, dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 13 April, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have not yet obtained any certain account that the fleet, which fell down to the Hook, has put to sea. I think however it may be depended on, from a concurrence of circumstances, that they are bound to the southward; but, until we know that they are actually gone out, we cannot be too much guarded against what may be only a feint. I am glad you have thought of bringing the fascines and gabions within the works upon the Point. They would be of the utmost importance to the enemy, should they move up seriously against our posts. There was a number cut about Fort Montgomery, and at other places near the water.

General Heath, who is appointed by the State of



Massachusetts to superintend the recruiting service, writes me that he shall endeavour to detain three commissioned and one non-commissioned officer of each regiment, who are already in the State on furlough, to go out recruiting, and to march the recruits, deserters who may be apprehended, and furloughed men, from the places of rendezvous to West Point. But as he is not certain of finding the number desired, he wishes you to send the deficiency, should there be any, from the line. This you will be pleased to do, if the state of the regiments will admit of it. Those officers, who have not been indulged with furloughs should be preferred, as they will have an opportunity of visiting their families and friends, and looking into their private affairs at the same time. Captain Webb, the bearer of this, who is under the necessity of resigning, if he cannot obtain leave of absence, would be content with going home upon these terms. He represents the situation of his family in such a manner, that I wish him to be indulged, if possible, at any rate.

That there may be no misapprehension, you will be pleased to acquaint the officers before they go out upon the recruiting service, that I know of no continental bounty or allowance to reimburse their expenses, or to compensate their trouble. The State, I have been informed, has made some provision, but I do not know exactly what it is. I have been full upon this point, lest the officers should hereafter complain, that they had gone out in obedience to orders, and that the State allowance was not adequate to their necessary expenditures. They must also be informed, that the recruits, who may be obtained, will be for the benefit of the line at large, and not for any particular corps. I am, &c.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 15 April, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

As far as it is possible for me, at this distance and with a very inconsiderable knowledge of the country, to judge, your reasonings on the best plan for an expedition against St. Augustine appear to me well founded. But unfortunately for us, from every present aspect, we shall find ample employment in defending ourselves, without meditating conquests. Your last letter announces the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, and his progress to Stono. It is of the greatest importance, that he met with the disasters which attended his voyage, though they were much smaller than was expected. This no doubt is the cause of his delay, and, I sincerely hope, will give you time to receive the necessary succours, and put yourself in an effectual posture of defence.

In my letter by General Duportail I informed you, that my advices from New York indicated a further embarkation, supposed to be destined for the southward. This has actually taken place, and has been for some time on the point of sailing, though it is not yet ascertained that the ships have sailed. I have had several accounts of the corps composing the detachment; but, as they materially differ from each other, I cannot rely sufficiently upon either of them to transmit it. From every information the total number will be from two thousand to two thousand five hundred men, commanded by Lord Rawdon as brigadier. I do not learn that there are any cavalry or draft-horses, more than about fifteen dragoons attached to Simcoe's corps. If this embarkation should be designed as a reinforcement to General Clinton, and he should suspend his operations



till its arrival, as is probable, so much time will be exhausted that he will be thrown into the hot season; a circumstance not a little unfavorable to his success. You will easily conceive the degree of our solicitude here for the fate of Charleston and its garrison. My apprehensions, after all, are principally for the harbour. If this is secured, the operations against you must become critical and arduous. But, whatever may be the event, of this we are assured, that no exertion, prudence, or perseverance on your part will be wanting to defeat the attempts of the enemy. May the issue be equally conducive to your personal glory, and to the advantage of these States.

In consequence of the detachment the enemy are now making, it has been determined to march the Maryland division of about two thousand men to your assistance; but our situation here will not permit it to move before it is certain the enemy's detachment has sailed. Baron de Kalb will command this division. This reinforcement in all probability will be too late to have any influence upon the fate of Charleston; but, if that should fall, it may serve to check the progress of the British troops, and prevent their getting entire possession of the State. If they succeed against Charleston, there is much reason to believe the southern States will become the principal theatre of the war.

I enclose to you sundry resolutions of Congress for raising specific supplies of provisions and forage in the different States, in which you will find the quantities apportioned to North and South Carolina. Congress have left it with me to determine the places of deposit; but my remoteness from those two States, and the imperfect knowledge I have of their position and circumstances, disqualify me from extending my arrangements to them. These will be much better made by you, and

I must request that you will as speedily as possible carry into execution that part of the resolutions, which depends on me. I have written to the governors of the two States, referring them to you for information on this head, which you will no doubt give without loss of time. I have written to the governor of Virginia, pressing the supplying of the troops of that State with clothing, agreeably to your request. I am very truly and affectionately, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 17 April, 1780.

SIR,

The Maryland division marched this morning, with the first regiment of artillery and eight field-pieces, besides those attached to the brigades, which will be useful at any rate, and essential, if an accident should happen to Charleston. The want of wagons has unavoidably retarded the march of the troops till this time.

I have attentively considered the application from the State of Massachusetts, on the subject of an expedition against the enemy at Penobscot. It appears to be of great importance in several points of view, that they should be dislodged; but, circumstanced as we are, I do not see how the attempt can be made with any prospect of success. A naval coöperation seems to be absolutely necessary, and for this we do not possess the means.

We have no fleet, and the enemy have a respectable one on the coast, which they can at any time employ to frustrate our measures. From all accounts, the posts at Penobscot are strongly situated, and susceptible of being made more formidable by additional fortifications, which it is to be presumed have not been neglected.

To attempt a *coup de main* with a tolerable certainty of success would require a considerable force, and of other troops than militia, which can by no means be spared. To operate by a siege, with cannon and the necessary apparatus, would be an affair of time. The operating force, I am informed, must depend on supplies of every kind by water. This communication would be liable to be interrupted at the pleasure of the enemy, and the situation of the troops would be alarmingly precarious. A reinforcement might at any time be sent from Halifax and New York to raise the siege; our troops would perhaps themselves escape with difficulty, no doubt with disgrace and with the loss of their cannon and stores. But, were there no other obstacles in the way, the total deficiency of money and magazines seems alone to be insurmountable. With respect to both of these we seem to be arrived at so desperate an extremity, that every arrangement and operation is at a stand, and, without speedy relief, inevitable ruin must ensue.

These objections to the expedition obviously present themselves in the present posture of our affairs, though I confess I have not a sufficient knowledge of the country in question to form a very accurate judgment. Could we obtain an effectual naval coöperation, this and many other things might be undertaken, which without it are impracticable. Indeed, considering the position of these States, a fleet is essential to our system of defence; and that we have not hitherto suffered more than we have for want of it, is to be ascribed to the feeble and injudicious manner in which the enemy have applied the means in their hands during this war. The plan they are now preparing, of attacking points remote from each other, will make us feel the disadvantage in a striking manner, and may be fatal, if our allies are not



able to afford us naval succour. In all respects it is more necessary now than it ever was.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO COLONEL JOHN LAURENS, AT CHARLESTON.

Morristown, 26 April, 1780.

MY DEAR LAURENS,

I sincerely lament that your prospects are not better than they are. The impracticability of defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town and garrison. At this distance it is difficult to judge for you, and I have the greatest confidence in General Lincoln's prudence; but it really appears to me, that the propriety of attempting to defend the town depended on the probability of defending the bar, and that, when this ceased, the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however, I suspend a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider what I say as confidential. Since your last to me, I have received a letter from General Lincoln, in which he informs me, that the enemy had got a sixty-four-gun ship with a number of other vessels over the bar, and that it had been determined to abandon the project of disputing the passage by Sullivan's Island, and to draw up the frigates to the town and take out their cannon. This brings your affairs nearer to a dangerous crisis, and increases my apprehensions.

You will have learned from General Lincoln, that a second detachment sailed from New York on the 7th instant, supposed to be destined to reinforce Sir Henry Clinton. I have not yet ascertained all the particular corps, but know that the forty-second, the Irish volunteers, Queen's rangers, and some foreign troops are of

the number, and have every reason to believe the total number is from two thousand to two thousand five hundred. They appeared a few days since off the Chesapeake Bay, but immediately continued their voyage. I have just received an account of the arrival of forty-one transports at New York from South Carolina, and that there were strong symptoms of another embarkation. This circumstance is to me not of easy explanation. I should imagine that Sir Henry Clinton's present force was equal to his object, and that he would not require more. The garrison of New York and its dependencies at this time cannot much exceed eight thousand men, a number barely sufficient for its defence, and not with propriety admitting a diminution. Perhaps, however, counting upon our weakness the enemy may determine to hazard something here, the more effectually to secure conquest to the southward; or perhaps they may only intend to detach a force for a temporary diversion in Virginia or North Carolina, to return afterwards to New York. I expect more certain advice to-day, and should it confirm the first, any demonstrations it may be in our power to make, to retard or prevent the embarkation, shall be put in practice; but unfortunately we have very little in our power.

In both your letters you express a wish, that I should come to the southward. Though I cannot flatter myself with the advantages you look for from such a step, yet, if it were proposed by Congress, I confess to you that I should not dislike the journey, did our affairs in this quarter permit it; but unluckily the great departments of the army are now in total confusion, and Congress have just appointed a committee, in conjunction with me, to new model and rectify them. Till this is done, I could not leave this army. And, were not this obstacle in the way, you will easily conceive that I must

have many scruples, which forbid me to let the measure in question originate with me. But all this for your private ear. Be assured, my dear Laurens, that I am extremely sensible to the expressions of your attachment, and that I feel all for you in your present situation, which the warmest friendship can dictate. I am confident you will do your duty, and in doing it you must run great hazards. May success attend you, and restore you with fresh laurels to your friends, to your country, and to me. I am, &c.

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TO JAMES BOWDOIN, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL  
OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Morristown, 26 April, 1780.

SIR,

I am much obliged to you for your favor, transmitting to me a copy of the plan proposed for the constitution of your State. I have not yet had leisure to give it an attentive consideration; but, from a cursory view, it appears to me to be a very judicious one, and to possess all the requisites towards securing the liberty and happiness of individuals, and at the same time giving energy to the administration. This latter indeed is essential to the former, though unfortunately in some of our constitutions it has not been sufficiently consulted. It is of great importance, that a State, which is of so much weight in the union as that of Massachusetts, should have a well combined and vigorous government. Nothing will give me greater pleasure, than to learn that the people have adopted one, which answers this description. Accept my thanks for your communication of the advice from Mr. Adams. It corresponds with



my expectations, though very little with our circumstances.\* It is devoutly to be wished, that this campaign may be the last. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Morristown, 28 April, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

It is lamentable that we should be obliged to suffer such distresses as we do everywhere. Those we feel here are not inferior to yours ; we are constantly on the point of starving for want of provision and forage. A deficiency of money is the cause, and a cause for which the present situation of affairs renders it infinitely difficult to provide a remedy. We are at a most delicate crisis. I dread with you the consequences.

We are informed that there is an arrival of forty-seven transports from South Carolina at New York, and that there are appearances of a further embarkation. It may be of use to make demonstrations of a movement on our part. I should be glad, so far as it can be done without interfering with the necessary operations, and without incurring expense, that you would set on foot a collection of boats on the river, and have them inspected and some little repairs made. Some time since you were directed at your own instance to have all the fascines and gabions, which had been provided in expectation of Count d'Estaing last fall, deposited within the works. If this has not been effected, you will be

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\* Mr. Adams was now in Europe as minister from the United States for negotiating a peace, whenever the time should arrive for that event. Mr. Bowdoin mentioned a letter from him, dated in January, in which he gave it as his opinion, that peace could not be expected during the present year.

pleased to have it done. They may possibly be of future utility, and the act of removing them will contribute to our present purpose. A number was provided below Stony Point where the Virginia troops lie. You will not forget to remove these also to a place of security.

General Duportail being gone to the southward, it is necessary that Colonel Gouvion should repair to this army. If there are any previous arrangements, which you wish him to make, you will be pleased to direct him to make them, and to set out for head-quarters as speedily as he can. It has been represented to me, that cattle coming on for this army have been stopped by some of your commissaries for the use of the garrison. As the purchasing commissary makes a distribution in the first instance, and always takes care to send a proportion to the posts under your command, any interference of this kind is irregular and improper. You will be pleased to give orders to prevent it in future. Our wants here are so extreme, that the supplies intended for this part of the army cannot be diverted to any other without risking the most serious consequences.

The state of our arsenals makes the greatest care and economy indispensable. I wish you to pay a pointed attention, that the men whose times of service expire do not, on leaving the army, carry away the public arms with them. Those, who may have brought arms of their own with them, for which they have not been paid, and which have been exchanged for better, must as far as may be practicable return those they now have and receive their own. You will make the commandants of battalions particularly responsible for carrying this into execution. The Maryland division being gone to the southward, all the men belonging to it in

the hospitals at Albany are directed to be sent to Fishkill. When arrived there, you will take measures to have them and those already at Fishkill forwarded to this place. Should they want any little necessities you will have them supplied. I am, with great regard, &c.

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TO DON DIEGO JOSEPH NAVARRO, GOVERNOR OF CUBA.

Morristown, 30 April, 1780.

SIR,

I am extremely sorry to communicate to your Excellency, the painful intelligence of the death of Don Juan de Miralles. This unfortunate event happened at my quarters the day before yesterday, and his remains were yesterday interred with all the respect due to his character and merit. He did me the honor of a visit, in company with the minister of France, and was seized on the day of his arrival with a violent bilious complaint, which, after nine days' continuance, put a period to his life, notwithstanding all the efforts of the most skilful physicians we were able to procure. Your Excellency will have the goodness to believe, that I took pleasure in performing every friendly office to him during his illness, and that no care or attention in our power was omitted towards his comfort or restoration. I the more sincerely sympathize with you in the loss of so estimable a friend, as, ever since his residence with us, I have been happy in ranking him among the number of mine. It must, however, be some consolation to his connexions to know, that in this country he has been universally esteemed, and will be universally regretted.

May I request the favor of your Excellency to present my respects to the lady and family of our deceased friend, and to assure them how much I participate in



their affliction on this melancholy occasion? I have the honor to be, with the highest respect and consideration, your Excellency's, &c.

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TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Morristown, 5 May, 1780.

SIR,

The polite terms in which you mention the attention, which my respectful attachment for you dictated during your stay in camp, add to the obligation I feel for the honor of your visit. I was happy in that opportunity of giving you new proofs of my sentiments, and I entreat you to afford me others as frequently as possible. As the minister of a prince, to whom America owes so much, you have every title to my respect; and, permit me to add, your personal qualities give you a claim, which my heart cheerfully acknowledges, to all my esteem and all my regard.

I beg you to accept my thanks for your intention to represent the army in so favorable a light, as will recommend it to the approbation of his Most Christian Majesty; an honor as flattering as it will be precious. It would be a want of gratitude not to be convinced of the intimate concern he takes in our affairs, after the repeated and decided proofs he has given. I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, &c.\*

P. S. Mrs. Washington, sensible of your polite at-

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\* In giving an account to M. de Vergennes of his visit to camp, M. de la Luzerne said, — "The time which I passed with General Washington has convinced me more than ever of the very great advantage, which the republic derives from his services. His virtues have gained for him the affection of the army which he commands, and the confidence and respect of the generals and other officers." — *MS. Letter, May 13th.*

tention to her, prays your acceptance of her compliments and best respects.

*Nine o'clock, A. M.* — I have this instant received a letter from my much esteemed and amiable friend, the Marquis de Lafayette, dated in Boston harbour, the 27th of last month. In the course of a day or two I shall expect to see him.

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TO MONSIEUR MARBOIS, SECRETARY TO THE EMBASSY  
FROM HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY.

Morristown, 5 May, 1780.

SIR,

Any marks of consideration, that you may have received during your stay in camp, were only a just tribute to your merit, which my esteem for you made me take pleasure in paying. The manner in which you speak of them in your letter, and the obliging assurances you give me, have a new title to my regard. The opportunity, which your visit to camp afforded me, of knowing you more particularly, has confirmed the sentiments with which the commencement of our acquaintance impressed me; and I entreat you to be assured, that there is nothing I desire more than frequent occasions of giving you proofs of the high estimation in which I hold you, and the perfect regard with which I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Morristown, 8 May, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Your welcome favor of the 27th of April came to my hands yesterday. I received it with all the joy that

the sincerest friendship could dictate, and with that impatience which an ardent desire to see you could not fail to inspire. I am sorry I do not know your route through the State of New York, that I might with certainty send a small party of horse (all I have at this place) to meet and escort you safely through the Tory settlements between this place and the North River. At all events, Major Gibbs will go as far as Pompton, where the roads unite, to meet you, and will proceed from thence as circumstances may direct, either towards King's Ferry or New Windsor. I most sincerely congratulate you on your safe arrival in America, and shall embrace you with all the warmth of an affectionate friend, when you come to head-quarters, where a bed is prepared for you. Adieu, till we meet. Yours.\*

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TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Morristown, 11 May, 1780.

SIR,

The attentions and honors paid to Monsieur Miralles after his death were a tribute due to his character and merit, and dictated by the sincere esteem which I al-

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\* The impressions of the British ministry, respecting the condition of things in America, may be learned from the following extract. — "All the private letters from the rebel countries are filled with representations of the general distress and sufferings of the people, the discontent of the troops, and the universal wish for peace. The middle provinces are said to be so disinclined to support the Congress, that no recruits are to be had, and the militia will not submit to be drafted. Their only resort for continuing the war seemed to be a foreign aid, which, however, has not yet been sent to them; and therefore I flatter myself you will have met but little interruption in your progress northward after the reduction of Charleston, and that you will have sufficient time to execute your plan in the Chesapeake, or at least to establish yourself there beyond the power of any force, which can be brought to dislodge you." — *MS. Letter from Lord George Germain to General Clinton, May 3d.*



ways felt for him. I am much obliged to your Excellency for your intention of sending me a detail of the land and sea forces arrived at Martinique.

You will participate in the joy I feel at the arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette. No event could have given me greater pleasure on a personal account, and motives of public utility conspire to make it agreeable. He will shortly have the honor to wait upon your Excellency, and impart matters of the greatest moment to these States. He announces a fresh and striking instance of the friendship of your court, which cannot fail to contribute greatly to perpetuate the gratitude of this country. I am always happy to repeat to you the sentiments of respect and inviolable attachment, with which I have the honor to be, your Excellency's, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 13 May, 1780.

SIR,

The Marquis de Lafayette will have the honor to deliver to you this letter. I am persuaded Congress will participate in the joy I feel at the return of a gentleman, who has so signally distinguished himself in the service of this country, who has given so many and so decisive proofs of his attachment to its interests, and who ought to be dear to it from every motive. The warm friendship I have for him conspires with considerations of public utility to afford me a double satisfaction in his return. During the time he has been in France, he has uniformly manifested the same zeal in our affairs, which animated his conduct while he was among us; and he has been upon all occasions an essential friend to America. He merits, and I doubt not

Congress will give him, every mark of consideration in their power. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

Morristown, 14 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette opens a prospect, which offers the most important advantages to these States, if proper measures are adopted to improve it. He announces an intention of his court to send a fleet and army to coöperate effectually with us. In the present state of our finances, and in the total emptiness of our magazines, a plan must be concerted to bring out the resources of the country with vigor and decision. This I think you will agree with me cannot

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\* When M. de la Luzerne informed the French ministry of the occurrences, which took place in consequence of the Marquis de Lafayette's arrival in America, he said,—"General Washington, whose circumspection increases in proportion to the confidence reposed in him by Congress, would not take upon himself the responsibility of arranging a plan of combined operations. After having assured the Marquis de Lafayette, that he would apply himself with all possible activity to hasten forward recruits and to collect provisions, he desired him to proceed immediately to Philadelphia, and concert further measures with the French minister, and particularly as to the expediency of acquainting Congress with the secret of the expected arrival of the French troops." The minister was reluctant to act against his orders in this respect, but was induced to do it chiefly from the fact, that the enemy were already informed of the secret. A New York newspaper had announced, that M. de Ternay would command a squadron destined to aid the Americans, consisting of six vessels, and that six regiments of troops would be embarked. This left no doubt, that the British commander had been informed of particulars. There was no longer occasion to conceal the intelligence from Congress. But it was communicated with caution. The number of forces was not mentioned. The subject was debated three days, and resolutions were passed in conformity with the views of the French minister. The powers of Congress were not such as to enable them to demand forces from the States; they could only recommend, and the authority of the governors

be effected, if the measures to be taken should depend on the slow deliberations of a body so large as Congress, admitting the best disposition in every member to promote the objects in view. It appears to me of the greatest importance, and even of absolute necessity, that a small committee should be immediately appointed to reside near head-quarters, vested with all the powers which Congress have, so far as respects the purpose of a full coöperation with the French fleet and army on the continent. Their authority should be plenipotentary to draw out men and supplies of every kind, and to give their sanction to any operations which the Commander-in-chief may not think himself at liberty to undertake without it, as well beyond as within the limits of these States. The committee can act with despatch and energy. By being on the spot they will be able to provide for exigencies as they arise, and the better to judge of their nature and urgency. The plans in con-

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must be obtained. Nor could there be any longer a reason for withholding from them a secret, which was known to the enemy. — It will be seen in the above letter, that General Washington does not hint at the object of the Marquis de Lafayette's visit to Philadelphia.

In fact the British government were fully apprized of the equipment of a squadron at Brest, destined for America, long before. Notice to this effect was communicated to Sir Henry Clinton as early as the middle of March. "Intelligence received respecting the destination of the armament preparing at Brest," said the minister, "causes alarm for Newfoundland, Halifax, and Canada. The last is confidently believed to be the object of the enemy; for, besides the expectations constantly entertained by the Americans of such an attack, the dispositions they have made for acting in concert with it, and the hopes given to the Canadians of seeing French troops again in their country, the return of the Marquis de Lafayette to Boston, the nature of the clothing, arms, money, and necessities provided to be sent with the troops, concur in pointing out that country as the ultimate destination of the armament. Measures have been taken to defeat this project. It is hoped, that you have before this time reinforced General Haldimand with the troops, whom you were disappointed in sending the last year." — *MS. Letter from Lord George Germain to General Clinton, March 15th.*

See APPENDIX, No. I.



temptation may be opened to them with more freedom and confidence, than to a numerous body, where secrecy is impossible, and where the indiscretion of a single member by disclosing may defeat the project.

I need not enlarge on the advantages of such a measure, as I flatter myself they will all occur to you, and that you will be ready to propose and give it all your support. The conjuncture is one of the most critical and important we have seen; all our prudence and exertions are requisite to give it a favorable issue; hesitancy and delay would in all probability ruin our affairs. Circumstanced as we are, the greatest good or the greatest ill must result. We shall probably fix the independence of America if we succeed, and, if we fail, the abilities of the States will have been so strained in the attempt, that a total relaxation and debility must ensue, and the worst is to be apprehended. These considerations should determine Congress to forego all inferior objects, and unite with mutual confidence in those measures, which seem best calculated to insure success.

There is no man, that can be more useful as a member of the committee than General Schuyler. His perfect knowledge of the resources of the country, the activity of his temper, his fruitfulness of expedients, and his sound military sense, make me wish, above all things, that he may be appointed. I have also a very favorable opinion of Mr. Mathews's understanding and integrity; and I should be willing to trust every thing to the goodness of the other's intentions, if I had not some doubts of his discretion. I wish the Chancellor or yourself could be in the appointment. A well composed committee is of primary importance. I need not hint that the delicacy of these intimations fits them only for your private ear. The opinion I have of your

friendship induces me thus freely and confidentially to impart my sentiments on this occasion, and I shall be very happy, if you shall agree with me in judgment.

I am with the greatest esteem and regard, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR JEFFERSON.

Morristown, 15 May, 1780.

SIR,

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency confidentially, that a French fleet may in the course of a few weeks be expected on this coast, and as it is uncertain what part of the land they may first make, gentlemen are to be stationed at different points, to give them signals and to make them some necessary communications immediately upon their arrival. Major Galvan, who will have the honor of delivering this to your Excellency, is appointed to go down to Cape Henry, for the purposes above mentioned; and, as he will have occasion to keep one or two boats in constant readiness to go off upon the appearance of the fleet, I shall be much obliged by your giving an order to the person, who has the superintendence of the public vessels and craft in Virginia, to supply him with the necessary number. Should the public have none of the proper kind in their possession, you will be pleased to recommend to Major Galvan the most certain and speedy method of procuring them. One or two skilful and trusty pilots will also be necessary, that, if any of the ships should have occasion to enter the bay, they may not be at a loss.

Your Excellency will no doubt see the propriety of keeping the object of Major Galvan's mission as much a secret as possible, lest the importance of the de-

spatches, with which he is charged, might be an inducement to some of the disaffected to take him off. It would add much to his security, if your Excellency would be good enough to introduce him to some gentlemen in the neighbourhood of Cape Henry, in whom he may confide, and with whom he may remain while in that quarter. It is essentially necessary that Major Galvan should be constantly informed of the operations in South Carolina; and, as he will be out of the common track of intelligence, I have desired him to keep up a communication with your Excellency. Your acquainting him therefore with what comes to your knowledge, either officially or in a manner sufficiently authentic to be depended upon, may be productive of most salutary consequences. I would beg leave to recommend Major Galvan generally to your Excellency, for every public assistance of which he may stand in need, and particularly to your personal civilities. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH, AT BOSTON.

Head-Quarters, 15 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have the pleasure to inform you in strict confidence, that we have authentic advices of his Most Christian Majesty's determination to send a respectable armament of sea and land forces to operate on the continent, and that the period is not remote when we may expect their arrival. Having informed you of this, I am now to add, that the destruction of Halifax, and of the naval arsenals and garrison there, is a primary object with our allies; as, this being effected, the support of the enemy's marine in those seas and in the West Indies would be exceedingly difficult and precarious, and, in this view,



that there is nothing they seem to wish for more. It would certainly be an event of infinite importance to them, and of course to the common cause; and therefore we ought, as far as possible, to give every aid in our power to accomplish it. It may be essential to the success of any attempt, that may be made against the place, to obtain previous information with respect to the force, the corps that are there, the number, sort, and condition of the fortifications, and also the ships of war; which are points about which our allies appear to be in the dark, and as to which unhappily I cannot give the necessary satisfaction myself. I therefore earnestly request, that you will assist me in this very important business, as far as present circumstances will permit, by communicating to me by the earliest opportunity the result of such inquiries, as you shall make on the subject. You cannot be too minute and particular with respect to it; and I should hope from the frequent flags, which I think I have heard have passed between Halifax and Boston for the exchange of prisoners, that you may gain good and useful intelligence upon the occasion.

I request this as a first step; but, besides, I wish you if possible to send to Halifax, in such way as may appear the most likely to succeed, one or two persons of good understanding, and upon whose firmness and fidelity we may safely rely, to obtain the most exact account of those matters. If they could be draftsmen, they would be so much the better, as a good plan of the fortifications would be of essential service, and is what our friends are very desirous of obtaining. I have written to Mr. Bowdoin a confidential letter on these subjects; and I am persuaded that he and the Council, without disclosing the matter, on your application, if you should find it necessary to make one, will most cheerfully do any thing that may be requisite to promote the plan for

gaining intelligence, and will assist you with money if you should have occasion for it. If you can engage proper persons to go on the business, you may stipulate with them for a generous compensation to be made to them on their return, which will be increased in proportion to the importance of the information they may bring. You will extend your inquiries in like manner to the post and garrison at Penobscot, and procure the best account of these that you can. If our allies should operate against Halifax, they will necessarily have occasion for some skilful and faithful pilots acquainted with the coast and harbour. I therefore wish you to turn your attention to the matter, and to inform me whether such may be had in case they are wanted. You will also do the same with respect to Penobscot. Indeed it might be best, if you have an opportunity, to speak to some of the pilots, who would be proper to be employed, without discovering the matter with respect to an arrival of the fleet from France, to know whether in case of such an expedition they would embark in it.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE, AT PHILADELPHIA.

Morristown, 16 May, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Since you left me I have more fully reflected on the plan, which it will be proper for the French fleet and army to pursue on their arrival upon the coast; and it appears to me, in the present situation of the enemy at

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\* Very full intelligence was obtained, respecting the particulars mentioned in this letter. Mr. Bowdoin succeeded in procuring a plan of the harbour of Halifax, in which were marked the depth of the water and the position of all the military works.

New York, that it ought to be our first object to reduce that post, and that it is of the utmost importance not to lose a moment in repairing to that place. I would therefore advise you to write to the Count de Rochambeau and Monsieur de Ternay in the following spirit; urging them in the strongest terms to proceed, both fleet and army, with all possible expedition to Sandy Hook, where they will be met with further advices of the precise situation, strength, and disposition of the enemy, and of our army, and with proposals for their future movements; unless they should have received authentic accounts, that the fleet and troops now operating in the southern States have evacuated them, and formed a junction at New York. In this case, if they arrive at Rhode Island, they can disembark their troops, dispose of their sick, and wait till a more definitive plan can be concerted; or if they arrive off Cape Henry, they can proceed directly to Rhode Island, and make the same arrangements. But, in case they should not have received the accounts above mentioned, of the evacuation of the southern States and junction at New York, and should proceed directly to Sandy Hook as is recommended, they can send their sick, and every thing of which they wish to be disencumbered, to Rhode Island.

The reasons for proceeding immediately to New York, in the present situation of the enemy there, are these. The enemy's whole effective land force, in regular troops, is about eight thousand men, to which may be added about four thousand refugees, and such of the militia as they would be able by persuasion or force to engage; but on the militia I should suppose they could place no great dependence. Their naval force is one ship of seventy-four guns and three or four small frigates. If the arrival of the French succour should find



them in this situation, the fleet can enter the harbour of New York without difficulty, and this is a point upon which the success of the whole enterprise absolutely turns. By stopping at Rhode Island, if they arrive there, or by passing from Cape Henry to Rhode Island, the most precious time will be lost, which will multiply the chances to the enemy of concentrating their force, of receiving a naval reinforcement from England or the West Indies, of increasing their precautions to obstruct the channel and their preparations for the defence of their posts. By gaining possession of the harbour and cutting off its communications, the present garrison at New York would be unable to resist the efforts of the combined forces ; and, together with their ships, must in all probability fall into our hands. On the contrary, if they have time to centre at New York all their sea and land force on the continent, the enterprise against that place becomes extremely arduous, has much less prospect of success, and will at least exhaust the whole campaign to bring it to a favorable issue.

The enemy have in the expedition under Sir Henry Clinton about seven thousand land troops, three ships of the line, one fifty-gun, two forty-four, and some smaller frigates. If these ships were added to the force at New York, they would, I apprehend, be sufficient to exclude the French squadron, unless aided by a vigorous coöperation by land towards Sandy Hook ; and the garrison, increased to fourteen or fifteen thousand regular troops, would present immense difficulties in the way of its reduction.

I observed that the French squadron would find no difficulty in entering the port of New York, with the present naval force of the enemy there. The only possible obstacles to this are the obstructions, which the enemy are preparing ; but I am inclined to hope these

will be ineffectual and may be easily removed. Last fall they made an attempt of the kind, on the expectation of Count d'Estaing ; but it failed from the depth of the water and the rapidity of the current. Pilots for the harbour can be ready at Black Point in the Jerseys, from which they can go on board the fleet at its first appearance. I would wish you to convey these things in the fullest light to the French commanders by way of recommendation, leaving it to them to act according to the condition of the fleet and troops with respect to health and other essential matters ; and, if they prefer it, to go immediately to Rhode Island from Cape Henry ; or, if they arrive at the former place in the first instance, to wait till a definitive plan is adopted. But I think every reason points to the mode here recommended.

You will be sensible, my dear Sir, that we can at present only touch upon preliminary measures. The plan for ultimate operations must be the result of mature deliberation, and a full view of our resources, and must be formed in conjunction with the general and admiral of the French forces. I refer Mr. Galvan to you for instructions ; but I send you a letter to Governor Jefferson of Virginia to give him any assistance he may require, and to correspond with him on the state of southern affairs. His own discretion, and the information he will get on the spot, must chiefly govern him. He cannot be despatched too soon.

I request you, in writing to the Count de Rochambeau and Monsieur de Ternay, to assure them of all my respect and consideration, of the high sense I entertain of this distinguished mark of his Most Christian Majesty's friendship to these States, and of the happiness I anticipate in a personal acquaintance and coöperation with gentlemen, whose reputation has inspired me with

the greatest esteem for their talents and merit. You will add, that I will do every thing on my part to give success to the intended operations, and that I flatter myself they will be attended with the happiest consequences. I cannot forbear recalling your attention to the importance of doing every thing possible to engage the Count de Guichen to come upon this coast without delay. The more I reflect upon it, the more essential it appears. With this addition to our present plan, we should have reason to flatter ourselves with every thing; without it, we have a great deal to apprehend, and, instead of the happiest, the worst consequences may ensue to the common cause. I am, my dear Marquis, with the greatest truth and affection, your friend, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Morristown, 18 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I yesterday received your obliging favor. From the great importance of the subject, I confess I am infinitely anxious myself about the issue of the operations at Charleston; and I wish most cordially that we had it in our power to pursue means, which would certainly relieve it. The unhappy state of our finances is opposed to this, and lays us under every embarrassment that can be conceived. If we could once get this in a favorable train, our affairs would look up, and we might do a thousand things which are now utterly impracticable. I thank you very much for your suggestions with respect to the mode of giving succour in that quarter, and shall always be happy in the freest communication of your sentiments. The same had often been in my mind, and it would certainly be the most eligible way,



if we were in circumstances to pursue it. But besides our distresses on the score of supplies, you will painfully recollect, that this winter and spring have put a period to the service of no inconsiderable part of our force. I also thank you for your attention to the Maryland troops, and for your endeavours to assist them. A melancholy consideration indeed, that we cannot move even a small detachment, however interesting the occasion, without the greatest difficulty and delay!

I shall be very happy to see you at camp again, and hope you will without hesitation resume your command in the Pennsylvania line. I know, on a former occasion, you had some difficulty on this head; but, when you consider the point, you will see the propriety of the measure. When I have the pleasure of seeing you, I shall talk with you more fully on the subject. I am, with very sincere regard and esteem, dear Sir, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Morristown, 18 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have the happiness to inform your Excellency, that the Marquis de Lafayette has brought the interesting intelligence of a French fleet and army, which was to sail from France early in April for this continent to co-operate with us. He has gone on to Congress, and measures will, it is to be hoped, be immediately taken by them to put us in a situation to derive the advantage from this succour, which with proper exertion we have a right to expect. You will be sensible, that there will be a necessity for the concurrence of the legislatures of the different States in providing men and supplies. As I am informed, your Assembly is now sit-

ting, and may probably be about rising ; and as the determination of Congress may not arrive in time to prevent its adjournment, I have thought it proper to give this intimation in confidence, that you may keep them together. If they once separate, it will be impossible to reassemble them in time to answer our purposes ; and it is of infinite importance that they should be assembled. As this anticipates Congress, it is of course only intended for your private information, and is not to be officially made use of to the Assembly. In the intended coöperation, to whatever point it may be directed, we shall stand in need of all the Continental force we can collect. I am, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Morristown, 19 May, 1780.

I impatiently wait, my dear Marquis, to know the result of the arrangements you were to make with Congress. The time glides away so fast, and we have so little before us, that every moment is infinitely precious and ought to be improved. We talked of a proclamation to the Canadians. If it is not already done, I think it ought not to be delayed. It should be in your own name, and have as much as possible an air of probability. Perhaps it will be more plausible to have two different kinds made ; one intimating to them the arrival of a French fleet and army in the River St. Lawrence, to coöperate by the way of Rhode Island, where to answer some important purposes they are to touch, and dwelling on the happy opportunity it will afford them to renew their ancient friendship with France, by joining the allied arms and assisting to make Canada a

part of the American confederation, with all the privileges and advantages enjoyed by the other members ; cautioning them by no means to aid the enemy in their preparations for defending the province. The other proclamation should be drawn, on the supposition of the fleet and army being already arrived, and should contain an animating invitation to arrange themselves under the allied banners. In both proclamations you should hold yourself up as a French and American officer, charged both by the King of France and by Congress with a commission to address them upon the occasion. It may indeed be well to throw out an idea, that you are to command the corps of American troops destined to coöperate with the French armament. The more mystery in this business the better. It will get out, and it ought to seem to be against our intention.\*

In a memorandum, which you left with Colonel Hamilton, you mention pilots to be sent to Cape Henry for conducting the fleet to Rhode Island. This does not appear to me necessary ; as there will be pilots ready at Rhode Island to take the fleet into the harbour, and every navigator can answer the purpose to the entrance

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\* According to the above suggestion, a proclamation to the Canadians was written in French, and signed by Lafayette. It was long, and contained arguments to persuade the Canadians to join Rochambeau's army when it should arrive, and expel the British from Canada, intimating that the chief object for which the French troops were coming to America was an attack on Canada. The proclamation was intended, not to be sent to the Canadians, but to operate as a stratagem to deceive the British commander, and draw away his attention from New York. The scheme was probably in part successful, unless it may be supposed, that Arnold, who was knowing to the secret, communicated it to the enemy. Several copies fell into the hands of Sir Henry Clinton. He wrote as follows to Lord George Germain ; — "I have the honor to transmit to you the copy of a proclamation, which I have reason to believe the Marquis de Lafayette intended to have published in Canada, if the proposed expedition against that province had taken place." — *August 31st*. In truth no such expedition had been *proposed*.



of the port. If however you think it will be expected that pilots be ready at Cape Henry, you can apply to the Marine Committee, who can easily provide them.

I forgot to observe, that something might be addressed to the savages. I mentioned to you, when here, the inserting of a paragraph in the papers somewhat to this effect ; " We have it from good authority, that the Marquis de Lafayette brings the important and agreeable intelligence of a very considerable naval and land force, intended to be sent by his Most Christian Majesty to the succour of these States ; and that the campaign will open with a combined operation against New York. This, there is every reason to hope, with proper exertions on our part, will put a happy period to the war ; nor can there be any room to doubt that the glorious opportunity will be effectually improved. This instance of the friendship of our ally is a new claim to the lasting affection and gratitude of this country." I think such a paragraph will be useful, as the people will be roused by it ; while the enemy, by the address to the Canadians and other demonstrations pointing another way, may be distracted by attending to different objects and weakened. You will judge by appearances how far it may be agreeable to Congress. I am, with all affection and sincerity, yours truly.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Morristown, 20 May, 1780.

I had written the enclosed, my dear Marquis, previously to the receipt of yours of the 17th, which arrived late yesterday. The despatches accompanying them for the eastward were sent off before day this morning.

Mr. Hamilton wrote to Captain de la Fouché on the points which you mention. I also wrote to him and to Governor Trumbull. The measures, that have been taken, are all evidently proper. The communication to Mr. Holker was necessary, and can be attended with no inconvenience. I could wish that gentleman might accompany you to camp. His knowledge of the country, and intelligence in business, will enable him to be useful in the arrangements we shall have to make. General Greene will give all the aid in his power in the article of wagons, or in any thing else in which it may be wanted and to which his means extend.

I hope the sending of the committee will not be delayed a moment. The members appointed to draw the instructions are very good men. I shall be sorry, however, if General Schuyler is not of the committee.\* The sooner the Chevalier can make it convenient to honor me with a visit the better. His advice and concurrence in some points may be very important. Will you present my respects to him? The enemy are embarking more troops at New York, and heavy cannon, as it is said, for Halifax and Cape Breton. I send a letter with

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\* Great satisfaction was expressed by Congress on the arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette in Philadelphia. A resolve was passed, testifying, that his return to America, to resume his command, was considered by Congress "as a fresh proof of the disinterested zeal and persevering attachment, which have justly recommended him to the public confidence and applause, and that they receive with pleasure a tender of the further services of so gallant and meritorious an officer." — *Journals, May 16th.*

A committee reported, and it was resolved in consequence, that the Commander-in-chief, after receiving such communications from the Marquis de Lafayette as he had to offer, should take such measures for carrying on the operations of the campaign as would effectually promote the purposes in view. The same committee were likewise instructed to confer with M. de la Luzerne, as to the means of obtaining supplies for the French forces; and to collect intelligence by establishing a correspondence with the governors of the several States, and such other persons as the committee should think proper. — *Secret Journals, May 20th.*

this to stop Lee's corps. You will find that I have anticipated that part of your letter, which relates to pilots for Cape Henry. You will act in this matter as you think proper. As the post is just setting out, I have not time to enlarge. Finish your business as soon as you can and hasten *home*, for so I would always have you consider head-quarters and my house. Mrs. Washington sends you her affectionate compliments; the gentlemen of the family theirs. Believe me on all occasions, with the greatest tenderness and sincerity, your friend and servant.

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TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

Morristown, 21 May, 1780.

SIR,

Supposing the enemy to continue in their present divided state, where can they be attacked to the greatest advantage, and in what manner can we operate most effectually against them? Is not that part of their army and shipping, which is at the southward, more exposed and liable to a more certain blow, than the other part, which is at New York, where there is uncertainty of getting into the harbour, and where works surrounding the city are already established for its defence, and every possible exertion using to increase and strengthen them? In what danger, for want of a secure harbour for ships of the line, would the French fleet be involved on the Carolina coast? What difficulties should we have to encounter in getting there with the necessary apparatus and provisions? And how could we be supported when there, in case an enterprise of this kind should otherwise be thought eligible?

Supposing the enemy to form a junction of their force



at New York, what is practicable in that case? And what measures had best be pursued in consequence? Again, let us suppose the enemy to have succeeded at Charleston, that they have captured the garrison employed in defence of it, that they mean to leave a sufficient force in the States of South Carolina and Georgia to hold the towns of Charleston and Savannah, without aiming at any thing more in that quarter at present; and the rest arrived at New York; what is best for us to do in that case?

In a word, my wish is to have our situation and that of the enemy considered in all the points of view they can be placed in, and the most advantageous plan of operation proposed for each. What force in aid of the French army and Continental troops will it be necessary to call upon the States for, in case of an operation against New York? To answer this question, it is necessary to premise, that, in New York and its dependencies, there are at least eight thousand regular troops, besides about four thousand refugees and militia. How many of the latter, when matters become serious, can be brought to act, is more than I can tell. At the southward there are about seven thousand regular troops, under the immediate command of Sir Henry Clinton.

Supposing the enemy to continue in the divided state in which they are at present, and New York (the troops in it I mean) should be our object, how far with perfect safety would it be practicable to let the French troops act separately on Long Island, if it should be judged expedient to attack the town by a combined operation in that quarter and from York Island at the same time? Where had the French best establish their hospitals and deposit their heavy stores? Under a full view of all circumstances, what position is most eligible for the

American army to take, previously to the arrival of the French fleet and army ; and when should it be taken ?

Your opinion on the foregoing queries and on such other matters as relate to the business, which is unfolding and which requires the closest attention under our circumstances, will be thankfully received by your affectionate, &c.

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TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, JOHN MATHEWS, AND NATHANIEL PEABODY, A COMMITTEE FROM CONGRESS.

Morristown, 25 May, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,

I have attentively considered the circular letter to the different States, which you did me the honor to communicate for my perusal, and I am happy to find, that my ideas perfectly correspond with those of the committee. The view they have given of our situation is just, full, and explicit ; the measures they have recommended are well adapted to the emergency and of indispensable necessity. I very freely give it as my opinion, that, unless they are carried into execution in the fullest extent and with the greatest decision and rapidity, it will be impossible for us to undertake the intended coöperation with any reasonable prospect of success.

The consequences you have well delineated. The succour designed for our benefit will prove a serious misfortune, and, instead of rescuing us from the embarrassments we experience, and from the danger with which we are threatened, will, in all probability, precipitate our ruin.\* Drained and weakened as we already

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\* That is, unless seconded and made effectual by extraordinary efforts on the part of the Americans.

are, the exertions we shall make, though they may be too imperfect to secure success, will at any rate be such as to leave us in a state of relaxation and debility, from which it will be difficult if not impracticable to recover; the country exhausted, the people dispirited, the consequence and reputation of these States in Europe sunk, our friends chagrined and discouraged, our enemies deriving new credit, new confidence, new resources. We have not, nor ought we to wish, an alternative. The court of France has done so much for us, that we must make a decisive effort on our part. Our situation demands it, and it is expected. We have the means of success, and it only remains to employ them. But the conjuncture requires all our wisdom and all our energy. Such is the present state of this country, that the utmost exertion of its resources, though equal, is not more than equal to the object, and our measures must be so taken as to call them into immediate and full effect.

There is only one thing, which I should have been happy if the committee had thought proper to take up on a larger scale; I mean the supply of men by drafts. Instead of completing the deficiencies of the quotas assigned by the resolution of Congress of the 9th of February last, it would, in my apprehension, be of the greatest importance, that the respective States should fill their battalions to their complement of five hundred and four, rank and file. Considering the different possible dispositions of the enemy, and the different possible operations on our part, we ought not to have less than twenty thousand efficient Continental troops. The whole number of battalions from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania inclusive, if complete, would not amount to this force. The total would be twenty-three thousand one hundred and eighty-four, rank and file, from



which the customary deductions being made, there will not remain more than about eighteen thousand fit for the service of the field. To this may be added the remainder of the sixteen regiments, amounting to about one thousand.

Unless the principal part of the force be composed of men regularly organized, and on the continuance of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be attempted. The militia are too precarious a dependence to justify such an attempt, where they form a material part of the plan. Militia cannot have the necessary habits nor the consistency, either for an assault or a siege. In employing them essentially, we should run a risk of being abandoned in the most critical moments. The expense and the consumption of provisions and stores, which we are bound by every motive to economize, will be very considerably increased. As we should not be able to keep the same body in the field, during the whole campaign, we should a great part of the time have a double set of men to pay and feed, those in actual service, and those on the march to relieve them or returning home when relieved. The operations of husbandry will suffer in proportion.

The mode by draft is, I am persuaded, the only efficacious one to obtain men. It appears to me certain, that it is the only one to obtain them in time; nor can the period, which you have appointed for bringing them into the field, be delayed without defeating the object. I have little doubt, that at any time, and much less at the present juncture, the powers of government exerted with confidence will be equal to the purpose of drafting. The hopes of the people, elevated by the prospects before them, will induce a cheerful compliance with this and all the other measures of vigor, which have been recommended, and which the exigency requires. Not-

withstanding the extension of the draft, which I have taken the liberty to advise, occasional aids of the militia will be still wanted, but in much less number in this case than in the other. I have entire confidence, that the respective legislatures will be fully impressed with the importance and delicacy of the present juncture, and will second the views of the committee by the most speedy and vigorous efforts. With every sentiment of respect and esteem, I am, &c.\*

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\* The following representations, contained in a letter from General Greene to the Commander-in-chief, convey impressions, which were doubtless common to many of the principal officers.

"From every new conversation," said General Greene, "which I have with your Excellency upon the business of the quartermaster's department, I am more and more convinced, that you are in a great measure a stranger to the difficulties and embarrassments attending it, as well as to the mortification, risk, and injury those are exposed to who engage in it. However important our cause, or valuable the blessings of liberty, it is utterly impossible to divest ourselves of our private feelings, while we are contending for them. Human nature must change, before men can act altogether regardless of their own private interest, or become insensible to what concerns their reputation; and perhaps it is best they should not, upon the great scale of human policy, though it may be inconvenient at particular seasons and to particular views. It is true, men may be influenced by motives of friendship and kindness to do that, which is contrary to their own private emolument; and so they may by interesting their pride or ambition; but when the public holds up to view neither the face of friendship nor prospects of reputation, but on the contrary adds insult to injury, and creates new and unnecessary difficulties, few men would be willing to tread the path where so little is to be gained and so much may be lost.

"Private emolument has been but a secondary object with far the greater part of the staff officers. The number of those, who have been benefited by their appointments, is very small; while hundreds have suffered in character and fortune from their employment, and are now loaded with heavy debts, without the remotest prospect of being able to pay them; and every obstacle thrown in the way of settling their accounts, to prevent their demands from being fixed. People can have but little spirit for business, where they are oppressed on every side with heavy demands, hunted by their creditors, and left to sink without support. I think I am pretty well acquainted with the temper of the people, and the disposition of the staff, in those States on whom we must depend for support, upon the present occasion; and, had your Excellency been as much exposed to



## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 27 May, 1780.

SIR,

It is with infinite pain I inform Congress, that we are reduced again to a situation of extremity for want of meat. On several days of late, the troops have been entirely destitute of any, and for a considerable time past they have been at best, at half, a quarter, an eighth allowance of this essential article of provision. The men have borne their distress in general with a firmness and patience never exceeded, and every commendation is due the officers for encouraging them to it, by exhortation and by example. They have suffered equally with the men, and, their relative situations considered, rather more. But such reiterated, constant instances of want are too much for the soldiery, and

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the murmurs of the one and the complaints of the other, as I have been, you would agree with me in opinion, that some healing measures are necessary for both, before great exertions are to be expected from either.

"With what face can the public ask further credit of the people or the staff, to increase their embarrassments, while they have no assurances respecting their present debts? I would stop all commission business; but it is a matter of more importance to attempt to smooth the ruffled temper of the people, who are public creditors, as well as to lighten the oppression of the staff officers, than it may be thought to be upon a slight view of the subject. Great objects may excite a general wish, and a seeming inclination to give support; but, without some new assurances respecting the past transactions, the returning thoughts of new loss and fresh embarrassments will cut the sinews of exertion. Our wishes often misguide our reason, especially when the object is important to ourselves or to the public. Whatever flatters our expectations gains an easy admittance, while the obstacles, which rise to view, are too often hurried over without examining their force or effect, or are discarded with impatience.

"I shall be happy to render every service in my power to promote the proposed plan of operations, notwithstanding the injuries I feel, providing they are not accompanied with circumstances of personal indignity. As to pay, I shall ask none, more than my family expenses; and all the conditions I shall ask are, to have my command in the line of the army agreeable to my rank, and to be secured from any loss in the settlement



cannot but lead to alarming consequences. Accordingly two regiments of the Connecticut line mutinied, and got under arms on Thursday night. Had it not been for the timely exertions of some of their officers, who obtained notice of it, the same might have been the case with the whole, with a determination to return home, or at best to gain subsistence at the point of the bayonet. After a good deal of expostulation by their officers and some of the Pennsylvania line, who had come to their assistance, and after parading their regiments upon the occasion, the men were prevailed upon to go to their huts; but a few nevertheless turned out again with their packs, who are now confined. Colonel Meigs, who acted with great propriety in endeavouring to suppress the mutiny, was struck by one of the soldiers. I wish our situation with respect to provision was better in other quarters, but it is not. They are in

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of the public accounts. These conditions are so reasonable and just, and so flattering to the interest of the public, that I hope there will not be a moment's hesitation in acceding to them in the fullest latitude. No man has devoted himself more to the public service than I have; and I hope I shall not be subject to the imputation of vanity if I claim some consideration for past services. Your Excellency must know me too well to suppose my spirits flag at imaginary difficulties, nor will you find the embarrassments less, but far greater, than they have been explained to you. I would wish to give you just information, neither aggravating nor lessening the obstacles that lie in our way; and I flatter myself, when you take a view of my past representations, the present state of things will agree with the picture drawn.

"Every man, whose happiness depends upon the success of the present controversy, and that sees the distress and confusion things are in, cannot help feeling alarmed and anxious to search out the cause. While our civil constitution rests upon its present basis, and the powers of Congress are so incompetent to the duty required of them, I have but little hopes, that the face of our affairs will mend; on the contrary, I fear they will grow worse and worse until ruin overtakes us. Nevertheless, if a new field should open for military exertions, my best endeavours shall not be wanting to give support to the measures that may be undertaken; and I hope your Excellency will give me such powers, and such assistance from the line of the army, as the business of the department may require."—*MS. Letter, May 21st*

as great distress at West Point ; and, by a letter from Colonel Van Schaick at Albany, he informs me, that the garrison of Fort Schuyler had then only a month's supply on hand, and that there were no more provisions to send them. From this detail Congress will see how distressing our situation is ; but there are other matters which still continue to render it more alarming.

Nothing is farther from my wishes, than to add in the smallest degree to the distresses or embarrassments of Congress upon any occasion, and more particularly on one where I have every reason to fear they have it not in their power to administer the least relief. Duty however compels me to add one matter more to those I have already detailed. I have been informed by the two colonels of the Pennsylvania line, in whom I have the utmost confidence, who were called to assist Colonel Meigs to suppress the mutiny on Thursday night, that in the course of their expostulations the troops very pointedly mentioned, besides their distresses for provision, their not being paid for five months ; and, what is of a still more serious and delicate nature in our present circumstances, they mentioned the great depreciation of the money, it being of little or no value at all, and yet, if they should be paid, that it would be in this way, and according to the usual amount, without an adequate allowance for the depreciation. They were reasoned with, and every argument used that these gentlemen and Colonel Meigs could devise, either to interest their pride or their passions ; they were reminded of their past good conduct ; of the late assurances of Congress ; of the objects for which they were contending ; but their answer was, that their sufferings were too great, and that they wanted present relief, and some present substantial recompense for their services. This matter, I confess, though I have heard of no further uneasiness

among the men, has given me infinitely more concern, than any thing that has ever happened, and strikes me as the most important, because we have no means at this time, that I know of, for paying the troops, except in Continental money ; and as it is evidently impracticable, from the immense quantity it would require, to pay them as much as would make up the depreciation. Every possible means in my power will be directed on this and all occasions, as they ever have been, to preserve order and promote the public service ; but in such an accumulation of distresses, amidst such a variety of embarrassments, which surround us on all sides, this will be found at least extremely difficult. If the troops could only be comfortably supplied with provisions, it would be a great point, and such as would with the event we expect soon to take place, the arrival of the armament from France to our succour, make them forget or at least forego many matters, which make a part of their anxieties and present complaints. I am, &c.

P. S. I enclose for your Excellency three New York Gazettes ; also a small printed paper found in our camp, containing an address to our soldiers by the enemy, to induce them to desert. It is most likely, that many copies were dispersed, and that they have had a considerable effect, though this is the only one that has been seen by the officers, notwithstanding their pains to find others. Your Excellency will see the points on which the enemy particularly found their addresses.



TO JOSEPH REED, PRESIDENT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Morristown, 23 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Nothing could be more necessary, than the aid given by your State towards supplying us with provisions. I assure you, every idea you can form of our distresses will fall short of the reality. There is such a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the soldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in every line of the army the most serious features of mutiny and sedition. All our departments, all our operations, are at a stand; and unless a system, very different from that which has for a long time prevailed, be immediately adopted throughout the States, our affairs must soon become desperate beyond the possibility of recovery. If you were on the spot, my dear Sir, if you could see what difficulties surround us on every side, how unable we are to administer to the most ordinary calls of the service, you would be convinced, that these expressions are not too strong, and that we have every thing to dread. Indeed, I have almost ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a state of insensibility and indifference to its interests, that I dare not flatter myself with any change for the better.

The committee of Congress, in their late address to the several States, have given a just picture of our situation. I very much doubt its making the desired impression; and, if it does not, I shall consider our lethargy as incurable. The present juncture is so interesting, that if it does not produce correspondent exertions, it will be a proof that motives of honor, public good, and even self-preservation, have lost their influence upon our minds. This is a decisive moment; one of the most, I will go further and say, *the* most important

America has seen. The court of France has made a glorious effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we after that venture to confide, that our allies will persist in an attempt to establish what it will appear we want inclination or ability to assist them in.

Every view of our own circumstances ought to determine us to the most vigorous efforts; but there are considerations of another kind, that should have equal weight. The combined fleets of France and Spain last year were greatly superior to those of the enemy. Nevertheless the enemy sustained no material damage, and at the close of the campaign gave a very important blow to our allies. This campaign the difference between the fleets, from every account I have been able to collect, will be inconsiderable. Indeed it is far from clear, that there will not be an equality. What are we to expect will be the case, if there should be another campaign? In all probability the advantage will be on the side of the English. And then what would become of America? We ought not to deceive ourselves. The maritime resources of Great Britain are more substantial and real, than those of France and Spain united. Her commerce is more extensive, than that of both her rivals; and it is an axiom, that the nation which has the most extensive commerce will always have the most powerful marine. Were this argument less convincing, the fact speaks for itself. Her progress in the course of the last year is an incontestable proof.

It is true, France in a manner created a fleet in a very short space, and this may mislead us in the judgment we form of her naval abilities. But, if they bore any comparison with those of Great Britain, how comes it to pass, that, with all the force of Spain added, she

has lost so much ground in so short a time, as now to have scarcely a superiority? We should consider what was done by France, as a violent and unnatural effort of the government, which, for want of sufficient foundation, cannot continue to operate proportionable effects.

In modern wars, the longest purse must chiefly determine the event. I fear that of the enemy will be found to be so. Though the government is deeply in debt, and of course poor, the nation is rich, and their riches afford a fund, which will not be easily exhausted. Besides, their system of public credit is such, that it is capable of greater exertions than that of any other nation. Speculatists have been a long time foretelling its downfall; but we see no symptoms of the catastrophe being very near. I am persuaded it will at least last out the war, and then in the opinion of many of the best politicians it will be a national advantage. If the war should terminate successfully, the crown will have acquired such influence and power, that it may attempt any thing; and a bankruptcy will probably be made the ladder to climb to absolute authority. The administration may perhaps wish to drive matters to this issue. At any rate they will not be restrained, by an apprehension of it, from forcing the resources of the state. It will promote their present purposes, on which their all is at stake, and it may pave the way to triumph more effectually over the constitution. With this disposition I have no doubt that ample means will be found to prosecute the war with the greatest vigor.

France is in a very different position. The abilities of her present financier have done wonders. By a wise administration of the revenues, aided by advantageous loans, he has avoided the necessity of additional taxes; but I am well informed, if the war continues another campaign, he will be obliged to have



recourse to the taxes usual in time of war, which are very heavy; and which the people of France are not in a condition to endure for a long time. When this necessity commences, France makes war on ruinous terms, and England, from her individual wealth, will find much greater facility in supplying her exigencies.

Spain derives great wealth from her mines, but not so great as is generally imagined. Of late years the profit to government is essentially diminished. Commerce and industry are the best mines of a nation; both which are wanting to her. I am told her treasury is far from being so well filled as we have flattered ourselves. She is also much divided on the propriety of the war. There is a strong party against it. The temper of the nation is too sluggish to admit of great exertions; and, though the courts of the two kingdoms are closely linked together, there never has been in any of their wars a perfect harmony of measures, nor has it been the case in this; which has already been no small detriment to the common cause.

I mention these things to show, that the circumstances of our allies, as well as our own, call for peace; to obtain which we must make one great effort this campaign. The present instance of the friendship of the court of France is attended with every circumstance, that can render it important and agreeable, that can interest our gratitude or fire our emulation. If we do our duty, we may even hope to make the campaign decisive of this contest. But we must do our duty in earnest, or disgrace and ruin will attend us. I am sincere in declaring a full persuasion, that the succour will be fatal to us, if our measures are not adequate to the emergency.

Now, my dear Sir, I must observe to you, that much will depend on the State of Pennsylvania. She has it

in her power to contribute, without comparison, more to our success than any other State, in the two essential articles of flour and transportation. New York, Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland are our flour countries. Virginia produced little of this article the last crop, and her resources are called for to the southward. New York, by legislative coercion, has already given all she could spare for the use of the army. Her inhabitants are left with scarcely a sufficiency for their own subsistence. Jersey, from being so long the place of the army's residence, is equally exhausted. Maryland has made great exertions, but she can still do something more. Delaware may contribute handsomely in proportion to her extent. But Pennsylvania is our chief dependence. From every information I can obtain, she is at this time full of flour. I speak to you in the language of frankness and as a friend. I do not mean to make any insinuations unfavorable to the State. I am aware of the embarrassment the government labors under, from the open opposition of one party and the underhand intrigues of another. I know that, with the best dispositions to promote the public service, you have been obliged to move with circumspection. But this is a time to hazard and to take a tone of energy and decision. All parties but the disaffected will acquiesce in the necessity and give their support. The hopes and fears of the people at large may be acted upon in such a manner, as to make them approve and second your views. This matter is reduced to a point. Either Pennsylvania must give us all the aid we ask of her, or we can undertake nothing. We must renounce every idea of coöperation, and must confess to our allies, that we look wholly to them for our safety. This will be a state of humiliation and littleness, against which the feelings of every good American ought to

revolt. Yours I am convinced will; nor have I the least doubt, that you will employ all your influence to animate the legislature and the people at large. The fate of these States hangs upon it. God grant we may be properly impressed with the consequences.

I wish the legislature could be engaged to vest the executive with plenipotentiary powers. I should then expect every thing practicable from your abilities and zeal. This is not a time for formality or ceremony. The crisis, in every point of view, is extraordinary; and extraordinary expedients are necessary. I am decided in this opinion. I am happy to hear, that you have a prospect of complying with the requisitions of Congress for specific supplies; that the spirit of the city and State seems to revive, and the warmth of party to decline. These are good omens of our success. Perhaps this is the proper period to unite. I am obliged to you for the renewal of your assurances of personal regard. You are too well acquainted with my sentiments for you, to make it necessary to tell you with how much esteem and regard I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 29 May, 1780.

SIR,

I informed you yesterday morning, that I had received certain advices that a body of the enemy from Canada computed at about five hundred, under Sir John Johnson, had penetrated into the State of New York by way of the Mohawk River as far as Johnstown, and seemed as if they were about to take post there; and that there were other accounts, received through prisoners who had escaped from Canada, that a larger



force than this was assembling at Montreal about the last of April, intended, as it was said, to make an expedition against Fort Schuyler. How far this last information is true, is a matter we cannot ascertain; but it is of infinite importance, that the communication with that post should be opened, and a quantity of provisions thrown into the garrison as early as possible for the support of the troops. At present it is cut off, or at least it was when I received my advices, by the position the enemy had taken at Johnstown.

You will therefore proceed with your brigade, which is already in motion, with all the expedition you can, consistently with the health of the men, to King's Ferry by the best and most direct route, where you will embark the troops in boats directed to be prepared for the purpose, and go to New Windsor. At this place it is expected that there will be sloops provided by the State, according to a requisition which has been made, for transporting the troops to Albany, where they cannot arrive too soon. After you arrive at Albany, your future conduct must be governed by your own discretion, the information which you receive with respect to the enemy above, and the exigency of the service. You are to remember, however, that it is of the greatest importance to open the communication with the garrison at Fort Schuyler, and to throw in for their relief a quantity of provisions, both flour and salted meat; and this you will endeavour to effect by every practicable means. I wish if possible that it may be supplied at least with a hundred barrels of flour, and with the same quantity of salt meat. A greater quantity of both will be still better, if it can be procured. You will correspond and advise with his Excellency Governor Clinton upon the occasion, and with respect to all the measures it may be necessary for you to pursue; whom

you will meet, I expect, either at Kingston or Albany. You will also inform me from time to time of your proceedings, and of every occurrence which you may deem material.

With respect to provision for your troops, I do not know how you will procure it. Their supplies will depend entirely upon your occasional arrangements and the aid of the State. You will look forward to these, and of course endeavour to do the best you can to obtain them. I wish you on your march even to the North River to take every reasonable precaution to prevent your being intercepted by the enemy, who may possibly attempt it by sending a detachment from New York ; and, in case you move from Albany, either against the enemy, should they remain, or to cover the provisions which may be sent to Fort Schuyler, you will use every possible means, (or the detachment which may be sent for the purpose,) to guard against a surprise or being cut off. You will take every pains to prevent desertions, and will always have your troops in readiness to rejoin the army on the shortest notice. From the situation of the fifth regiment lately commanded by Colonel Dubois, with respect to field-officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Willett will take the command till further orders. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Morristown, 31 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Although I am convinced from your late frequent representations, and my own knowledge, of the distress in which your department is involved for want of money, and consequently of your inability to make

almost any new provision of the many articles necessary for the operations of this campaign, yet there are some matters, which may be put in a state of readiness through the means of the artificers, whom we have in service, aided by the materials on hand. Of these are our carriages, old camp-equipages, and boats. To the last I would wish you to pay a particular attention, directing them to be completely provided with oars, boat-hooks, and setting-poles.

We shall probably have occasion for the materials necessary for laying bridges of boats; such as cables, anchors, plank, and scantling. Should it not be in your power to engage these articles, it may not be amiss to be inquiring where they may be most readily procured, that you may, in case you should either be furnished with the means of purchase by the treasury, or by the authority of the States, know where to apply for them without loss of time. This mode may perhaps be extended with advantage to many other articles in your line; for, should the States comply with the specific demands made upon them by the committee of Congress, they will in all likelihood be obliged to seek for assistance and information from the heads of the several departments.

There is a matter, which I would wish you seemingly to turn your attention to, with a view of distracting the enemy by an appearance of making preparations for an embarkation of troops. To this end be pleased to give your deputies in Philadelphia, Boston, and other considerable ports, directions to inquire what quantity of shipping can be procured and upon what terms. This they may do in an open manner, and, as the owners will naturally want to know the destination, they may hint at Penobscot, Halifax, or Newfoundland.

Enclosed you have an estimate of sundry articles in



the artillery and engineering line, which will be wanted in the execution of the intended coöperation. Should it not be in your power, circumstanced as you are, to procure or make contracts for the timber, you had best deliver in an estimate to the committee with the whole quantity apportioned on the States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, which, from their convenience of water carriage, can easily send it to the places where it will be wanted. I think you have the greater part of the tools already provided. The sand-bags are very essential, and must be procured in considerable quantities if possible. I am, &c.

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TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Morristown, 31 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have been honored with your favor in answer to my letter respecting the appointment of a committee, with two others of later dates. Certain I am, unless Congress speak in a more decisive tone, unless they are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great purposes of war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the States respectively act with more energy than they hitherto have done, that our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill timing the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit from them. One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill; and, while such a sys-

tem as the present one or rather want of one prevails, we shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage.

This, my dear Sir, is plain language to a member of Congress; but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long thinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen, which, instead of looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, are considering themselves as dependent on their respective States. In a word, I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration and respect, which are due to them as the great representative body of America, and I am fearful of the consequences.

Till your letter came to hand, I thought General Weedon had actually resigned his commission; but, be this as it may, I see no possibility of giving him a command out of the line of his own State. He certainly knows, that every State that has troops enough to form a brigade, claims and has uniformly exercised the privilege of having them commanded by a brigadier of their own. Nor is it in my power to depart from this system, without convulsing the army, which at all times is hurtful, and at this it might be ruinous. I am sincerely and affectionately yours, &c.\*

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\* General Weedon had retired from the service, while the army was at Valley Forge, on account of some difficulty with General Woodford respecting rank. Mr. Jones had inquired whether he could not be restored, so as to have a command in the line at large. In his reply to the above letter Mr. Jones wrote; "Congress have been gradually surrendering or throwing upon the several States the exercise of powers, which they should have claimed, and to their utmost have exercised themselves, till at length they have scarcely a power left, but such as concerns foreign transactions; for, as to the army, Congress is at present little more than

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Morristown, 1 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

We have received advice from New York, published by authority, of the surrender of Charleston. As I dare say you will have seen the handbill, and, as I am pressed for time, I shall not go into particulars.\* A person from Amboy reports, that he saw the day before yesterday one hundred sail of vessels enter Sandy Hook. This, if true, can be nothing else than Sir Henry Clinton returned with the whole or part of his force. There is every reason to believe, that, encouraged by his success to the southward, and by the distresses of the garrison, he may resolve upon an immediate attempt upon West Point. You ought to be prepared for it, by collecting your force and redoubling your vigilance, especially towards the water.

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the medium through which the wants of the army are conveyed to the States. This body never had, or at least in few instances ever exercised, powers adequate to the purposes of war; and indeed such as they possessed have been frittered away to the States, and it will be found, I fear, very difficult to recover them. A resolution was passed the other day, desiring the States to inform us what they had done upon certain requirements for some time past, that we might know upon what to rely. This may serve as a basis for assuming powers, should the answers afford an opening. Other resolutions are now before us, by one of which the States are desired to give express powers to call forth men, provisions, and money for carrying on the war for the common defence. Others go to the assumption of them immediately. The first I have no doubt will pass this body, but I expect it will sleep with the States. The others I believe will die where they are; for, so cautious are some of offending the States in this respect, that a gentleman the other day plainly told us, upon a proposition to order some armed vessels to search the vessels going out, with a view to prevent the exportation of flour, that, if an embargo was laid in the Delaware as in this State, he would consent to the measure, otherwise he never would agree to such an exercise of power."

\* The capitulation of Charleston took place on the 12th of May. A full account of the siege and surrender is contained in MOULTRIE'S *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, Vol. II. pp. 65-106.



We shall immediately impress a number of wagons, to forward to you a considerable supply of flour from this place. I have also written to the Governor of Connecticut, to interpose the authority of government for forwarding with all possible despatch a quantity of salted meat from Connecticut, and for keeping up supplies of fresh meat. To give you, however, a temporary aid, I would have you immediately collect, principally in the counties towards the enemy, a number of cattle in the manner least distressing to the inhabitants. This will enable you to spare your salted provision. You can have the cattle in your neighbourhood. With the greatest regard, I am, &c.\*

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\* On the 2d of June the committee from Congress in camp sent a circular letter to all the eastern and middle States, representing the condition of the army, and the necessity of complying as soon as possible with the requisitions of Congress for troops and supplies. General Washington enforced the representations of the committee by another circular of the same date, in which he urged in a particular manner, that the quotas of men should be raised and sent to the army without the least delay. The numbers for each State, and the places in which they were to rendezvous, were specified as follows.

States.	Quotas.	Regiments.	Place of Rendezvous.
New Hampshire	945	2	Claverac
Massachusetts	4725	9	Claverac
Rhode Island	630	1	Providence
Connecticut	2520	5	Danbury
New York	1575	3	Fishkill
New Jersey	945	2	Morristown
Pennsylvania	3465	7	Easton and Trenton
Delaware	315	1	Wilmington
Maryland	2205	4	Head of Elk

The quotas from the other States were intended for the southern army, and were subject to the orders of the commander in that department.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Morristown, 2 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

It is expected that the fleet of our ally will in the first instance touch at Rhode Island, for the purpose of landing their sick and supernumerary stores, and to meet the intelligence necessary to direct their operations. I have already sent forward Dr. Craik to take up proper houses for hospitals, and to make some previous arrangements in that department; but, as I apprehend the French general and admiral will, upon their arrival, want the advice and assistance of a person of discretion and judgment, who is acquainted with the country, I must request you to repair immediately to Providence, and upon their arrival present yourself to them, letting them know that they may command your services. I would wish you to endeavour, in conjunction with the governor, to establish a market between the fleet and army and country, and be careful that our allies are not imposed upon in the prices of articles, which they may find necessary. This is a point recommended in the plan drawn up by the ministry of France, and which policy and generosity direct should be strictly attended to. You will by the next opportunity receive a letter from the Marquis de Lafayette introducing you to Lieutenant-General Count de Rochambeau and Admiral de Ternay. I am, &c.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

Morristown, 4 June, 1780.

SIR,

As the opening of the campaign is fast approaching, and it is time to form a general disposition of the army

with that view, it is essential I should know as soon as possible what general officers will be present. For this purpose I am to request that you will inform me without delay, whether the situation of your private affairs will permit you to take the field this campaign or not, and, if you do take the field, when we may hope to see you at camp. I am, Sir, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Morristown, 4 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Enclosed you have the draught of a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Canada. You will be pleased to put this into the hands of a printer, whose secrecy and discretion may be depended on, and desire him to strike off a proof-sheet with the utmost despatch, which you will send to me for correction. We shall want at least five hundred copies. The importance of this business will sufficiently impress you with the necessity of transacting it with every possible degree of caution. The printer is to be particularly charged not on any account to reserve a copy himself, or suffer one to get abroad. With great regard, I am, &c.†

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\* From the time of his leaving the command at Providence in the beginning of winter, General Gates had been at his own residence in Virginia. He was unanimously appointed by Congress, on the 13th of June, to take the command in the southern department.

† This was the proclamation mentioned in the letter to Lafayette, dated May 19th, and designed to mislead the British commander. Arnold was at this time in secret correspondence with him, and it may be presumed, that he communicated intelligence so important, and thus defeated the object of the proclamation. For several months previously, Arnold had endeavoured to recommend himself to the enemy by sending intelligence concerning the movements and plans of the American army.



## TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Morristown, 5 June, 1780.

SIR,

My time has been so entirely engrossed in the preliminary arrangements of immediate necessity towards the intended coöperation, that I have not been able till now to do myself the honor to thank your Excellency for your letter of the 21st of May. We have too many proofs of the generous zeal of your countrymen in the cause of America, not to be entirely convinced of it, and to feel all that the most grateful sensibility can inspire. I am happy in believing, that the troops and citizens of these States will eagerly embrace every opportunity to manifest their affection to the troops and citizens of your nation, as well as their gratitude and veneration to a prince, from whom they have received the most important benefits. Penetrated with a sense of these, I shall think it my duty to cultivate correspondent sentiments, as far as my influence extends.

The Marquis has given me an account of all your Excellency has done for the advancement of the combined operations. It will no doubt contribute essentially to their success, and give you a claim to the acknowledgments of the two countries. I am too sensible of the value of the permission you give me, to solicit your aid in every thing in which you can continue to afford us your good offices, not to make use of it as frequently as possible. I begin by entreating you to favor me with your advice with the greatest freedom, on whatever occurs to you interesting to our affairs at this period. I have the honor to be, &c.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Heights above Springfield, 10 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You do well to consider the post of West Point as the capital object of your attention, and every other as secondary. This is peculiarly necessary at the present moment, as there are circumstances that authorize a suspicion of something being intended against that post. I would therefore have you by all means keep your force collected in such manner, that there may not be a possibility of your being found in a divided state, in case of a sudden movement of the enemy your way.

General Knyphausen, we have reason to believe, with all the force that he could spare from New York, made an incursion into the Jerseys on the night of the 6th instant, and proceeded early the next morning towards Connecticut Farms, about five miles from Elizabethtown. In the night of the 7th he retired to the point of his debarkation beyond Elizabethtown, where he has remained ever since and has been crossing and recrossing his cavalry and baggage. His whole conduct is inexplicable, and begins to have much the air of an amusement. It is probable that Clinton, with the whole or a part of the troops under his command, is momentarily expected at New York; and the present movement may be intended to draw our attention this way, while he on his arrival pushes immediately up the North River and attacks the forts, united with what troops still remain in New York.

The day Knyphausen moved out, he was very severely galled by an advanced corps of Continental troops, and the Jersey militia, who have turned out and acted with admirable spirit on the occasion. We

conjectured at first, that his coming out was to forage or to draw us down into the plain and give us battle; but, as he did not pursue the first, and as he must have seen that we shall not fight him but upon our own terms, we cannot see why he should remain in his present position so long. We are therefore led to the other conjecture respecting you. Use all possible vigilance and caution. It is not improbable that Clinton's \* brigade may shortly reinforce you. The enemy have a good many cavalry, and we have none here. You will despatch immediately Moylan's regiment to join us. Sheldon's will continue with you. His infantry on an emergency may be thrown into the garrison.

You ask my opinion about giving due-bills for deficient rations. It would be but justice, if our circumstances permitted it, but they do not. We can neither afford provision, nor have we money to pay for deficiencies. No such allowance has been made to the troops here. You will order Colonel Hay to detain the ship-carpenters in his employ, even if the business now in hand should be finished; for we shall have essential need of their services hereafter. With respect to the mode of purchasing horses, as proposed by Colonel Hay, I can only say, that the necessity of the case must justify the measure, but that I wish you to procure such a number only as may be absolutely necessary. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Springfield, 10 June, 1780.

SIR,

I beg leave to inform your Excellency, that on Tuesday night the enemy landed at Elizabethtown Point,

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\* General James Clinton.



with the principal part of their force, under the command of General Knyphausen, and proceeded the next morning into the country, till they were within half a mile of Springfield. In their march they were most spiritedly opposed by the Jersey troops, who formed the advanced corps of the army, and by such of the militia as had an opportunity from their situation and the suddenness of the occasion to collect. The moment I received advice, that the enemy were out in force, I put the army in motion, and it reached the heights in the rear of Springfield on Wednesday afternoon. A pretty warm skirmishing was kept up through the day between the enemy and the light parties on our side, in which there is reason to believe the enemy were a good deal galled. We have received intelligence, which seems to be authentic, that Brigadier-General Sterling was wounded in the thigh shortly after the debarkation. In the night they retired to Elizabethtown Point, where they have remained ever since, having burnt in the course of the day, according to their common mode of warfare, a meeting-house and several dwelling-houses and barns.\* Their movements are a little mysterious, and the design of them not easily penetrated. We can only form conjectures. The militia have turned out with remarkable spirit, and have hitherto done themselves great honor. I cannot precisely ascertain the loss we have sustained upon this occasion, but it is inconsiderable. I am, &c.†

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\* It was on this occasion that Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of the Reverend James Caldwell, was shot by a soldier while sitting in her house and in the midst of her children. See the particulars in MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*, Vol. IV. p. 225.

† It was supposed that the enemy, being informed of the distress and dissatisfaction in the American army, on account of a want of clothing and provisions and a deficiency of pay, made this incursion into Jersey, with a view of affording an opportunity to the American troops to revolt

## TO MAJOR HENRY LEE.

Head-Quarters, near Springfield, 11 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favor of this date. The spirit which has been exhibited by your corps gives me pleasure, and, be assured, meets with my thanks and approbation. As your rapid progress must have fatigued the cavalry in some degree, I wish you for the present to take post somewhere in our rear. Perhaps Chatham, or its vicinity, is as well calculated to afford you forage as any other place. You will, however, when you have fixed on the spot, be pleased by a line to point it out to me. I shall be glad to see you at my quarters to-morrow morning. I am, &c.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Springfield, 15 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The enemy still remain here, and every thing indicates that they have some serious enterprise in view. My suspicions for the North River still continue and rather increase. It is some time since I have had a return of your garrison; therefore I cannot judge precisely of your force; but, if you have not two thousand five hundred rank and file fit for action, you will be pleased immediately to apply to Governor Clinton for militia to complete that number. Not knowing with certainty the state of things on our northern frontier, I

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or desert. The attempt proving unsuccessful, General Knyphausen retired with his whole force to Elizabethtown Point, where he erected three small works of defence, and threw a bridge of boats across the Sound to Staten Island.

have not thought it advisable to give a positive order for Clinton's return ; but I have written to the Governor in such a spirit, that, if his presence above should not be indispensable, he will certainly reinforce you as speedily as possible. When this event takes place, you will dismiss the militia.

In my letter of the 10th instant I urged you to collect all your force for the immediate defence of the posts of West Point and its dependencies. I hope it will be done before this reaches you ; but, if any part of your force remains divided, you will instantly call it in, and keep yourself compact, whatever temptations may be thrown out to induce you to detach. If the enemy's designs should be against this army, you may be useful to us by making a demonstration in your quarter. I would therefore have you collect a number of boats at West Point, sufficient for two thousand men ; put the garrison under moving orders with three days' provision ; circulate ideas of having the militia ready for a sudden call ; apply to Governor Trumbull for the advance of the Connecticut State regiments ; and take such other steps as may make a noise, without overdoing the matter, and give the enemy some alarm.

You can also send some emissary into New York with these particulars, so colored as to give them the greatest likelihood of making the desired impression. You may instruct him to tell the enemy, that he was sent in to find out the general state and disposition of the force on the Island of New York ; but that his inquiries were more particularly to be directed to the magazines at Fort Washington and other places accessible by water. If any movements of the enemy should come to your knowledge, which announce an immediate attempt upon your post, you will give notice to the governor of Connecticut, and solicit suc-



cour from that State. I have desired General McDougall to join you without delay. I am, with great regard, dear Sir, &c.

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## TO GOVERNOR LIVINGSTON.

Springfield, 18 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received advice, which appears to be direct, that the legislature of this State has determined on a draft from the militia to serve for the campaign under their own officers, instead of being incorporated with their Continental battalions. This mode, if adopted, will be attended with so many inconveniences if followed by the States in general, and will be so absolutely pernicious to all the prospects of the campaign, that I cannot forbear taking the liberty to send Brigadier-General Knox to represent, on my part, the ill consequences of the measure, and the superior advantages of the plan recommended in preference. I entreat your Excellency to procure him the honor of a conference with the legislature for this purpose. The crisis is so delicate and important, the honor and interest of these States so essentially depend on a judicious and vigorous exertion of our resources at this juncture, that I cannot but manifest my anxiety, when I see any measures in agitation that threaten the disappointment of our hopes, and take every step in my power to prevent their being carried into execution. In military questions, the officers of the army have a right to flatter themselves their country will place some confidence in their experience and judgment; and it is the policy of every wise nation to do it. I cannot doubt, that, on reconsideration, the zeal and wisdom, which

have distinguished the councils of this State, will embrace what the true interest of America on this occasion demands. I have the honor to be, with every sentiment of respect and esteem, your Excellency's most obedient servant.

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TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, JOHN MATHEWS, AND NATHANIEL PEABODY, COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS.

Springfield, 19 June, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,

From the vast importance of the thing, I hoped that I should have been informed before this, of the measures which the several States meant to adopt, in consequence of your late requisitions ; but, as I have not, I am certain you remain unadvised yourselves, and I have only to lament with you the delay. This is a point of primary consequence. We are now arrived at the period when we may momentarily expect the fleet from France. For want of information it has been impossible for me to digest a system of coöperation. I have no data on which to proceed, and of course, were the armament to come, I should find myself in the most delicate, embarrassing, and cruel situation. The French commanders, from the relation in which I stand, the instant they reach our coast will look to me for a plan of the measures to be pursued, and I ought of right to have one prepared ; but I cannot even give them conjectures. The interests of the States, the reputation of their councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies, a regard for my own character, all demand, that I should without delay be enabled to ascertain and inform them what we can or cannot undertake.

Besides, there is a point now to be determined, on

which the success of all our future operations may turn, and concerning which, for want of knowing our prospects, I am altogether at a loss what to do. To avoid involving the fleet and army of our allies in circumstances which, if not seconded by us, would expose them to material inconveniences and hazard, I shall be obliged to suspend a step, the delay of which may be fatal to our hopes. I therefore beg leave to suggest to the committee the indispensable necessity of writing again to the different States, urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken, the success they have had, and the probable result of them. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Springfield, 20 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The posts at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point were established more with a view of preventing the communication being interrupted by a vessel or two with a small body of men, than from an expectation that they would be able to stand a regular investment, or a serious attack in force. The officers, therefore, who command them, should be directed to govern themselves by appearances and circumstances. If the enemy come up in force, they will be under the necessity of making such demonstration, by the number of their vessels and other preparations, as will evince their designs. The officers are then to withdraw their garrisons at all events, and cannon and stores if possible. To give them the better chance of effecting the latter, boats should be constantly kept at each place, appropriated to that service only. There is a bare possibility, that



the enemy may throw a force suddenly in the rear of each, and run a vessel above them. In such case the best defence that the places will admit of must be made; and, to provide for such a contingency, let ten or twelve days' provision be kept in each post, and a supply of ammunition equal to an expenditure of that time. I would not wish the officers to set fire to the works, if upon any occasion they should be obliged to leave them; because they may perhaps be induced to quit them upon appearances seemingly well grounded, and therefore, if left entire, they may return to them when the alarm is over. If the officers at present commanding at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point are men of discretion, it will be best to let them remain, with directions not to disclose their instructions to any person whatever; because, should the enemy obtain a knowledge of them, they might, by making feints, manœuvre them out of the posts.

The security of the western part of the State of New York depends so absolutely upon holding the post of Fort Schuyler, that I shall not be easy till I have thrown a handsome supply of provisions into it. You will therefore be pleased instantly to send up one hundred barrels of flour to Albany, addressed to Colonel Van Schaick, who will forward it; and, should his Excellency Governor Clinton call upon you for one hundred barrels of beef, you will deliver it to his order, or send it up to Albany if required. This will be wanted for the garrison of the fort also, and must therefore be of sound and good quality. Should it be called for, give the commissary strict orders to have it inspected, and put in the best order for keeping, before it is removed. I shall continue sending up flour to you as fast as teams can be procured to transport it.

The scarcity of cavalry has obliged me to divert the

Maréchaussée corps of horse from their proper occupation, and put them upon ordinary field duty. Enclosed you have a letter under a flying seal for General Glover, directing him to repair immediately to Springfield,\* and superintend forwarding the drafts from Massachusetts Bay. Should not General Glover be arrived at West Point, you will be pleased to forward the letter immediately to him. I have written to General Heath, desiring him to order all the officers, who were upon the recruiting service in Massachusetts, to repair to Springfield, and march the drafts from thence. As they arrive they are to be distributed in proportion to the several regiments of the State, so as to keep them as nearly as possible upon a level. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Springfield, 21 June, 1780.

SIR,

By the general order of this day, you will take the command of the troops left at this post and the vicinity, consisting of Maxwell's and Stark's brigades, Lee's corps, and the militia. The objects of your command are, as far as possible, to cover the country and the public stores. The dispositions for this purpose are left entirely to your discretion, with this recommendation only, that you use every precaution in your power to avoid surprise, and provide for the security of your corps. You will pay particular attention to the obtaining of intelligence from the enemy, of their land and sea force, of their movements and intentions; giving me punctual advice of whatever comes to your knowledge. I am, &c.

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\* In the State of Massachusetts.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Springfield, 21 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I yesterday evening received your two favors, and was happy to find that a part of Clinton's brigade had joined you. I hope by this time the whole will have got down, or at least all of it except the regiment detached to Fort Schuyler with provisions. From the immense importance of the post under your direction, I wish, as expressed in my letter of the 15th, that you may have and keep your force completed to two thousand five hundred efficient men. This force I hold to be necessary, and you will keep it appropriated by a proper distribution for the defence of the several works particularly, and exclusively of any other duty. This is the object, and the only one, for which I wish it to be employed; and, from the very embarrassing state of our provisions, and the evident necessity of economizing with respect to them as much as possible, I would not have your force consist of a man more, than the number I have mentioned. This has been deemed sufficient, and will be, to oppose any force the enemy can operate with; and no aid of militia, beyond what may be necessary to make it up to this number, should be called in, but in case of the most pressing emergency. I request you, so far as it can be done, to save the salt provisions. Whenever we have it in our power, fresh should be used. Our stores of the former are scanty in the extreme, and should be preserved for occasions when it may not be in our power to procure the latter, or when they may not answer.

The enemy remain in the same position, and have made no movements or alterations in their circumstances. Sir Henry Clinton is said to be on Staten



Island, with the troops, who came from the southward, and whose number is variously reported to be from four to six thousand men. I cannot yet penetrate their designs. In the present situation of things, the whole of Moylan's regiment is essential here. Sheldon's will certainly be sufficient to furnish reconnoitring parties, and parties of advance, to announce the movements and approach of the enemy, in case they proceed to operate up the river. I am, &c.

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## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Whippany, 25 June, 1780.

SIR,

Since I had the honor of addressing Congress, the following movements have taken place on the part of the enemy and on our part. The conduct of the enemy and our intelligence giving us reason to suspect a design against West Point, on the 21st the army, except two brigades left under the command of General Greene to cover the country and our stores, were put in motion to proceed slowly towards Pompton. On the 22d they arrived at Rockaway Bridge, about eleven miles from Morristown. The day following, the enemy moved in force from Elizabethtown towards Springfield. They were opposed with great conduct and spirit by Major-Generals Greene and Dickinson, with the Continental troops and such of the militia as were assembled; but, with their superiority of numbers, they of course gained Springfield, burnt the village, and retired the same day to their former position.\* In the night they abandoned it, crossed over to Staten Island, and took

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\* See General Greene's letter in the APPENDIX, No. II.

up their bridge. I beg leave to refer Congress to General Greene's report for particulars.

The enemy advanced on this occasion with so serious an aspect, that we were compelled to act upon the supposition of their menacing our stores. A brigade was detached to fall in with their right flank, and the army moved back towards Morristown five or six miles, to be more in supporting distance. On receiving intelligence of the enemy's withdrawing from the Point, all the troops were put under marching orders for the North River; but the weather prevented them from commencing their march before this morning.

The late movements of the enemy seem to have no satisfactory solution but an enterprise against West Point. Our last advices look strongly to the same object, yet there are many powerful reasons against it. But as we are now in a great degree rid of the incumbrance of our stores by the measures taken to remove them, prudence demands that our dispositions should be principally relative to West Point. We shall do every thing in our power for its security; and, in spite of the peculiar embarrassments of our situation, I hope not without success. The enemy have not made their incursions into this State without loss. Ours has been small. The militia deserve every thing that can be said on both occasions. They flew to arms universally, and acted with a spirit equal to any thing I have seen in the course of the war. With every sentiment of respect I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* It will be seen by an extract from General Clinton's letter to Lord George Germain, relating to this subject, that, so far from having any design against West Point, his object was to seek a place of security where he could give rest to his troops, just returned from the fatigues of the southern campaign.

"I arrived in New York from the south," he wrote, "on the 17th of

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Whippany, 25 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

On Friday last, the enemy moved from Elizabethtown Point to Springfield, in considerable force, supposed to be about five thousand. The bridge at Springfield was pretty obstinately defended by Colonel Angell's regiment; nor was it gained by the enemy till after a contest of nearly forty minutes. This regiment had about forty killed and wounded. Our whole loss during the day does not rise much higher; but, from all the accounts, which we have been as yet able to collect, the enemy's has been much greater. They retreated with great rapidity, after having burnt Springfield, to Elizabethtown Point, and evacuated the place between twelve and one the same night. We have not been able to ascertain, since their leaving the Jerseys, wheth-

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June, and found that General Knyphausen had made a move with the army into Jersey. At my arrival they were between Elizabethtown Creek and Newark. Washington's army was at Chatham, and an advanced corps at Connecticut Farms. In the present circumstances I could not think of keeping the field in Jersey. Washington's retreat gave me little time for deliberation. To avail myself, however, as much as I could, of our situation, I ordered, previously to quitting Jersey, a strong detachment under General Mathew, well supported by Knyphausen, to move to the last division of the rebel army and press it if possible, whilst I put the troops, just arrived from Carolina and already landed on Staten Island, afloat again, and repaired in person to Haverstraw Bay, the transports following me to Phillipsburg. I was thus in readiness to take advantage of any unguarded march the enemy might make to succour the corps attacked; or, finding no enemy for offence (as was the event), to land the troops and give a camp of rest to an army, of which many corps had had an uninterrupted campaign of fourteen months. The attack of the rear of Washington's army was conducted with judgment and spirit. The enemy were forced from two strong positions, and the troops, after remaining some hours in Springfield, retired according to my orders, and that evening without molestation evacuated Jersey, bringing off the bridge of boats, which had been thrown across the Staten Island Sound."

- MS. Letter, July 4th.



er they have embarked with a design to proceed up the North River, or whether they have returned to New York. I thought it however advisable to give you this information, that all necessary measures may be taken to provide against the former. General Huntington is some way on his march, and is instructed to take post at Suffern's, and to communicate with you. The rest of the army is also in motion; but their progress must be governed by our intelligence.

I would just observe, with regard to the posts at West Point most exposed and most important, that they will no doubt experience your most immediate attention, and be provided specifically, not only with the proper quantity of stores and provisions, but garrisoned with troops best calculated for an obstinate resistance. At this moment, it is difficult to say what the enemy propose to themselves; but, let it be what it may, it is our principal business to be fully prepared for them at West Point. I enclose to you a letter from the Board of War, which they transmitted open in one to me. Every precaution and measure for obtaining provisions and supplying West Point have certainly been taken, which appeared practicable. The route, by which the southern supplies come, must, as has been heretofore the case, depend on the situation and movements of the enemy; on which head the quartermaster and commissary will always be advised. You will direct the receiving commissary to keep a particular account of the provisions forwarded by the Associators, and to give receipts for them. I am, &c.

## TO PRESIDENT REED.

Head-Quarters, Whippany, 25 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I very much admire the patriotic spirit of the ladies of Philadelphia, and shall with great pleasure give them my advice, as to the application of their benevolent and generous donation to the soldiers of the army. Although the terms of the Association seem in some measure to preclude the purchase of any article, which the public is bound to find, I would nevertheless recommend a provision of shirts, in preference to any thing else, in case the fund should amount to a sum equivalent to a supply of eight or ten thousand. The soldiery are exceedingly in want of them, and the public have never, for several years past, been able to procure a sufficient quantity to make them comfortable. They are, besides, more capable of an equal and satisfactory distribution than almost any other article. Should the fund fall short of a supply of the number of shirts I have mentioned, perhaps there could be no better application of the money, than laying it out in the purchase of refreshments for the hospitals. These are my ideas at present. When I have the pleasure of hearing more particularly from Mrs. Reed, I shall probably be able to form a more complete opinion.\*

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\* This was in reply to a letter in which Mr. Reed had written; — “The ladies have caught the happy contagion, and in a few days Mrs. Reed will have the honor of writing to you on the subject. It is expected she will have a sum equal to one hundred thousand pounds to be laid out according to your Excellency’s direction, in such a way as may be thought most honorable and gratifying to the brave old soldiers, who have borne so great a share of the burden of this war. I thought it best to mention it in this way to your Excellency for your consideration, as it may tend to forward the benevolent scheme of the donors with despatch. I must observe, that the ladies have excepted such articles of necessity as clothing;

I shall, agreeably to your Excellency's request, send down a few officers to take charge of and bring forward the drafts. As to the business of recruiting by voluntary enlistments, you may be assured, that its operation, if attended with any tolerable success in the end, will be too slow to answer our present purposes. I would therefore most earnestly recommend to you to place no dependence upon any such measure; but, by an immediate augmentation of drafts, to supply the men required from Pennsylvania by the committee of Congress.

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which the States are bound to provide. We have just heard, that Mrs. Washington is on the road to this city, so that we shall have the benefit of her advice and assistance here, and if necessary refer afterwards to your Excellency." — *MS. Letter, June 20th.*

A further account of this contribution was communicated in a letter from Mrs. Reed to General Washington, in which she wrote as follows.

"The subscription set on foot by the ladies of this city for the use of the soldiers is so far completed, as to induce me to transmit to your Excellency an account of the money I have received, which, although it has answered our expectations, does not equal our wishes. But I am persuaded it will be received as a proof of our zeal for the great cause of America, and of our esteem and gratitude for those, who so bravely defend it. The amount of the subscription is 200,580 dollars, and £625, 6s. 8d. in specie, which make in the whole in paper money 300,634 dollars. The ladies are anxious for the soldiers to receive the benefit of it, and wait your directions how it can best be disposed of. We expect considerable additions from the country; and I have also written to the other States in hopes that the ladies there will adopt a similar plan to render it more general and beneficial." — *Philadelphia, July 4th.*

The depreciation at this time was a little more than forty for one. Hence the actual amount subscribed in specie value was about seven thousand five hundred dollars.

The example was followed by ladies in New Jersey. Miss Mary Dagworthy wrote to the Commander-in-chief; — "By order of Mrs. Dickinson and the other ladies of the committee, I have transmitted to your Excellency fifteen thousand four hundred and eighty-eight dollars, being the subscriptions received at this place, to be disposed of in such manner as your Excellency shall think proper for the benefit of the Continental soldiers. As the other subscriptions come in, they will be forwarded without delay." — *Trenton, July 17th.* This amount also is estimated in the depreciated currency.



They make so considerable a part of the force estimated as necessary to give a probability of success to our expected operations, that they cannot be dispensed with. Be kind enough to deliver the enclosed to Mrs. Washington. I am infinitely obliged to your Excellency and to Mrs. Reed for your polite attention to her. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, Ramapo, 27 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Before this time, the Connecticut division will probably have joined you. The rest of the army arrived here yesterday. The delay, which has occurred, makes it probable, that the enemy either had not any intention, or have relinquished the project, of attacking West Point, and only intend to retard our operations by menacing us at different points and obliging us to call out the militia. I believe what they have done hitherto will rather be of service than disservice to us, as it seems to have given a stimulus to the States. But this would not be the case, if we should continue to keep in the field a considerable body of militia, which, besides interfering with the drafts for the Continental battalions, will injure the operations of agriculture. The removal of our stores in the Jerseys to remoter deposits, and the present disposition of our Continental force, seem to supersede the necessity of the services of the militia, and to give us tolerable security without them. I have therefore written to send back the militia, marching from Massachusetts and Connecticut. The letters for this purpose are enclosed. You will be pleased to forward them without delay.

With the augmentation of the Connecticut line I take it for granted, that your garrison will amount in Continental troops to the number mentioned in a former letter. You will, therefore, dismiss all the militia, who may be in the garrison. If your number should not be complete without them, you can detain one of the Connecticut State regiments. You will be pleased to send to me immediately an exact field return, on the honor of the officers commanding brigades, of the number of Continental troops under your command fit for action, of the serviceable stores of every kind, and of your provisions, specifying the quantity at each of the works, that I may form a judgment with certainty upon your situation. These returns may be sent successively as they may be completed.

I am, with the greatest esteem and regard, &c.\*

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\* The following particulars, contained in a letter from M. de la Luzerne to Count de Vergennes, afford an explanation of some of the opinions and motives, which at this time influenced both parties in the contest.

"After the taking of Charleston the English practised much greater moderation towards the inhabitants of the south, than they had done towards those of the middle and eastern States. Their plan was to sever the Carolinas and Georgia, and they seemed at this time to have abandoned the idea of reducing the northern States. They commenced publishing a gazette at Charleston, in which they circulated insinuations, that the northern States had abandoned the south, and that they were about to make an arrangement with England, which would exclude the Carolinas and Georgia. These attempts had an effect. The members of Congress are divided as to their interests and objects. Some are for using all efforts for rescuing the south. Others think the people there have shown too little zeal and activity in the cause, and that it is not expedient to put in jeopardy the safety of the north by rendering extraordinary aid to people, who are so indifferent about their own independence. One party speaks secretly of an expedition against Canada, another magnifies the difficulties of taking New York; one insists on an expedition to the south during the summer, and another is for a combined enterprise against Quebec. The British at the south talk of peace, and encourage the people to return to their former allegiance. It is possible that the British will make a proposition to the ten northern States tending to assure their independence; and their scheme will be to form into a new government the

## TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Ramapo, 27 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I can omit no occasion of repeating my earnest entreaties to your Excellency to use all your influence to forward the measures recommended by the committee of coöperation. I assure you with the greatest sincerity and truth, that nothing short of them will answer our purpose, and that I am fully persuaded from a general view of European and American affairs, that the fate of our cause depends on the exertions of this campaign. The sparing system has been tried, till it has brought us to a crisis little less than desperate; and, if the opportunity now before us be neglected, I believe it will be too late to retrieve our affairs. These are ideas that I may safely trust to your judgment, though I know they would be slighted by those indolent and narrow politicians, who, except at the moment of some signal misfortune, are continually crying, *All is well*, and who, to save a little present expense and avoid some tem-

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two Carolinas, Georgia, East Florida and the Bahama Islands, which together would make a respectable possession." — *MS. Letter, June 24th.*

A letter from Mr. Duane in Congress to General Schuyler confirms in part the impressions above communicated. "That the reinforcements ordered to the southward should be halted," said he, "is obvious for the reasons you assign. But do you expect such a proposition from a northern member, deeply interested in strengthening the main army? It is a question of the utmost delicacy and even danger; for, however groundlessly, an opinion has been propagated, that Congress means to sacrifice the two southernmost States, and it has been productive of the greatest animosity and discontent. We have privately stated the subject to some of the southern gentlemen, who, though I believe convinced of the propriety of the measure, did not choose, after great deliberation, to have it adopted, much less to propose it. There is but one person from whom it can originate with any prospect of success. If we had undertaken it, nothing would have resulted but disappointment and the loss of personal confidence." — *MS. Letter, May 21st.*



porary inconvenience, with no ill designs in the main, would protract the war, and risk the perdition of our liberties. As I always speak to your Excellency in the confidence of friendship, I shall not scruple to confess, that the prevailing politics for a considerable time past have filled me with inexpressible anxiety and apprehension, and have uniformly appeared to me to threaten the subversion of our independence. I hope a period to them is now arrived, and that a change of measures will save us from ruin. I beg your Excellency to accept my warmest acknowledgments for your exertions in support of West Point. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON, IN CONGRESS.

Ramapo, 29 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your favor from Trenton, and thank you for the aid you have been pleased to afford in getting the provisions and stores removed from that place. Happily for us, the transportation is in a better train, and in greater forwardness, than I had reason a few days ago to expect it would be at this time. I am under no apprehension now of danger to the post at West Point, on the score either of provisions, the strength of the works, or of the garrison. I am sorry, however, to find there are apprehensions on account of the commandant, and that my knowledge of him does not enable me to form any decisive judgment of his fitness to command; but, as General McDougall and Baron Steuben, men of approved bravery, are both with him, and the main army is within supporting distance, I confess I have no fear on the ground of what I

presume is suspected. To remove him, therefore, under these circumstances, and at this period, must be too severe a wound to the feelings of any officer, to be given but in cases of real necessity. When a general arrangement is gone into, and a disposition made for the campaign, I can with propriety, and certainly shall, bring him into the line of the army, and place the general you have named at that post, if the operations of the campaign are such as to render it expedient to leave an officer of his rank in that command.\*

If the States mean to put the army in a condition to adopt any offensive plan, the period cannot be far off

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\* Mr. Livingston had suggested his fears, that General Howe, in case of an exigency, would not inspire such a degree of confidence in the New York militia, as would be essential for engaging their efficient services. He solicited the appointment for General Arnold. "If I might presume so far," he said, "I should beg leave to submit it to your Excellency, whether this post might not be safely confided to General Arnold, whose courage is undoubted, who is the favorite of our militia, and who will agree perfectly with our governor."—*MS. Letter, June 22d.*

Arnold had some time before written on the same subject to General Schuyler, who was then in camp as one of the committee from Congress. "I know not," said Arnold, "who is to have the command on the North River. If General Heath joins the army, as I am told he intends, that post will of course, I suppose, fall under his command. When I requested leave of absence from General Washington for the summer, it was under the idea, that it would be a very inactive campaign, and that my services would be of little consequence, as my wounds made it very painful for me to walk or ride. The prospect now seems to be altered, and there is a probability of an active campaign, in which, though attended with pain and difficulty, I wish to render my country every service in my power; and, by the advice of my friends, I am determined to join the army; with which I beg you will do me the favor to acquaint General Washington, that I may be included in any arrangement that may be made."—*MS. Letter, May 25th.*

The application, on the part of Mr. Livingston, was no doubt made at the request of General Arnold, who immediately afterwards visited the camp and West Point. On the 30th of June, General Howe wrote to General Washington from that post;—"I have taken General Arnold round our works, and he has my opinion of them, and of many other matters. I have long wished to give it to you, but I could not convey it by letter."

when this measure must take place. Your sentiments, my dear Sir, upon this occasion required no apology. The opinion and advice of friends I receive at all times as a proof of their friendship, and am thankful when they are offered. I am so well persuaded of the safety of West Point, the necessity of easing the militia as much as possible, and of husbanding our provisions and stores, that I have dismissed all the militia, that were called in for the defence of the posts on the North River. With the greatest esteem and regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Ramapo, 30 June, 1780.

SIR,

I send Brigadier-General Stark to your State to collect, and forward to the appointed place of rendezvous, the drafts for your battalions and the levies for three months. The zeal, which the State of New Hampshire has always manifested, gives me the fullest confidence that they have complied with the requisitions of the committee of Congress in all their extent; though we have not yet heard from thence what measures have been taken. This is the time for America, by one great exertion, to put an end to the war; but for this purpose the necessary means must be furnished. The basis of every thing else is the completion of the Continental battalions to their full establishment. If this is not done, I think it my duty to forewarn every State, that nothing decisive can be attempted, and that this campaign, like all the former, must be chiefly defensive. I am sorry to observe, that some of the States have taken up the business on a less extensive scale. The conse-



quences have been represented with candor and plainness; and I hope, for the honor and safety of America, the representation may have the weight it deserves.

The drafts cannot be forwarded with too much expedition; but, as to the militia, under present appearances, I think it advisable to suspend the time fixed for their rendezvousing to the 25th of next month, at which period I hope they may be without fail at the place appointed; and it would be my wish that they should come out under the command of General Stark. I entreat your Excellency to employ all your influence to give activity and vigor to the measures of your State. Every thing depends on the proper improvement of the present conjuncture. We have every thing to hope on one side, and every thing to fear on the other.

With perfect respect, I am, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL STARK.

Head-Quarters, Ramapo, 30 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You will be pleased to repair immediately to the State of New Hampshire, in order to receive and forward to the army the levies required of the State by the honorable the committee of Congress for filling their three battalions. I have not heard from the State upon the subject, and therefore cannot inform you of the place which may have been appointed for their rendezvous. But this you will learn, and, if you do not find the levies assembled there, you will exert every degree of industry in your power to effect it. You know how precious moments are to us, and I am persuaded your efforts, both to collect and forward the levies, will correspond with the exigency. That the

business may be the more facilitated, you will take with you four officers from General Poor's brigade, to whom I write on the subject, (if this number should not be already in the State,) and with whom you will forward the levies, either in a body, or in detachments of one hundred and fifty or two hundred men, as circumstances may best suit, and with all possible expedition. If there are more officers than this number in the State, you may retain them on this service. In receiving the men, you will pay particular attention to their being sound and healthy, and in every respect fit for service; and none but such as answer this description must be taken, as they would otherwise prove an incumbrance and a great expense, without being of the least advantage.

Besides the levies for filling these battalions, it has been deemed essential, to render the success of our operations the more certain, to call upon the State for between nine hundred and one thousand militia to join the army and continue in the service for three months from the time of their arriving at Claverac on the North River, the place assigned for their rendezvous, by the 25th of next month. It is much my wish, that you should have the direction and command of these. You will therefore use your best endeavours to have them assembled, armed, and equipped, in every respect in the best manner circumstances will admit, for taking the field, and march with them so as to arrive with certainty at Claverac by the time I have mentioned. I shall only add, that I shall be happy to hear from you very frequently on the subject of this important and interesting business, as it respects both the levies for the battalions and the militia; and that, entirely confiding in your address and assiduity to promote it, I am, dear Sir, with much regard and esteem, &c.

## TO PRESIDENT REED.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 4 July, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

Motives of friendship, not less than of public good, induce me with freedom to give you my sentiments on a matter, which interests you personally as well as the good of the common cause. I flatter myself that you will receive what I say in the same spirit which dictates it, and that it will have all the influence which circumstances will possibly permit.

The legislature of Pennsylvania has vested you, in case of necessity, with a power of declaring martial law throughout the State, to enable you to take such measures as the exigency may demand. So far the legislature has done its part. Europe, America, the State itself, will look to you for the rest. The power vested in you will admit of all the latitude, that could be desired, and may be made to mean any thing, which the public safety may require. If it is not exerted proportionably, you will be responsible for the consequences. Nothing, my dear Sir, can be more delicate and critical than your situation; a full discretionary power lodged in your hands in conjunction with the Council; great expectations in our allies and in the people of this country; ample means in the State for great exertions of every kind; a powerful party on one hand to take advantage of every opening to prejudice you, on the other popular indolence and avarice, averse to every measure inconsistent with present ease and present interest. In this dilemma, there is a seeming danger whatever side you take; it remains to choose that, which has least real danger and will best promote the public weal. This in my opinion clearly is to exert



the powers entrusted to you with a boldness and vigor suited to the emergency.

In general I esteem it a good maxim, that the best way to preserve the confidence of the people durably is to promote their true interest. There are particular exigencies when this maxim has peculiar force. When any great object is in view, the popular mind is roused into expectation, and prepared to make sacrifices both of ease and property. If those, to whom the people confide the management of their affairs, do not call them to make these sacrifices, and the object is not attained, or they are involved in the reproach of not having contributed as much as they ought to have done towards it, they will be mortified at the disappointment, they will feel the censure, and their resentment will rise against those, who, with sufficient authority, have omitted to do what their interest and their honor required. Extensive powers not exercised as far as was necessary have, I believe, scarcely ever failed to ruin the possessor. The legislature and the people, in your case, would be very glad to excuse themselves by condemning you. You would be assailed with blame from every quarter, and your enemies would triumph.

The party opposed to you in the government are making great efforts. I am told the bank, established for supplying the army, is principally under the auspices of that party. It will undoubtedly give them great credit with the people, and you have no effectual way to counterbalance this, but by employing all your influence and authority to render services proportioned to your station. Hitherto I confess to you frankly, my dear Sir, I do not think your affairs have been in the train which might be wished; and if Pennsylvania does not do its part fully, it is of so much importance in the general scale, that we must fail of success, or limit our

views to mere defence. I have conversed with some gentlemen on the measure of filling your battalions. They seemed to think you could not exceed what the legislature had done for this purpose. I am of very different sentiments. The establishment of martial law implies, in my judgment, the right of calling any part of your citizens into military service, and in any manner which may be found expedient; and I have no doubt the draft may be executed.

I write to you with the freedom of friendship, and I hope you will esteem it the truest mark I could give you of it. In this view, whether you think my observations well founded or not, the motive will, I am persuaded, render them agreeable. With the greatest regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL PUTNAM.

Head-Quarters, 5 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am very happy to learn from your letter of the 29th, handed to me by Captain Humphreys, that the present state of your health is so flattering, and that it promises you the prospect of being in a condition to make a visit to your old associates some time this campaign. I wish it were in my power to congratulate you upon a complete recovery. I should feel a sincere satisfaction in such an event, and I hope for it heartily, with the rest of your friends in this quarter. I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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\* In the preceding autumn General Putnam had visited his family, and in December, while at Hartford, on his way back to camp he was seized with a paralysis, which disabled him to such a degree, as to render it necessary for him to return home. Although a partial recovery

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters near Passaic, 10 July, 1780.

SIR,

At this time I do not think, that the circumstances of the campaign would admit at any rate an inquiry to be gone into respecting the loss of Charleston; but, if it were otherwise, I do not see that it could be made, so as to be completely satisfactory either to General Lincoln or to the public, unless some gentlemen could be present, who have been acting in that quarter.\* This, it seems, would be necessary on the occasion, and the more so, as I have not a single document or paper in my possession concerning the department, by which the court could be enabled to form a right conclusion in the case. Whenever the business can be undertaken, I should apprehend it will be requisite for the court to have before them such papers as Congress may have respecting the department, and a copy of the instructions and orders, which they may have been pleased to give General Lincoln from time to time, and of their correspondence. And, besides the reasons against the inquiry at this time, General Lincoln being a prisoner of war, his situation it appears to me must preclude one until he is exchanged, supposing every other obstacle were out of the question. If Congress think proper, they will be pleased to transmit to me such papers as they may have, which concern the matters of inquiry, that there may be no delay in proceeding in the business when other circumstances will permit.

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ensued, his health was never sufficiently restored to permit him to re-join the army.—HUMPHREY'S *Life of Putnam*, p. 161, ed. 1818.

\* At General Lincoln's request, Congress had passed a resolve, directing the Commander-in-chief to cause an inquiry to be made concerning the loss of Charleston, and the conduct of General Lincoln while commanding in the southern department.



With respect to an exchange of prisoners, I most earnestly wish that Congress, apprized of the situation of our affairs in the fullest manner, and of the prospects of the campaign, had been pleased to determine the point themselves. But as they have not done it, and they have thought proper to refer it to me, I cannot but observe, if motives of policy are ever to prevail over those of humanity, they seem to apply at present against a general exchange. As to officers, their exchange either on the principle of equal rank, or of composition where that will not apply (confining the exchange to composition for officers only), is favored both by policy and humanity, and therefore in every point of light it is to be desired; and there is now a negotiation on foot between us and the enemy in consequence of a late proposition from them for the exchange of all their officers, who are prisoners of war, and for such of those of the convention (General Phillips, General Riedesel, and their families excepted), as are in New York on parole, for an equal number of ours of their rank and in the order of their captivity; which, if carried into effect, will give relief to a few. But the exchange of privates, though strongly urged by humanity, would certainly be against us in a political view. It would throw into the enemy's hands a very respectable permanent augmentation to their present force, already great, while it would add but inconsiderably to ours, as a large proportion of the men, whom we should receive, would not belong to the army, and many others would probably be soon released from it by the expiration of their enlistments. This is one among the innumerable ill consequences that result from short enlistments. Indeed, if the case were otherwise, and the whole of the privates, whom the enemy have to exchange, were enlisted for the war, the advantages derived from an ex-

change would not be equal at this time. These considerations seem to make the release of the privates ineligible for the present; but Congress will themselves decide. If they think that their exchange should be deferred, or if we should not be able to effect that of the officers, I should hope that every exertion, which our circumstances will authorize, may be made to render their situation easy and comfortable. They have a claim to this, and nothing in our power should be omitted to effect it.\*

General Lincoln informed me, when he arrived here, that, from some correspondence which had passed between him and Sir Henry Clinton, he hoped his exchange might be effected for one of the major-generals of the convention; and for this purpose he wrote to him just before his departure for Boston with my approbation. The proposition falls within the principle of equality of rank, by which exchanges between us hitherto have been governed; and his release will not be injurious to the claims of any other officer of ours in captivity, and therefore it appeared to me not objectionable. I hope it will be considered in the same light by Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.

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\* When this letter was considered in Congress, a resolve was passed, "That General Washington be authorized to effectuate an exchange of officers, either on the footing of equal rank, or on composition, or both, as the cases may respectively require, confining the exchange on that of composition to officers only, and having due regard to the order of captivity; such exchange to be rendered as extensive as possible in its execution, so as not only to include, on the part of the enemy, prisoners of war, but also the officers of the convention troops, now on parole at New York."—*Journals, August 7th.*

TO MAJOR HENRY LEE.

Head-Quarters, 11 July, 1780.

SIR,

You will proceed to Monmouth and establish yourself in that vicinity. When you arrive there, you will see General Forman, who is charged with despatches for a French fleet expected at the Hook, and to keep a look out for its arrival. You will give such assistance as will be necessary. Pilots will be stationed in that quarter, who will put themselves under your protection. Should a fleet appear, which you have good reason to believe is a French fleet, General Forman and you will immediately go on board with the despatches, and offer your service to the general and admiral for every thing in which you can be useful to them.

You will instantly impress every kind of refreshment the country affords, cattle, vegetables, and the like, for the use of our allies; for which purpose you will make previous arrangements, and execute them in the manner most effectual, and least grievous to the inhabitants, giving certificates for every thing taken. Should there be any State troops or militia in service, not under a superior officer, you will take command of them. If there should be a superior officer, you will endeavour to engage him to coöperate with you. Advise me instantly of any thing important, that happens on the coast; of all vessels coming in and going out; and of whatever may be doing at the Hook and in the Bay. On the appearance of the fleet, send immediately a dragoon to head-quarters, and another to the minister of France, with advice of the arrival. I am, &c.\*

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\* Directions were also given to several pilots to be in readiness to go on board the French fleet as soon as it should arrive on the coast.



TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE, QUARTERMASTER-  
GENERAL.

Head-Quarters, 14 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have determined upon a plan of operations for the reduction of the city and garrison of New York, which is to be pursued in conjunction with the French forces daily expected from France. The number of troops to be employed upon this occasion may be about forty thousand men. You are hereby directed, therefore, to make every necessary arrangement and provision in your department for carrying the plan of operations into execution. You will apply to the States for what they are bound to furnish, agreeably to the several requisitions of Congress and their committee at camp. All such articles as the States are not bound to furnish, which will be necessary for conducting the operations, you will provide; and for this purpose you will apply to the Treasury Board for the requisite supplies of cash.

I have been in anxious expectation, that some plan would be determined upon for your department; but, as it has not hitherto taken place, and as it is impossible to delay its operations a moment longer, I have to desire, that you will yourself arrange it in some effectual manner, to give despatch and efficacy to your measures equal to the exigency. Your knowledge and experience in the business will be sufficient to direct your conduct, without my going into more particular instructions. It is my wish, that your provisions should be ample, as nothing is more fatal to military operations, than a deficiency in the great departments of the army, and particularly in yours, which will be the hinge on which the whole enterprise must turn. The committee

of Congress, in their applications to the States, have requested them to deliver the supplies raised, at such places as the quartermaster-general and the commissary-general should point out for the articles in their respective departments. The committee informed me, that they had given you and Colonel Blaine information on this head. But, if any thing remains to be done, you will immediately do it; and I should be glad, that you would see the commissary, Mr. Blaine, if present; if not, Mr. Stewart, to concert the arrangement with him.

I am informed, that there is at Albany a quantity of plank and timber, sufficient for constructing about forty batteaux, which may be procured. If you have not a sufficiency of boats, you will endeavour to procure the abovementioned plank and timber. General Schuyler will give you more particular information. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 14 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform Congress, that I have this moment received a letter from General Heath, dated at Providence on the 11th instant, informing me that on the afternoon of the 10th the French fleet arrived off Newport, that the signals of recognizance had been made, and the fleet was standing into the harbour when the express came way. I congratulate Congress on this important event, and entreat them to press every measure in their power to put us, as soon as possible, in a condition to begin the intended coöperation with vigor and efficiency.

I enclose a plan, which, in conjunction with the inspector-general I have framed for the consideration of

Congress. It is indispensable that the department should be put into full activity without loss of time. The speedier the decision, the better. A large additional allowance, at least nominally, for the inspectors is proposed, but it is a very imperfect compensation for the additional trouble; and, unless some extra privileges and emoluments attend the office, it will not be undertaken by officers of rank and abilities.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX.

Head-Quarters, 15 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The period for commencing our operations is so near, that not a moment is to be lost in bringing forward all the cannon and stores in our possession, proper for a siege and necessary for the service of the campaign, to the North River. New York will be the object, with an army of thirty thousand men, which you will receive in confidence. I request, that you will take immediate measures for the above purpose, and apply to the Board of War, to the quartermaster-general, and to the executives of those States where the cannon and stores now are, for the requisite assistance. The exigency of the moment, in a matter which is essential to the commencement of our operations, will, I am persuaded, induce the States to give you instant and effectual aid. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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\**Extract from General Heath's Letter.* — "A little before one o'clock this morning an express arrived here from Newport with advice, that yesterday afternoon the long expected fleet of our illustrious ally appeared off that place; that the signals were all made, and the fleet was standing into the harbour, when he was sent off. I thought it my duty to give your Excellency this instant notice." — *Providence, July 11th.*



## TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters 16 July, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received your favor of this date, and thank you for the sentiments contained in it. You have totally misconceived my meaning, if you think I have or shall relinquish the idea of an enterprise against New York, till it shall appear obviously impracticable, from the want of force or means to operate. I have not as yet relaxed in any preparation tending to this end; nor shall I, till I am convinced of the futility of the measure. I would, by all means, have it understood as my wish, that the French squadron, if superior to Arbuthnot's since the junction, should take a station, while it can do it with safety, off Sandy Hook. This, and our exertions in the mean while, will demonstrate, long before the equinoctial gales, to what we are competent.

What I had in view, by discouraging the first draft of the letter to the French general and admiral, was, first, with our ignorance of their strength, I thought we ought not to give them more than the information of Graves's arrival; and, secondly, not to hold up strong ideas of success, which probably would not be warranted by the issue; because I never wish to promise more than I have a moral certainty of performing.

I am, most sincerely, yours, &c.\*

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\* Immediately after receiving this letter the Marquis de Lafayette set out on his journey to Newport, with full instructions to concert measures for future operations with the French general and admiral. Letters from those officers met him at Peekskill, copies of which he forwarded to General Washington. A paper, containing the general instructions to the Marquis de Lafayette may be found in the APPENDIX, No. III.

## TO THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, New Jersey, 16 July, 1780.

SIR,

I hasten to impart to you the happiness I feel at the welcome news of your arrival; and, as well in the name of the American army, as in my own, to present you with an assurance of our warmest sentiments for allies, who have so generously come to our aid. As a citizen of the United States, and as a soldier in the cause of liberty, I thankfully acknowledge this new mark of friendship from his Most Christian Majesty, and I feel a most grateful sensibility for the flattering confidence he has been pleased to honor me with on this occasion.

Among the obligations we are under to your prince, I esteem it one of the first, that he has made choice, for the command of his troops, of a gentleman whose high reputation and happy union of social qualities and military abilities promise me every public advantage and private satisfaction. I beg, Sir, that you will be the interpreter of my sentiments to the gentlemen under your command. Be pleased to assure them, that, to the pleasure I anticipate of an acquaintance with them, I join the warmest desire to do every thing that may be agreeable to them and to the soldiers under their command. But in the midst of a war, the nature and difficulties of which are peculiar and uncommon, I cannot flatter myself in any way to recompense the sacrifices they have made, but by giving them such opportunities in the field of glory, as will enable them to display that gallantry and those talents, which we shall always be happy to acknowledge with applause.

The Marquis de Lafayette has been by me desired from time to time to communicate such intelligence, and

make such propositions, as circumstances dictated. I think it so important, immediately to fix our plan of operations, and with as much secrecy as possible, that I have requested him to go himself to New London, where he will probably meet you. As a general officer, I have the greatest confidence in him; as a friend, he is perfectly acquainted with my sentiments and opinions. He knows all the circumstances of our army and the country at large. All the information he gives, and all the propositions he makes, I entreat you to consider as coming from me. I request you will settle all arrangements whatsoever with him; and I shall only add, that I shall exactly conform to the intentions of his Most Christian Majesty, as explained in the several papers put into my hands by his order, and signed by his ministers.

Permit me to refer you to the Marquis de Lafayette for more particular assurances of what I feel on this occasion, which I the more readily do, from a knowledge of his peculiar affection and regard for you. Impatiently waiting for the time when our operations will afford me the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with you, I have the honor to be, with the most perfect consideration, &c.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 19 July, 1780.

SIR,

On the first account of your arrival, I did myself the honor to write to you the letter annexed; but, in momentary expectation of hearing from you, I thought it best to delay the departure of the Marquis till the arrival of your despatches. These Monsieur de Roche-



fontaine delivered to me yesterday afternoon. The assurance you give me of the ulterior intentions of his Most Christian Majesty adds to our obligations and to our hopes. On our part we shall make every effort in our power.

The contrarieties you experienced, which have retarded your arrival, were unfortunate; but they depended on' events not at your command, and I hope will have no ill influence on the issue of our measures. My opinion perfectly corresponds with the motives, which determined you in the first instance to Rhode Island, and upon which you have calculated your present disposition. I shall be happy to hear, that the health of such of your troops, as were indisposed by the voyage, is speedily restored, and that you receive every refreshment and supply from the country, which can contribute to the comfort and convenience of the whole.

I cannot sufficiently express to you my sensibility for the marks of confidence, and for the assurances of your sentiments, contained in your letter, and I shall be happy in seizing every opportunity to convince you how entirely I reciprocate them. I have the honor to be, with the highest esteem and regard, Sir, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 19 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

By despatches received last evening from the Count de Rochambeau, I am informed, that the French fleet

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\* As soon as Count de Rochambeau arrived at Newport, he wrote to General Washington, and enclosed a copy of his instructions from the King, and an account of his voyage. See the letter in the APPENDIX, No. IV.

and army, consisting of eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bombs, and upwards of five thousand men, have arrived at Newport.\* This makes them rather inferior to "the combined naval force of Arbuthnot and Graves; but, as a second division of ships and land forces (a circumstance you will keep to yourself) may be expected in a few weeks, it is probable we shall gain a superiority at sea by the time we can be ready to operate, as Count de Rochambeau is of the opinion, that his land force will not be sufficiently recruited under four weeks from the 12th instant. Should a superiority at sea be established, it would lessen our land transportation in so considerable a degree, that little or no doubt would remain of our being able to keep up the requisite supply of provision, forage, and military stores, during the time of an operation against New York. But, as that is a matter which cannot be ascertained, and as New York seems, for reasons which have presented themselves since the arrival of the fleet, to

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\* Letters were also received from General Heath. "I arrived here last night," said he, "and this morning I had the honor of congratulating M. de Rochambeau and M. de Ternay on their safe arrival. The inhabitants appear disposed to treat our allies with much respect. The town, by a vote of the inhabitants, is to be illuminated this evening. I am myself charmed with the officers. Count de Rochambeau has desired me to publish an advertisement inviting the inhabitants to bring small meats, vegetables, and the like, to market, and that they shall receive hard money in payment. This the Count intended with a good view to our currency. I have told him it would have a different effect. I shall therefore only assure the farmers, that they will receive a handsome price."—*Newport, July 12th.*

Again; "The French troops are landed, and encamped in a fine situation south-east of the town, and extend nearly across the Island. They make a good appearance. The legion under the command of the Duke de Lauzun, the officer who took Senegal last year, is as fine a corps as I have ever seen. It is about six hundred strong. The officers express the highest satisfaction with the treatment they receive. The markets are become very good, and great regularity is preserved. In short, hitherto every thing appears agreeable and satisfactory."—*July 16th.*

be the only object we can attempt, it remains to be considered whether it would be possible to maintain an army proportioned to such an undertaking, when wholly dependent upon a land transportation, aided by a contingent one by the way of the Sound.

In making your estimates, you are to observe, that the directors of the Bank of Philadelphia engage to deliver upwards of two month's supply of flour for the American army in the camp, if so ordered; and, as we have little reason to doubt the abilities and activity of these gentlemen, we may with tolerable safety count upon so considerable an aid. Meat will chiefly be brought to us on foot. The matter, then, for which we shall be principally apprehensive, will be the transportation of forage and military stores. To insure this, there are but three ways; a competent sum of money to pay the hire of the teams upon performing the service; the exertion of the States to draw them out upon requisition; or military coercion in case of extremity. Upon the first, deranged as our finances are, we ought to place but little dependence. As to the second, you can as well judge as myself from the present temper of the States, and from what they are actually doing. And, although the third method is a disagreeable one, yet I shall not hesitate, if the resources of the country are equal to it, to execute it to the utmost of our means, if the attainment of so great an object, as that which is now before us, is made to depend upon it. With this assurance, I beg to know candidly your opinion of the probable practicability of supporting the operation so far as it depends on transportation. While we do not underrate difficulties on one hand, we should not overrate them on the other; nor discourage ourselves from a very important undertaking by obstacles, which are to be surmounted. I am, &c.



## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic, 20 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have received a letter from Brigadier-General Maxwell, requesting me to accept his resignation, and assigning his reasons for the same. Having never acted on an application of this sort from an officer of his rank, I beg leave to lay the matter before Congress, and to transmit a copy of his letter, by which they will be more fully informed of his request. The merits of this general are known to Congress, and therefore it is unnecessary for me to say any thing with respect to them; but I will take the liberty to add, that I believe him to be an honest man, a warm friend to his country, and firmly attached to her interests. In this view, and from the length of time he has been in service, and the decided part he took at the commencement of the controversy, I would further observe, that I think his claim to such compensation, as may be made to other officers of his standing to the present time, no more than equitable, and I hope it will be considered in this light by Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

## TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Head-Quarters, Colonel Dey's, 20 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You will proceed with the first and second Pennsylvania brigades, and Colonel Moylan's regiment of dragoons, upon the execution of the business planned

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\* General Maxwell's resignation was accepted by Congress on the 25th of July.

in yours of yesterday. I do not at present think of any necessary alteration, except that of detaching a few horse this afternoon to patrol all night, and to see that the enemy do not, in the course of the night, throw over any troops to form an ambuscade. They need not go so low down, nor in such numbers, as to create any alarm. They may inquire as they go for deserters, after whom they may say they are in pursuit. The enemy have so many emissaries among us, that scarce a move or an order passes unnoticed. You are so well acquainted with the critical situation of the ground, that it is needless in me to recommend the extreme of caution. I most heartily wish you success, being, with real esteem, &c.\*

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\* At a place called Bull's Ferry, and near Fort Lee on the west bank of Hudson's River, was a blockhouse, protected on one side by the perpendicular rocks, which rise from the margin of the river, and surrounded on the other sides by an *abatis* and stockade, with a kind of ditch or parapet, serving as a covered way. It was occupied by a party of Refugees under the command of Colonel Cuyler. A plan had been formed by General Wayne to take this post by assault, and at the same time to collect and drive off the cattle belonging to the Tories in that neighbourhood.

In the afternoon of the 20th of July the two Pennsylvania brigades, with four pieces of artillery belonging to Procter's regiment, and Moylan's dragoons, commenced their march from camp, and arrived at the New Bridge on the Hackensac River, about nine at night. After resting at that place four or five hours, they moved forward, and by the dawn of day they advanced towards Bull's Ferry; General Irvine with part of his brigade proceeding along the summit of the ridge; and the first brigade under Colonel Humpton, with the artillery and Moylan's horse, by the direct road. About ten o'clock in the morning of the 21st, part of the first brigade had reached the post. Moylan's horse and a detachment of infantry remained at the fork of the road leading to Paulus Hook and Bergen, prepared to receive the enemy if they should approach from that quarter. General Irvine was directed to halt in a position from which he could move to any point where the enemy might attempt to land, either in the vicinity of Bull's Ferry or Fort Lee. Near this latter place two regiments were likewise concealed, with orders to wait the landing of the enemy, and then at the point of the bayonet to dispute the pass in the gorge of the mountain until supported by General Irvine. One regiment

## TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 22 July, 1780.

I have received, my dear Marquis, your letter enclosing me those you had received from Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay. As I speak to you in confidence, I am sorry to find that the objections made by M. de Ternay are of a nature to prevent his entering the harbour, notwithstanding any superiority he will probably have. I certainly would not wish him to endanger his fleet in any enterprise not

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was posted in a hollow way on the north side of the blockhouse, and another on the south side, with orders to keep up a constant fire into the port-holes, to favor the advance of the artillery.

When the field-pieces arrived, they were stationed at the medium distance of sixty yards, and a cannonade commenced, which continued without intermission from eleven till twelve o'clock. The fire was returned with spirit by the besieged. It was at length found that the cannon, owing to the lightness of their metal, made no impression upon the thick walls of the blockhouse, and the troops were ordered to retire. At this moment, however, a regiment in reserve rushed through the *abatis* and advanced to the stockades, but the troops were so much exposed to a galling fire within, that they were withdrawn. During the cannonade several vessels and boats were seen moving on the river, but no troops were landed by the enemy. A detachment of infantry destroyed the sloops and wood-boats at the landing, and took three or four prisoners. The cattle were driven off, according to the original plan, and the whole party returned the same evening across the Hackensac River at the New Bridge. The number of troops killed during the attack was fifteen, and wounded forty-nine. The enemy reported six killed and fifteen wounded. The expedition was a failure, which General Wayne ascribed to the smallness of his cannon. He had in person reconnoitred the post, but the strength of the works seems not to have been ascertained. He was disappointed, also, that the enemy did not land troops from the other side of the river during the cannonade, which he had expected, and had made such preparations for receiving them as promised success. — *General Wayne's MS. Letter, July 22d.*

The incidents of this expedition afforded the groundwork of the dog-grel written by Major André, called the "*Cow Chase*," which, with much that is coarse and crude, contains several stanzas of genuine humor and satire.



warranted by prudence, and by a sufficient prospect of success and security; and I shall acquiesce in his better judgment of maritime affairs. But I should hope, that, whenever he shall have a decided superiority, he may possess the port; and certainly, without this, our operations must be infinitely more precarious, and success much less decisive.\*

Another thing that gives me concern is the non-arrival of our arms and powder. Of the former we have not one half a sufficiency for our recruits, and in the latter, including the quantity expected, we were defective. Unless, therefore, our allies can lend us largely, we certainly can attempt nothing. With every effort we can make, we shall fall short at least four or five thousand arms, and two hundred tons of powder. We must of necessity, my dear Marquis, however painful it is to abuse the generosity of our friends, know of them whether they can assist us with a loan of that quantity of arms and ammunition. I do not believe we can make out with less; but, before we can enter into any engagements, we must ascertain what they will be able to spare us. I entreat you to speak to the Count on this subject without delay, and let me know the result by express. If the arms can be obtained, endeavour to have them forwarded as quickly as possible,

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\* Alluding to the harbour of New York. The Chevalier de Ternay declined attempting to pass Sandy Hook in any event, being convinced, as he said, by the experience of Count d'Estaing, and by such charts as he had examined, that such an attempt with his large ships would be extremely hazardous. "I have therefore concluded," he wrote, "that, if it is possible to sustain the fleet at Long Island without entering the Hook, this arrangement will be preferable on all accounts. I will combat the English squadron at sea, should it attempt to oppose the passage of troops. All my vessels are actually without water. I have landed thirteen hundred men sick. It was with difficulty, that I was enabled to supply the wants of the frigates, which I despatched yesterday to endeavour to intercept some of the enemy's vessels." — *MS. Letter to Lafayette, July 16th.*

to be put into the hands of the recruits, that we may be training them a little, and putting them in condition to act.

With respect to the Count's desire of a personal interview with me, you are sensible, my dear Marquis, that there is nothing I should more ardently desire than to meet him; but you are also sensible, that my presence here is essential to keep our preparations in activity, or even going on at all. I entreat you to impress the Count with a proper idea of this matter, and convince him with what pleasure I should hasten to meet him, if it would not be injurious to our affairs. I am persuaded, that, however ardent may be your wishes to undertake the reduction of a certain place, you will not fail to take a candid and full view of the difficulties. We owe it to our allies. We owe it to ourselves.

Colonel Hamilton informed you yesterday of the advices received from New York of an intended embarkation, said to be destined for Rhode Island. Assure the Count and the Chevalier of all the esteem and attachment I feel for them, and receive the assurances of the affection with which I am, dear Marquis, &c.\*

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\* *From the Orderly Book.* — "The Commander-in-chief has the pleasure to congratulate the army on the arrival of a large land and naval armament at Rhode Island, sent by his Most Christian Majesty to co-operate with the troops of these States against the common enemy, accompanied with every circumstance that can render it honorable and useful. The generosity of this succour, and the manner in which it is given, is a new tie between France and America. The lively concern, which our allies manifest for our safety and independence, has a claim to the affection of every virtuous citizen. The General with confidence assures the army, that the officers and men of the French forces come to our aid, animated with a zeal founded in sentiment for us, as well as in duty to their prince, and that they will do every thing in their power to promote harmony and cultivate friendship. He is equally persuaded, that on our part we shall vie with them in their good dispositions, to which we are excited by gratitude as well as by a common interest; and that the only contention between the two armies will be to excel each other in

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 22 July, 1780.

SIR,

The committee has done me the honor to communicate to me a copy of their letter to Congress, containing a state of the measures they had taken, and of our present prospects. The knowledge I have of facts perfectly coincides with their representation; and the consequences they draw are so just and important, that they ought to engage, and I am persuaded will engage, the closest attention of Congress. I think it my duty to add, that, pressed on all sides by a choice of difficulties, in a moment which required decision, I have adopted that line of conduct, which suited the dignity and faith of Congress, the reputation of these States, and the honor of our arms. I have sent definitive proposals of coöperation to the French general and admiral. Neither the season, nor a regard to decency, would permit delay. The die is cast, and it remains with the States either to fulfil their engagements, preserve their credit, and support their independence, or to involve us in disgrace and defeat. Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the committee, I shall proceed, on the supposition that they will ultimately consult their own interest and honor, and not suffer us to fail for want of means, which it is evidently in their power to afford. What has been done, and is doing, by some of the States, confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in the country. As to the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangements for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground to

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good offices, and in the display of every military virtue. This will be the pledge of the most solid advantages to the common cause, and of a glorious issue to the campaign."—*July 20th.*



doubt. If we fail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments, I trust the responsibility will fall where it ought, and that I shall stand justified to Congress, to my country, and to the world.

Congress are sensible, that I have made it a rule to speak with the most scrupulous delicacy of the measures of the States, generally or particularly, and will do me the justice to believe, that the plainness of my present remarks is dictated by a sense of duty, by the importance of the conjuncture, and by the necessity of giving them a just view of our situation. I beg leave to observe, that, from present appearances, it seems to me indispensable, that Congress should enlarge the powers of their committee. We have every reason to believe it will become unavoidable to exert powers, which, if they have no sanction, may be very disagreeable to the people, and productive of discontents and oppositions, which will be infinitely injurious. With perfect respect and esteem, I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 24 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The intelligence I have received from different quarters is of the same nature as that of yours, and speaks of an embarkation destined against our allies at Rhode Island. The communications, which you made to Major-General Heath on this subject, were very proper, whether the enemy mean only a demonstration for the purpose of delaying, or serious operations in that quarter. You will be pleased to order forward the militia from New Hampshire and Massachusetts, arrived and arriving at Claverac, either to Fishkill or the

most eligible situation in its vicinity on either side of the river. However, as Claverac is considered a place of rendezvous for the militia, it will be expedient to have a small deposit of provision at that post for temporary purposes. I wish you immediately to put the troops within your command under orders to march at the shortest notice, and to concert measures with the quartermaster to give the order efficiency, as soon as its execution becomes necessary. Pray inform me whether the arms from Albany have arrived, and in what number. I am, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, 26 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I transmit the enclosed letter from Sir Henry Clinton, in answer to yours of the 5th instant. I am exceedingly sorry to find, that he seems to involve your exchange with that of the southern army, and to make one depend on the other. At this time, for the reasons I mentioned to you, and others which will readily occur, an exchange of privates could not possibly be gone into with the least degree of policy; and, under any circumstances of an extensive exchange, the release of the officers on Long Island, who have been so long in captivity, must be first attended to. If you think a personal interview between yourself and Major-General Phillips may conduce in the smallest degree to your own liberation, I should be happy to promote it, so far as it can depend on me. Wishing you health and happiness, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 26 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have been duly honored with your Excellency's letter of the 19th instant, and am pleased to find, that the proposition I had the honor of communicating to General Knyphausen, and afterwards to your Excellency, on the 5th of this month, for mutually appointing agents for prisoners, has met your approbation. I should have been happy, if you had in your letter delineated your ideas of the powers and restrictions, under which they are to act; but, as you have not done it, I beg leave to offer the enclosed propositions on this head for your consideration, and to request your answer to them as soon as it may be convenient, with any additional ones your Excellency may think proper to subjoin. It will be perfectly agreeable for the agent, that shall be appointed on your part, to reside at Lancaster, as your Excellency has proposed, which will also be made the place of confinement for the privates, prisoners of war in our hands, so far as circumstances will reasonably permit.

Your Excellency's despatches on the subject of the troops of convention, have been received. I am exceedingly obliged by the favorable sentiments you are pleased to entertain of my disposition towards prisoners; and I beg leave to assure you, Sir, that I am sensible of the treatment, which those under your direction have generally experienced. There is nothing more contrary to my wishes, than that men in captivity should suffer the least unnecessary severity or want; and I shall take immediate occasion to transmit a copy of the report you enclose (the truth of which I can neither deny nor admit) to the commandant at Char-



lottesville, with orders to inquire into the facts, and to redress grievances wherever they may exist. At the same time, that I will not pretend to controvert the justice of the matters complained of by Mr. Hoaksley (the report transmitted being the first and only communication I have had with respect to them); I cannot but think the terms of General Phillips's letter to your Excellency rather exceptionable, and that this gentleman's own experience and good understanding should have led to a more favorable and just interpretation, than the one he has been pleased to make upon the occasion. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 27 July, 1780.

I have received your letter from Hartford. I perceive, my dear Marquis, that you are determined at all events to take New York, and that obstacles only increase your zeal. I am sorry that our prospects,

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\* Mr. Hoaksley, wagon-master to the British army which capitulated at Saratoga, had lately returned to New York from Charlottesville, and reported that the prisoners were not properly supplied with provisions. General Phillips, in representing the matter to Sir Henry Clinton, used the following language. "Such severities and hardships upon the troops of convention will force them to disperse and desert, and in doing so to cease from abiding by the treaty of Saratoga, which the Americans perhaps wish to have dissolved. By this starving, as it were, the troops of convention, they are driven to seek refuge in the country, or, by deserting, to become prisoners of war, under the supposition that, in detached and scattered parties, they may be able to procure provisions, which seem to be denied them in a collected body." A copy of the letter containing these words was enclosed to General Washington by Sir Henry Clinton, who added, "You cannot but be informed, Sir, that our conduct towards your prisoners here is humane and liberal, and I am persuaded your wish must be to maintain this system of benevolence towards men, who have the misfortune of enduring captivity." — *July 19th.*

instead of brightening, grow duller.\* I have already written to you on the subject of arms. There is no probability of our getting the number we want from the States; so that, without the timely arrival of those we expect, or the assistance of our allies, this alone will prove an insuperable obstacle. Our levies come in even slower than I expected; though we have still an abundance of fair promises, and some earnest of performance from the eastern States. Pennsylvania has given us not quite four hundred, and seems to think that she has done admirably well. Jersey has given us fifty or sixty. But I do not despair of Jersey

Mr. Clinton still continues to threaten your countrymen with a combined attack. You will judge, as well as I, of the probability of his being sincere; but I have put the troops here under marching orders, and have ordered those at West Point to King's Ferry. If Clinton moves in force to Rhode Island, we may possibly be able to take advantage of it; or we may embarrass him a little and precipitate his movements. In this case, there are but two things, that would hinder us from taking New York before your return, the want of men and arms to do it with. If this letter should not meet you on your way back, a visit from you to the Council of Massachusetts may have a good effect. Urge the absolute necessity of their giving us their full complement of men, and of doing every thing else that has been asked of them. Dwell upon the articles of arms and ammunition. With the truest affection, I remain, my dear Marquis, your assured friend, &c.

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\* In his progress to Newport, the Marquis de Lafayette called on Governor Trumbull, General Parsons, Mr. Wadsworth, and other persons in Connecticut, and used his personal efforts to engage them to procure and hasten forward the quota of troops, and such supplies of arms and ammunition as could be spared from that State.

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paramus, 30 July, 1780.

SIR,

The committee address Congress by this opportunity to inform them of the most disagreeable crisis, to which our affairs are brought in the quartermaster-general's department. I think it my duty to assure Congress, that I entirely agree with the committee in opinion, and that, unless effectual measures are immediately taken to induce General Greene and the other principal officers of that department to continue their services, there must of necessity be a total stagnation of military business. We not only must cease from the preparations for the campaign, but in all probability shall be obliged to disperse, if not disband the army, for want of subsistence.

With every effort it will be possible for us to make, embarrassed on every side as we are, it will be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to keep the great departments of the army in motion. Any interruption, therefore, in addition to what arises from the present posture of affairs, must be ruinous at this important juncture. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

## TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Highlands, State of New York, 31 July, 1780.

SIR,

Sir Henry Clinton has sailed with the principal part of his force to attack you, estimated at about eight thousand men. It cannot be more, nor do I suppose

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\* See APPENDIX, No. V.



he would hazard the enterprise with a much less number. I am glad the inactivity of the enemy has given you time to prepare; and, relying on your abilities, and the excellence of your troops, I hope you will send them back with disgrace. Had I any prospect of arriving in time I would march to your support; but, as I think there is no probability of this, the only way I can be useful to you is to menace New York, and even to attack it, if the force remaining there does not exceed what I have reason to believe. I am pressing my movements for that purpose, with all the rapidity in our power. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* Admiral Graves arrived at New York with six ships of the line, and joined Admiral Arbuthnot, on the 13th of July, three days after the French squadron reached Newport. This junction made the British naval force at New York decidedly superior to that of M. de Ternay; for the armament under Admiral Arbuthnot consisted of four ships of the line, three frigates of forty-four guns, and three of a smaller size. On the 19th, four British vessels appeared off the harbour of Newport, and the next morning, as soon as the wind would permit, three frigates of the French squadron went in pursuit of them; and two days afterwards nine or ten British vessels of the line came in sight, with five frigates and four small vessels. The three French frigates and a despatch-boat were chased into the harbour. The British fleet continued near Block Island. From these movements it was evidently the object of the British commander to blockade the French squadron; and an attack was also feared before preparations could be made to resist it. General Heath immediately ordered Colonel Greene's regiment of Continental troops, and the recruits for that service, to take post at Howland's Ferry, Bristol Ferry, and Butts's Hill. He called on the governor of Rhode Island for fifteen hundred militia, and requested eight hundred more from Bristol County in Massachusetts. He likewise wrote to the Council of Massachusetts, desiring that all the militia in the State, who had been detached to serve for three months in the main army, except those in Hampshire and Berkshire counties, should be sent immediately to Newport. A like requisition was made on Governor Trumbull for one thousand militia from Connecticut. With these forces, if they could be speedily collected, Count de Rochambeau thought he should be able to withstand an attack.

The Marquis de Lafayette arrived at Newport on the 25th of July, and intelligence had already come from various quarters, that Sir Henry Clinton was preparing to proceed in person from New York, with a large part of his army, to give battle to the French. The most vigorous efforts were

## TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Robinson's, in the Highlands, 31 July, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I received your two obliging favors, just as I was commencing yesterday our second day's march for the North River. There is no doubt that Sir Henry Clinton means to attack the Count de Rochambeau, and that a considerable force has sailed for the purpose, of which you will have the greatest certainty by the time this reaches you. I am happy in the measures, which have been taken for calling in aid from the militia, and I hope it will arrive and prove effectual. I cannot help wishing, that the Count had taken post on the main; and, if circumstances would admit, this might be still best. In such case he would derive much greater support from the country; and the island of Rhode Island is not an object for which we should put any thing of importance to hazard.

On account of the great distance between this place and Rhode Island, I do not think it probable that any succour from this army could be there in time; and, were it to be attempted by a rapid march, a great part of the men detached would be unfit for service when

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made to meet the event. As Lafayette was well acquainted with the environs of Newport, having examined them at the time of General Sullivan's expedition, the French officers arranged with him a plan of defence. Conanicut Island was to be abandoned, and all the force to be concentrated on Rhode Island. The transports were to be secured in the harbour, and the ships to be stationed at anchor from Brenton's Point northward, where they would be protected by batteries. A frigate and a cutter were to be placed in Seaconnet Passage. The army was to remain encamped at its usual station, till the enemy should appear, and then move and attack them wherever they should disembark. If unsuccessful, the troops were to retreat and rally behind the old lines, which had been thrown up by the British, and there maintain a defence. A body of militia was likewise to be posted within those lines. — *MS. Letters of Lafayette and Heath, July 21st, 26th.*

they arrived. Besides, in the present state of things, I do not know how they would be subsisted with bread. These considerations leave me but one line of conduct to pursue, which is to move against New York. I am making every effort to accomplish this, and would willingly hope that it will relieve the Count, if nothing more. It appears to be the most probable mode of doing it, and indeed the only practicable one, so far as his relief can depend upon the troops here. That part of the army, which was with me in Jersey, will pass the River at King's Ferry this morning or forenoon; and part of those at this post moved yesterday evening, and will be followed by the remainder to-day, except so many as may be essential to be left in the garrison.\*

With respect to your remaining with General Heath, you will use your own pleasure in the matter. Wherever you are, your best services will be rendered and will be interesting. I am exceedingly hurried in arranging and preparing a variety of matters, which must justify me to you for not adding more, than that I am, with the most affectionate regard and esteem, my dear Marquis, &c.

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\* *From the Marquis de Lafayette's Letter.*—“If the enemy mean regular approaches, the French generals say, that this would give time for succour to come. In any event I do not think the French will be able to form a junction with you for some time, as they cannot leave this place before the 15th of August, even if they are not attacked. The number of sick is such, that by a return it appears they have but three thousand six hundred men fit for duty. The fleet has a great proportion of sick, and the ships are therefore poorly manned for the present. Count de Rochambeau has asked me so often whether you would not send a body of Continental troops to their relief, if within twelve days the enemy should not arrive, that I knew he wished me to write to you about it, and at length he told me so; but this must be between ourselves. The Count says he will stand a storm, but, if the enemy make a long work of it, a corps of Continental troops in their rear would have the best effect.” — *July 26th.*



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Robinson's House, 31 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Immediately upon hearing, that the transports with the troops, who had been some days on board, had sailed eastward, I put the army in motion again. They will cross the Ferry to-day, and will be joined by the troops from hence. I propose moving as rapidly as possible down towards Kingsbridge, which will either oblige the enemy to abandon their project against Rhodè Island, or may afford us an opportunity of striking them to advantage in this quarter, if Sir Henry Clinton has carried with him the number of men reported (eight thousand), with less than which I think he would scarcely venture an attempt upon Count Rochambeau, reinforced by the militia. I entirely approve of the measure you have taken for calling in aid, and I have the strongest hopes, that, if Sir Henry should venture upon an attack, he will meet with a reception very different from what he expects. You know the critical situation in which this army will be below, and how much depends upon constant intelligence of the motions of the enemy. I shall direct relays of expresses the whole way between this army and you, to convey intelligence in the most expeditious manner.

The nearest express to you will be upon Tower Hill; and General Greene advises, that you should keep two whale-boats to communicate with him by South Ferry, so long as that passage shall be safe, and, if that should be interrupted, by Bissell's Harbour.

I am, &amp;c.\*

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\* General Clinton had formed a plan of a joint operation of his land and naval forces against the French at Newport, and on the 27th of July

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL FELLOWS, MASSACHUSETTS  
MILITIA.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 31 July, 1780.

SIR,

By advices just received, I hear that the enemy have cut off the communication with Fort Schuyler; and, as the place is not well supplied with provision, there is reason to fear the loss of that valuable post, unless it is speedily relieved. You will therefore be pleased instantly upon the receipt hereof to detach five hundred of the militia under your command properly officered, with direction to the officer to march and put himself under the command of Brigadier-General Van Rensselaer of Tryon county. I have written to Colonel Van Schaick at Albany, to supply provisions, wagons, and whatever else may be necessary to expedite the marching of the detachment. Governor Clinton has written to the same effect to Colonel Van Schaick, and to General Van Rensselaer. When you consider how

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he actually embarked six thousand troops at Frog's Neck on board transports to proceed through the Sound for that purpose. In the mean time there had been so much delay, and the French had been enabled so far to make preparation and strengthen their works of defence, that the prospect of a successful assault was very doubtful; and the situation of affairs in New York would not admit of a protracted absence. It appears, moreover, that there was not a harmony of sentiment between Admiral Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the measures that should be pursued. Hence, after the troops were embarked, and all things were in readiness, Sir Henry Clinton concluded to abandon the enterprise. He crossed the Sound to Huntington Bay, and disembarked the troops at Whitestone on the 31st of July. See his Letter in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. X. p. 260.—It is probable, however, that the rapid march of Washington towards New York was the principal motive with General Clinton for retracing his steps. As soon as this counter movement was known at Newport, the militia were dismissed, except those that had been raised for three months. Admiral Arbuthnot remained off the port to blockade the French fleet, and to intercept the second division, which was expected from France.

very essential the post of Fort Schuyler is to the security of our whole frontier, and that the saving of the harvest of the fine country upon the Mohawk River depends upon an immediate removal of the enemy, I am convinced you will not lose any time in marching off the detachment, that they may form a junction with the militia of the State of New York. Ammunition will be ready at Albany. I am, &c.

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## TO GOVERNOR LIVINGSTON.

Peekskill, 1 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

From our present advices a considerable part of the enemy's force are gone to Rhode Island, with a view of reducing the armament from France. We can give them no succour from hence by detaching, on account of the distance and the difficulty there would be, if not impracticability, of subsisting the troops with bread. There is no other mode, which promises them relief, so far as it may depend on us, but our moving against New York immediately, and acting against it with rapidity and vigor, as far as circumstances will admit. For this end the whole of the Continental troops are in motion, and, as every aid will be essential, I entreat that your Excellency will order your State regiment, and the militia called for by the committee of Congress, to march as soon as possible for Dobbs's Ferry, subject to my direction, where the officers will receive further orders. I would also beg leave to suggest, that I think it advisable that your Excellency should order the whole of the militia to hold themselves in readiness to march in case of orders; as events may arise to make their aid highly essential and important for a few days.



They will not be called for but in this case, and I have the utmost confidence that they will give me support whenever it may be requisite.

I am much concerned, that so few levies have joined the regiments belonging to the State. They amount but to a mere handful. I pray that your Excellency will use your best endeavours to have them forwarded with all possible expedition. The service and our most essential interests require it. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL DICKINSON, NEW JERSEY MILITIA.

Peekskill, 1 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

From our present advices, a considerable part of the enemy's force has gone to the eastward, with a view of striking the armament from France. In consequence of this, I am moving with our Continental force towards New York, there to act as circumstances may justify. Events may arise to make the aid of the Jersey militia essential, of which I have apprized his Excellency the governor, and requested that they might be in readiness to move, and to give us succour, should it be requisite. If this should be the case, I need not tell you, that I shall be happy to see you at their head. I am confident it will be the case; and my principal design in troubling you with this is to advertise you, that the militia may be called for, and that you may turn your eyes towards the event, and have it the more in your power to expedite their movement whenever it may be proper. I am, dear Sir, &c.

## TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Peekskill, 1 August, 1780.

We are thus far, my dear Marquis, on our way to New York. To-morrow the whole army was to have taken up its line of march, and would have moved with all the rapidity in our power to this object, had we not a few hours since received advice from the Sound, dated yesterday, that the fleet of transports had put back, and were steering westward. Colonel Sheldon, by a letter this instant come to hand, writes me to the same effect. We shall therefore govern our subsequent motions agreeably to our original plan.

The express, who takes this, comes from the minister, and only leaves me time to beg you to communicate to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay the force of this information, and to tell you that I am most affectionately, my dear Marquis, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

Head-Quarters, 1 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You will perceive by the orders of this day, that the corps of Light Infantry is immediately to be formed. The command of it for the campaign is promised to the Marquis de Lafayette, for reasons, which I dare say will be to you obvious and satisfactory. If we attack New York, the part, which this corps will take, will make it a most desirable command. Should it be agreeable to you to take it until the return of this gentleman, which is uncertain, it would give me great pleasure. I wish

you however to consult your delicacy, and determine without the least restraint. I want your answer.

I am, with the greatest regard, &c.\*

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

The blunders which have been made with respect to arms, ammunition, and clothing, are serious disappointments. I think, however, from a closer inspection of our means, that we shall be able to collect nearly arms enough to put into the hands of our recruits, and powder enough to undertake the enterprise, if in the course of the operation we can depend on the fifty tons expected from France, and can obtain fifty tons more from the fleet.

I would not wish you to press the French general and admiral to any thing, to which they show a disinclination, especially to the withdrawing of their troops from Rhode Island before the second division arrives to give them a naval superiority. Should they yield to importunity, and an accident happen either there or here, they would lay the consequences to us. Only inform them what we can do, what we are willing to undertake, and let them entirely consult their own inclination for the rest. Our prospects are not so flattering, as to justify our being very pressing to engage

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\* The corps of Light Infantry consisted of six battalions, each composed of eight companies selected from the different lines of the army. These battalions were arranged in two brigades, one of which was commanded by General Hand and the other by General Poor. The Light Infantry were stationed in advance of the main army. The Marquis de Lafayette returned from Newport, and took command of the Light Infantry on the 7th of August.



them in our views. I shall, however, go on with all our preparations, and I hope circumstances will ultimately favor us. If a part of the West India fleet should come this way, it will powerfully contribute to our success.

Should not the second division arrive so as to enable us to commence our operations by the first of September, I shall have no great expectation of effecting the object. When we calculated on having twice the force of the enemy, we included the whole succour expected from France. It will be difficult, if not impracticable, to accomplish this before the second division arrives. The number of men hitherto come in rather falls short of than exceeds our calculation.

Nothing appears to me more evident, than that a communication may be secured with Long Island by land batteries. The narrowness of the Sound, the Islands, the sinuosity and other difficulties of the channel about Hell Gate, show the impracticability of vessels interrupting the communication you may establish there. All the experiments I have seen demonstrate, that shipping cannot be under the fire of land batteries, nor will they venture to try their strength with them except when they are low, or there is a bold shore, and they can annoy them from their tops; neither of which would be the case there.

I wrote to you two days ago by a French gentleman on his way to Rhode Island with despatches from the minister of France. You will find by that letter, that, on the 31st of July, the enemy's fleet returned towards New York. In all probability our movement this way occasioned them to relinquish their expedition to Rhode Island. To-morrow we shall recross the River and proceed to Dobbs's Ferry; our motives for recrossing are to save transportation and forage. Your Light In-

fantry is formed, about two thousand fine men; but the greater part of them without clothing.

Adieu, my dear Marquis, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Before this comes to hand, you will have been informed, that the fleet in the Sound, which it is generally believed was designed to proceed to Rhode Island, has returned. We have so many accounts of this, that we have no doubt of it, and are pursuing measures accordingly. With respect to the return of the militia,

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\* By advices, which Sir Henry Clinton had received from the ministry, he was prepared to expect the French armament; and other intelligence had convinced him, that its destination was probably Rhode Island. This opinion he communicated seasonably to Admiral Arbuthnot, and requested that transports for six thousand men might be kept in readiness to receive troops, in case an enterprise should be deemed expedient as soon as the French should arrive. Although the French fleet entered the harbour of Newport on the 10th of July, the news did not reach New York till the 18th. Sir Henry Clinton determined, nevertheless, to attempt an attack either by land or by a combined operation with the fleet, and immediately gave notice of his design to the admiral. He proceeded with his troops to Frog's Neck, but the transports did not arrive till the 27th, when it was too late to hope for success by a *coup de main*. He embarked his troops; but, receiving information that the French had been very active in fortifying themselves at Newport, and that the militia were assembling at that place, he considered it impossible to secure success by land forces alone, and crossed the Sound to Huntington Bay, where the troops were disembarked on the 31st. The approach of Washington to New York also rendered it necessary for him to hasten back. By his first plan he hoped, with the aid of the fleet, to make a rapid descent upon Rhode Island, and return to New York before Washington should be able to move with his army upon that city. His scheme was defeated by the delay in furnishing transports. There was a want of harmony between Admiral Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, which already began to produce ill effects, and which in the end proved very unfavorable to the public service.

who were called for under the persuasion that the enemy meant to attack Count de Rochambeau, it will rest with him and you to determine the point. But, as it is of consequence, on account of the state of our provisions, that we should not have more of these in the field, than prudence and necessity may require, and as it is not very probable, that the enemy will now return upon their steps and prosecute their supposed original plan, it might be best to permit the militia to go to their homes.\*

As to your coming to the army immediately, I shall leave it entirely with yourself to act in the affair as you please. Your command is, and will always be, ready for you. However, if you find your presence where you are necessary, and that it will contribute to the accommodation of our allies, and to the cultivation of harmony, matters about which I am very anxious, it may possibly be more eligible for you to remain longer, as we shall not, probably, have any instant active operations. But, as I have already said, do in the matter as you like, and as circumstances may decide.

I find by a letter from his Excellency Governor Greene, of the 24th, that nearly the whole of the State's quota of levies for filling her two regiments had assembled, and were doing duty under the command of Colonel Greene. It is of consequence that Colonel Greene's regiment and the levies should join the army, in order to complete our arrangements, and

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\* The militia had come in with great promptness and alacrity from Rhode Island and Massachusetts. As soon as it was known, that General Clinton had suspended or abandoned his enterprise against Newport, it was agreed between General Heath and Count de Rochambeau, that all the militia should be sent home except three thousand five hundred. Of these, two thousand were stationed between Quaker Hill and the town, and the remainder at Butts's Hill. The militia, that were retained, had been called out to serve for three months.



that they may be disciplined. However, I would not wish them to be ordered on, without your consulting the Count and obtaining his approbation of the measure. If they do not march immediately, you will impress Colonel Greene with the necessity of his strictest and most constant attention to disciplining them, and for his being ready to proceed the moment he is ordered, or that the Count shall judge his remaining longer unnecessary. You will also direct him to transmit to me a return of his regiment and of the levies. I am, dear Sir, with great regard, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

SIR,

You are to proceed to West Point, and take the command of that post and its dependencies, in which all are included from Fishkill to King's Ferry. The corps of infantry and cavalry, advanced towards the enemy's lines on the east side of the river, will also be under your orders, and will take directions from you; and you will endeavour to obtain every intelligence of the enemy's motions. The garrison of West Point is to consist of the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts; for which reason, so soon as the number from those States amounts to twelve hundred, the New York militia under the command of Colonel Malcom, are to join the main army on the west side of the river; and, when the number from Massachusetts Bay alone shall amount to fifteen hundred, rank and file, the militia of New Hampshire will also march to the main army. Colonel James Livingston's regiment is, till further orders, to garrison the redoubts at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point.

Claverac, upon the North River, is appointed for the place of rendezvous of the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, from whence you will have them brought down as fast as they arrive. A supply of provision will be necessary at that place, which you will order, from time to time, as there may be occasion. You will endeavour to have the works at West Point carried on as expeditiously as possible by the garrison, under the direction and superintendence of the engineers, the stores carefully preserved, and the provision safely deposited and often inspected, particularly the salted meat. A certain quantity of provision has been constantly kept in each work, to be ready against a sudden attack. Where there are bomb-proofs, they serve for magazines; but in the smaller works, where there are none, you will have places erected sufficiently tight to preserve the provision from damage and pillage.

You will, as soon as possible, obtain and transmit an accurate return of the militia, who have come in, and inform me regularly of their increase. Should any levies from the State of New York, or those to the eastward of it, intended for the Continental army, arrive at West Point, you will immediately forward them to the lines to which they respectively belong. The difficulty we shall certainly experience, on the score of provisions, renders the utmost economy highly necessary. You will, therefore, attend frequently to the daily issues; and, by comparing them with your returns, you will be able to check any impositions. I am, &c.\*

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\* Although there had been various intimations to the Commander-in-chief, that Arnold wished the command at West Point, yet he had delayed conferring it, probably because he considered the services of so efficient an officer much more important in the main army. In the arrangement of the army, therefore, published in general orders on the 1st of August, the command of the left wing was assigned to Arnold. When it was found, that he was disappointed and dissatisfied, and complained that his wound would not allow him to act in the field, Washington complied with his request to be stationed at West Point.

TO COLONEL THADDEUS KOSCIUSZKO, ENGINEER AT  
WEST POINT.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

SIR,

The artificers are drawn from the post at West Point for a particular and temporary service only ; and, as there is a necessity for a gentleman in the engineering department to remain constantly at that post, and as you, from your long residence there, are particularly well acquainted with the nature of the works and the plans for their completion, it was my intention that you should continue. The infantry corps was arranged before the receipt of your letter. The southern army, by the captivity of General Duportail and the other gentlemen of that branch, is without an engineer ; and, as you seem to express a wish for going there, rather than remaining at West Point, I shall, if you prefer it to your present appointment, have no objection to your going. I am, &c.\*

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 5 August, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I approve the steps you have taken. I am sorry to find, however, that the Chevalier de Ternay is so

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\* Kosciuszko replied to this letter as follows. "The choice your Excellency was pleased to give me in your letter of yesterday is very kind ; and, as the completion of the works at this place during this campaign, as circumstances are, will be impossible in my opinion, I prefer going to the southward to continuing here. I beg you to favor me with your orders, and a letter of recommendation to the Board of War, as I shall pass through Philadelphia. I shall wait on your Excellency to pay due respects in a few days." — *West Point, August 4th.*



averse to entering the harbour\* in case of superiority. I believe he will find it impracticable, without entering, effectually to interrupt supplies and blockade the enemy; and, in my opinion, our principal chance of success is in a complete blockade. I am however willing to go on with the chances of a siege, if agreeable to our allies. But let me entreat you to ascertain the probability of a succour coming from France and the West Indies; for, to be keeping so large a body of militia in the field, with a slender hope of being able to operate, will be unadvisable on every account. We shall exhaust ourselves to no purpose, and every day will add to the impressions, that relinquishing the enterprise will make on the minds of the people. We ought to stand upon pretty sure ground, or dismiss our preparations for offensive measures at once.

Though I seriously intended to attack New York, if Clinton had gone to Rhode Island, yet I did not send for you, because I thought it not improbable he would return in consequence of our movement, as has happened, and because your presence where you are, in the other case, would have been of great utility to the French fleet and army; but above all, because I was of opinion, that it would be impracticable for you to arrive in time, as I intended to operate with the utmost celerity. I rejoice in the approbation your countrymen give to mine, and in the marks of mutual good will. The alliance ought to be cemented in affection, and you will be justly dear to both countries for the share you have in binding it by those powerful and pleasing ties. You know all my friendship for you. Adieu.†

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\* The harbour of New York.

† See the letter from the Marquis de Lafayette, to which this is a reply, in the APPENDIX, No. VI.

## TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 5 August, 1780.

SIR,

I applaud all the measures you have taken, which appear to me precisely such as the occasion required ; and I am very happy to hear, that the neighbouring States manifested so much ardor in doing what their interest, their duty, and their gratitude demanded from them. It is my wish that you should detain the levies, as long as you think they can be useful to you.

The Marquis de Lafayette will have informed you, by my desire, that Clinton returned with his fleet the 31st of July. He has since landed his troops on Long Island, and I think will hardly resume the project, which he certainly entertained, of attacking you. In consequence of his return, the army is recrossing the river and will proceed to Dobbs's Ferry, about ten miles from Kingsbridge, where we intend to establish a communication that will save us a considerable land transportation, in case New York is our eventual object. The reason for preferring the west side of the river to the other, which at first sight will appear most natural, is to meet our supplies of flour, and save the forage on this side ; both of which in our circumstances are objects of importance. By the enclosed copy of a letter to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, you will see the opinion I have ventured to give respecting the second division and those of the Chevalier de Ternay, with a plan for a junction of the fleets as suggested in my letter. No other changes have taken place in the situation of the enemy at New York. I am, &c.

P. S. The minister, agreeably to the application to him, has sent out fast sailing cruisers from all the parts of the coast where it is probable they may fall in with the second division.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD, WEST POINT.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 5 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Enclosed is a letter, which I received this day from Colonel Malcom. His observations may perhaps be of use to you. He was a considerable time in command at the post, and is well acquainted with what relates to its security. It would be well to make inquiry into the cases of the number of persons, who are confined in the fort. Some of them may have been committed on frivolous occasions, and no charges, that can be supported, left against them. If so, they had better be discharged than kept. Some of the others may be usefully employed, in the way Colonel Malcom mentions. The quartermaster-general expects some camp-kettles shortly. He will, if possible, spare some to the militia. I imagine they are what are principally wanting. In the mean time, they must endeavour to make a shift with the few cooking utensils they have. I believe the matter of changing the officers of the light infantry companies has been settled between Governor Clinton and the Baron. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

Peekskill, 6 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have received your letter of yesterday. When you quit the department I shall be happy to give you my sense of your conduct; and, I am persuaded, it will be such as will be entirely satisfactory. I cannot, however, forbear thinking, that it would be unadvisable for



you to leave the department before the success of the letters, written from Paramus by the committee and myself to Congress, is known, and I entreat you to wait the issue of the application. I am, Sir, with great respect and regard, &c.

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## TO THE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.

Head-Quarters, 6 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to transmit to you a letter, which I have just received for you from the Chevalier de la Luzerne. Congress have directed a junction of the Continental frigates with your fleet, and for this purpose have put them under my orders. They were to rendezvous in the Delaware; from whence they were to proceed to join you. As this at present seems impracticable, I should be glad of your advice in what mode they may be employed usefully to your fleet; and that you will send me signals of recognizance for them. I request that you will also impart these to the captains of the frigates in Boston harbour, if they have not left that place. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 8 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am exceedingly happy at the conduct of the militia in turning out with so much spirit and alacrity. It does them great honor; at the same time that it is very interesting to the common cause. The Count de Rochambeau has expressed himself highly pleased with

them, and in such terms as have given me much satisfaction. Gratitude, interest, and policy combined in the strongest manner to lead us to give him the earliest and most effectual support. The Count will have received long before this my letters advising him of the certain return of General Clinton to New York, and will have made every arrangement in consequence of it. You will see, by my letter of the 3d, that your joining the army is entirely with yourself. Sir Henry Clinton's return having put an end to the plan I had formed of an immediate attempt on New York, while he should be operating to the eastward, the army has passed the river; and we are now going, agreeably to my original design, to establish as soon as possible a communication for the present across the river at Dobbs's Ferry, in order to aid our land transportation and facilitate our supplies of bread; which, at any rate, will be found sufficiently difficult, but much less so, than if the flour were to be carried around the circuitous route by King's Ferry and thence to the Plains.

I very much wish, that the fleet, reported to have been met at sea, may have been the second division from France, and that it may get safe into port. In order to give it the better chance for this, it would be well if the intelligence should remain a secret; for, if it should reach the enemy, they would try every measure they could devise to intercept it.

I am dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 11 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received intelligence, that the British troops, who lately returned from the eastward and debarked

upon Long Island, have orders to embark again. I cannot suppose, that they mean again to go towards Rhode Island ; neither can I think, that, in the present situation of matters, they can expect any success from an attempt upon West Point ; but, in order that we may run no risk, I shall write to Colonel Malcom, directing him to halt in the neighbourhood of Haverstraw till further orders. He will from thence be within supporting distance of the posts, should a serious move up the river take place. You will also detain all the militia of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, who may come in, until we receive more certain intelligence of the views and intentions of the enemy. You will put all your posts upon their guard. They can be affected by nothing but a surprise, while this army is so near them.

We shall have occasion to throw up some small works at Dobbs's Ferry, to secure the intended communication at that place ; and, in order that we may be enabled to finish them in the most expeditious manner, you will be pleased to order sixty of Colonel Baldwin's artificers to come immediately down here.

Colonel Hay writes, that he shall be able to lay up some stock of hay at Fishkill, provided orders are given, that none shall be issued while grass or pasture is to be had, except upon such occasions as you, or the deputy quartermaster-general at the post, shall think proper. This measure appears to be necessary ; and you will, therefore, be pleased to give orders to have it carried into execution. A new quartermaster-general (Colonel Pickering) is appointed. Whether he will be supplied with the means of procuring what is necessary in the department, or whether the new system is calculated to produce them, is yet to be known. In the mean time, you can only proceed in working up the materials, which you find on hand. I am, &c.



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 12 August, 1780.

SIR,

We are impatiently awaiting the arrival of the second division of the French fleet and army, upon which the commencement of operations in a great measure or entirely depends. In my letter of the 18th of July, I desired you to make frequent communications of the situation of affairs at the southward. I cannot forbear repeating my wish on this subject, as circumstances may require a very sudden alteration of our present plans; and, should the transfer of the whole or a part of the force of our allies to the southward be deemed eligible, it will be necessary that we should be acquainted beforehand with your strength, expectations, and resources, and also with the number, position, and circumstances of the enemy. You may depend upon every intelligence from me, which can in any way affect or be interesting to the operations in your quarter.

I have taken the opportunity of writing by Colonel Kosciuszko, with whom I part reluctantly, as I have experienced great satisfaction from his general conduct, and particularly from the attention and zeal with which he has prosecuted the works committed to his charge at West Point. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Orangetown, 13 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The providing of wood in season for the garrison is so essential a matter, that you will be pleased to furnish Colonel Hay with the men required. I expect that

those men, who were detained at Rhode Island while there was an expectation of General Clinton, will soon come forward. Colonel Sheldon may be directed to send down a flag with Captain Benedict and Mr. Stevens. If the former can obtain liberty to be admitted into New York, I have no objection to his going. The general directions, which have been given respecting flags, have been as follows ; To discourage the frequent use of them as much as possible ; to permit no persons, inhabitants of the States, to go into New York without permission in writing from the respective governors, except in such a case as that of Captain Benedict, who shows good cause for going ; and always to grant flags upon the application of the governors of the neighbouring States.

Several prisoners have lately made their escape from the provost at West Point, and voluntarily surrendered themselves here. Two of them, who came in to-day, say that they were induced to break out for want of water, as a practice has been made of keeping it from them, and obliging them to pay exorbitantly for it. Be pleased to inquire into this matter, and let the officer of the guard look to it in future. I am confident it is an imposition without the knowledge or concurrence of any but the inferior officers. I am, &c.

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TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 13 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The subject of this letter will be confined to a single point. I shall make it as short as possible, and write it with frankness. If any sentiment therefore is delivered, which might be displeasing to you as a member of

Congress, ascribe it to the freedom which is taken with you by a friend, who has nothing in view but the public good.

In your letter without date, but which came to hand yesterday, an idea is held up, as if the acceptance of General Greene's resignation of the quartermaster's department was not all that Congress meant to do with him.\* If by this it is in contemplation to suspend him from his command in the line, of which he made an express reservation at the time of entering on the other duty, and it is not already enacted, let me beseech you to consider well what you are about before you resolve. I shall neither condemn nor acquit General Greene's conduct for the act of resignation, because all the antecedent correspondence is necessary to form a right judgment of the matter; and possibly, if the affair is ever brought before the public, you may find him treading on better ground than you seem to imagine; but

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\* Mr. Jones had written from Congress;—"We have been greatly perplexed the last week with General Greene's refusal to act in the office of quartermaster-general, unless the new system was totally repealed, and he was allowed to conduct it under your direction in such a manner as he should think most conducive to the public service. If General Greene thought the new system wanted amendment, and had pointed out the defect, Congress would have considered the matter, and I doubt not would have made the necessary alteration. But the manner of these demands, made in such peremptory terms at the moment of action, when the campaign was opened, the enemy in the field, and our ally waiting for coöperation, has lessened General Greene, not only in the opinion of Congress, but I think of the public; and I question whether it will terminate with the acceptance of his refusal only.

"On Saturday Colonel Pickering was appointed to the office of quartermaster-general, with the rank of Colonel and the pay and rations of a brigadier-general, and to hold his seat at the Board of War without pay or right to act while in the office of quartermaster-general. This gentleman's integrity, ability, and attention to business will, I hope, not only prevent the evils to be apprehended from a change in so important a department at this time, but be able to reform some of the abuses, which have crept into that business."

See further particulars on this subject in the APPENDIX, No. V.



this by the by. My sole aim at present is to advertise you of what I think would be the consequences of suspending him from his command in the line (a matter distinct from the other) without a proper trial. A procedure of this kind must touch the feelings of every officer. It will show in a conspicuous point of view the uncertain tenure by which they hold their commissions. In a word, it will exhibit such a specimen of power, that I question much if there is an officer in the whole line, that will hold a commission beyond the end of the campaign, if he does till then. Such an act in the most despotic government would be attended at least with loud complaints.

It does not require with you, I am sure, at this time of day, arguments to prove, that there is no set of men in the United States, considered as a body, that have made the same sacrifices of their interest in support of the common cause, as the officers of the American army; that nothing but a love of their country, of honor, and a desire of seeing their labors crowned with success, could possibly induce them to continue one moment in service; that no officer can live upon his pay; that hundreds, having spent their little all in addition to their scanty public allowance, have resigned, because they could no longer support themselves as officers; that numbers are at this moment rendered unfit for duty for want of clothing, while the rest are wasting their property, and some of them verging fast to the gulf of poverty and distress.

Can it be supposed, that men under these circumstances, who can derive at best, if the contest ends happily, only the advantages which accrue in equal proportion to others, will sit patient under such a precedent? Surely they will not; for the measure, not the man, will be the subject of consideration, and each will

ask himself this question ; If Congress by its mere fiat, without inquiry and without trial, will suspend an officer to-day, and an officer of such high rank, may it not be my turn to-morrow, and ought I to put it in the power of any man or body of men to sport with my commission and character, and lay me under the necessity of tamely acquiescing, or, by an appeal to the public, exposing matters, which must be injurious to its interests ? The suspension of Generals Schuyler and St. Clair, though it was preceded by the loss of Ticonderoga, which contributed not a little for the moment to excite prejudices against them, was by no means viewed with a satisfactory eye by many discerning men, though it was in a manner supported by the public clamor ; and the one in contemplation I am almost certain will be generally reprobated by the army.

Suffer not, my friend, if it is within the compass of your abilities to prevent it, so disagreeable an event to take place. I do not mean to justify, to countenance, or excuse, in the most distant degree, any expressions of disrespect, which the gentleman in question, if he has used any, may have offered to Congress ; no more than I do any unreasonable matters he may have required respecting the quartermaster-general's department ; but, as I have already observed, my letter is to prevent his suspension, because I fear, because I feel, that it must lead to very disagreeable and injurious consequences. General Greene has his numerous friends out of the army as well as in it ; and, from his character and consideration in the world, he might not, when he felt himself wounded in so summary a way, withhold himself from a discussion, that could not at best promote the public cause. As a military officer he stands very fair, and very deservedly so, in the opinion of all his acquaintance. These sentiments are the result of my

own reflections, and I hasten to inform you of them. I do not know that General Greene has ever heard of the matter, and I hope he never may; nor am I acquainted with the opinion of a single officer in the whole army upon the subject, nor will any tone be given by me. It is my wish to prevent the proceeding; for, sure I am, that it cannot be brought to a happy issue, if it takes place. I am, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 15 August, 1780.

SIR,

As you are retiring from the office of quartermaster-general, and have requested my sense of your conduct and services while you acted in it, I shall give it to you with the greatest cheerfulness and pleasure. You have conducted the various duties of it with capacity and diligence, entirely to my satisfaction, and, as far as I have had an opportunity of knowing, with the strictest integrity. When you were prevailed on to undertake the office, in March, 1778, it was in great disorder and confusion, and by extraordinary exertions you so arranged it, as to enable the army to take the field the moment it was necessary, and to move with rapidity after the enemy when they left Philadelphia. From that period to the present time, your exertions have been equally great. They have appeared to me to be the result of system, and to have been well calculated to promote the interest and honor of your country. In fine, I cannot but add, that the States have had in you, in my opinion, an able, upright, and diligent servant.

I am, Sir, &c.



## TO THE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 16 August, 1780.

SIR,

The reasons, which you assign for preferring the harbour of Boston to that of Delaware for the rendezvous of the second division, are certainly well founded, and I hope, from the steps which have been taken to give it notice of the position of Admiral Arbuthnot's fleet, that the division will reach one or the other of those ports in safety. I immediately communicated to the Board of Admiralty at Philadelphia your opinion of the most advantageous manner of employing the American frigates and sloop *Saratoga*, until circumstances shall admit of our commencing serious operations against the enemy; and I have advised them, should it not interfere with any arrangements which may have been previously made, to adopt the measures recommended by you. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* M. de Ternay objected to the Delaware as the place for the rendezvous of the second French squadron expected soon to arrive in the American waters, on account of the difficult navigation of that bay for large ships, and the danger of being blockaded there by the British fleet. He considered Boston harbour as more secure, and as affording greater advantages for future operations. The merchant vessels, which were convoyed by the fleet of the second division, he thought might enter the Delaware. "I write accordingly," said he, "to M. de la Luzerne, that, if the second division should arrive in the Chesapeake Bay, it may be at the option of Count de Rochambeau or General Washington to cause the transport vessels to enter the Delaware, and that afterwards the vessels of war should proceed to Boston."

It was the advice of the French admiral, that the American frigates should cruise on the coast, to intercept British vessels sailing from Charleston to New York. He requested that the sloop *Saratoga* might be sent to St. Domingo with despatches to Count de Guichen, who was then commanding a French squadron in the West Indies. It was hoped that Guichen would join the French armament in the United States, and thus form a decided superiority to the British naval force, by which a successful combined attack might be made on New York. M. de Ternay had instructions from the King to call on M. de Guichen for a reinforcement.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Orangetown, 17 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

With respect to the militia, or three months' men as they are called, I do not wish them to leave the Count, so long as he shall think their services really essential; but, when he judges that he can part with them, without injury or inconvenience, the whole, as well those furnished by Rhode Island as those from Massachusetts, will proceed to Peekskill. When they march, you will advise me of it, that I may meet the officer commanding them with orders for his further destination when he arrives.

As to your wish to join the army, I have observed to you before, that your aid may be very material to the Count; and, as we have no prospect of immediate active operations, I would rather wish you to remain with him longer. I thought it essential, in the first instance, that there should be an officer of rank sent to him; and a variety of reasons concurred to induce me to believe, that you would answer the important objects I had in view as well, at least, as any I could choose. I have not been disappointed in the least in my expectations; and the Count himself judges your continuing very essential, and expressed himself in the following manner upon the subject several days ago. "I shall keep with me, if you think proper, General Heath, whose ardor, spirit, and activity are absolutely necessary to me." For these several considerations, I wish you to reconcile yourself to remaining with him for a while; which will be the more easy, when you consider that you will be fully advertised, whenever we are in a situation to attempt any thing offensive on a great scale, and that you will have your command.

I return to you the proceedings of the court-martial, as your powers are fully competent to the case it respects; and you will act in the affair as you shall judge proper. I am exceedingly happy to hear of the success of the eastern cruisers against the fleet bound to Quebec, and hope that the sixteen prizes, already arrived, will be followed by the remainder of the fleet, or the greater part of it. A stroke of this kind against the provision vessels expected from Cork, to follow this, would be very interesting. I hope it will happen.

From advices I have received, the enemy are again preparing an embarkation. The number of troops is said to be about two thousand; and, from several circumstances, it would seem, that they are intended for some coasting expedition. I am, dear Sir, &c.

P. S. On further consideration, the Rhode Island militia, or three months' men, will not proceed till further orders, or till the French troops advance.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Orangetown, 20 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have been duly honored with your Excellency's letters and their enclosures. I have a grateful sense of the confidence of which those acts are expressive, and shall labor to improve it to the utmost extent of the means with which I am entrusted. I sincerely wish our prospects were more favorable than they are.\*

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\* Hitherto the operations of the Commander-in-chief had been restricted within the limits of the United States. To enable him to act effectually in concert with the French forces, it seemed necessary to remove this restriction, which was done by a resolution of Congress on the



The enclosed copy of a letter to the committee of coöperation will give Congress an idea of our situation at this time, and how little reason we have to expect we shall be able to prosecute our original intentions in this quarter, even should the event correspond with the expectations of our allies on their part. The same obstacles will oppose in a great degree the operations recommended at the southward; for, from all the accounts we receive from thence, the affairs of the southern States seem to be so exceedingly disordered, and their resources so much exhausted, that whatever may be undertaken there must chiefly depend on the means carried from hence. If these fail, we shall be condemned to a disgraceful and fatal inactivity. It is impossible to be more impressed with the necessity of the reverse than I am. I think our affairs absolutely require it, and if any efforts of mine can enable us to act with vigor either here or elsewhere, it shall be done. But there is a complication of embarrassments, that menaces us on every side with disappointment.

At this very juncture I am reduced to the painful alternative, either of dismissing a part of the militia now assembling (though by the way they were to have rendezvoused the 25th of last month), or let them come forward to starve, which it will be extremely difficult for the troops already in the field to avoid. If we adopt

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2d of August. In the vote on this question, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Virginia, were unanimously in the affirmative; Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina were unanimously in the negative; Georgia was divided; Connecticut and Pennsylvania gave one negative vote each, but the majority of the delegates were in the affirmative. It was singular, that South Carolina and Georgia should oppose the resolution, as it was mainly intended to enable the Commander-in-chief to operate with more vigor, in concert with the French, and with the Spanish in the West Indies, to drive the enemy from those two States.—See the *Secret Journals of Congress*, Vol. I. p. 161.

the first, we shall probably not be able to get them out again in time to be of any service this campaign, and to let them come on without the means of subsistence would be absurd. Every day's experience proves more and more, that the present mode of obtaining supplies is the most uncertain, expensive, and injurious, that could be devised. It is impossible for us to form any calculations of what we are to expect, and consequently to concert any plans for future execution. No adequate provision of forage having been made, we are now obliged to subsist the horses of the army by force, which among other evils often gives rise to civil disputes and prosecutions, as vexatious as they will be burthensome to the public. This is the spirit prevailing among the inhabitants, and its effects cannot be prevented by us, without an open rupture with the civil magistrate. Influence and persuasion begin now to be unavailing; we of course have no other remedy.

In our present state of suspense, I would not propose any specific requisitions for the southern States, other than those already made. They should be urged to exert themselves to comply with these, and in general to do every thing in their power to form as ample magazines of bread, forage, and salted meat, as the resources of the country will afford, at such places of deposit as the commanding officer in that quarter may point out, having regard, as far as circumstances will admit, to transportation by water. Congress, I doubt not, are better acquainted with the abilities of those States than I am, or any person I can consult, and will be better able to direct calculations of what they can furnish. If they think any further specific demands necessary to answer the purpose of forming magazines, I shall be much obliged to them to take the proper measures, calculating for an army of eight thousand American

troops. If possible, this force should be kept up and supplied in any case, while the enemy remain there with their present strength.

If any thing more can be done to stimulate the States this way to a compliance with the requisitions made of them, particularly in the articles of flour and forage, in which we seem most defective, it will conduce more than any thing else to enable us to act both here and to the southward; for, as I before observed, it appears to me evident, that the means for southern operations, as well with respect to supplies as men, must be principally carried from hence.

But while we are meditating offensive operations, which may either not be undertaken at all, or being undertaken may fail, I am persuaded Congress are not inattentive to the present state of the army, and will view in the same light with me the necessity of providing in time against a period (the 1st of January), when one half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army, that will remain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, to abandon the service, without the hope, which has hitherto supported them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and certainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth, of which every spectator of the distresses of the army cannot help being convinced; those at a distance may speculate differently, but on the spot an opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale, would be chimerical. The committee of Congress, who have seen and heard for themselves, will add their testimony to mine, and the wisdom and justice of Congress cannot fail to give it the most serious attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their pres-



ent train. If either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America, in America, upheld by foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all our confidence and all our gratitude, but it is neither for the honor of America, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the work entirely to them.

It is true that our enemies as well as ourselves are struggling with embarrassments of a singular and complicated nature, from which we may hope a great deal. But they have already more than once disappointed the general expectations, and displayed resources as extraordinary as unexpected. There is no good reason to suppose those resources yet exhausted. Hitherto they have carried on the war with pretty equal success, and the comparative forces of this campaign are, I believe, less disadvantageous to them than they were the last. At present, indeed, their affairs wear a critical aspect, but there are chances in their favor; and, if they escape, their situation will be likely to take a more prosperous turn, and they may continue to prosecute the war with vigor. Their finances are distressed, they have a heavy debt, and are obliged to borrow money at an excessive interest; but they have great individual wealth, and while they can pay the interest of what they borrow, they will not want credit, nor will they fear to stretch it. A bankruptcy, which may be the result, will perhaps be less terrible to the King and his ministers than giving up the contest. If the measures leading to it enable them to succeed, it will add so much to the influence and power of the crown, as to make that event a ladder to absolute authority, supposed by many to be the object of the present reign. Nor are there wanting enlightened politicians, who

maintain that a national bankruptcy is not only a necessary consequence, but would be a national benefit. When we consider the genius of the present reign, and the violent counsels by which it has been governed, a system of this kind will be judged less improbable.

As to the domestic dissensions of the enemy in Ireland, we see they have hitherto not only diverted, but in some measure appeased them; and by pursuing their plan of taking off the leaders, and making plausible concessions to the people, we ought not to be surprised, if they keep matters in that country from going to extremity. In England it is much to be feared, that the overbearing influence of the crown will triumph over the opposition to it, and that the next Parliament will be nearly as obsequious as the last. A change of some of the ministry, to make way for a few of the principal heads of opposition, would perhaps allay the ferment. But even without this, considering the complexion of the British nation for some time past, it is more probable these appearances will terminate in a partial reform of abuses, than in any revolution favorable to the interests of America. The ministry may be perplexed for a time, and may be obliged to make a few sacrifices in favor of public economy, which may finally promote their views by leaving more money in the treasury to be applied to the purposes of the war.

The general disposition of Europe is such as we could wish; but we have no security that it will remain so. The politics of princes are fluctuating, often more guided by a particular prejudice, whim, or interest, than by extensive views of policy. The change or caprice of a single minister is capable of altering the whole system of Europe. But, admitting the different courts at this time ever so well fixed in their principles,



the death of one of their sovereigns may happen, and the whole face of things be reversed. This ought to be the more attended to, as three of the principal potentates are at so advanced an age, that it is perhaps more probable one of them should die in the course of a year, than that all three should survive it.

The inference from these reflections is, that we cannot count upon a speedy end to the war, and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give consistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to this will be immediately to devise a plan, and put it in execution, for providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of the year, and for subsisting the officers and soldiers and making them a reasonable allowance. The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and such as will execute itself. Experience has shown, that a peremptory draft will be the only effectual one. If a draft for the war or for three years can be effected, it ought to be made on every account. A shorter period than a year is inadmissible. To one, who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description, and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown, that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding



winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of every thing, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak, as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force, which the country was completely able to afford; and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause.

Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war, and the paper emissions, have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had, a great part of the time, two sets of men to feed and pay, the discharged men going home and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in

1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present levies we find there are some, who have received a hundred and fifty dollars in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught those men the rudiments of a soldier's duty, their services will have expired, and the work recommence with a new set. The consumption of provision, arms, accoutrements, and stores of every kind, has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person, who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs, can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments, than it would have done otherwise.

There is every reason to believe, that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.

If the army is left in its present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. It will be an interesting winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favorable terms in forcible language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.

I am inclined to hope that a draft for the war, or for three years, would succeed. Many incentives of immediate interest may be held up to the people to induce them to submit to it. They must begin to consider the repeated bounties they are obliged to pay as a burthen, and will be willing to get rid of it by sacrificing a little more once for all. Indeed it is probable, that the bounties may not be much greater in that case than they have been. The people of the States near the seat of war ought to enter into such a plan with alacrity, as it would ease them in a variety of respects; among others, by obviating the frequent calls upon the militia.

I cannot forbear recurring in this place to the necessity of a more ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this head have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are many symptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to unite both officers and men in a general refusal of the money, and some corps now actually decline receiving it. Every method has been taken to



counteract it, because such a combination in the army would be a severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist, that the accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods, and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not be satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good.

This is one instance of complaint. There are others equally serious. Among the most serious is the inequality of the provision made by the several States. Pennsylvania maintains her officers in a decent manner; she has given them half-pay for life. What a wide difference between their situation and that of the officers of every other line in this army, some of whom are actually so destitute of clothing as to be unfit for duty, and are for that cause only obliged to confine themselves to quarters. I have often said, and beg leave to repeat it, that the half-pay provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can be adopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not done, the army (already so much reduced in officers by daily resignations, as not to have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it,) must either cease to exist at the end of the campaign, or it will exhibit an example of more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance, than has perhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm.

The dissolution of the army is an event, that cannot be regarded with indifference. It would bring accumulated distresses upon us; it would throw the people of America into a general consternation; it would discredit our cause throughout the world; it would shock our allies. To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary; the loss of the veteran soldiers could not be repaired; to attempt to carry on the war with

militia against disciplined troops would be to attempt what the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to Congress, were I to dwell on observations of this kind in a letter. But having gone into a detail of our situation, I shall beg leave to make one observation more.

It is a thing, that has been all along ardently desired by the army, that every matter which relates to it should be under the immediate direction of Congress. The contrary has been productive of innumerable inconveniences. Besides the inequality of provision already mentioned, all the confusion we have experienced by irregular appointments and promotions has chiefly originated here; and we are again relapsing into the same chaos. I have daily complaints of palpable mistakes and deviations from those rules on which the tranquillity of the service depends, of which I might cite recent instances if it were necessary to trouble Congress with such a detail. I shall however mention one in the Jersey line, by way of example. A vacancy happened in July, 1779, by Lieutenant-Colonel Brearly's being appointed chief justice of the State. This was not filled till March following, by which the officer entitled to succeed has lost several months' rank in the line of the army. The vacancies, which his promotion made, still continue open to the prejudice of those next in order; and yet, as I have been informed, new appointments have been made by the State on the ground of those vacancies. As this is a fruitful source of discontent, it is naturally in my province to point it out; but, if I were to permit myself to touch upon the political consequences, I might easily show, that it has a direct tendency to enfeeble our civil union by making us thirteen armies instead of one, and by attaching the

troops of each State to that State, rather than to the United States. The effects of this spirit begin to be visible. But this is a topic on which I may not be permitted to enlarge.

In this delicate and perplexing conjuncture, which I cannot but contemplate with extreme inquietude, I have thought it my duty to lay my sentiments with freedom before Congress, and to give them the fullest and truest information in my power; and I hope I have done it with all possible deference. I trust they will receive what I have said with all the indulgence, which must flow from a conviction, that it is dictated by a sincere attachment to their honor, and by an anxious concern for the welfare of my country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, 21 August, 1760.

DEAR SIR,

I received your favor of yesterday late last evening. Should you receive intelligence, upon which you can depend, that any considerable number of the enemy's shipping have sailed eastward, or any other matter, which you may think interesting to the French army and navy, you will be pleased to communicate it to General Heath at Newport as well as to me. There is a chain of expresses from Colonel Sheldon's quarters to Tower Hill. Baron Steuben wishes you to make inquiry, whether there is an officer in Colonel Livingston's regiment at King's Ferry, capable of doing the duty of deputy adjutant-general and sub-inspector at your post; if there is, he will depute him, and send him proper instructions. I am, &c.



## TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Orangetown, 21 August. 1780.

SIR,

In the idea of an operation against New York, it has always been a fundamental principle with me, that there ought to be a naval superiority to give such a prospect of success as would justify the undertaking. Relying, however, upon a moral certainty of this event shortly happening, if you had found yourself in a good condition to desire a commencement of operations, previously to the arrival of the second division, I should have concurred in it. The reflections you make on the difficulty of effecting a debarkation on Long Island, without a naval superiority, are natural and judicious, from the view you must have of it; but, from a knowledge in part of the local situation, and from particular inquiries of others, I think the debarkation would be practicable. From the shape of the ground on both sides, and the narrowness of the Sound in several parts, there are different points of debarkation; and the enemy could not with propriety uncover New York so much (especially if we had once thrown ourselves upon that Island) as to have a sufficient force on Long Island to give effectual opposition at each point. The attempt in question supposes a number of boats collected to throw over at once a force superior to the part of the enemy's force opposed to you, which might I believe have been done. Their vessels might have been compelled to keep stations too remote to interrupt your descent, by land batteries erected at different places on the main, and on the intermediate Islands.

But notwithstanding the practicability of such an operation, I entirely agree in opinion with you, for several reasons, that it will be best to defer the commence-

ment of the enterprise till we get a superiority at sea. One of the most powerful is, that you could not leave the fleet in security without a considerable part of the land force to coöperate with it, and in this case our collective force would be smaller than would be requisite to act with vigor and confidence.

As to the particular mode of operating against New York, we may at this time combine different possibilities; but we cannot fix a definitive plan. There are three ways in which we may accomplish our purpose; first, by acting in the first instance with our whole force on York Island; secondly, by beginning our operations against Brooklyn with the principal part of our force, leaving a corps of observation for the security of our communication well intrenched on York Island or on the main; or, thirdly, by dividing our force into two parts to act against the works on both Islands at once. Which of these plans will be preferable must depend on the time we begin to act, and the force we have to act with. If these circumstances correspond with our wishes, I should prefer the last of the three. In this case, we ought, if possible, as a preliminary, to establish ourselves on the Island of New York, and then detach to Long Island a force equal to the whole, which the enemy may be able to bring to act there.

In taking post on Long Island, a force equal to the whole of the enemy may be prudent to guard against possibilities; but, after we have taken post and the usual precautions, two thirds of their whole force will in my opinion be sufficient both for security and for the reduction of the works there. Notwithstanding the facility with which the enemy can pass from one island to the other, they will never hazard the withdrawing of more than two thirds of their force from York Island to attack the corps on Long Island, while there is an army

of more than their whole force in front ready to fall upon the remainder. This would be to expose their essential point, where all their magazines are, to imminent danger. Nor even with their whole force would they have great hopes of success against two thirds of the number in intrenchments.\*

These, Sir, are my sentiments, which I am happy to find in the main correspond with yours. A naval superiority we both consider as the basis of offensive operations. We both propose the same distribution of force, if circumstances will permit; with only this difference, that I think a small number will suffice for

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\* After the Marquis de Lafayette returned from Newport, he wrote a very long letter to Count de Rochambeau, containing a plan for an attack upon New York, and recommending it to the adoption of the French general and admiral. See APPENDIX, No. VI. This letter was written with the approbation of General Washington, but it did not accord with the views of the French commanders, who believed that one of the three following conditions ought to be verified, before it would be advisable to act on the offensive. First, the arrival of the second division of French troops, with a maritime force sufficient to give a superiority to the French fleet. Secondly, succours from Count de Guichen, after his enterprise in the West Indies. Thirdly, a decrease of the enemy's force at New York, by a detachment to the West Indies or the southern States. Unless one of these cases should occur, Count de Rochambeau had laid it down as an axiom, that he was to remain on the defensive. He was not well pleased, therefore, with Lafayette's letter, and he presented his objections to the plan of an attack, which it contained. The above explanation was in reply to the letter, in which those objections were stated.

Count de Rochambeau touches upon the matter in his *Mémoires*. He gives an account of the particulars, and adds, "I ought to say, nevertheless, in justification of Lafayette, that he expressed substantially the sentiments of General Washington. That commander feared, and not without foundation, considering the absolute discredit of the finances of Congress, that the struggles of this campaign would be the last efforts of expiring patriotism. He wished, at any hazard, to risk an attack upon the enemy in their strong-hold, while he had the French troops at his disposal. But he perceived the consequences, and adopted the principles of my letter; and, during a long correspondence between us, I could never too highly praise the solidity of his judgment and the amenity of his style." — *Mémoires Militaires, Historiques et Politiques de Rochambeau*, Tom. 1. p. 248.



Long Island. I ardently desire, that the interview you mention could take place. I am sensible it would infinitely facilitate our arrangements, and it would gratify the desire I feel of assuring you and the admiral personally of my esteem. But, to my great mortification and regret, there are difficulties in the way not easily surmounted. We are about ten miles from the enemy. Our popular government imposes a necessity of great circumspection. If any misfortune should happen in my absence, it would be attended with every inconvenience. I will however endeavour, if possible and as soon as possible, to meet you at some convenient rendezvous. I entreat you to inform me in your next to what distance the admiral and yourself would think it prudent to absent yourselves from the fleet and army.\*

In one of my last letters I informed you, that Sir Henry was preparing an embarkation, of which it appears you had also received advice. I have received several pieces of similar intelligence, and there has been lately a very hot press for seamen. I cannot, however, suppose he has resumed his intention to attack you, as it would imply too much inconsistency. It is suspected by some, that he is making a detachment to the West Indies. If he means any thing serious, this seems to me as probable as any other supposition. But I doubt his having any thing serious in view. I am much obliged to you for the frankness with which you have given me your opinions, and for the favorable sentiments you entertain of me. Your conduct since your arrival has confirmed the prepossession, which your reputation had given me of your abilities; and I

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\* Count de Rochambeau replied, that he and the admiral could go as far as Hartford to a rendezvous, and if necessary even to Danbury. He requested General Washington to decide upon the time and place, and desired that the meeting might be held without delay.

promise myself from them, from your counsel, and from your exertions, the most important advantages to the common cause. Let me entreat, that you will oblige me with your opinions upon all occasions, and be assured of the perfect esteem and attachment, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 24 August, 1780.

SIR,

You are appointed to the command of the Light Infantry, and four brigades from your own wing, to be employed upon a forage down to Bergen, and from thence up to the English neighbourhood. You will make the necessary disposition for your own security and the wagons employed on the occasion. Such are the necessities of the army, and such the situation of the inhabitants, being all within the power of the enemy, that you will make the forage as extensive as possible in the articles of hay and grain, as well as in cattle, hogs, and sheep, fit for slaughter; and horses fit for the use of the army. All the articles are to be receipted for by the respective departments to which they belong; and the whole are to be sent up to the army, and delivered over to the officers in the several departments to be appointed to receive and receipt for the same, except such articles of provision and forage, as may be necessary for the subsistence of the party under your command.

As soon as you have completed the forage, you will draw off the troops and join the army. Should the enemy attempt to interrupt you in the business, you must govern yourself according to circumstances. I

leave you at liberty either to attack or retire, as you may think prudent, from the force in which they appear. Particular care is to be taken, that the men do not straggle, and that no unnecessary distress or oppression is brought upon the inhabitants. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 26 August, 1780.

SIR,

I am this moment favored with your letter of this day. I need scarcely inform you of the extreme pain and anxiety, which the licentiousness of some of the soldiery has given me. Something must and shall be done, if possible, to put an effectual check to it. I entirely approve of the prompt punishment, which you propose to have inflicted on the culprits in question. You will, therefore, be pleased to order one of the soldiers detected in plundering, and also the deserters you mention, to be immediately executed. I am, with great esteem, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 28 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The late European intelligence has so altered the immediate prospects of the campaign, that I think it advisable to dismiss the militia now in service, and prevent any other coming out for the present. You will, therefore, let those now with you return home, so soon as their services are no longer thought necessary by Count de Rochambeau; for, as the probability of ope-



rating in this quarter is greatly diminished, and that of an operation elsewhere remote, it becomes our duty to lessen our expenses and economize our supplies as much as possible.

With respect to what you mention concerning the works on Butts's Hill, if our allies expect we are to contribute to the expense of them, we shall be obliged in delicacy to do it; but, if it could have been avoided, it would have better suited the present state of our affairs. I do not consider the works raising on the Island as of any great utility to us, farther than they contribute to the safety of our allies; and the expense, which may be incurred, will, in my opinion, have little other equivalent than this. You will therefore easily conceive, that I should be glad that every thing of this kind might be avoided, so far as it can be done without impeaching the generosity of the States; for, while our allies are sending fleets and armies to our assistance, and maintaining them at their own expense in our country, it might not be decent to refuse bearing such little expenses as they seem to expect. But we ought not to volunteer any thing of this kind, and I am persuaded you will not. You will act agreeably to these ideas.\* With respect to the culprits you mention, you have my consent to pardon such of them as you may think proper. I am, with great regard, &c.

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\* An opinion prevailed with some persons, that the French government did not contribute so largely to the aid of the United States, as the conditions of the alliance and the importance of the common cause required. Among these were Mr. Izard, who had recently returned from France, and who complained that Dr. Franklin neglected to make proper representations to the French ministry. These things came to the ears of M. de la Luzerne, who said, in reporting them to Count de Vergennes, that, according to the views of Mr. Izard and others of his way of thinking, the American minister ought instantly to alarm the French court with vivid pictures of the critical situation of the United States, and redouble his applications and requisitions; that France should be informed, that,

TO JAMES BOWDOIN, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL  
OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Head-Quarters, 28 August, 1780.

SIR,

I am much obliged to you for the interesting intelligence you do me the favor to communicate. The blockade of the port of Brest, by delaying the sailing of the second division, makes a material change in our prospects.\* I fear it will put it out of our power to operate against New York ; but, if we are not unfortunate in Europe, and if vigorous measures are taken to give us magazines, we may still hope for some important operation, but it will probably be in a different quarter. I think, however, as I have mentioned in my official letter to you, that we ought not to discontinue

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without a subsidy of twenty millions of livres annually, and the aid of twenty vessels of war, the United States would be in danger of falling into the hands of England ; and even if these should not all be obtained, it was necessary to make France fear, that the people of America, discouraged with the burdens and length of the war, would finally be driven to make a separate arrangement with England.

To this statement Count de Vergennes replied, that nothing could be more pernicious than an attempt to alarm the French ministry by false and exaggerated accounts ; that, as they were well acquainted with the state of affairs, this proceeding would destroy confidence in any future representations, and put the reports of the American minister in contradiction with those of M. de la Luzerne, who was on the spot ; that it would excite suspicions and distrust, instead of the frankness and good faith, which had hitherto prevailed ; and that it would be returning deception and imposture for the generous conduct and benefits of the King, the only ally of the United States in their greatest distress. — *MS. Letter from Count de Vergennes to M. de la Luzerne, August 18th.*

\* The frigate Alliance arrived in Boston from L'Orient, on the 16th of August, and brought the intelligence, that the French squadron and troops, which were to constitute the second division of Count de Rochambeau's army, were blockaded in the harbour of Brest by an English fleet of thirty-two sail. The Alliance had on board two thousand stands of arms, several cannon, and a quantity of powder for the United States.

raising men for the Continental battalions, as there is a possibility that we may still operate here, from the movement of the Cadiz fleet, or by a reinforcement from the Islands; or, if an operation here should not be practicable, the increasing of our force will enable us the better to detach to the southward.

I should be happy to comply with the wishes of the Council respecting the arms; but our present deficiencies, and the casualties that daily arise, will make us stand in need of all that have arrived in the Alliance. We expect a further supply shortly, and the State may depend, that as soon as possible its loan shall be replaced. I entreat your influence to have all the arms, powder, cannon, and clothing ready made, forwarded without delay to Springfield; for the officers in the service of the continent have not the necessary means of transportation.

I am informed of a set of resolutions lately entered into by a convention of delegates from the four eastern States, which, if rightly represented to me, and should they be carried into execution, will be the most likely means that could be adopted to rescue our affairs from the complicated and dreadful embarrassments under which they labor, and will do infinite honor to those with whom they originate. I sincerely wish they may meet with no opposition or delay in their progress. Our situation is truly delicate, and demands all our wisdom, all our virtue, all our energy. Great Britain no doubt encounters many serious perplexities and dangers, but there will be no miracle in her surmounting them. In Europe, by the last advices, there was a critical moment where the chances were too equally balanced. On this continent the affairs of the enemy are too prosperous; in the West Indies at this season, the elements may fight against our allies, but here is our best hope.



As to domestic dissensions, though they will no doubt embarrass, I confess I have no great confidence in them. We have every motive to be in earnest, and to exert ourselves to the utmost to take care of ourselves. With the truest esteem, I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters 28 August, 1780.

SIR,

The intelligence brought by the Alliance, of the second division being blocked up in Brest by thirty-two British ships of the line, has made a material change in the prospects of the campaign. This, and the extreme distress of our magazines, have determined me to dismiss all the militia in service, except such as were wanted for immediate purposes. The probability of our being able to act in this quarter is become too precarious and remote to justify our keeping a large body of militia in the field, as it would be attended with much expense and additional consumption of provision and stores, neither of which are we in any condition to afford. This would have been the less eligible, as in all probability the periods for which they were called out would have expired before they could be made use of, if at all. Indeed, I have little hope of any thing decisive in this quarter this campaign. The enclosed copy of a circular letter to the States respectively will inform Congress of the extremity of our present necessities, and the shocking consequences that are resulting from them.\*

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\* The circular was principally taken up in describing the distresses of the army for want of provisions, and the hopeless prospect of obtaining timely or effectual relief.

The army being in motion at the time Mr. Mathews left head-quarters, in order to return to Philadelphia, I could not then do myself the honor to testify to Congress the grateful sense I have of the cheerful and vigorous exertions of the committee during their residence with the army. This I now beg leave to do, and to assure Congress, that I feel myself under the greatest obligations to them for having done all in their power to accomplish the objects of their appointment, and forward the measures, which the good of the service and the exigency of the conjuncture demanded. With perfect respect and esteem I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HALDIMAND, QUEBEC.

Head-Quarters, 30 August, 1780.

SIR,

I think it my duty to inform your Excellency, that it has been represented to me, that several American officers, who are your prisoners, are suffering a close and rigorous confinement in the jails of Quebec, without any good reason to warrant such treatment. I will not pretend to decide that these facts are authentic, as they have not come to me in such a way as is entirely satisfactory, and as they are opposed to that humanity and liberality of character, which I have always supposed your Excellency to possess. They have, however, been so represented, that I could not but make the communication, as well in justice to yourself, as to the officers of Colonel Warner's regiment, who are mentioned as the parties suffering; and I will not doubt it will have your attention, and that these, and all others, prisoners under your direction, will receive a treatment consistent with their rank, and with the principles

of humanity. And as the officers and soldiers, who are prisoners in your hands, are very remote from their friends and the means of support, I would submit to you, whether they might not be sent to Sir Henry Clinton at New York, with proper lists, where they would be exchanged in the due order of their capture with respect to the other prisoners in his possession. I do not perceive, that any inconvenience to yourself can result from the measure, or I would not propose it; especially when I add, that, if the prisoners are retaken or lost at sea in their passage, they shall be accounted for in the order of exchange. I am, &c.

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TO COLONEL ETHAN ALLEN.

Head-Quarters, 30 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have been favored with yours of the 16th instant. I cannot, without deviating from the rule of conduct, which I have constantly observed, exchange the officers of Colonel Warner's regiment at this time, because there are a great many who have been much longer in captivity, and have therefore a just right to a preference. But, to endeavour to afford them the best relief the nature of the case will admit, I have written to General Haldimand, and proposed to him to send them and the other prisoners of war in his possession to New York, where we can furnish them with supplies of several kinds, which we cannot, from the great distance, forward to Quebec, and where they will be exchanged in due course. I have also represented to General Haldimand what you report of the treatment of our prisoners in Canada; and I hope my remonstrance will have the desired effect, should the cause of complaint be well grounded. I am, &c.



TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 2 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Having received intelligence, that the enemy are in preparation for some important movement, I thought it advisable, that you should be apprized of it, because it is uncertain, if the information should prove true, whether their object will be an attack on the main army, or an attempt on the posts in the Highlands. I wish you, therefore, to take every precaution to put the latter in the most defensible state which is possible. Orders are already given for the two State regiments of Connecticut to form a junction with Colonel Sheldon;\* and, in case the enemy should make demonstrations seriously of attacking the fortifications on the North River, you will call this force immediately to your assistance, collect all your detachments, and withdraw the garrisons from the post at King's Ferry; at the same time removing the stores from thence. For this and other purposes you will, without delay, be pleased to order sixty boats to that place, with five men each, to be ready to act as circumstances may require.

I am, dear Sir, &amp;c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 3 September, 1780.

SIR,

A few days ago I moved the army to this place to cover a forage, which we thought it advisable to make

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\* These regiments had been stationed at Danbury and on the Sound, with the view of protecting Connecticut against any inroads the enemy might make into that State. They were commanded by General Parsons.

in the lower parts of this country, which, by its proximity to New York, has afforded the enemy considerable supplies. Having effected our purpose, we shall to-morrow take a new position on the other side of the Hackensac, about two miles from this and about five miles from the North River, where we shall remain till there is a solution of the present designs of the enemy; as soon as possible after which, I shall do myself the honor to meet you at one of the places you mention.

I have pretty good information, that Sir Henry lately endeavoured to engage a person to go to Rhode Island in the character of a spy, who was to be met by a frigate in some part of the Sound, after having collected all the knowledge he could of your situation, and that of the fleet. The person declined the errand; but circumstances lead to a suspicion, that Clinton's movements look your way. I cannot, however, easily persuade myself that this is the case. Nor am I yet satisfied, notwithstanding the appearances are so strong, that he can be making a detachment to the West Indies. In all probability the fate of Jamaica would be decided one way or the other before it could arrive. If the object should be to save the other Islands, a month hence would answer the purpose, as the season will not till the latter end of October admit of operations in the Windward Islands, and New York would be less exposed in the mean time. Indeed I cannot easily believe, that the enemy will venture at this period to make any considerable division of their force at New York. Yet I confess their affairs have somewhat this aspect.

In consequence of the advices brought by the Alliance, I have dismissed the principal part of the militia, who were called out for three months. From the

position of the fleets in Europe, there is reason to apprehend the second division will arrive too late to enable us to avail ourselves of their services, which, with respect to a great part of them, will expire in October. If fortunate events should bring the second division here sooner than I now expect, and in time for an operation against New York, we must assemble all the militia in the neighbouring country, till those more remote can come to our aid. Another inducement for dismissing the militia is to economize our supplies.

The visit you have had from the Indians gives me great pleasure. I felicitate you on that, which you must have had in the company of such agreeable and respectable guests. I dare say the reception they met with will have a good effect. It has been the policy of the English, in regard to them, to discredit the accounts of an alliance between France and America; a conviction of which, on the substantial evidence of your army and fleet, and not less of your presents and good cheer, will not fail to have a happy influence.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* It was deemed good policy by General Schuyler and others, that a deputation of Indians should be encouraged to visit the French army and fleet at Newport. Many of the Iroquois Indians had been strongly attached to the French in former times, particularly during the last war, and they still retained a lively remembrance of the amicable intercourse that had then existed. When M. de Vaudreuil surrendered Canada to the British, he gave to the Indians, as tokens of recognisance, a golden crucifix and a watch; and it was supposed, that a renewal of the impressions, which had been in some degree preserved among the tribes by these emblems of friendship, would have the effect to detach them from the influence of the British, and strengthen their union with the Americans and French. For this end their journey to Newport was planned.

General Schuyler, who was at Albany, selected eighteen Indians for this deputation. Thirteen of these were Oneidas and Tuscaroras, and the other five Caghnawagas from the Sault of St. Louis near Montreal. They were accompanied by Mr. Deane, who was thoroughly acquainted



## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 6 September, 1780.

SIR,

I cannot forbear expressing my wishes, for the sake of harmony, which our affairs essentially require, that the business of depreciation, so far as it is not to be provided for by the different States, could be a matter of speedy and general arrangement, so as to exhibit at one view all the parties, who are to have their pay made good. For I would beg leave to observe, that the mentioning of one part or class of the army, and postponing another, though they should eventually be placed on the same footing, is the source of uneasiness and of apprehensions that injurious discriminations may obtain; and it is said, that all officers and persons of every description, who have constantly served for a fixed pay, which has not been increased from time to

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with their language. They arrived at Newport on the 29th of August, and were received with a good deal of ceremony and attention by the French commanders. Entertainments and military shows were prepared for them, and they expressed much satisfaction at what they saw and heard. Suitable presents were distributed among them; and to the chiefs were given medals representing the coronation of the French King. When they went away, a written address was delivered to them, or rather a kind of proclamation, signed by Count de Rochambeau, copies of which were to be distributed among the friendly Indians. It was in the following words.

"The King of France, your father, has not forgotten his children. As a token of remembrance I have presented gifts to your deputies in his name. He learned with concern, that many nations, deceived by the English, who are his enemies, had attacked and lifted up the hatchet against his good and faithful allies the United States. He has desired me to tell you, that he is a firm and faithful friend to all the friends of America, and a decided enemy to all its foes. He hopes, that his children, whom he loves sincerely, will take part with their father in this war against the English."

This paper was written in both the French and English languages, and sealed and signed in due form.—*Rochambeau's MS. Letter, August 31st.*

time with the depreciation, stand upon the same principle and are entitled to the same consideration.

I am sorry to inform Congress, that our distresses for meat still continue. The army in general have been entirely destitute for two and three days, and at most have not drawn more than one day's supply in four or five. Such injury to the discipline of the army, and such distresses to the inhabitants, result from these frequent wants, that my feelings are hurt beyond description at the cries of the one and at seeing the other. Your Excellency's very interesting letter of the 31st, by Mr. Izard, came yesterday to my hands. The event, which its enclosures announce, is an unfortunate one indeed. News of it had arrived in camp from Philadelphia before your despatches were received.\* I have the honor to be, &c.

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\* The event here alluded to was the total defeat of General Gates's army on the 16th of August, in the battle of Camden. This intelligence was received with the greater disappointment and surprise, as recent accounts had given very flattering prospects of the state of affairs in that quarter. The first letters after the action, from General Gates to Washington, are chiefly remarkable as showing the subdued feelings of the writer, and the change of tone, compared with his communications during the season of his prosperity. At the close of a general statement of facts he added;

"Anxious for the public good, I shall continue my unwearied endeavours to stop the progress of the enemy, reinstate our affairs, recommence an offensive war, and recover all our losses in the southern States. But, if being unfortunate is solely a reason sufficient for removing me from command, I shall most cheerfully submit to the orders of Congress, and resign an office, which few generals would be anxious to possess, and where the utmost skill and fortitude are subject to be baffled by difficulties, which must for a time surround the chief in command here. That your Excellency may meet with no such difficulties, that your road to fame and fortune may be smooth and easy, is the sincere wish of your most obedient servant." — *Hillsborough, August 30th.*

Again; "Too much honor cannot be paid by Congress to the memory of the Baron de Kalb. He was every thing an excellent officer should be, and in the cause of the United States he has sacrificed his life. If I can yet render good service to the United States, it will be necessary it



TO THOMAS S. LEE, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 6 September, 1780.

SIR,

In consequence of the disagreeable intelligence of the defeat of the army under Major-General Gates, which I have just received, I think it expedient to countermand the march of the troops, who were ordered from Maryland to join the main army. I am therefore to request your Excellency to give directions for the regiment enlisted to serve during the war, as well as for all the recruits, as soon as they can possibly be collected and organized, to march immediately to the southward, and put themselves under the orders of the commanding officer in that department.

Although I have not had the particulars of the late disaster, yet it is certain the exigency is such, as will demand the most spirited and vigorous measures to retrieve our affairs and check the enemy. And I cannot entertain a doubt, that your Excellency and the State will use every exertion to give activity and despatch to the march of the troops, and to all the measures necessary for the protection of the southern States. I have enclosed this letter open to the Board of War, that, in case the regiment in question is on its march

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should be seen, that I have the support of Congress and of your Excellency; otherwise some men may think they please my superiors by blaming me, and thus recommend themselves to favor. But you, Sir, will be too generous to lend an ear to such men, if such there be, and will show your greatness of soul rather by protecting than slighting the unfortunate. If, on the contrary, I am not supported, and countenance is given to every one who will speak disrespectfully of me, it will be better for Congress to remove me at once from a command, where I shall be unable to render them any good service. This, Sir, I submit to your candor and honor, and shall cheerfully await the decision of my superiors. With the warmest wishes for your prosperity, and the sincerest sentiments of esteem and regard, I am, &c." — *September 3d.*



from Maryland, it may be ordered to return without delay. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Head-Quarters, 6 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your letter of the 3d, and return you my warmest thanks for your professions of friendship. They are the more pleasing, as I am convinced they are founded in the strictest sincerity, and I hope it is needless for me to tell you at this time, that an equal regard for you prevails on my part. I am concerned, however, that you should have given yourself the trouble of writing to me on the subject of your letter. I did not want any assurances or any proofs upon the point, because I entertain no idea, that you encouraged the unhappy measure, to which you allude, and which I wish to be buried in oblivion. Your former assurances, your anxiety to which I was a witness, the interesting part you took to compromise and settle the matter, were sufficient to remove every belief of the sort.

I do not know with certainty the person to whom you allude, as having attempted to injure you; but, from what I have heard, and not without much pain, it is probable I could conjecture who it is. If I am not

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\* A council of general officers was held on the 6th of September, and the Commander-in-chief, after stating to them the condition and prospects of the army, requested them to send to him, in writing, their opinions respecting the plan of operations that ought to be pursued. The result was an almost unanimous voice, that it was not advisable to make any attempt against New York, till the second French division should arrive, or till there should be a naval superiority to coöperate with the movements on land. Several of the officers recommended detachments to the southward, and some of them thought that the southern army should be supported at all events.

mistaken with respect to the person I mean, I can with the greatest truth assure you, that he never mentioned a syllable to me in his life injurious to you, in the least possible degree, nor have I any reason to believe that he ever did to any gentleman of my family. The bare report of a coolness, which is said to subsist between you and the gentleman I have in view, has given me great concern, because I have a warm friendship for both, and consider harmony essential to our interest. There is nothing, if he is the person, which would give me more pleasure than to hear that you were in perfect amity again. Let it be the case; let all differences subside; the situation of our affairs never required it more; and in the emphatical terms of your and General Irvine's letter, of which you enclosed a copy, let all be as a band of brothers, and rise superior to every injury, whether real or imaginary, and persevere in the arduous but glorious struggle in which we are engaged, till peace and independence shall be secured to our country. I am certain you will do it; and I will only add, that I am, with the most perfect regard, yours, &c.\*

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\* A promotion of an officer in the Pennsylvania line, which was thought by the other officers to be unjust to their claims, had excited a ferment among them, threatening the most alarming consequences to the whole army. General Wayne and General Irvine had used all their efforts to quell the storm, which, by the aid of the Commander-in-chief, had proved successful. It had been reported to General Wayne, that some person had insidiously represented him as being at the bottom of the affair, and as acting a treacherous part. This was the subject of his letter, to which the above was a reply.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, 7 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favor of the 5th, enclosing your instructions to Colonel Livingston, which perfectly comprehend my ideas of the rule of conduct, which is to be observed, should the enemy come up the river in force. I hear nothing further of any extraordinary preparations; but our precautions should be continued, because, if they do operate against you, it will be rapidly. I have no objection to the appointment of Captain-Lieutenant Hubbell to do the duty of deputy adjutant-general and sub-inspector. We have very disagreeable accounts from the southward. General Gates's letter does not go into particulars, but only mentions, that the army under his command had been totally defeated on the 16th of August, about eight miles from Camden. I am, &c.

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## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 8 September, 1780.

SIR,

Since the letter, which I did myself the honor to write to Congress the 20th ultimo, I have been more attentively considering the import of the resolutions of the 5th of August, and am at a loss to satisfy myself as to its precise extent, whether it be meant to authorize me to extend my views beyond the present campaign, and even to apply to the ministers of France and Spain in Europe, or only to concert plans for the present fall and winter with the ministers and officers of those powers in America, on the continent, or in the West



Indies. The latter appeared to me the most natural construction, and was the one I had adopted ; but intimations have been given to me, by particular gentlemen, that Congress understood the resolve in the first sense. If I have been mistaken in my interpretation, I request to have the resolve explained in a full and explicit manner. If I am right no explanation will be necessary.\* I also take the liberty to request to be informed whether Congress, in two or three months from the present period, can rely on being able to furnish specie or bills on Europe for the maintenance of a body of four or five thousand men in a country, where the paper of these States will not serve as a currency.

I should also be glad, if Congress will have the goodness to assist me with some light, as to the extent in which the States of South and North Carolina have ability to contribute to the support of an army in the articles of bread, meat, forage, horses, and wagons. I suppose an army to be there, sufficient to secure to us the full command of those States.

I entreat as speedy an answer as possible on these points, which are of the greatest consequence in determining our future plans ; particularly I wish for immediate information on the subject of money. But the basis of every plan we can form is an army, and the means of subsistence. Without immediate measures to supply the places of the men, who leave us by the 1st of January, we shall scarcely have any thing that deserves the name of one. Our whole efficient force in this quarter will then probably be less than six thousand men. In proposing plans of coöperation, I must engage that something specific shall be performed on our

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\* This was probably the view of the matter taken by Congress, as no explanation has been found.

part. Congress will be sensible, that I cannot do this as to any plan for future execution, when I know that our army will be reduced one half in less than four months, and when, so far from being certain that we shall have it in our power to replace the men in time, I do not even know what measures will be attempted for the purpose, nor when they will be undertaken. The honor of Congress and of the States, as well as my own reputation, forbid me to enter into engagements, which I have no assurances of our being able to fulfil. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 8 September, 1780.

SIR,

The great preparations of General Clinton have hitherto resulted in nothing more, than the sailing of a fleet of about ninety vessels of different sizes for Europe with a few invalids. We are however still amused with rumors of an embarkation; but these now go upon a new and more probable ground, a descent upon Virginia. We have just received the most disagreeable advices from General Gates, of a defeat of the army under his command near Camden in South Carolina, in which the greater part of his best troops were cut off. We have not yet the details. This event must have the worst effect upon the affairs of the southern States. Nor is it easy to say how far its influence may extend. On this account, I should not be astonished if the enemy should really make a detachment of three or four thousand men to Virginia.

If convenient to you, I have the honor to propose the 20th instant for our interview at Hartford, where I

hope we shall be able to combine some plan of future operation, which events will enable us to execute. Our plans, however, can only turn upon possibilities; which is the more unfortunate, as the affairs of this country absolutely require activity, on whatever side they are viewed. I intend to conceal here the time of the intended interview. I dare say you will think it advisable to do the same on your part. The Marquis de Lafayette and the commandant of artillery and engineers will accompany me. I am, &c.\*

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TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 9 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have heard that a new arrangement is about to take place in the medical department, and that it is likely it will be a good deal curtailed with respect to many of its present appointments. Who will be the persons generally employed I am not informed, nor do I wish to know. However, I will mention to you that I think Dr. Cochran and Dr. Craik, from their services, abilities, experience, and close attention, have the justest claim to their country's notice, and are among the first officers in the establishment. Doctors Latimer, Tilton, Hagan, and Townshend, who are now senior surgeons, are also

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\* General Washington wrote to General Heath; "I should have been very glad, had the situation of the works, which Count de Rochambeau is constructing for the defence of the Island, admitted of the immediate dismission of the three months' Massachusetts militia; but, as it does not, and as the Count seems very desirous of completing them, we cannot but consent to their staying out their term of service, should it be necessary. I make no doubt but the State will do every thing possible to accommodate the French troops, should circumstances require them to take up their winter-quarters in Rhode Island." — *September 8th.*



gentlemen of great merit, and have a just claim to be continued, from their abilities, attention, and other considerations. They are all single men, and therefore, being otherwise well qualified, are the most eligible. I have received too the most favorable reports of the merits and attention of Dr. Jenifer, a junior surgeon, who is in the same situation. Dr. Craigie, the present apothecary-general, a gentleman not personally known to me, has been reported as very deserving of the appointment.

The several gentlemen I have mentioned, as I have observed, appear to me to have the fairest pretensions to the public esteem, and, if they are honored with proper places, I am satisfied the public will be greatly benefited by their services. There are many other gentlemen in the department, whom I have omitted to name. The reason of my mentioning these particularly proceeds from a hint given me, that the new arrangement might possibly be influenced by a spirit of party out of doors, which would not operate in their favor. I will add no more, than that I am, dear Sir, with the most perfect regard, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, 10 September, 1780.

SIR,

By a letter I have received from Sir Henry Clinton, I find that the interview, which has been proposed between you and General Phillips, is to take place on the 19th of the month at Elizabethtown. I presume that Sir Henry Clinton has informed you of this by the letter I now transmit; and I need not add, that it will give me the highest pleasure, if you can effect your

exchange, either for Major-General Phillips or Major-General de Riedesel.

From the prospect I had, founded on the correspondence which I had seen, that there would be a meeting between you and General Phillips on the subject of your exchange, and the earnest desire I had of extending this business still farther, I was induced to inform Sir Henry Clinton, by a letter of the 26th ultimo, that "I should direct our commissary of prisoners to be present at the time, who would be instructed to execute with the commissary on his part, if he should think proper to send him, an exchange of officers, prisoners of war, on the footing of equal rank or composition, so far as the number in our hands would admit, and to include also the whole of the officers of convention now on parole in New York or in Europe." General Clinton has answered my letter, and informed me, that "his commissary of prisoners will attend." I shall accordingly order Mr. Skinner, our deputy commissary of prisoners, to be at Elizabethtown on the 19th, who will be fully instructed to carry my propositions to Sir Henry Clinton into execution. The business, as to the main points, will rest on the most simple footing, and such as Mr. Skinner is perfectly acquainted with. He has also a familiar knowledge of the few more particular cases, which can arise on the occasion, as he has been long in office, and has not only had repeated instructions, but has acted upon the subject. From these considerations, I will not give you any trouble in the matter, more than to wish you to interest General Phillips, so far as you can with propriety, if you should find it necessary to promote and countenance the exchanges, which are mutually interesting to both parties. Before you set out for Elizabethtown, I

will show you the instructions, which Mr. Skinner will receive. I am, &c.\*

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TO COUNT DE GUICHEN.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 12 September, 1780.

SIR,

The Marquis de Lafayette arrived in America in April last, charged by the court of France to announce to me its intention to send a fleet and army to co-operate with the troops of these States. Foreseeing that this succour would not have the intended effect,

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\* A meeting took place at Elizabethtown, according to the tenor of the above letter, between General Lincoln and General Phillips; but the parties could not agree, and nothing was effected, either in regard to the personal exchange of these two officers, or a general exchange proposed in the instructions to Mr. Skinner. There was a misunderstanding as to the object of the interview. General Phillips had got the idea, that he and General Lincoln were to discuss the whole subject of exchanges, and also the appointment of commissaries to reside with the respective armies, and said he went out with powers to that extent; whereas General Lincoln had no other authority than to make an arrangement for his own exchange. "I shall decline giving any opinion upon this fruitless meeting," said General Phillips in a letter to General Washington, "but I must be allowed to acknowledge my extreme surprise, that it should be conceived by any person necessary for General Lincoln and myself to confer upon the matter of his partial and personal exchange, which depended so entirely and absolutely upon Sir Henry Clinton and your Excellency, and might have been settled by the receipt and return of a letter on either side." — *Elizabethtown, September 23d.* The mistake was on the part of Sir Henry Clinton, because, in his letter on the subject of the meeting for an exchange of prisoners, he had said that Mr. Loring, the commissary, would be sent out for the purpose, and had not mentioned General Phillips as being designed to take any other part, than that of concerting his own exchange with General Lincoln. He wrote a letter to Washington dated the 19th, the day on which the meeting took place, stating that he had entrusted General Phillips with full powers respecting the business of exchange. But General Washington was absent when the letter arrived in camp, nor was it received till it was too late to send similar powers to General Lincoln.



from an insufficiency of the naval force, which would probably be found inferior to the enemy, I requested the Marquis to represent to you the situation of affairs on this continent, the necessity of an active campaign, and the great utility of a detachment from your fleet to reinforce the one expected from Europe, and give efficacy to the generous intentions of your court. I was persuaded, that, if it were compatible with your instructions and the plans in contemplation in the Islands, you would cheerfully afford your assistance in a coöperation so necessary to this country, so beneficial to the common interest.

It appears since to have been the intention of your court to send a larger succour than was at first mentioned, and that a second division was to have followed that, which has arrived at Rhode Island. The late advices from Europe show, however, that the execution of this project will at least be suspended by the appearance of the British fleet off the port of Brest; and there is little hope that the second division can arrive in time to undertake any operations against the enemy in this part of the continent.

The Chevalier de Ternay has informed you of his being blockaded in the port of Rhode Island by a superior British fleet; and the French troops are of course under a necessity of remaining there for the security of the fleet against a combined attack by sea and land. Nor indeed could they be more useful to us in any other position, a naval superiority being essential to every enterprise in these States. In consequence of the expected aid, great exertions have been made on our part for offensive operations. An additional expense, immense for this country in its present exhausted state, has been incurred; great expectations have been excited among the people; and if events

do not permit us to derive correspondent advantages, the disappointment will no doubt be attended with effects very injurious to our affairs.

The situation of America at this time is critical. The government is without finances. Its paper credit is sunk, and no expedients can be adopted capable of retrieving it. The resources of the country are much diminished by a five years' war, in which it has made efforts beyond its ability. Clinton, with an army of ten thousand regular troops (aided by a considerable body of militia, whom, from motives of fear and attachment, he has engaged to take arms), is in possession of one of our capital towns, and a large part of the State to which it belongs. The savages are desolating the frontiers. A fleet, superior to that of our allies, not only protects the enemy against any attempts of ours, but facilitates those, which they may project against us. Lord Cornwallis, with seven or eight thousand men, is in complete possession of two States, Georgia and South Carolina; and, by recent misfortunes, North Carolina is at his mercy. His force is daily increasing by an accession of adherents, whom his successes naturally procure in a country inhabited by emigrants from England and Scotland, who have not been long enough transplanted to exchange their ancient habits and attachments in favor of their new residence.

By a letter received from General Gates, we learn, that, in attempting to penetrate and regain the State of South Carolina, he met with a total defeat near Camden, in which many of his troops have been cut off, and the remainder dispersed, with the loss of all their cannon and baggage. The enemy are said to be now making a detachment from New York for a southern destination. If they push their successes in that quarter, we cannot predict where their career may end.



The opposition will be feeble, unless we can give succour from hence, which, from a variety of causes, must depend on a naval superiority.

In addition to the representation made to you by the Marquis de Lafayette, it has been imparted to me by the Chevalier de Ternay, that he has also applied to you for a reinforcement to put him in condition to act. Though I have entire confidence, that the steps already taken will determine you to give us all the assistance, which your situation and the plans you have formed will permit, yet, as Congress have lately thought proper to vest me with full power to concert with the officers of his Most Christian and Catholic Majesties any enterprises, which appear to me advantageous to the common cause, it becomes my duty to address you immediately myself, and to expose to you the dangers and difficulties we experience in the present posture of our affairs, that you may judge how essential your assistance would be to us at this juncture.

I write to you with that confidence and candor, which ought to subsist between allies and between military men. In my eye the interests of France and America are the same, and to conceal our embarrassments would be to betray both. While I assure you, that the latter stands in need of the most vigorous assistance of its friends, I entreat you to believe, that I am as remote from exaggerating as from palliating, and that I do not heighten the picture from a partiality to our interest. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, whom I shall beg to transmit to you this letter in ciphers, will, I doubt not, add his testimony to mine. To propose at this time a plan of precise coöperation would be fruitless. I shall only observe in general, that any succour you can send in consequence of this letter must arrive too late for an enterprise against New York ; but an unequivocal



naval superiority would, I hope, enable us to act decisively in the southern extremity.

The 20th instant is appointed for an interview with Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, in which we shall probably combine several plans, dependent for their execution on different contingencies. One of these will be the arrival of a detachment from your fleet. Convinced as I am, that the independence of America is with your court the primary object of the war, it is unnecessary to offer any other motives to engage your exertions in our favor. I might otherwise remark, that the destruction of the enemy here would greatly facilitate the reduction of their Islands. Supplies in much greater abundance, and on much better terms, might then be drawn from hence to forward your operations there; and these States, disencumbered of an internal war, might unite their inhabitants and resources in vigorous efforts against the common enemy elsewhere, for the benefit of the common cause. I am happy in this opportunity of congratulating you on the advantages, which you have reaped in your different combats, as glorious to the flag of France, as humiliating to that of Britain. My happiness would be complete, if the coasts of this continent should add to your laurels. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* The Chevalier de Ternay wrote also to Count de Guichen, requesting him to send four ships of the line to the coast of the United States; but he had left the West Indies and sailed for France before the letters arrived. M. de Monteil, his successor, could not decipher them, and of course no reinforcements were forwarded from the fleet.

M. de Ternay was not well satisfied at this time with his situation and prospects. In writing to Count de Vergennes he said; "I think that the squadron of the King, and his army, have not arrived at the most advantageous point for effecting any important operation on the American continent. The inferiority of means seems to require, that we should be at a greater distance from the place where the enemy concentrate their forces. We are actually compelled to remain on a very strict defensive.

## TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 12 September, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose to you a letter, which, upon the whole, I have thought it advisable to write to Count de Guichen. As its contents are of a nature to make its falling into the enemy's hands in its present form dangerous, and as I have no cipher for communicating with the Count, I take the liberty to request your Excellency's assistance in making use of yours, and forwarding it by triplicates with your despatches by the first opportunities. I make no mention of a land force, because, though it would be useful, it may be dispensed with. But if a body of troops could conveniently accompany the fleets, it would give greater energy and certainty of success to our operations. I am the more induced to desire it, as the composition of a considerable part of our army is temporary, and I am not informed what measures may be taken to replace the men, whose times of service will expire.

I need use no arguments to convince your Excellency of the extremity to which our affairs are tending, and the necessity of support. You are an eye-witness to all our perplexities and all our wants. You know the dangerous consequences of leaving the enemy in quiet possession of their southern conquests, either in regard to negotiation this winter, or a continuance of the war. You know our inability to expel them unassisted, or perhaps even to stop their career. I have the honor to be, with the sincerest sentiments of respect, &c.

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The English squadron is superior in number and in every other respect. The fate of North America is yet very uncertain, and the revolution is not so far advanced, as it has been believed in Europe." — *MS. Letter, Rhode Island September 10th.*

TO JOHN RUTLEDGE, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Head-Quarters, 12 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am fully impressed with the importance of the southern States, and of course with the necessity of making every effort to expel the enemy from them. The late unlucky affair near Camden renders their situation more precarious, and calls for every exertion to stop, at least, the further progress of the British army. It is to be wished, that the composition of our force in this quarter, our resources, and the present situation of the fleet and army of our ally would admit of an immediate and sufficient detachment, not only to answer the purpose I have just mentioned, but to carry on operations of a more serious and extensive nature. But this not being the case, for reasons which must be obvious to you, let it suffice that your Excellency be informed, that our views tend ultimately to the southward.

In the mean time, our endeavours in that quarter should be directed rather to checking the progress of the enemy by a permanent, compact, and well organized body of men, than attempting immediately to recover the State of South Carolina by a numerous army of militia, who, besides being inconceivably expensive, are too fluctuating and undisciplined to oppose one composed chiefly of regular troops. I would recommend to you, therefore, to make use of your influence with the States from Maryland southward, to raise without delay at least five thousand men, for the war if it can be effected, if not, for as long a time as possible. These, with the militia in the vicinity, would answer the purpose I have last mentioned, and would in proper time make a useful body, either to form a



diversion in favor of, or to coöperate with, a force upon the coast.

I have hinted the outlines of a plan to your Excellency, which for many reasons should be in general kept to yourself. You will oblige me by informing yourself as accurately as possible, what may be the present resources of the country, as to meat, corn, wheat, or rice, and transportation, as I suppose circumstances may have occasioned a considerable change. And if it is possible to form magazines of either, it should be done, especially of salt meat, which is an article so essential to military operations, that the States of Virginia and North Carolina should be requested to lay up, as soon as the weather will permit, at least four thousand barrels in proportion to their respective abilities. You will also be pleased to endeavour to gain a knowledge of the force of the enemy, the posts they occupy, the nature and state of those posts, and the reinforcements they may probably derive from the people of the country. As you receive these several intelligences, you will be pleased to communicate them to me, with your opinion of the best place for debarking troops, in case of an expedition against the enemy in the southern States, and the names of persons in that quarter, whose opinion and advice may be serviceable in such an event. With much esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 13 September, 1780.

SIR,

I have just received advices from pretty good authority, of which the enclosed is a copy. From the

complexion and agreement of these accounts, it seems very probable, that the Count de Guichen is really approaching the coast. Should this be the case, it is of so much importance to lose no time in concerting our plans, that I renew my proposal for meeting you and the admiral on the 20th instant, and I shall be at Hartford accordingly.

Should the Count de Guichen arrive before the end of this month, I still recommend New York to be our object; and in this view I cannot forbear repeating to you how essential it is, that the fleet should instantly proceed to take possession of the port, and that your troops should, as soon as possible, form a junction with ours by way of the Sound. The former is in my opinion the most critical point of the operation, and the advanced period of the season increases the necessity for despatch in the execution. I mention this, lest the arrival of the Count de Guichen should precede our interview. I have directed Captains Dobbs and Shaw to hold themselves in readiness to repair to the fleet on the first notice. A letter from the admiral, or from you to Captain Dobbs at Fishkill, will be immediately obeyed. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 13 September, 1780.

SIR,

This will be presented to your Excellency by Captain Hendricks Solomon of Stockbridge. He and about twenty of his tribe have been serving as volunteers with the army since the beginning of July. They

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\* Captains Dobbs and Shaw were employed as pilots.

have been generally attached to the light corps, and have conducted themselves with great propriety and fidelity. Seeing no immediate prospect of any operation in this quarter, in which they can be serviceable, they are desirous of returning home, after receiving some compensation for the time, during which they have been with us, and after having made a visit to Philadelphia. I have thought it best to gratify them, not only on account of its being agreeable to them, but because I have it not in my power to furnish them with such articles of clothing as they request, and which they would prefer to money. Congress will, I doubt not, direct such a supply as they shall think proper. Captain Solomon, with part of these people, was with us in the year 1778. The tribe suffered severely during that campaign, in a skirmish with the enemy, in which they lost their chief and several of their warriors.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, 14 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favors of the 11th and 12th instant. I have no objection to your sending down the two pieces of cannon to Colonel Gouvion. Under the circumstances you mention, you may detain the men of Colonel Putnam's regiment, who are serving as bargemen to you; and, if you can with convenience withdraw the batteaux-men, sent down to King's Fer-

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\* Several of the Stockbridge Indians were engaged at the beginning of the war, while the army was at Cambridge, and were in active service at different times. There was a party of Indians with Lafayette in the affair of Barren Hill.



ry, it will be a measure entirely agreeable to me. I hope Colonel Hay's plans for obtaining a supply of flour from the State of New York, and his application to the people of the Grants, will both meet with success. He is a faithful and indefatigable officer.

I shall be at Peekskill on Sunday evening, on my way to Hartford, to meet the French admiral and general. You will be pleased to send down a guard of a captain and fifty men at that time, and direct the quartermaster to endeavour to have a night's forage for about forty horses. You will keep this to yourself, as I wish to make my journey a secret. I am, &c.\*

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 15 September, 1780.

SIR,

I am happy to find, that the late disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its first features indicated. This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence; and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular

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\* This was the last letter written by General Washington to Arnold. A copy of the statement submitted to the council of general officers, on the 6th of September, was sent to Arnold, with a request that he would forward his opinion in writing. He acknowledged the receipt of it in his letter of the 12th, and said it should receive immediate attention. He wrote his opinion at some length, and gave it in person to Washington in the afternoon of the 18th, when he met him at King's Ferry on his way to Hartford. The statement here mentioned was one of the papers found in André's boots at the time of his capture.

force. Even those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods, and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance, that can justify a different opinion; and it is most earnestly to be wished, that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence.

I cannot but remark, that it gives me pain to find the measures pursuing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of once for all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the true system of war at the southward, the object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one. Every exertion should be made by North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, to raise a permanent force of six thousand men, exclusive of horse and artillery. These, with the occasional aid of the militia in the vicinity of the scene of action, will not only suffice to prevent the further progress of the enemy, but, if properly supplied, to oblige them to compact their force and relinquish a part of what they now hold. To expel them from the country entirely is what we cannot aim at, till we derive more effectual support from abroad; and by attempting too much, instead of going forward, we shall go backward. Could such a force be once on foot, it would immediately make an inconceivable change in the face of affairs, not only in the opposition to the enemy, but in expense, consumption of provisions, and waste of arms and stores. No magazines can be equal to the demands of an army of militia, and none ever needed economy more than ours.

Speaking of magazines, I beg leave to observe, that it is of infinite importance to endeavour to establish ample ones in the southern States. I mean more particularly of provisions, not only with a view to an immediate supply of the troops there, but also with a view to offensive operations in that quarter. A quantity of salt provision would be of great utility. It is deplorable that, if every other circumstance suited our wishes, we cannot reasonably undertake any thing for want of provisions. Here the country might, on an emergency, afford temporary supplies for a much larger force than we have; but, if we should find it eligible to turn our attention to the southward, we should in all appearance meet with an insuperable obstacle in the want of a sufficiency of provisions for the voyage, and for the operations previous to our opening a full communication with the country. In the course of the present month, the army here has had scarcely one third of the established rations of meat; and our distress continues without prospect of relief.

I have the honor to inform Congress, that to-morrow I shall set out for Hartford, to have an interview with Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay.\* The command of the army in my absence devolves on Major-General Greene. It is with extreme regret, that I announce the death of Brigadier-General Poor on the 9th instant, an officer of distinguished merit, who, as a citizen and a soldier, had every claim to the esteem of his country.†

I have the honor to be, &c.

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\* He did not in reality set out till Monday the 18th, having been delayed one or two days longer than he expected. This was a circumstance of some moment, as connected with the chain of events in Arnold's treason.

† General Poor had been in the army during the whole war, as an officer in the New Hampshire line. Few officers had been engaged in



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 16 September, 1780.

SIR,

To-morrow I shall set out for Hartford, to have an interview with the French general and admiral. In my absence, the command of the army devolves upon you. I have such entire confidence in your prudence and abilities, that I leave the conduct of it to your discretion, with only one observation, that, with our present prospects, it is not our business to seek an action, or accept one, but upon advantageous terms. You will attend to the post at Dobbs's Ferry, and take such precautions for its security, as you may judge necessary. As Lieutenant-Colonel Gouvion accompanies me, a Continental officer should be appointed to the command. There is now a lieutenant-colonel of militia there.

Should you receive authentic advice of the arrival of a superior French fleet on the coast, you will immediately put the army under marching orders, and take measures for collecting all the boats on the North River, and plank to form a bridge across Haerlem River. You will also immediately write to the States of Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Jersey, and New York, informing them of the advice you have received, and urging them to redouble their exertions for collecting provisions and forage, and to raise levies for their Continental battalions; and also to put their nearest militia under marching orders. You will acquaint me with every occurrence of importance, that comes to your

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so much active service, and none had sustained a more honorable military reputation, or a more estimable private character. On the occasion of his death a *Discourse* was delivered to the troops whom he had commanded, by the Reverend Israel Evans, chaplain to the New Hampshire brigade.

knowledge, by the route which Colonel Tilghman will point out\*; and any thing, that it may be interesting for Congress immediately to know, you will transmit to them. I am, &c.\*

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TO ABRAHAM SKINNER, DEPUTY COMMISSARY-  
GENERAL OF PRISONERS.

Head-Quarters, 17 September, 1780.

SIR,

It having been agreed, that an interview should take place at Elizabethtown between Major-Generals Phillips and Lincoln on the subject of their exchange, I was induced, from the earnest desire I had of relieving the prisoners on both sides, so far as circumstances would admit, and in compliance with the directions of Congress, to inform his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton on the 26th ultimo, that "I should direct our commissary of prisoners to attend at Elizabethtown at the same time, who would be instructed to execute with the commissary on his part, if he should think proper to send him, an exchange of officers, prisoners of war, on the footing of equal rank, or composition, so far as the number in our hands would admit, and to include also the whole of the officers of convention on parole at New York, or in Europe." The interview between the two Generals is to be on the 19th instant, when

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\* The morning orders on the 17th were issued in the name of General Washington. The following are General Greene's "*after-orders*" for the same day. "His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, going to be absent from the army a few days, the knowledge of which may possibly reach the enemy, and encourage them to make some movement in consequence thereof; the General desires the officers of all ranks to be in perfect readiness to meet them on the shortest notice, and recommends to the out-guards to be very vigilant and attentive, and the patrols active and watchful."

Sir Henry Clinton has informed me in answer to my letter, that "his commissary should attend."

You will, therefore, proceed to Elizabethtown, and meet the commissary on the part of Sir Henry Clinton, or other officer deputed by him, with whom you will make, or endeavour to make, under the restrictions and exceptions heretofore mentioned, an exchange of all the enemy's officers, who are prisoners of war in our hands, and also of all the officers of convention on parole in New York, or in Europe, for an equal number of ours of like rank, according to the order of their captivity; and, when the principle of equal rank will not apply, you will exchange them on the footing of composition; confining the composition to officers only; and according to the value or tariff treated of and judged reasonable by the commissioners at the last meeting at Amboy. In the exchange on the principle of composition, our officers next in rank to those belonging to the enemy's army, who cannot be exchanged on the principle of equality, are to be included, and in the order of their captivity.

The above are the general rules, by which you are to conduct yourself in the execution of the proposed business, and which are to operate only in general with respect to our officers, prisoners in this quarter, and for their benefit, whose long captivity gives them a claim to the public's first attention. There is, however, besides the exchange, which it is hoped Major-General Lincoln will effect of himself, either for Major-General Phillips or Major-General Riedesel, and which falls within the principle of equality, the case of Brigadier-General Duportail, whose release, being particularly directed by Congress, must be attempted and effected, either upon one or the other of the foregoing principles, though it would be best if it could be obtained on that of com-



position. The case of Lieutenant-Colonels Ramsay and Connolly is also to be particularly attended to, for the reasons formerly given, and likewise Colonel Webb's, if the several officers taken in the Eagle packet are comprehended in your transactions, which, upon every principle of justice, ought to be the case. If there are any other instances of exchanges out of the general and customary line, about which you have received any orders from Congress or the Board of War, you must of course regard them and comply with their directions, or at least endeavour to carry them into execution.

You are perfectly acquainted with all the circumstances respecting violators of parole, and know who have been adjudged such, and who have not, and the order and manner in which they are to be accounted; and also the characters for whom we do not conceive ourselves accountable. It is therefore unnecessary for me to observe further respecting these, than that the instructions, which you have had repeatedly concerning them, are to govern you on the present occasion. We have in Canada a Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey, a prisoner belonging to the Massachusetts line, who was taken at Cherry Valley on the 11th of November, 1778. He is to be added to your list of lieutenant-colonels, and exchanged whenever it comes to his turn, having regard to the time of his captivity. You will also recollect the captains, who are hostages, and endeavour to obtain their release.

An exchange of all the officers, prisoners of war in our hands, and also of all the convention officers on parole in New York or Europe, is what is earnestly wished. But if you find that you cannot make it so general as to comprehend the whole, make it as extensive as you can. You will report your proceedings

to me and the exchanges you may make, specifying the names and rank of the officers on both sides. I have mentioned your instructions to Major-General Lincoln, who will facilitate the objects to which they extend, so far as he can, by endeavouring to get General Phillips to countenance the business either wholly or partially, if it should be necessary.

I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO COLONEL WADE, AT WEST POINT.

Head-Quarters, Robinson's House, 25 September, 1780.†

SIR,

General Arnold is gone to the enemy. I have just now received a line from him, enclosing one to Mrs. Arnold, dated on board the Vulture. From this circumstance, and Colonel Lamb's being detached on some business, the command of the garrison, for the

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\* Mr. Skinner met the British commissary, but they could not agree upon any plan of exchange within the range of the above instructions. Mr. Loring, the British commissary, said the proposals would be accepted if the privates then prisoners in New York were included. On the 8th of October, General Washington wrote to Sir Henry Clinton; "This is perfectly agreeable to me, and I have accordingly directed our commissary to take the most effectual and immediate measures to carry into execution the exchange as well of those privates as of the officers."

† According to his previous arrangements Washington left the camp on the 18th of September, and the same evening crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry. Arnold went down the river, and met him there, but returned the next morning to Robinson's House. Washington pursued his journey to Hartford, had an interview with the French commanders as proposed, and reached West Point in the morning of the 25th, on his way back to camp. Meantime André had been captured, and Arnold had deserted to the enemy. All the details relating to these events are fully and accurately narrated in SPARKS'S *Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold*, contained in the *Library of American Biography*, Vol. III. See likewise the official letters and other papers in the APPENDIX, No. VII.

present, devolves on you. I request, that you will be as vigilant as possible; and, as the enemy may have it in contemplation to attempt some enterprise, even to-night, against these posts, I wish you to make, immediately after the receipt of this, the best disposition you can of your force, so as to have a proportion of men in each work on the west side of the river. You will see me or hear from me further to-morrow.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL EBENEZER GRAY.

Robinson's House, 25 September, 7 o'clock, P. M., 1780.

SIR,

From some intelligence I have received, I think it necessary, that the regiment at present under your command should march without a moment's delay. You will therefore, on the receipt of this, put it in motion, and with one half of it you will occupy the north and middle redoubt on the heights above this place, as soon as possible. The other half will proceed to the landing-place above Mandeville's, near the old Connecticut encampment, and will cross the river to West Point immediately after their arrival.

I am, Sir, with great regard, &c.\*

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\* At the same time the above letter was written, another was despatched to Colonel James Livingston, who commanded at Verplanck's Point and Stony Point, and to whom Washington wrote in the following laconic manner. "I wish to see you here immediately, and request that you will come without the least delay." Colonel Lamb was ordered to take the command of the posts in Colonel Livingston's absence. He also wrote to the officer commanding a wood-cutting party at Staatsburg; "I request that you will, on receipt of this, march with the wood-cutting detachment under your command to Fishkill, where you will remain till further orders." To Major Low, of the Massachusetts levies, who was stationed at Fishkill, he wrote; "You will be pleased to march early



TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN JAMESON.

Robinson's House, 25 September, 7 o'clock, P. M., 1780.

SIR,

I wish every precaution and attention to be paid, to prevent Major André from making his escape.\* He will without doubt effect it if possible; and, in order that he may not have it in his power, you will send him under the care of such a party and so many officers, as to preclude him from the least opportunity of doing it. That he may be less liable to be recaptured by the enemy, who will no doubt make every effort to regain him, he had better be conducted to this place by some upper road, rather than by the route of Crompond. I would not wish Mr. André to be treated with insult; but he does not appear to stand upon the footing of a common prisoner of war; and therefore he is not entitled to the usual indulgences, which they receive, and is to be most closely and narrowly watched. General Arnold, before I arrived here, went off to-day to the enemy, and is on board the Vulture sloop of war. I am, Sir, &c.†

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to-morrow morning with all the militia under your command, and proceed to the landing opposite to West Point. You will send an officer to this place, by whom you will receive further orders. Colonel Gouvion, the bearer of this, will apply to you for an officer and a small party of men. These you will furnish." All these letters were dated at half past seven o'clock in the evening. Colonel Gouvion was sent to arrest Joshua H. Smith, who was then at Fishkill, and the guard was designed for that object, and to conduct him to West Point.

\* A letter written by Major André in his own name to General Washington, on the 24th of September, had been received before the date of the above letter.

† Major André and Joshua H. Smith were brought to Robinson's House on the morning of the 26th of September, the former from Colonel Sheldon's quarters in Lower Salem, and the latter from Fishkill. They were sent over separately to West Point the evening of the same day.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Robinson's House, 25 September, half past 7 o'clock, P. M., 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I request, that you will put the division on the left in motion as soon as possible, with orders to proceed to King's Ferry, where, or before they arrive there, they will be met with further orders. The division will come on light, leaving their heavy baggage to follow. You will also hold all the troops in readiness to move on the shortest notice. Transactions of a most interesting nature, and such as will astonish you, have been just discovered. I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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## TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, Robinson's House, 26 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I arrived here yesterday, on my return from an interview with the French general and admiral, and have been witness to a scene of treason, as shocking as it was unexpected. General Arnold, from every circumstance, had entered into a plot for sacrificing West Point. He had an interview with Major André, the

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\* General Greene was now at Tappan. The above letter reached him in the night, and the left wing of the army immediately commenced its march towards King's Ferry.

Before this order came to the hands of General Greene, he had received intelligence of what had happened, as will appear by the following letter from Hamilton to General Washington. As soon as the escape of Arnold was ascertained, Hamilton was despatched from Robinson's House to Verplanck's Point, with orders to intercept and seize Arnold, should he not already have passed below King's Ferry. In writing to Washington, after his arrival at Verplanck's Point, Hamilton said;

"You will see by the enclosed, that we are too late. Arnold went by

British adjutant-general, last week at Joshua H. Smith's, where the plan was concerted. By an extraordinary concurrence of incidents André was taken while on his return, with several papers in Arnold's hand-writing, that proved the treason. The latter unluckily got notice of it before I did, went immediately down the river, got on board the Vulture, which brought up André, and proceeded to New York. I found the post in the most critical condition, and have been taking measures to give it security, which I hope will be to-night effectual. With the greatest respect and regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Robinson's House, 26 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

In the present situation of things, I think it necessary that you should join the army, and request that you will do it. You will come to head-quarters. The route through Litchfield will be the most eligible for you on account of security, and you may direct your baggage to halt at Fishkill for your further orders. I write to the Count de Rochambeau by this conveyance; and I trust that your coming away now will not be attended with any material inconvenience to him.

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water to the Vulture. I shall write to General Greene, advising him, without making a bustle, to be in readiness to march, and even to detach a brigade this way; for, though I do not believe the project will go on, it is possible Arnold has made such dispositions with the garrison, as may tempt the enemy in its present weakness to make the stroke this night, and it seems prudent to be providing against it. I shall endeavour to find Meigs, and request him to march to the garrison; and shall make some arrangements here. I hope your Excellency will approve these steps, as there may be no time to be lost." — *MS. Letter, September 25th.*



I cannot conclude, without informing you of an event, which has happened here, and which will strike you with astonishment and indignation. Major-General Arnold has gone to the enemy. He had had an interview with Major André, adjutant-general of the British army, and had put into his possession a statement of our army, of the garrison at this post, of the number of men considered as necessary for the defence of it, a return of the ordnance, and the disposition of the artillery corps, in case of an alarm. By a most providential interposition, Major André was taken in returning to New York, with all those papers in General Arnold's handwriting, who, hearing of the matter, kept it secret, and left his quarters immediately, under the pretence of going over to West Point on Monday forenoon, about an hour before my arrival; then pushed down the river in the barge, which was not discovered till I had returned from West Point in the afternoon; and, when I received the first information of Major André's captivity, measures were instantly taken to apprehend General Arnold; but, before the officers, sent for the purpose, could reach Verplanck's Point, he had passed it with a flag, and got on board the Vulture ship of war, which lay a few miles below. He knew of my approach, and that I was visiting, with the Marquis, the north and middle redoubts, and from this circumstance was so straitened in point of time, that I believe he carried with him but very few if any material papers, though he has a very precise knowledge of the affairs of the post. The gentlemen of General Arnold's family,\* I have the greatest reason to believe, were not

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\* Colonel Franks and Colonel Varick were General Arnold's aids-de-camp, but they had no knowledge or suspicion of his treasonable designs, till he had escaped to the enemy.

privity in the least degree to the measures he was carrying on, nor to his escape. I am, dear Sir, with very great esteem and regard, your, &c.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, near West Point, 26 September, 1780.

SIR,

On my arrival here a very disagreeable scene unfolded itself. By lucky accident, a conspiracy of the most dangerous nature, the object of which was to sacrifice this post, has been detected. General Arnold, who has sullied his former glory by the blackest treason, has escaped to the enemy. This is an event that occasions me equal regret and mortification; but traitors are the growth of every country, and in a revolution of the present nature, it is more to be wondered at, that the catalogue is so small, than that there have been found a few. The situation of the army at this time will make General Heath's presence with us useful. I have written to him for this purpose. I hope his removal will be attended with no inconvenience to your Excellency. With the greatest regard, I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Robinson's House, in the Highlands, 26 September, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform Congress, that I arrived here yesterday, about twelve o'clock, on my return from Hartford. Some hours previous to my arrival, Major-General Arnold went from his quarters, which were at this place, as it was supposed over the river to the

garrison at West Point ; whither I proceeded myself, in order to visit the post. I found General Arnold had not been there during the day, and on my return to his quarters he was still absent. In the mean time a packet had arrived from Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, announcing the capture of a John Anderson, who was endeavouring to go to New York, with several interesting and important papers, all in the handwriting of General Arnold.\* This was also accompanied with a letter from the prisoner, avowing himself to be Major John André, adjutant-general of the British army, relating the manner of his capture, and endeavouring to show that he did not come under the description of a spy. From the several circumstances, and information that the General seemed to be thrown into some degree of agitation on receiving a letter, a little time before he went down from his quarters, I was led to conclude immediately, that he had heard of Major André's captivity, and that he would if possible escape to the enemy ; and I accordingly took such measures, as appeared the most probable, to apprehend him. But he had embarked in a barge, and proceeded down the river under a flag to the Vulture sloop-of-war, which lay some miles below Stony and Verplanck's Points. After he got on board, he wrote to me a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy.

Major André is not arrived yet, but I hope he is secure, and that he will be here to-day. I have been and am taking proper precautions, which I trust will prove effectual, to prevent the important consequences, which this conduct on the part of General Arnold was intended to produce. I do not know the party, that took Major André, but it is said to have consisted only

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\* The papers contained in André's boots, copies of which were sent to Congress.



of militia, who acted in such a manner, as does them the highest honor, and proves them to be men of great virtue. They were offered, I am informed, a large sum of money for his release, and as many goods as they would demand, but without any effect. Their conduct gives them a just claim to the thanks of their country, and I also hope they will be otherwise rewarded. As soon as I know their names, I shall take pleasure in transmitting them to Congress. I have taken such measures, with respect to the gentlemen of General Arnold's family, as prudence dictated; but, from every thing that has hitherto come to my knowledge, I have the greatest reason to believe they are perfectly innocent. I early secured Joshua H. Smith, the person mentioned in the close of General Arnold's letter, and find him to have had considerable share in this business. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING AT WEST POINT.

Robinson's House, 27 September, 1780.

SIR,

You will immediately make a distribution of the troops under your command to the several posts, that the whole may be in a state of defence at the shortest notice. You will also have each work supplied with ten days' provision, wood, water, and stores, and keep up constantly that supply; and you will take every other precaution for the security of the post. The enemy will have acquired from General Arnold a perfect knowledge of the defences, and will be able to take their measures with the utmost precision. This makes it essential, that our vigilance and care should be redoubled for its preservation. You will do every thing

in your power to gain information of the enemy's designs, and give me intelligence, as early as possible, of any movement against you. A party of militia, who have been employed cutting wood, and another as guards to the stores at Fishkill, that have been called in, are to return to their destinations. Colonel Gouvion will remain a few days at this post, to assist in the necessary arrangements. I am, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Robinson's House, 27 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have concluded to send to camp to-morrow Major André of the British army, and Mr. Joshua H. Smith, who has had a great hand in carrying on the business between him and Arnold. They will be under an escort of horse, and I wish you to have separate houses in camp ready for their reception, in which they may be kept perfectly secure; and also strong, trusty guards trebly officered, that a part may be constantly in the room with them. They have not been permitted to be together, and must be still kept apart. I would wish the room for Mr. André to be a decent one, and that he may be treated with civility; but that he may be so guarded as to preclude a possibility of his escaping, which he will certainly attempt to effect, if it shall seem practicable in the most distant degree. Smith must also be carefully secured, and not treated with asperity. I intend to return to-morrow morning, and hope to have the pleasure of seeing you in the course

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\* On the day that the above instructions were written, General McDougall was directed to take the command at West Point, till the arrival of General St. Clair.

of the day. You may keep these several matters secret. I write to Mr. Tilghman. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

Instructions.

SIR,

You will repair forthwith to West Point, and take the command of that post with its dependencies till further orders. The troops under your command will consist of the Pennsylvania division, Colonels Meigs's and Livingston's regiments of Continental troops, and a body of Massachusetts and New Hampshire militia. The enclosed is a copy of the instructions left for the commanding officer, which you will please to observe. Unless you should think it necessary, for the immediate security of the post, to draw the first Pennsylvania brigade nearer to West Point, I should wish it to remain somewhere in its present position, as it may then, at the same time, serve the purpose of reinforcing the main army, in case of a movement against it. But, on the first appearance of the enemy coming in force up the river, that brigade should have previous orders to march to your succour.

Orders have been given, in the case last mentioned, for the posts of Verplanck's and Stony Points to be evacuated, with all the cannon and stores, and the garrison added to that at West Point. But I would not wish this step to be precipitated; as, in case of an attempt to surprise you, these posts will not only be useful to give you the alarm, but they will probably, in all cases, gain you time, as the enemy would hardly venture to pass them with transports full of troops. The baggage and extra stores may be sent off at the



first aspect of a serious movement; but the troops should not evacuate until the enemy are in a situation to invest the posts. Dobbs's Ferry may also serve you as an out-post; but care must be taken to distinguish the firing against a single vessel passing, from that against a number, which will of course be more continued. Great vigilance should be used in patrolling on the east side of the river, as it would otherwise be easy for the enemy to land a body of men below, and surprise Verplanck's Point. I must entreat your particular care of the boats on the river; to keep them in repair, and as much as possible collected. All those at King's Ferry, more than are wanted for the necessary service of the communication, should be moved up the North River. A part of the militia at Verplanck's and Stony Points may also be drawn to the main garrison. Given at Head-quarters, Tappan, October 1st, 1780.

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TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

Tappan, 4 October, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

I thank you much for your kind communications, which are rendered more pleasing as they are offered without reserve. As Congress has already allowed the alternative of raising men for twelve months, opinions on the propriety of the measure can be of no avail; but since you have done me the honor to ask mine, I have no scruple in declaring, that I most firmly believe the independence of the United States never will be established, till there is an army on foot for the war; and that, if we are to rely on occasional or annual levies, we must sink under the expense, and ruin must follow.

From an opinion, which seems to have influenced Congress, that men cannot be drafted for the war, (but which, with due deference to their judgment, I think is a mistaken one, as it seems to be a prevailing sentiment I have heard, that nothing but an army on a permanent footing will do,) gentlemen unacquainted with the true state of facts, and struck with the magnitude of the bounty, which in the first instance must be given to induce men to engage for this period; without attending to the sum which is given for a year's service (perhaps in reality for a much less time, though a year may be mentioned as the ostensible term); without reflecting that this sum is more than doubled at every new enlistment; without considering the immense waste of arms, ammunition, stores, and camp utensils, incidental to these changes; without advertg to the pay and subsistence of two sets of men at the same instant, the old and new levies, and the expense of marching and countermarching them to and from camp; without taking into the account the interruption, which agriculture and all kinds of handicraft meet with, by which our supplies are lessened and the prices considerably increased; and, which is of the greatest importance, without considering the difference between a healthy army, which is generally the case of one composed of old soldiers, and a sickly one, which is commonly the case with respect to the new, and the lives lost in acquiring a seasoning; and without considering that, in all exchanges of privates prisoners of war, we give the enemy a certain permanent force, and add but little and sometimes nothing to our own strength, as the terms of service of those we receive in exchange are already expired, or terminate often soon after; — without attending, I say, to these things, which are remote, and require close investigation and a recurrence

to the public expenditures to be masters of them, they conclude, that the bounty necessary to engage men for the war is beyond our abilities, reject it, and adopt another system, which involves ultimately ten times the expense and infinitely greater distress. While, in the one case, we should have a well disciplined army, ready at all times and upon all occasions to take advantage of circumstances; in the other, the most favorable moments may pass away unimproved, because the composition of our troops is such, that we dare not in the beginning of a campaign attempt enterprises, on account of the rawness of the men, nor at the latter end of it, because they are about to leave us, after the immense toil and pains the officers have taken to teach them their duty, and we have another set to attend to.

From long experience and the fullest conviction, I have been and now am decidedly in favor of a permanent force; but knowing the jealousies, which have been entertained on this head (Heaven knows how unjustly, and the cause of which could never be apprehended, were a due regard had to our local and other circumstances, even if ambitious views could be supposed to exist), and that our political helm was in another direction, I forbore to express my sentiments for a time; but, at a moment when we are tottering on the brink of a precipice, silence would have been criminal. The amendment proposed by you for keeping the old levies in the field, till the new should arrive, would certainly be a most desirable thing, if it could be accomplished; but I doubt the practicability of it. For, if there is not a definite term fixed with the men, we could as easily get them for the war; and, if there were a period fixed, although the condition of a relief should be annexed to it, which more than probably would be kept as much as possible out of their sight, we never



should be able to retain them. Desertion and a general loss of public arms would be the inevitable consequence of an attempt to detain them, after they had completed what they conceived to be the term of their engagement.

I felt much pain in reading that part of your letter, which speaks of the reception of the committee of co-operation in Congress. At a time when public harmony is so essential, when we should aid and assist each other with all our abilities, when our hearts should be open to information and our hands ready to administer relief, to find distrusts and jealousies taking possession of the mind, and a party spirit prevailing, affords a most melancholy reflection, and forbodes no good. I shall always be happy to hear from you, being with the truest esteem and regard, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 4 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I should have been happy in the information you give me, that some progress had been made in the business of raising a permanent army, had it not been intimated to me, through other channels, that in the resolutions framed on this article, the fatal alternative of *for one*

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\* The committee of coöperation, who had been several months with the army, and recently returned to Congress, had become unpopular with some of the members, in consequence of their strenuous endeavours to increase and render more permanent the military force. They were charged with being "too strongly tinctured with the *army principles*," which they had imbibed while absent in camp. In short, it appears from the letters of Mr. Mathews, that the spirit of party raged unusually high at this time in Congress, and not only soured the feelings of the members towards each other, but essentially obstructed the adoption of efficient measures for the public service.

*year* has been admitted. In my letter to Congress, of the 20th of August, I recommended a draft for the war, or for three years, and said, "A shorter period than one year is inadmissible." You will perceive, however, that the general scope of my arguments look to an army for the war. Any different idea crept in from an apprehension that this plan would not go down. The present juncture is, in my opinion, peculiarly favorable to a permanent army, and I regret that an opening is given for a temporary one. It also gives me pain to find, that the pernicious State system is still adhered to, by leaving the reduction and incorporation of the regiments to the particular States. This is one of the greatest evils of our affairs.

I share with you the pleasure you feel from the measures taking to strengthen the hands of Congress. I am convinced it is essential to our safety, that Congress should have an efficient power. The want of it must ruin us. The satisfaction I have in any successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, is always allayed by a fear that it will lull us into security. Supineness and a disposition to flatter ourselves seem to make parts of our national character. When we receive a check, and are not quite undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and, when we do gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive and expect the war immediately at an end. The history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! This winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing scene, than we have yet experienced, to the southward. I have little doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton will detach to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far from being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts.

Reflections of this kind to you, my dear Sir, are unnecessary. I am convinced you view our affairs on the same scale that I do, and will exert yourself to correct our errors and call forth our resources. The interview at Hartford produced nothing conclusive; because neither side knew with certainty what was to be expected. We could only combine possible plans on the supposition of possible events, and engage mutually to do every thing in our power against the next campaign. Happy to rank you among the number of my friends, I speak to you with confidence. With the truest esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN CADWALADER.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 5 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Although I have but little leisure for the gratification of private correspondence, I beg you to be assured, that, from a warmth of friendship, any letters of yours

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\* In reply to this letter, after speaking of the plan proposed in Congress for a new arrangement of the army, Mr. Duane said,—"I am persuaded that your Excellency's representations on this and every other subject will have as much influence as you can wish, and that, on this particular occasion, nothing but a clear conviction of impracticability will induce Congress to overrule your opinion. A false estimate of the power and perseverance of our enemies was friendly to the present revolution, and inspired that confidence of success in all ranks of people, which was necessary to unite them in so arduous a cause. You cannot forget the opinions, which were current on this floor during the first and second Congresses, and how firmly they established this error. We seem to part with it with reluctance. It still hangs heavily upon us, and has produced the indecision, the expedients, and the debility, of which you complain. I hope misfortunes and distresses will at length rouse us to just sentiments and vigorous exertions; and, with your Excellency, I pray God, that the fatal delusion, which has marked our conduct, may end here."

—MS. Letter, October 10th.



will be gratefully accepted; and it is with much pleasure I receive fresh assurances of your regard and attachment to me. We are now drawing an inactive campaign to a close; the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a favorable complexion. I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was displaying, which would enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favorable disposition of Spain, the promised succour from France, the combined force in the West Indies, the declaration of Russia (acceded to by other governments of Europe, and humiliating to the naval pride and power of Great Britain), the superiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the Irish claims and English disturbances, formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast, which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams, that the hour of deliverance was not far distant; since, however unwilling Great Britain might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power to continue the contest. But alas! these prospects, flattering as they were, have proved delusory, and I see nothing before us but accumulating distress.

We have been half of our time without provision, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor money to form them; and in a little time we shall have no men, if we had money to pay them. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and economy. It is in vain, however, to look back, nor is it our business to do so. Our case is not desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is wisdom among our rulers. But to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army, that this army will be subsisted by State supplies, and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is in my opinion absurd,

and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion in the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it was necessary, it could be easily proved to any person of a moderate share of understanding, that an annual army raised on the spur of the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, in various ways which could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than a permanent body of men, under good organization and military discipline, which never was nor ever will be the case of new troops. A thousand arguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, might also be adduced to prove, that the army, if it is to depend upon State supplies, must disband or starve; and that taxation alone, especially at this late hour, cannot furnish the means to carry on the war. Is it not time then to retract from error, and benefit by experience? Or do we want further proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously adhered to?

You seem to regret not having accepted the appointment of Congress to a command in the American army. It is a circumstance, that ever was most sincerely regretted by me; and it is the more to be lamented, as we find an officer high in rank and military reputation capable of turning apostate and attempting to sell his country. Men of independent spirit and firmness of mind must step forth to rescue our affairs from the embarrassments they have fallen into, or they will suffer in the general wreck. I do not mean to apply this more to the military than civil line. We want the best and ablest men in both.

To tell you, if any event should ever bring you to the army, and you have no command in it equal to your merit, nor place more agreeable to your wishes than being a member of my family, that I should be happy in seeing you there, would only be announcing a truth,

which has often been repeated, and of which I hope you are convinced. My best respects attend Mrs. Cadwalader, and compliments of congratulation to both of you on the increase of your family. With sentiments of the most sincere regard and affection, I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 6 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

There is no disposition that can be made of the army at this time, under our present uncertainties, that may not be subjected to material change, as you will be convinced by recurring to the conversation, which I held with you on Wednesday last. It is, as I observed to you on that occasion, a matter of great question with me, whether West Point will not become the headquarters of the army, when we go into cantonments for the winter. I am very apprehensive, that the diminution of our present force and the little prospect of recruiting the army in season, the importance of West Point and economical motives, will compel us to concentrate our force on the North River, keeping light par-

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\* General Cadwalader had written;—"I have now reason to wish I had accepted the command given me by Congress; but at that time I conceived that the war was near a conclusion. Many others were of the same opinion, and we flattered ourselves with expectations of a speedy peace. In this, however, I remember you widely differed in opinion. Whatever may be the event, be assured there is no person in America more firmly attached to you as commander, and to the general cause; and, should our affairs take an unfortunate turn, I shall to the last share with you the misfortunes of the times."—*September 20th.* General Washington had a strong personal regard for General Cadwalader, and confidence in his military talents, and had solicited him earnestly to accept a command in the army, when it was proffered to him by Congress.



ties only on our flanks. If, under this information, you should incline to take the immediate command of the detachment, which is about to march for West Point, and the general direction of matters on the east side of Hudson's River, it will be quite agreeable to me, that you should do so. But candor has led me to a declaration of the uncertainty of that post's being long removed from my immediate command. The army will march and separate to-morrow. Your immediate determination is therefore necessary, that the orders may be prepared accordingly. I am, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 6 October, 1780.

SIR,

You will take the command of the two divisions, consisting of the Jersey and York brigades, and Stark's

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\* For a full understanding of this letter, it may be necessary to recur to that of General Greene, to which it is a reply.

"A new disposition of the army going to be made," says General Greene, "and an officer appointed to the command of West Point and the district on the east side of the North River, I take the liberty just to intimate my inclination for the appointment. Your Excellency will judge of the propriety, and determine as the honor of the army and the good of the service may require. I hope there is nothing indelicate or improper in the application. I am prompted to the measure from the feelings incident to the human heart, as well as encouraged with the hope that it will meet with your approbation, from the flattering manner in which you have been pleased to speak of my conduct upon different occasions.

"I shall make use of no arguments, being persuaded my pretensions and inclinations will have their full operation, and that nothing short of the public good and military propriety will contravene my wishes. My first object is the freedom and happiness of my country. With these your Excellency's reputation and glory are inseparably connected; and, as it has been my constant wish, so it shall be my future endeavour, to promote the establishment of both." — *October 5th.*

and late Poor's brigades, with which you will march by the most direct route to West Point. The troops will go all the way by land, sending their baggage and artillery by water from King's Ferry, for the security of which you will take effectual precautions. I wish the troops to arrive at their destination, as soon as it can be done without fatiguing them. The first Pennsylvania brigade marches to-morrow to join the army; and General St. Clair is directed to move the second Pennsylvania brigade and Meigs's regiment to the army, as soon as a sufficient corps arrives to replace them. I wish them to be enabled to begin their march, as soon as it can conveniently be done. St. Clair waits till he is relieved by a major-general.

You will observe the instructions already given to the commanding officers of the post, of which the enclosed are copies, with the following additions. So soon as you arrive with the troops, you will discharge all the New Hampshire and Massachusetts militia, with my thanks for their services. You will send off all of the spare wagon and riding-horses, and use every other expedient in your power to economize your forage, which you know is an article of the greatest importance. You will exert yourself to complete the works, and to put them in the most perfect state of defence. This is essential, under the knowledge the enemy have of their present state, as a change in their situation will not only render them in reality more defensive, but will diminish the usefulness of the information, which Arnold has it in his power to give. The approaching reduction of the army adds to the necessity of having this important post in the most respectable state of defence. Lieutenant-Colonel Gouvion has my orders to join you for this purpose with his corps. You will keep such parties, as you may judge safe and expedient, advanced

towards the enemy on the east side of the river, for the purpose of restraining their depredations and protecting the country.

You will begin to form winter covering at West Point and its dependencies for a garrison of about the number of your present command; and you will prosecute measures for ample magazines of wood. Besides the four brigades already mentioned, the artillery, and the corps of sappers and miners, you will have under your command Livingston's regiment and Sheldon's dragoons. There are also two Connecticut State regiments stationed on the Sound, which, on an emergency, you may call to your aid; and with whom, in the mean time, you can communicate for intelligence of what passes in the Sound. You will inform General M<sup>c</sup>Dougall that his division, Stark's and late Poor's brigades, are with you. His private affairs may demand his attention for a while; after which he will probably join you. When you have made your disposition, you will report it to me. I commit this important post to your care, in full confidence in your prudence, vigilance, activity, and good conduct.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 6 October, 1780.

SIR,

Congress having received information, that there were good grounds to believe, that a number of respectable citizens of South Carolina, prisoners of war by the capitulation of Charleston, had been seized upon and confined on board a ship of war, have directed me to inquire of your Excellency whether such arrests and confinement have been made, and for what



reasons. You will oblige me by making the communication as soon as convenient.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paramus, 7 October, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose to Congress a copy of the proceedings of a board of general officers in the case of Major André, adjutant-general to the British army. This officer was executed in pursuance of the opinion of the board, on Monday the 2d instant, at twelve o'clock at our late camp at Tappan. He acted with great candor, from the time he avowed himself after his capture, until he was executed. Congress will perceive by a copy of a letter I received from him on the 1st instant, that it was his desire to be shot; but the practice and usage of war, circumstanced as he was, were against the indulgence. At the bottom of the sixth page of the proceedings an explanatory note is added, to prevent any suspicions being entertained injurious to Colonel Sheldon, who, otherwise, from the letter addressed to him, might be supposed to have been privy to the measures between General Arnold and Major André. If it should be the pleasure of Congress to publish the case, which I would take the liberty to suggest may not be improper, it will be necessary for the explanatory note to be annexed.

Besides these proceedings, I transmit copies of sundry letters respecting the matter, which are all that passed on the subject, not included in the proceedings.

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\* Sir Henry Clinton's answer, and other letters relating to this subject, are contained in the APPENDIX, No. VIII.

I would not suffer Mr. Elliot and Mr. Smith to land, who came up to Dobbs's Ferry agreeably to Sir Henry Clinton's letter of the 30th September. General Robertson was permitted to come on shore, and was met by Major-General Greene, and mentioned substantially what is contained in his letter of the 2d instant. It might not perhaps be improper to publish the letters, or part of them, as an appendix to the proceedings of the board of general officers.\*

I have now the pleasure to communicate the names of the three persons, who captured Major André, and who refused to release him, notwithstanding the most earnest importunities and assurances of a liberal reward on his part. Their conduct merits our warmest esteem; and I beg leave to add, that I think the public will do well to make them a handsome gratuity. They have prevented in all probability our suffering one of the severest strokes, that could have been meditated against us. Their names are John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart.†

For the present I have detached the Jersey, New York, and New Hampshire brigades, with Stark's, to the Highland posts. They marched this morning from Orangetown, and will relieve the Pennsylvania line, which was thrown in at the moment General Arnold

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\* For the papers referred to in this letter, see APPENDIX, No. VII.

† Congress rewarded Paulding, Williams, and Van Wart by voting an annual pension of two hundred dollars to each for life; and also ordering that the Board of War should procure for each a silver medal, on one side of which should be a shield with the inscription *Fidelity*, and on the other the motto, *Vincit Amor Patriæ*. To a letter from the President of Congress, accompanying the resolutions for these objects, General Washington replied; "The recompense is ample; it is an evidence of the generosity of Congress, a flattering tribute to the virtue of those citizens, and must prove a powerful incitement to others to imitate their example." The medals were afterwards given to the three individuals by Washington himself at head-quarters.

went to the enemy. Major-General Greene has marched with these four brigades, and will command at West Point and its dependencies, till a further disposition. The main body of the army (the forage about Orangetown and the lower country being exhausted) also moved this morning, and is now arrived here. We have had a cold, wet, and tedious march, on account of the feeble state of our cattle, and have not a drop of rum to give the troops. My intention is to proceed with them to the country in the neighbourhood of Passaic Falls. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic Falls, 8 October, 1780.

SIR,

I have received your several favors. The first reached me only two days before I set out for Hartford, to meet Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay. The two last came to hand while I was absent. The first account, which I received of the unfortunate affair near Camden, was by a copy of your letter from Hillsborough to the President of Congress. The shock was the greater, as the operations, a few days preceding the action, were much in our favor. The behaviour of the Continental troops does them infinite honor. The accounts, which the enemy give of the action, show that their victory was dearly bought. Under present circumstances, the system, which you are pursuing, seems to be extremely proper. It would answer no good purpose to take a position near the enemy, while you are so far inferior in force. If they can be kept in check by the light, irregular troops under Colonel Sumpter and other active officers, they will gain nothing



by the time, which must be necessarily spent by you in collecting and arranging the new army, forming magazines, and replacing the stores, which were lost in the action.

Further detachments from this army will very much depend upon the measures, which the enemy mean ultimately to pursue. While they maintain a superiority by sea, they have an infinite advantage over us; as they can send off a detachment from their army, make a stroke, and return again, while a part of ours may be marching to meet them at the point of destination. Indeed, our reduction of numbers will be so great, by the expiration of the times of the levies, the last of December, that the enemy may then make very considerable detachments, and yet leave a force sufficient to make us apprehensive for the safety of the Highland posts, and for the security of the communication through Jersey, on which we in a great measure depend for supplies.

It was owing to the fatal policy of temporary enlistments, that the enemy were enabled to gain the footing, which they hold in the southern States; and it is much to be feared, that the same cause will be attended with an increase of disagreeable effects. They are well acquainted with the periods of our dissolution, and have scarcely ever failed to take advantage of them; and we can hardly suppose, that they will be more negligent this winter, than the preceding ones.

Preparations have been some time making for an embarkation from New York. The destination is publicly said to be to the southward, and I think the probability is in favor of that report. Should a further extension of their conquests in that quarter be their object, I am in hopes, that the force, collecting by the exertions of North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, will keep them

confined to the limits of South Carolina, at least till a better disposition of our affairs can be made, or until we may receive more effectual assistance from our allies; a measure which they have most seriously in view, and of which an unlucky coincidence of circumstances has hitherto deprived us.

The French fleet has been blocked up in the harbour of Newport almost ever since its arrival there, by a superior British squadron; which superiority has been lately increased by the arrival of Admiral Rodney from the West Indies with ten ships. Count de Guichen touched nowhere upon this coast, though, by a variety of accounts, he was up as high as the latitude of twenty-six degrees, and perhaps higher. The report of his having taken one hundred sail of British merchantmen is, I imagine, premature; as we have intelligence of a late date from Havana, and no such circumstance is mentioned. It will be of very great importance, that I should be regularly informed of every movement of the enemy, as I shall thereby be better enabled to form an opinion upon any appearances in this quarter. I am, Sir, &c.

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TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DUBUYSSON.\*

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 10 October, 1780.

SIR,

I have received your several favors from Hillsborough, Annapolis, and Philadelphia. I sincerely lament the loss of the Baron de Kalb. The manner in which he

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\* A French officer attached to the family of Baron de Kalb, and wounded and taken prisoner at the battle of Camden. He wished to procure such an extension of his parole, as would enable him to return to Europe.

died fully justified the opinion, which I have ever entertained of him, and will endear his memory to the country. The State of Virginia, sensible of the dangerous influence which Governor Hamilton holds over the Indians, have absolutely refused to exchange him on any terms, for the present at least; and, as I have never deviated from a rule, which I laid down at the beginning of the war, of exchanging officers in course, according to the time of their captivity, I cannot, without manifest injury to several gentlemen of your rank, who have been prisoners for more than three years, propose your exchange in preference to theirs. I am glad to find, that you seem to be aware of this difficulty, in your letter from Philadelphia.

Being bound by the terms of your parole to render yourself at New York by a certain time, unless you effect an exchange, I do not see how you can possibly avoid a compliance, so soon as the state of your wounds will admit of it. Sir Henry Clinton may, perhaps, in consideration of your circumstances, extend your parole to Europe, as a similar indulgence has been allowed to several officers of the British army on account of their health. This application can only be made to him, either personally, or by your informing him by letter of your arrival at Philadelphia, and requesting liberty, on account of the peculiarity of your situation, to go to France. I am, Sir, &c.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 10 October, 1780.

SIR,

I am much obliged to you for the information you do me the honor to communicate. We have to regret,



that this campaign has not been productive of such important advantages, as we had reason to flatter ourselves; but we must hope for better success the next. The operation of the Spaniards in the Floridas will be a useful diversion to the southern States, if it can be vigorously prosecuted; but I confess, while the enemy have a naval superiority in America, I am not sanguine about any enterprise, which is connected with maritime dispositions.

I entirely approve of the detention of Greene's regiment, and I entreat you to keep it as long as you think its services can be interesting. Your Excellency will have heard of the execution of the British adjutant-general. The circumstances under which he was taken justified it, and policy required a sacrifice; but as he was more unfortunate than criminal, and, as there was much in his character to interest, while we yielded to the necessity of rigor, we could not but lament it. I have detached two divisions of the army to West Point, and removed the remainder to this post, at a greater distance from the enemy. With every sentiment of attachment, I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* The French admiral, M. de Ternay, continued to entertain the same unfavorable sentiments, respecting the prospect of affairs in America, which he conceived on his first arrival in the country. In writing to Count de Vergennes he said, — "In my letter of the 10th of September" (see above, p. 199), "you will have seen what were my views relative to the actual position of the squadron and the army. I am still of the same opinion, and have charged M. de la Pérouse to explain to you my reasons. I persist in the belief, that the revolution is not so far advanced, as is generally imagined in Europe. The conspiracy lately formed by an American general to deliver into the hands of the English the post, which was confided to him, is an evidence that there are traitors. A single individual of this description might decide the fortunes of a campaign, and the fate of the country. When the word *liberty* was pronounced in North America, all the world took up arms, but the leaders of the revolution have never calculated the consequences. If France does not decide the question, all is lost. What an occasion have we missed during the

TO BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY  
AT THE COURT OF FRANCE.

Bergen County, New Jersey, 11 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I was very much obliged by the letter, which you did me the honor to write by our amiable young friend, the Marquis de Lafayette, whose exertions to serve this country in his own are additional proofs of his zealous attachment to our cause, and have endeared him to us still more. He came out flushed with expectations of a decisive campaign, and fired with hopes of acquiring fresh laurels; but in both he has been disappointed; for we have been condemned to an inactivity as inconsistent with the situation of our affairs, as with the ardor of his temper.

I am sensible of all I owe you, my dear Sir, for your sentiments of me; and, while I am happy in your esteem, I cannot but wish for occasions of giving you marks of

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present year! Shall we be more fortunate the next? A general, who is absolute master of his operations, can alone succeed. If there is an inferiority, the sea and land forces should act separately. An unforeseen reunion of the enemy ought to be the basis of every project."—*MS. Letter, October 18th.*

In reply to this letter, Count de Vergennes said,—“You are on the spot, and have a better opportunity of judging of the prevalent dispositions in America, than we can have here; but I feel no difficulty in subscribing to your opinion respecting the progress of the revolution, and I am not less afflicted than yourself, that a republic, which is yet hardly in its cradle, should witness a crime so atrocious as that of Arnold. It is too enormous to excite a fear, that it will find many imitators. The example, therefore, is less to be apprehended, than the motives which gave rise to his treason. These may find action in a country, where jealousy is in some sort the essence of the government. I have always thought, and have not yet changed my opinion, that the great efforts on our part by land would have the double inconvenience of creating much internal disquietude, without obtaining a decisive external advantage, and that the most effective succours ought to consist in forces by sea. I am alone in this opinion, but I shall retain it till I can be convinced of its unsoundness or error.”—*MS. Letter, December 2d.*

mine. The idea of making a tour together, which you suggest, after the war, would be one of the strongest motives I could have to postpone my plan of retirement, and make a visit to Europe, if my domestic habits, which seem to acquire strength from restraint, did not tell me I shall find it impossible to resist them longer than my duty to the public calls for the sacrifice of my inclinations.

I doubt not you are so fully informed by Congress of our political and military state, that it would be superfluous to trouble you with any thing relating to either. If I were to speak on topics of this kind, it would be to show that our present situation makes one of two things essential to us, a peace, or the most vigorous aid of our allies, particularly in the article of money. Of their disposition to serve us we cannot doubt; their generosity will do every thing their means will permit. With my best wishes for the preservation of your useful life, and for every happiness that can attend you, which a sincere attachment can dictate, I am, &c.

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TO MRS. MARY LEE.

Head-Quarters, 11 October, 1780.

MADAM,

I am honored with your letter of the 27th of September, and cannot forbear taking the earliest moment to express the high sense I entertain of the patriotic exertions of the ladies of Maryland in favor of the army. In answer to your inquiry, respecting the disposal of the gratuity, I must take the liberty to observe, that it appears to me the money, which has been or may be collected, cannot be expended in so eligible and beneficial a manner, as in the purchase of shirts



and black stocks for the use of the troops in the southern army. The polite offer you are pleased to make of your further assistance in the execution of this liberal design, and the generous disposition of the ladies, insure me of its success, and cannot fail to entitle both yourself and them to the warmest gratitude of those, who are the objects of it. I am, &c.

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TO COLONEL JAMES WOOD.

Head-Quarters, 11 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am pleased to find that your supplies had been more regular for some time, and that you had prospects of keeping them up.\* I never entertained the least doubt of your care and attention to the business committed to your charge, or supposed that the distresses of the troops of convention, on the score of provision, were in any degree owing to your want of proper exertions. Had such a thought ever existed, I should have altered my opinion, on receiving letters upon the subject from Governor Jefferson, and from Brigadier-General Hamilton, who both speak of your conduct in the most favorable manner, and attribute the good order and temper, which prevailed among the troops during the time of their distress, to your prudent and conciliating management. This entitles you to my warmest thanks.

Your command, from the nature of it, cannot be the most agreeable at any rate, much less so when attended by a variety of perplexities; and you may

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\* Colonel Wood commanded at Charlottesville, and had the charge of the convention troops at that place.

therefore have a wish for being relieved this winter. Should this be your inclination, I could not with propriety in common cases object to it, as no officer ought to have more than his share of any duty imposed upon him; but when it is considered how essential your services are in your present station, how difficult it is to find persons capable of conducting matters properly in the deranged state of all our departments, and how much better you are qualified, from an acquaintance with the business, than a stranger; to say nothing of the agreeable light in which you stand with the officers of convention, which will add not a little to the relief of any difficulties which may occur; you must excuse me for requesting your continuance at least a while longer. An exchange of the troops may possibly take place, or the mode of supplies may be put upon such a footing, as to render your presence of less importance.

We have never made the least difficulty of exchanging the officers of the troops of convention; on the contrary, we have ever endeavoured to accomplish it. If, therefore, Brigadier-General Specht can make interest with Sir Henry Clinton, I shall without hesitation agree to his exchange for an officer of equal rank. Be pleased to inform General Hamilton, that I forwarded the letter enclosed in his of the 24th of August, as I shall also do that enclosed in your last. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic Falls, 11 October, 1780.

SIR,

Three days ago I received your Excellency's letter of the 4th, with the enclosed resolutions, which, as the

army was in motion to this post, I had it not in my power to answer before.\* I am much obliged to Congress for the honor they do me by the fresh mark of their attention and confidence, conferred upon me in the reference they have been pleased to make. My wish to concur in sentiment with them, and a conviction that there is no time to be lost in carrying the measures relative to the army into execution, make me reluctantly offer any objections to the plan, that has been adopted; but a sense of what I owe to Congress, and a regard to consistency, will not permit me to suppress the difference of opinion, which happens to exist upon the present occasion, on points that appear to me far from unessential. In expressing it, I can only repeat the ideas, which I have more than once taken the liberty to urge.

That there are the most conclusive reasons for reducing the number of regiments, no person acquainted with the situation of our affairs and the state of the army will deny. A want of officers, independently of other considerations, is sufficient to compel us. But that the temper of the army, produced by its sufferings, requires great caution, in any reforms that are attempted, is a position not less evident than the former. In services the best established, where the hands of government are strengthened by the strongest interest of the army for submission, the reducing of its regiments and dismissing a great part of its officers is always a measure of delicacy and difficulty. In ours, where the officers are held by the feeblest ties, and mouldering away by daily resignations, it is peculiarly so. The last reduction occasioned many to quit the service, be-

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\* See the above resolutions in the *Journals of Congress*, October 3d. They contain the plan of a new arrangement of the army. By a separate resolve they were referred to the Commander-in-chief for his opinion.



sides those who were reformed, and left durable seeds of discontent among those who remained. The general topic of declamation was, that it was as hard as dishonorable for men, who had made every sacrifice to the service, to be turned out of it at the pleasure of those in power, without an adequate compensation. In the maturity to which their uneasiness has now risen, from a continuance in misery, they will be still more impatient under an attempt of a similar nature. How far these dispositions may be reasonable, I pretend not to decide, but in the extremity to which we are arrived, policy forbids us to add new irritations. Too many of the officers wish to get rid of their commissions; but they are unwilling to be forced into it.

It is not the intention of these remarks to discourage a reform; but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill effects by an ample provision, both for the officers who stay, and for those who are reduced. This should be the basis of the plan, and without it I apprehend the most mischievous consequences. This would obviate many scruples, that will otherwise be found prejudicial in the extreme. I am convinced Congress are not a little straitened in the means of a present provision, so ample as to give satisfaction; but this proves the expediency of a future one, and brings me to that, which I have so frequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic, and the most effectual, that could be devised, a half-pay for life. Supported by a prospect of a permanent independence, the officers would be tied to the service, and would submit to many momentary privations, and to the inconveniences, which the situation of public affairs makes unavoidable. This is exemplified in the Pennsylvania officers, who, being upon this establishment, are so much interested in the service, that, in the course of

months, there has been only one resignation in that line.

If the objection, drawn from the principle of this measure being incompatible with the genius of our government, is thought insurmountable, I would propose a substitute less eligible in my opinion, but which may answer the purpose; it is to make the present half-pay for seven years, whole pay for the same period, to be advanced in two different payments, one half in a year after the conclusion of peace, the other half in two years subsequently to the first. It will be well to have it clearly understood, that the reduced officers are to have the depreciation of their pay made good, lest any doubt should arise on that head.

No objection to this measure occurs to me, except it be thought too great an expense; but, in my judgment, whatever can give consistency to our military establishment will be ultimately favorable to economy. It is not easy to be conceived, except by those who are witnesses to it, what an additional waste and consumption of every thing, and consequently what an increase of expense, result from laxness of discipline in the army; and where the officers think they are doing the public a favor by holding their commissions, and the men are continually fluctuating, it is impossible to maintain discipline. Nothing can be to me more obvious, than that a sound military establishment and the interests of economy are the same. How much more the purposes of the war will be promoted by it, in other respects, will not admit of an argument.

In reasoning upon the measure of a future provision, I have heard gentlemen object the want of it in some foreign armies, without adverting to the difference of circumstances. The military profession holds the first rank in most of the countries of Europe, and is the

road to honor and emolument. The establishment is permanent, and whatever be an officer's provision, it is for life, and he has a profession for life. He has future as well as present motives of military honor and preferment. He is attached to the service by the spirit of the government, by education, and in most cases by early habit. His present condition, if not splendid, is comfortable. Pensions, distinctions, and particular privileges, are commonly his rewards in retirement. In the case of the American officers, the military character has been suddenly taken up, and is to end with the war.

The number of regiments fixed upon by Congress is that, which I should have wished, but I think the aggregate number of men too small. Should the regiments be completed, making the usual deductions for casualties, and not counting upon the three regiments of South Carolina and Georgia, we should not have in the infantry above eighteen thousand fighting men rank and file; from whom, when we have taken the garrison of West Point, and the different garrisons for the frontiers, there would remain a force not equal even to a vigorous defensive, and entirely unequal to a decisive coöperation with our allies, should their efforts next campaign be directed this way, as we have reason to hope. I confess, too, that I do not expect the States will complete their regiments, at whatever point they may be placed. If they are any thing near being full, they will be apt to think the difference not material, without considering that what may be small in their quota, will be very considerable in the aggregate of deficiencies in a force originally calculated too low for our exigencies.

The enemy's embodied force of infantry in these States (without speaking of the occasional aids of mi-



litia), on a moderate estimate, must amount to between eighteen and twenty thousand fighting men. We ought on no scale of reasoning to have less than an equal number in the field, exclusive of all garrisons, for a vigorous defensive. Let us then state our armies in the field at eighteen thousand. West Point for complete security requires two thousand five hundred. Fort Schuyler, Fort Pitt, and other frontier posts require fifteen hundred. By this calculation twenty-two thousand fighting men appear to be necessary on a defensive plan. To have these, our total number must be thirty thousand rank and file. The wagoners, workmen at factories, waiters, men for other extra services, and sick, on an average make at least a fourth of the total numbers; which Congress may see by recurring to the returns of the army from time to time.

Much less should we hesitate to exert ourselves to have this number, if we have any thoughts of recovering what we have lost. As to the abilities of the country to maintain them, I am of opinion, they will be found adequate, and that they will be less strained than they have heretofore been, from the necessity we have been so frequently under of recurring to the aid of militia.

It is my duty also to inform Congress, that in the late conference with the French general and admiral, though I could not give assurances, I was obliged to give an opinion of the force we might have the next campaign, and I stated the army in this quarter at fifteen thousand operative Continental troops; which will greatly exceed that which we should have by the proposed arrangement, for it would not give us above eleven. On this idea of fifteen thousand, a memorial with a plan for the next campaign has been transmitted to the court of France.

I would therefore beg leave to propose that each regiment of infantry should consist of one colonel, where the present colonels are continued, or one lieutenant-colonel commandant, two majors (a first and second), nine captains, twenty-two subalterns, one surgeon, one mate, one sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, forty-five sergeants, one drum-major, one fife-major, ten drums, ten fifes, six hundred and twelve rank and file. Fifty regiments at six hundred and twelve rank and file each will amount to thirty thousand six hundred rank and file, the force I have stated to be requisite.

The number of officers to a regiment by our present establishment has been found insufficient. It is not only inconvenient and productive of irregularities in our formation and manœuvres, but the number taken for the different offices of the staff leaves the regiments defective in field-officers, and the companies so unprovided, that they are obliged to be entrusted to the care of sergeants and corporals, which soon ruins them. To obviate this, I ask three field-officers to a regiment, besides a captain and two subalterns to do the duty of each company, three supernumerary subalterns as paymaster, adjutant, and quartermaster, and one to reside in the State as a recruiting officer. Officers continually employed in this way, to improve every opportunity that offered, would engage men while those who were occasionally detached for a short space of time would do nothing. I ask one drum and fife extraordinary to attend this officer. These supernumeraries are to rank and file in the regiment with the other officers. These field-officers will be thought necessary, when we consider the great proportion employed as adjutant-general, inspectors, brigade-majors, wagon-master, superintendent of hospitals; in addition to whom I would also

propose a field-officer to reside in each State, where the number of its regiments exceeds two, and a captain where it does not, to direct the recruiting service, and transact with the State all business for the line to which he belongs, which I think would be a very useful institution.

Instead of regiments of cavalry, I would recommend legionary corps, which should consist of four troops of mounted dragoons of sixty each, making two hundred and forty; and two corps of dismounted dragoons of sixty each, making one hundred and twenty; with the same number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers as at present. To make the regiments larger will be attended with an excessive expense, for the purchase of horses in the first instance and for subsistence afterwards; and I think the augmentation, though it would be useful, not essential. I prefer legionary corps, because the kind of service we have for horse almost constantly requires the aid of infantry. In quarters, as they are commonly obliged to be remote from the army for the benefit of forage, it is indispensable for their security; and to attach to them infantry drawn from the regiments has many inconveniences.

Besides the four regiments I cannot forbear recommending, that two partisan corps may be kept up, commanded by Colonel Armand and Major Lee. Though in general I dislike independent corps, I think a partisan corps with an army useful in many respects. Its name and destination stimulate to enterprise; and the two officers I have mentioned have the best claims to public attention. Colonel Armand is an officer of great merit, which, added to his being a foreigner, to his rank in life, and to the sacrifices of property he has made, renders it a point of delicacy as well as justice to continue



to him the means of serving honorably. Major Lee has rendered such distinguished services, possesses so many talents for commanding a corps of this nature, and deserves so much credit for the perfection in which he has kept his corps, as well as for the handsome exploits he has performed, that it would be a loss to the service, and a discouragement to merit, to reduce him, and I do not see how he can be introduced into one of the regiments in a manner satisfactory to himself, and which will enable him to be equally useful, without giving too much disgust to the whole line of cavalry.

The partisan corps may consist of three troops of mounted and three of dismounted dragoons, of fifty each, making in all three hundred. I would recommend one alteration in the proposed arrangement of artillery, which is to have ten companies instead of nine. The numerous demands of the service have made the establishment of companies hitherto not too great; and it would be injurious to diminish them materially. Nine companies would be an irregular formation for a battalion of artillery, and eight would be much too few. This makes me wish they may be fixed at ten. The formation of nine companies in the infantry is with a view of having one light company to act separately.

I sincerely wish Congress had been pleased to make no alternative in the term of service, but had confined it to the war, by enlistment, draft, or assessment, as might be found necessary. On the footing on which their requisition now stands, we shall be certain of getting very few men for the war, and must continue to feel all the evils of temporary engagements. In the present humor of the States, I should entertain the most flattering hopes, that they would enter upon vigorous measures to raise an army for the war, if Con-

gress appeared decided upon the point ; but, if they hold up a different idea as admissible, it will be again concluded, that they do not consider an army for the war essential. This will encourage the opposition of narrow, interested, and feeble tempers, and enable them to defeat the primary object of the resolution. Indeed, if the mode by enlistment is the only one made use of to procure the men, it must necessarily fail. In my letter of the 20th of August I have said, that any period short of one year is inadmissible ; but all my observations tend to prove the pernicious operation of engaging men for any term short of the war, and the alternative is only on the supposition, that the other should on experiment be found impracticable. But I regard it as of the highest importance, that the experiment should first be fairly tried. The alternative, if absolutely necessary, can be substituted hereafter. The encouragement to the officer, and the bounty to the recruit, are both too small in the present state of things, unless the latter could be in specie, which it is probable would have a powerful influence. In the case of recruits made in camp, no bounty is specified ; it will be necessary here as well as in the country, with this additional reason, that a recruit obtained in the army will be more valuable than one obtained in the country.

I must confess, also, that it would have given me infinite pleasure, if Congress had thought proper to take the reduction and incorporation of the regiments under their own direction. The mode of leaving it to the States is contrary to my sentiments, because it is an adherence to the State system, and because I fear it will be productive of great confusion and discontent ; and it is requisite the business in contemplation should be conducted with the greatest circumspection. I fear, also, the professing to select the officers retained in

service will give disgust, both to those who go and to those who remain; the former will be sent away under the public stigma of inferior merit, and the latter will feel no pleasure in a present preference, when they reflect that at some future period they may experience a similar fate. I barely mention this, as I am persuaded Congress did not advert to the operation of the expressions made use of, and will readily alter them.

I beg leave to remark, before I conclude, that, if Congress should be pleased to reconsider their resolutions, it will be of the greatest moment that the number of men, and the term for which they are to be raised, should be first determined, and the requisition transmitted to the several States. In this article time presses; the others may be examined more at leisure, though it is very necessary that the whole should be put into execution as speedily as possible.

To accelerate the business I have directed, agreeably to the tenor of the resolution, returns to be immediately made, which shall be without delay transmitted to the States, to show them at one view the force they have, and the deficiencies for which they will have to provide the moment they know the quotas respectively required of them. With the highest respect and esteem I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* On receiving this letter, and reconsidering the plan for a new arrangement of the army, Congress adopted the amendments proposed by the Commander-in-chief. Baron Steuben, who was then in Philadelphia, on his way to the southward, wrote as follows.

"It is with the greatest satisfaction I acquaint you, that the plan of arrangement for the army, which your Excellency sent to Congress, has been agreed to without any alteration. The granting half-pay for life to the reduced officers has met with some opposition; yet the proposition has not only passed, but it was resolved immediately after to extend these advantages to all the officers in the service." — *MS. Letter, October 23d.* See also *Journals of Congress, October 21st.*

Two points, for which General Washington had struggled from the



## TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.\*

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 13 October, 1780.

MY DEAR LAURENS,

In no instance since the commencement of the war, has the interposition of Providence appeared more remarkably conspicuous than in the rescue of the post and garrison of West Point from Arnold's villanous perfidy. How far he meant to involve me in the catastrophe of this place, does not appear by any indubitable evidence; and I am rather inclined to think he did not wish to hazard the more important object of his treachery, by attempting to combine two events, the less of which might have marred the greater. A combination of extraordinary circumstances, an unaccountable deprivation of presence of mind in a man of the first abilities, and the virtue of three militia men, threw the adjutant-general of the British forces, with full proofs of Arnold's treachery, into our hands. But for the egregious folly, or the bewildered conception, of Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, who seemed lost in astonishment, and not to know what he was doing, I should undoubtedly have got Arnold. André has met his fate, and with that fortitude, which was to be expected from an accomplished man and gallant officer; but I am mistaken if, at this time, "Arnold is under-

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beginning of the war, and which he deemed of the utmost importance, were at last obtained, namely, the enlisting of all the troops to serve during the war, and half-pay to the officers for life. The entire proceedings, in regard to the above letter, indicate an essential change in the minds of some of the members of Congress, and the unbounded confidence, which was now placed by that assembly in the Commander-in-chief.

\* Colonel Laurens had been taken prisoner at the capitulation of Charleston, and was now on parole at Philadelphia. He had written to General Washington, congratulating him on the providential detection of Arnold's treason.

going the torment of a mental hell." \* He wants feeling. From some traits of his character, which have lately come to my knowledge, he seems to have been so hackneyed in villany, and so lost to all sense of honor and shame, that, while his faculties will enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there will be no time for remorse.

Believe me sincere when I assure you, that my warmest wishes accompany Captain Wallop's endeavours,† and your expectations of exchange; and that nothing but the principle of justice and policy, which I have religiously adhered to, of exchanging officers in the order of their captivity, where rank would apply, has prevented my utmost exertion to obtain your release and restoration to a family, where you will be received with open arms by every individual, but by none with more cordiality and true affection than your sincere friend, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 14 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

By a letter received yesterday afternoon from his Excellency, the President of Congress, dated the 6th instant, and enclosing a copy of a resolution of the preceding day, I find it has been their pleasure to order me

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\* Alluding to a passage in Colonel Laurens's letter, in which he said, — "André has, I suppose, paid the forfeit which public justice demanded. Example will derive new force from his conspicuous character. Arnold must undergo a punishment comparatively more severe in the permanent, increasing torment of a mental hell." — *October 4th.*

† Captain Wallop was a British prisoner, who had gone into New York for the purpose of endeavouring to effect an exchange, which should restore both himself and Colonel Laurens to liberty.

to direct a court of inquiry to be held on the conduct of Major-General Gates, as commander of the southern army; and also to direct me to appoint an officer to command it in his room, until the inquiry shall be made. As Congress have been pleased to leave the officer, who shall command on this occasion, to my choice, it is my wish to appoint you; and, from the pressing situation of affairs in that quarter, of which you are not unapprized, that you should arrive there as soon as circumstances will possibly admit. Besides my own inclination to this choice, I have the satisfaction to inform you, that, from a letter I have received, it concurs with the wishes of the delegates of the three southern States most immediately interested in the present operations of the enemy; and I have no doubt, that it will be perfectly agreeable to the sentiments of the whole.\* Your ulterior instructions will be prepared when you arrive here.

I suppose that General Heath, if not already at West Point, is on his way from Rhode Island. I write to him to take command of the post. If he is with you, be pleased to communicate to him your instructions with respect to it, and any other matters you may judge it to be material for him to know. If he has not arrived, General McDougall will command till he comes; to whom I also write for the purpose, and to whom you will make the communications I have requested, which he will transfer to General Heath.

I have only to add, that I wish for your earliest ar-

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\* Mr. Mathews, a delegate in Congress from South Carolina, wrote as follows to General Washington. "I am authorized by the delegates of the three southern States to communicate to your Excellency their wish, that Major-General Greene may be the officer appointed to the command of the southern department, if it would not be incompatible with the rules of the army."— *October 6th.*



rival, that there may be no circumstances to retard your proceeding to the southward, and that the command may be attended with the most interesting good consequences to the States, and the highest honor to yourself. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 14 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

In my letter of the 26th ultimo, by which I requested you to rejoin the army, I desired that you would come yourself to head-quarters. I have now to request, that you will proceed to West Point, and take upon you the command of that post and its dependencies. Major-General Greene, who is at present there, will either communicate to you himself, or leave with Major-General McDougall to be transferred, the instructions, which he received respecting the post, to which you will be pleased to attend. If this should not find you at West Point, it is my wish, that you should arrive there as soon as circumstances will possibly admit, and I hope there will be nothing to delay it. I am, dear Sir, with great regard and esteem, &c.\*

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## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters Passaic Falls, 15 October, 1780.

SIR,

I shall in obedience to the orders of Congress take the proper steps for a court of inquiry to be held on

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\* General Heath arrived at West Point, and took the command on the 16th of October.

the conduct of Major-General Gates, as commander of the southern army; and shall also, agreeably to their directions appoint an officer to command in his room, until such inquiry be made. Major-General Greene is the officer I shall nominate, who is at present at West Point. I am sorry to find, by the copies transmitted in your Excellency's letter of the 9th, that our affairs at the southward are in so deranged a state. I see not how we are to supply the defect of clothing and arms, unless those, which have been long expected from France, should speedily arrive.

I enclose to your Excellency a New York paper, which contains nothing material, except Arnold's address to the inhabitants of America. I am at a loss which to admire most, the confidence of Arnold in publishing it, or the folly of the enemy in supposing that a production signed by so infamous a character will have any weight with the people of these States, or any influence upon our affairs abroad. Our accounts from New York respecting the intended embarkation continue vague and contradictory. A few days ago it was said, that the troops designed for the expedition were all on board and that the fleet would sail immediately. I last night received intelligence, though not through a direct channel, that the troops were again disembarking, and that a plan entirely new was in agitation. Unluckily the person in whom I have the greatest confidence is afraid to take any measure for communicating with me just at this time, as he is apprehensive that Arnold may possibly have some knowledge of the connexion, and may have him watched. But as he is assured, that Arnold has not the most distant hint of him, I expect soon to hear from him as usual.

I have, in my several late letters to Governor Jefferson, mentioned the preparations in New York, and

have advised him to have all public stores removed from the navigable waters, lest the expedition should really, as they industriously propagate, be destined for Virginia. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 16 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am favored with yours of yesterday, accompanied by a letter from his Excellency Governor Clinton, who gives me an account of the incursion upon the frontiers. I am happy, that you detached Gansevoort's regiment immediately. You will be pleased to order either Weissenfels's or Willett's regiment, as you may judge proper, to follow and to take orders from the Governor, or the commanding officer. This is all the force I think we ought to detach from the posts, until the views of the enemy are more fully ascertained. They put off the long expected embarkation strangely. They had not sailed the 13th, and it was then said, that the expedition was delayed for some purpose. The numbers under orders, by estimation, are about two thousand or something upwards.

If the militia should not have been discharged, when this reaches you, be pleased to detain about five hundred, to make up for the detachment, which you have lately sent up the river. I have received yours of the 13th, as I have done that enclosing the estimates, for which I am much obliged. You will be pleased to carry into execution what you propose respecting the posts at Verplanck's and Stony Points.

It is represented to be indispensably necessary in the course of Smith's trial, that Colonel Lamb, Colonel



Livingston, and Mr. Kierse, the quartermaster, should attend the court-martial as witnesses. Their presence will be necessary on Thursday next. I have to request that you will notify them, and give them directions to attend accordingly if possible. I am, &c.

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TO COLONEL WILLIAM MALCOM.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic Falls, 16 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am obliged by the exertions, which you had been making to throw a present supply of provisions into Fort Schuyler; and congratulate you upon your success against the party of savages, which opposed you in your march up. A company of artillery from Colonel Lamb's regiment is ordered to relieve Captain Brown's. Warner's regiment will be incorporated the 1st of January. It will not, therefore, be worth while to remove it from its present station, as its time of existence will be so short. Spencer's will also undergo the same reform.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the situation of the country above, to give an opinion upon the propriety of evacuating Fort Schuyler, and establishing a post lower down. At any rate, this could not be done before the new post shall be in sufficient forwardness to receive the garrison immediately upon the evacuation of the old; and this, I take it, under our present circumstances, would be a work of considerable time. It is a matter, that will much depend upon the prevailing sentiment in the State, which is more immediately interested; and, as you have mentioned your opinion upon the subject to the Governor, he will, I imagine, take the necessary steps to have the measure adopted, should it be deemed eligible.

In your letter of the 8th of September, you say, that you shall for the present throw about three hundred and fifty men into the fort, whose times of service will expire the 1st of December. Be pleased to let me know, as soon as possible, whether you have made any alteration since, that I may govern myself in sending up the relief. Your command must, of consequence, expire with the service of your men.\* I shall be obliged to send up a Continental regiment to garrison the post, and the colonel must in course have the command. I am persuaded that you will, notwithstanding, take as effectual measures to lay in a winter supply of provision, wood, and other necessaries, as if you yourself were to remain. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 18 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Your letter of the 16th was delivered to me an hour since. I am aware, that the command you are entering upon will be attended with peculiar difficulties and embarrassments; but the confidence I have in your abilities, which determined me to choose you for it, assures me, that you will do every thing the means in your power will permit to surmount them and stop the progress of the evils, which have befallen and still menace the southern States. You may depend upon all the support I can give you, from the double motives of regard to you personally, and to the public good.

I wish that circumstances could be made to correspond with your wishes to spend a little time at home

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\* Colonel Malcom was now in command of New York levies, who had been raised for a temporary service.

previously to your setting out; but your presence with your command, as soon as possible, is indispensable. The embarkation at New York sailed the 16th, and is, in all probability, destined to coöperate with Earl Cornwallis, who, by the last advices, was advanced as far as Charlotte. I hope to see you without delay, and that your health will be no obstacle to your commencing your journey. With the sincerest regard and esteem, I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO PRESIDENT REED.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 18 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

By your favor of the 3d from Bethlehem, I perceive my letter of the 1st had not got to your hands; but I have the pleasure to find, that the business you were upon anticipated the purposes of it, and was in a fair way to answer the end.\*

Arnold's conduct is so villanously perfidious, that there are no terms which can describe the baseness of his heart. That overruling Providence, which has so often and so remarkably interposed in our favor, never manifested itself more conspicuously than in the timely discovery of his horrid design of surrendering the post and garrison of West Point into the hands of the enemy. I confine my remark to this single act of perfidy; for I am far from thinking he intended to hazard a defeat of this important object, by combining another with it, although there were circumstances which led to a contrary belief. The confidence and folly, which have

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\* General Washington had written, requesting President Reed to cause to be sent forward as expeditiously as possible a supply of flour to the army.



marked the subsequent conduct of this man, are of a piece with his villany ; and all three are perfect in their kind. The interest you take in my supposed escape, and the manner in which you speak of it, claim my thanks as much as if he had really intended to involve my fate with that of the garrison, and I consider it as a fresh instance of your affectionate regard for me.

As I do not recollect ever to have had any very particular conversation with General Schuyler respecting Arnold, I should be glad to obtain a copy of the letter in which you say my "opinion and confidence in him (Arnold) is conveyed in terms of affection and approbation." Some time before or after Arnold's return from Connecticut (the conversation made so little impression on me, that I know not which), General Schuyler informed me, that he had received a letter from Arnold, intimating his intention of joining the army, and rendering such services as his leg would permit, adding that he was incapable of active service, but could discharge the duties of a stationary command without much inconvenience or uneasiness to his leg. I answered, that, as we had a prospect of an active and vigorous campaign, I should be glad of General Arnold's aid and assistance, but saw little prospect of his obtaining such a command as appeared to be the object of his wishes, because it was my intention to draw my whole force into the field, when we were in circumstances to commence our operations against New York, leaving even West Point to the care of invalids, and a small garrison of militia ; but if, after this previous declaration, the command of the post, for the reasons he assigned, would be more convenient and agreeable to him than a command in the field, I should readily indulge him, having had it hinted to me, by a very

respectable character, a member of Congress\* (not General Schuyler), that a measure of this kind would not be unacceptable to the State most immediately interested in the welfare and safety of the post.

This, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, is every syllable that ever passed between General Schuyler and me respecting Arnold, or any of his concerns. The manner and the matter appeared perfectly uninteresting to both of us at the time. He seemed to have no other view in communicating the thing, than because he was requested to do it, and my answer, dictated by circumstances, you already have; but how it was communicated, the letter will show.

That General Schuyler possesses a share of my regard and confidence, I shall readily acknowledge. A pretty long acquaintance with him, an opinion of his abilities, his intimate knowledge of our circumstances, his candor as far as I have had opportunities of forming a judgment of it, added to personal civilities and proofs of a warm friendship, which I never had a doubt of, would leave me without excuse, were I to withhold these from him. What ascendancy he may have over the army is more than I can tell; but I should not be surprised if he stands in a favorable point of view with respect to their esteem. The means he took to acquire a true knowledge of their distresses while he was with them, the representations he made to procure relief, and his evident endeavours to promote the objects for which he was appointed, seem to have made this a natural consequence. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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\* Robert R. Livingston. See above, p. 95.

## TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RICHARD VARICK.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 21 October, 1780.

SIR,

I would willingly comply with your request for an inquiry, on the extensive ground you propose, did I think it could be done with propriety. But, in order for it to be a real and not a nominal inquiry, the court would be obliged to go into an investigation of particular facts, which is impossible, as there are no allegations and no witnesses; so that they would only proceed on such materials as you would furnish them. There seems to me to be too much generality in the inquiry, and that it is besides unnecessary, as your character, so far as I am informed, is unimpeached. In my opinion the proper line is to confine the inquiry to your conduct during your connexion with Arnold; and, as your former character will be a presumptive evidence of your present innocence, the court, I presume, will admit your testimonials respecting it, by the way, and in this light.\*

Colonel Meade, I am informed, has sent to you his deposition and the papers you requested. His going to Virginia prevented his personal attendance. I write to General Heath by this opportunity directing him to appoint a court. I am, with regard, &c.

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\* Colonel Varick had requested, that a court of inquiry might be appointed to investigate his conduct before he was Arnold's aid-de-camp, as well as during that period. This was thought by General Washington to be unnecessary. In the result it was established, that no just suspicions whatever could rest against the character of Colonel Varick. The court decided, that "his conduct was not only unimpeachable, but such as entitled him to a degree of merit, that did him great honor as an officer, and particularly distinguished him as a sincere friend to his country." A decision of the same import was made in regard to Colonel Franks, who was Arnold's other aid-de-camp, and who had likewise solicited a court of inquiry.



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 21 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The disposition you have made of the troops, at and near West Point, is agreeable to me. The two small regiments, at present at King's Ferry, were purposely stationed there, because they could not be brigaded with convenience. They are shortly to be reformed and incorporated, and therefore had best remain where they are until that time. General Greene had proposed to remove all the superfluous stores from those posts, so that, in case of necessity, they might be evacuated with little loss. He was of opinion, that the enemy, if they came up seriously, would run an armed vessel or two above them, and thereby render the removal of the stores by water impracticable. This seemed to be so probable a conjecture, that I desired him to strip them of all but a very few stores. You will be pleased to follow that method.

The minister of France may soon be expected from the eastward. Should he take West Point in his way, or should you hear certainly of his approach, be pleased to give me notice of it by express. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic Falls, 21 October, 1780.

SIR,

The advance of the British army towards the borders of North Carolina is an alarming circumstance, more especially as there is every reason to believe, that the force which lately sailed from New York is intended to

coöperate with them.\* The enemy, by several accounts, received a reinforcement from Europe in the last fleet. It is said by some to consist of two British regiments, about seven hundred German recruits, and some from Scotland. If so, this new accession is nearly equal to their late detachment; but others again say the reinforcement consists wholly of recruits. I have heard nothing directly from the northward since my letter of the 16th. There are reports, that the enemy retired after destroying Fort Anne, Fort George, and burning some houses. It is thought and perhaps not without foundation, that this incursion was made upon a supposition, that Arnold's treachery had succeeded.†

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\* General Leslie sailed from New York on the 16th of October, with about three thousand troops. He was instructed to enter the Chesapeake and establish a post on Elizabeth River, with the design of creating a diversion in favor of Lord Cornwallis's operations in North Carolina. General Leslie was to be under the command of Lord Cornwallis, and to act on James River towards the Roanoke, but not to pass this latter river without orders from his commander. Should Lord Cornwallis meet with serious opposition in crossing the Yadkin, it was recommended to General Leslie to move upon Cape Fear River, but this was left to his discretion. Should a post be established on the Chesapeake, it was Sir Henry Clinton's intention to reinforce it with more troops. "But while Washington remains in such force," said he, "and the French continue at Rhode Island, I do not think it advisable to weaken New York. If, however, he should send any detachments to the southward, I shall most likely do the same."—*MS. Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain, November 10th.*

† In a preceding letter General Washington had communicated to Congress intelligence of the incursion of the enemy from Canada, by the way both of Lake Champlain and of Niagara. A large force came up Lake Champlain and took Fort George and Fort Anne, with all the troops stationed in them. Captain Chipman commanded a part of Warner's regiment at Fort George. On the morning of the 11th of October, he despatched an express to Fort Edward for the purpose of obtaining provisions. While on his way this person was fired upon by a party of twenty-five men, but he escaped and returned to the fort. Captain Chipman, supposing the party to consist of a scout from the enemy, sent out all his garrison except fourteen men. This detachment met the enemy between Bloody Pond and Gage's Hill, where a conflict ensued, in which

Colonel Brodhead has in many of his late letters expressed his apprehension of the consequences, which may result from the want of provisions, should the enemy, agreeably to their threats, invest the post of Fort Pitt this winter. But by a letter from him of the 14th of September, matters had proceeded to such extremities, that the garrison, headed by the non-commissioned officers, had waited upon him, and he says in a decent manner remonstrated upon the hardship of having been without bread for five days. Upon being told that every thing would be done to relieve them, they retired in good order. Colonel Brodhead adds, that the country is not deficient in resources, but that public credit is exhausted, and will no longer procure supplies. Congress will therefore see the necessity of either furnishing the commissary to the westward with a competent sum of money, or of obtaining from the State of Pennsylvania an assurance, that the part of the quota of supplies demanded of her by the requi-

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almost every man was either killed or taken. The enemy marched to Fort George, which after a short resistance was surrendered by capitulation. Colonel Warner and Lieutenant-Colonel Safford were absent. The force of the enemy was estimated at eight hundred British troops, two hundred Indians, and two companies of Tories. Twenty-eight of the garrison were killed and fifty-six taken prisoners. Two days previously Captain Sherwood had surrendered Fort Anne and the whole garrison, consisting of seventy-seven men.

The invading troops approached Fort Edward, but were probably prevented from making an attack by a stratagem of Colonel Livingston, who commanded there. Hearing of the incursion of the enemy he wrote a letter to Captain Sherwood, on the morning of the day in which Fort Anne was surrendered, saying he was very strong and would support that garrison if attacked. He gave this letter to a messenger, who he had little doubt would carry it to the enemy, which he is presumed to have done, and thus to have saved that post from the fate, which had befallen the others. The garrison did not amount to seventy men. Parties of the enemy penetrated near to Saratoga. Thirty-five houses were burned. — *MS. Letter from Colonel Livingston, October 12th.* — *Colonel Warner's Letter, October 30th*



sition of Congress in February last, and directed to be deposited in the magazines at the westward, which were intended for the support of Fort Pitt, shall be immediately laid in, if it has not been already done. The importance of that post to the whole western frontier is so great, as not to admit of its being left to any risk, if it can be avoided.

Since I began this letter, I have received advices from Governor Clinton at Albany, who mentions that the party of the enemy, which came from the northward, had retired by the way of Lake George; but that another party from the westward had penetrated as far as Schoharie, which valuable settlement they had destroyed. The Governor himself was going to Schenectady to make a disposition of the force in that quarter. I have sent up two Continental regiments to his assistance, which I hope will be sufficient to repel the enemy, as they are not reported as very numerous. Fort Schuyler is well garrisoned, and has forty days' provision in it. I therefore hope no great danger is to be apprehended from the present incursion.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Instructions.

SIR,

Congress having been pleased, by their resolution of the 5th instant, to authorize me to appoint an officer to the command of the southern army, in the room of Major-General Gates, till an inquiry can be had into his conduct as therein directed, I have thought proper to choose you for this purpose. You will, therefore, proceed without delay to the southern army, now in

North Carolina, and take the command accordingly. Uninformed as I am of the enemy's force in that quarter, of our own, or of the resources, which it will be in our power to command for carrying on the war, I can give you no particular instructions, but must leave you to govern yourself entirely according to your own prudence and judgment, and the circumstances in which you find yourself. I am aware, that the nature of the command will offer you embarrassments of a singular and complicated nature; but I rely upon your abilities and exertions for every thing your means will enable you to effect. I give you a letter to Congress, informing them of your appointment, and requesting them to give you such powers and such support, as your situation and the good of the service demand. You will take their orders in your way to the southward.

I also propose to them to send Baron Steuben to the southward with you. His talents, knowledge of service, zeal, and activity will make him very useful to you in all respects, and particularly in the formation and regulation of the raw troops, who will principally compose the southern army. You will give him a command suited to his rank, besides employing him as inspector-general. If Congress approve it, he will take your orders at Philadelphia. I have put Major Lee's corps under marching orders, and, so soon as he is ready, shall detach him to join you.

As it is necessary, that the inquiry into the conduct of Major-General Gates should be conducted in the quarter in which he has acted, where all the witnesses are, and where alone the requisite information can be obtained, I have to desire, that, as soon as the situation of affairs will possibly permit, you will nominate a court of inquiry to examine into his case, agreeably to the forementioned resolution of Congress. Baron Steuben

will preside at this court, and the members of it will consist of such general and field officers of the Continental troops, as were not present at the battle of Camden, or, having been present, are not wanted as witnesses, or are persons to whom Major-General Gates has no objection. I wish this affair to be conducted with the greatest impartiality, and with as much despatch as circumstances will permit. You will, on your arrival at the army, take the sense in writing of the general officers and other principal officers, concerning the practicability of an immediate inquiry. If they judge it practicable, on the principles of these instructions, you will have it carried into execution. If they do not think it can take place immediately, you will inform General Gates of it, and transmit to me their determination; and you will from time to time pursue the same mode, that any delay which may happen may appear, as I am persuaded it will really be, unavoidable. The court need not consist of more than five, nor must it consist of less than three members; and in all cases there must be three general officers. Should General Gates have any objection to the mode of inquiry, which he wishes to make to Congress or to me, you will suspend proceeding in the affair, until he transmits his objection, and you receive further orders. You will keep me constantly advised of the state of your affairs, and of every material occurrence. My warmest wishes for your success, reputation, health, and happiness accompany you. Given at Head-Quarters, Preakness, October 22d, 1780.\*

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\* Congress by a formal resolve approved the appointment of Major-General Greene, and invested him with all the powers formerly conferred on General Gates, and the additional one of negotiating an exchange of prisoners. His command included all the regular troops raised at the south, from the State of Delaware to Georgia inclusive. — *Journals*, October 30th.



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 22 October, 1780.

SIR,

I enclose to you a resolution of Congress of the 5th instant, directing me to order a court of inquiry to be held on your conduct, as commander of the southern army, and to appoint an officer to command that army in your room, until such inquiry be made. In obedience to this order, I have appointed Major-General Greene to the command; and I have instructed him respecting the inquiry, in the manner which the enclosed extract from his instructions will show. It appears to me, that the business could be nowhere so properly conducted as with the army, where the transactions, which enter into the inquiry, took place, and where every kind of light can with the most facility be obtained. I could not, however, order it immediately to commence, because it is possible, that the situation of affairs might render it impracticable; but I have endeavoured to take every precaution to prevent delay, if it is not unavoidable. Should you have any objection to the mode proposed, I shall be obliged to you to communicate it to me, with your reasons; in the fullest assurance, that it is my aim to execute the orders of Congress in the manner most consistent with justice to the public and to yourself. In this case, General Greene will suspend proceeding, till I receive your objections, and send him further instructions. I am, &c.\*

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\* When General Greene joined the southern army, it was General Gates's wish, that the court of inquiry might be immediately convened. "It is true," said he, "there are some evidences I could wish were here, that cannot at present be procured; but innocence and integrity induce me to be confident, that the honor and justice of the court of inquiry will make every allowance for that deficiency." A council of general officers decided, however, that in the state of the army at that time it was not

TO THOMAS S. LEE, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND.

Head-Quarters, 22 October, 1780.

SIR,

Major-General Greene, who goes to take command of the southern army, will have the honor of presenting this to your Excellency. I have advised him to take the several States in his way, which are immediately concerned in furnishing men and supplies for the department committed to his direction, that he may gain a more accurate knowledge of the forwardness they are in, a tolerable idea of what may be his future expectations, and endeavour to settle some plans for the regular support and subsistence of the army in provisions, forage, and transportation.

I am well aware of the embarrassments under which the southern States labor, and of the many difficulties which are to be surmounted. But I have a very full dependence that the most vigorous exertions will be made by them upon the present occasion; and the entire confidence I have in the abilities, fortitude, and integrity of General Greene, founded on a long and intimate experience of them, assures me that he will do every thing his means will enable him to do; and I doubt not that candid allowances will be made for the peculiar difficulties he has to encounter. I recommend him to your State as worthy of its utmost confidence and support, and to your Excellency personally as one whom I rank among the number of my friends. With the greatest respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

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practicable for a court to be summoned. It would interfere with important operations, and render it necessary to call Baron Steuben from Virginia, where his services were essential. The time of assembling the court was accordingly deferred, and General Gates retired to his residence in the county of Berkeley in Virginia.

## TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 22 October, 1780.

DEAR BARON,

Though I am sensible how important your services would be in this quarter, yet, as at the southward there is an army to be created, the mass of which is without any formation at all, your services there would be still more essential; and, as I am persuaded that your inclination is to be wherever you can be most useful, I have recommended it to Congress to send you with General Greene to the southern army. If Congress approve, you will take his orders and proceed as speedily as possible. I wish you may have been able previously to obtain a satisfactory establishment of your department, which, in your absence, will become more necessary than it has been heretofore. But, if it is not done, I would not have it detain you. Assure yourself that, wherever you are, my best wishes for your success and happiness attend you. I am with great regard, dear Baron, &c.

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## TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 23 October, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

I shall with the greatest pleasure apply to Sir Henry Clinton for the permission you wish for Mrs. Mathews, the moment the Board of War make their application for the vessel. As I have heard nothing concerning this from them, I presume it is not done, and before it is, the other request would be premature. I shall be happy if any thing on my part can promote your wishes in an article so interesting to yourself and family; and



of this I beg you to assure Mrs. Mathews with my respects.\*

Our southern affairs wear a most disagreeable aspect, and prove more and more the necessity of renouncing that feeble system, which has brought this country to so perplexing a crisis. If there were any hope of our counsels assuming that complexion, which the exigency demands, the progress of the enemy at this period would seem to me an advantage rather than an evil; for they have not force sufficient for such extensive conquests, and by spreading themselves out, as they are now doing, they will render themselves vulnerable every where. But I see no chance of the change of which we stand in need, and therefore I fear they will realize their anticipations. You have your wish in the officer appointed to the southern command. I think I am giving you a general, but what can a general do, without men, without arms, without clothing, without stores, without provisions? Lee's corps will also go to the southward. I believe it will be found very useful. The corps itself is an excellent one, and the officer at the head of it has great resources of genius. With the truest regard and attachment, I am, &c.

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\* Mr. Mathews had requested General Washington to obtain from Sir Henry Clinton permission for his wife to return to South Carolina in a flag-ship, which was to sail in a few days. "My situation here," said Mr. Mathews, in writing from Philadelphia, "is truly distressing. I have no dependence but on an empty treasury for my support, and when the little money I have left is exhausted, I know not where I am to apply for more. Although the duties of my station demand of me to undergo every species of inconvenience and distress, yet I do not think I can with any degree of propriety impose the same on her. Could I see the least prospect of an alteration for the better in our affairs, I could be content to wait with patience; but when, on the contrary, I daily see them grow worse, and the treasury cannot furnish so much money as will support those few delegates, who have no other resource, I think it necessary for me to bear alone the mortification, that must necessarily ensue." — *October 14th.* Sir Henry Clinton did not grant the request.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL MCDUGALL.

Head-Quarters, 24 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am informed that the State has recently called upon you to repair to Congress, so soon as you have obtained permission to leave the army. I think your presence there, at this juncture, while all the arrangements for the next campaign are before them, would be of so much utility, that I cannot but take the liberty to urge your immediate compliance with the pleasure of the State. It appears to me that you can in no way at this time so essentially serve the public as by going there. The moment is singularly critical, and the determinations depending must have the greatest influence upon our future affairs. I am, &c.\*

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## TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MARINUS WILLETT.

Head-Quarters, 24 October, 1780.

SIR,

Congress have it in contemplation to reduce the number of regiments; but the mode, or terms, on which the reformed officers are to go out, are not yet fixed. It will give me great pleasure to see an officer of your merit retained in service; but your determination to submit cheerfully to any regulations, which may be deemed necessary for the public good, is very laudable, and the surest mark of a disinterested, worthy citizen. I have not heard any thing of the formation of a legion. Colonel Hazen's regiment is the only one of the independent corps of infantry, which Congress propose keeping up. I am, &c.

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\* General McDougall had been appointed a delegate in Congress by the State of New York, but he did not take his seat till the following January.

## TO THE BOARD OF WAR.

Head-Quarters, 25 October, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,

The enemy seem to be practising the arts of corruption so extensively, that I think we cannot be too much upon our guard against its effects, nor ought we to neglect any clues that may lead to discoveries; but, on the other hand, we ought to be equally circumspect in admitting suspicions or proceeding upon them without sufficient evidence. It will be the policy of the enemy to distract us, as much as possible, by sowing jealousies, and, if we swallow the bait, no character will be safe. There will be nothing but mutual distrust. In the present case, from every thing I have heard of your informant, I should suspect him of the worst intentions; and, notwithstanding what we are told about the motives, which obliged him to leave the enemy, I still think it probable he came out as a spy, and that the assigned causes are either altogether fictitious, or, being real, were made the inducement with him for undertaking the errand to avoid punishment, as well as obtain a reward. The kind of information he is willing to give may be received; but in my opinion it would be a very improper foundation for an inquiry, unless the circumstances of it have much more weight than the character of the witness. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 28 October, 1780.

SIR,

As it is necessary, that there should be an officer, in whom the State has confidence, to take the general



direction of affairs at Albany and on the frontier, I have fixed upon you for this purpose; and I request, that you will proceed to Albany without delay, and assume the command. You will be particularly attentive to the post of Fort Schuyler, and do every thing in your power to have it supplied with a good stock of provision and stores; and you will take every other precaution, which the means at your command will permit, for the security of the frontier, giving me the most early advice of any incursions of the enemy. I inform General Heath of your appointment. I am, with great esteem and regard, Sir, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 30 October, 1780.

It is impossible, my dear Marquis, to desire more ardently than I do to terminate the campaign by some happy stroke; but we must consult our means rather than our wishes, and not endeavour to better our affairs by attempting things, which for want of success may make them worse. We are to lament, that there has been a misapprehension of our circumstances in Europe; but, to endeavour to recover our reputation, we should take care that we do not injure it more. Ever since it became evident, that the allied arms could not coöperate this campaign, I have had an eye to the point you mention, determined, if a favorable opening should offer, to embrace it; but, so far as my information goes, the enterprise would not be warranted. It would in my opinion be imprudent to throw an army of ten thousand men upon an Island against nine thousand, exclusive of seamen and militia. This, from the ac-

counts we have, appears to be the enemy's force. All we can do at present, therefore, is to endeavour to gain a more certain knowledge of their situation and act accordingly. This I have been some time employed in doing, but hitherto with little success. I shall thank you for any aids you can afford. Arnold's flight seems to have frightened all my intelligencers out of their senses. I am sincerely and affectionately yours.\*

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TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 5 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I congratulate you upon your safe return from your late excursion, and upon the success, which attended General Van Rensselaer's attack upon the enemy in their retreat. It is to be regretted, that your Excellency was not near enough with the reinforcement to take advantage of their situation. The damage, which has been done,† will, I fear, be severely felt by the pub-

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\* The Marquis de Lafayette, being now in command of the six battalions of Light Infantry, stationed in advance of the main army, was extremely anxious to effect some important enterprise before the campaign should be brought to a close. A descent upon Staten Island had been projected, which was to be conducted by him; but it was rendered impracticable by the want of boats and of other necessary preparations. He had written a letter to General Washington, to which the above was a reply, urging for various political reasons an attack upon the upper part of New York Island. See this letter in the APPENDIX, No. IX.

† The ravages committed on the Mohawk River by large bodies of Indians and Tories, under Sir John Johnson and Joseph Brant, had spread great alarm throughout that region. Governor Clinton went out himself at the head of the militia to repel the invaders. Before his arrival, General Van Rensselaer with a party of militia had attacked and driven them back. A short time previously to this event, Colonel Brown from Massachusetts, and more than thirty of his men, were killed while bravely fighting to check the advance of the enemy.



lic, as well as by individuals. We had the most pleasing prospects of forming considerable magazines of bread from the country, which has been laid waste, and which from your Excellency's letter is so extensive, that I am apprehensive we shall be obliged to bring flour from the southward to support the troops at and near West Point. You will be pleased to give me your opinion upon the quantity of flour that may yet, with probability, be procured above, in the course of the winter, that I may form some calculation of the quantity, which it will be necessary to draw from Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.

I am very sorry that the troops of your State should look upon it as a hardship to do the garrison duty of Fort Schuyler. I had always allotted it to them, as thinking it would be agreeable to both officers and men to guard their own frontier, especially when they were not continued an unreasonable time upon the tour. The frontier posts of Pennsylvania and Virginia have been constantly garrisoned by their own regiments, which have not been relieved these two years.

I have appointed Brigadier-General Clinton to take the command in the northern department, and have ordered him to repair to Albany for that purpose. I am convinced he will second every measure, which may be thought expedient for the security of the frontier. I am much obliged to your Excellency for the attention, which you promise to pay to the provisioning of Fort Schuyler. I daily expect four or five hundred barrels of salt beef from Connecticut; as soon as they arrive upon the North River, part of them shall be sent up to Albany for the garrison of Fort Schuyler. I desired Governor Trumbull to hurry them on, that they might be got up in all this month. I am very happy to find, that the legislature have vested your Excellency with



the power of complying with the requisitions of Congress for completing the new army.

Our affairs at the southward put on a more pleasing aspect since the defeat of Colonel Ferguson. Lord Cornwallis was retreating precipitately from Charlotte, and giving up a fine district of country, which he had in possession. But the diversion, which General Leslie will occasion by taking post in Virginia, will, I fear, operate against the formation of the southern army, and embarrass us on the score of supplies. Another embarkation is preparing at New York, which I have no doubt is also intended for the southward, as without considerable reinforcements they must abandon their late conquests in that quarter. I am, Sir, &c.

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TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

Head-Quarters, 6 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Your favors of the 31st ultimo and 1st instant were this day forwarded to me by his Excellency Governor Clinton. I immediately ordered Major-General Heath to detach the three remaining regiments of the York brigade, if he could conveniently spare them all, to Albany, where they will receive further orders from Brigadier-General Clinton. Should any intelligence, which you may receive, make it unnecessary for these troops to advance, you will communicate it to General Heath.

I confess, all circumstances and previous information considered, that matters in a certain quarter carry a very suspicious face. Should it appear, upon a further investigation, that there are good grounds for present suspicions, you will concert measures with Brigadier-

General Clinton (to whom I have written upon the subject, without mentioning names), to seize and secure, with as much secrecy and as suddenly as possible, the person in question with his papers. You know how very delicate a business this is, and I therefore trust to your prudence in the execution of it. Nothing but the most palpable proofs ought to warrant the seizure of his person. But a variety of means may be fallen upon to circumvent and defeat their plans, when you have a regular force to depend upon. I shall not order down Gansevoort's regiment, while there appears to be occasion for them.\* Colonel Hamilton went to Philadelphia the day before yesterday, but will be back the latter end of this week. When he returns, I will communicate what you desire to him. I am, &c.

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TO ABNER NASH, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Head-Quarters, 6 November, 1780.

SIR,

I had the honor yesterday to receive your Excellency's letter of the 6th of October, and am extremely obliged to you for the intelligence contained in it. It is of so great importance, that the earliest and best intelligence of all the great movements and designs of the enemy, as well as of the situation of our own affairs, should be obtained, that I must entreat you will be so good as to favor me with such communications, as may have any influence on our military arrangements and operations.

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\* The leaders in Vermont were at this time holding a correspondence with the British commanders in Canada, a partial account of which had come to the knowledge of General Schuyler, and which seemed mysterious. The matter is explained in SPARKS'S *Life of Ethan Allen*. See *The Library of American Biography*, Vol. I. p. 341.

While I sincerely lament the distressed and exhausted situation of the southern States, I cannot but hope the enemy have committed themselves so far as to be made to repent their temerity ; especially since I have received information, of a more recent date than your letter, of the success of the militia against Colonel Ferguson. This I flatter myself will give a better aspect to your affairs, and will awaken more extensively that spirit of bravery and enterprise, which displayed itself so conspicuously on that occasion.

The enemy seem again to have adopted the same system of policy, which they have before prosecuted with but too much success, of making detachments to the southward at a time when our army is greatly reduced by the expiration of the service of the levies, who were raised for the campaign only. Besides the detachment under General Leslie, which has landed in Virginia, it is reported another embarkation is taking place at New York. But I have great confidence in the exertion of the southern States, when their all is at stake, and in the abilities of General Greene to call forth and apply the resources of the country in the best and most effectual manner to its defence. Baron Steuben, who accompanies him, possesses the most distinguished military talents, and has rendered signal service to this army as inspector-general. Major Lee has also marched to join the southern army with his legion. The arrival of a reinforcement in New York, nearly equal to the late detachment, and the incursion of a large force, of which I have just received intelligence, from Canada on the northern and western frontiers of the State of New York, where great devastation has already been committed, will I fear render it impossible to make any farther detachments from this army to the southward. I have the honor to be, &c.



## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 7 November, 1780.

SIR,

I am happy to find that my appointment of Major-General Greene to the command of the southern army meets the approbation of Congress. By letters from Governor Clinton I find, that the enemy have gone off for the present from the Mohawk River, after totally destroying the country as low down as Schoharie. Those upon the northern quarter had repassed Lake George, and were again proceeding towards St. John's, but suddenly returned with a reinforcement, and were, by accounts from General Schuyler of the 1st instant, assembled in so considerable a force at Ticonderoga, that I have thought proper to send up the remainder of the New York brigade from West Point to Albany, that they may be ready to act as circumstances may require. The destruction of the grain upon the western frontier of the State of New York is likely to be attended with the most alarming consequences, in respect to the formation of magazines upon the North River. We had prospects of establishing a very considerable magazine of flour in that quarter, previously to the late incursion. The settlement of Schoharie alone would have delivered eighty thousand bushels of grain, but that fine district is now totally destroyed. I should view the calamity with less concern, did I see the least prospect of obtaining the necessary supplies of flour from the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, previously to the interruption of transportation by frost and bad roads.

While our army is experiencing almost daily want, that of the enemy in New York is deriving ample supplies from a trade with the adjacent States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, which has by de-

grees become so common, that it is hardly thought a crime. It is true there are, in those States, laws imposing a penalty upon this criminal commerce ; but it is so light or so little attended to, that it does not prevent the practice. The markets of New York are so well supplied, that a great number of mouths, which would otherwise be fed from the public magazines, are now supported upon the fresh meats and flour of the country, by which means the enemy have been often enabled to bear the disappointments of the arrival of their provision fleets without much inconvenience ; and, if report be true, they would at this very time experience distress for the want of their long expected Irish fleet, if the resources of the country were effectually cut off from them. This cannot be done by military measures alone, except in cases of blockade or siege, and much less will it be in my power to do it with our army in the weak state it is verging to. I believe that most nations make it capital for their subjects to furnish their enemies with provisions and military stores during a war. Were this done by the several States, and the laws rigidly put in execution in a few instances, the practice would be stopped. Without something of the kind, the enemy, while they have a kind of money superior in value to ours, will find little difficulty in making up the losses, which they now and then meet with at sea, and which would very much embarrass their operations, had they no immediate mode of making good the deficiency.

I have the pleasure to inform Congress, that, at the late meeting of the respective commissaries, the exchanges of about one hundred and forty of our officers, and all our privates in New York, amounting to four hundred and seventy-six, were effected. Among the former are Major-General Lincoln, Brigadier-Generals

Thompson, Waterbury, and Duportail, and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens. Sir Henry Clinton having made a proposal of exchanging a further number of the convention officers, without attaching men to them, I have acceded to it, by which we shall liberate all our officers in this quarter, except one brigadier-general (Irvine), nine colonels, one captain, and thirty-nine lieutenants. An offer is made by Sir Henry Clinton to exchange all those, also, for a division of the convention troops, by composition where rank will not apply. To this I have refused to accede, unless Lieutenant-General Burgoyne is taken into the account. If they will agree to this, he alone will liberate nearly the whole of them. They have further proposed a general exchange of the convention troops, officers and men, for our prisoners of war at the southward. I have not thought proper to enter at all upon the business of southern prisoners at present, because I have but a very imperfect state of them, and because I perceive by the powers granted to Major-General Greene, that he is at liberty to negotiate the exchange of prisoners in that quarter.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic Falls, 8 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am glad to find your appointment so agreeable to the views and wishes of Congress. So fully sensible have I long been of the distressed situation of the army, not only in this quarter, but also at the southward, and in all our great departments, from the embarrassed state of our finances, that it has been a constant subject of representation in the strongest terms not only to Con-



gress and to the States individually, but particularly so to the minister of France at our last interview; and that a foreign loan was absolutely necessary to retrieve our affairs. My ideas therefore must have been exceedingly misapprehended by him, or his by Baron Steuben.

I entirely approve of your plan for forming a flying army. And in addition to this, if the enemy should continue to harass those parts of Virginia, which are intersected with large navigable rivers, I would recommend the building of a number of flat-boats, of as large construction as can be conveniently transported on carriages. This I conceive might be of great utility, by furnishing the means to take advantage of the enemy's situation by crossing those rivers, which would otherwise be impassable. I have also written to Governor Jefferson on the subject. If a spirit of patriotism, or even a true policy, animates the merchants and men of property in the southern States, a subscription may be attended with success; at least the experiment can do no injury. General Knox has received directions to send forward the company of artillery. An order will be given for the thousand stands of arms.

Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens will have heard of his exchange before this time, and is at liberty to go to the southward if he thinks proper. With respect to the power, which Congress have invested you with, to make exchanges, I should suppose it regarded the prisoners taken in the southern department on the usual principles, without involving the convention or any other troops to the northward. A pretty extensive exchange has just taken place in this quarter. It is impossible, from the non-arrival of the French arms, and the scarcity in the eastern States, to furnish those requested by you. Nor do I think the legion of the Duke de Lau-

zun can be detached from the French army. The fleet of Arbuthnot, which still blockades that of France in the harbour of Newport, effectually precludes the execution of the other plan. Our last advices from the northward mentioned another incursion of the enemy from Canada in greater force; in consequence of which the remainder of the York brigade is ordered thither. There are reports, that an embarkation is about to be made at New York; but the accounts are vague and contradictory, and the fact not yet ascertained. I have to request that you will be pleased to send by a flag of truce the enclosed letter to Brigadier-General Duportail, who is exchanged. I am, dear Sir, &c

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN, AT BOSTON.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 8 November, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have now the pleasure to congratulate you upon your exchange. The certificate of it will be transmitted to you by the commissary of prisoners. Majors Baylies and Jackson are also exchanged. I do not mean by this notice to hasten your return to the army; for that, alas! is upon the eve of its annual dissolution; consequently of the enemy's advantages. I am of the opinion, that your influence and exertions in procuring the State's quota of troops for the war, providing funds for the subsistence of them, and magazines, will be of infinitely more importance in your own State this winter, than it can be to become a mere spectator of the hunger and cold, or a fellow-sufferer from the scantiness of provision and clothing, which I expect the small remains of our army will have to encounter in a very short time, and more than probably to contend with

during the winter. But at the same time I give this as an opinion; and I leave you at full liberty to pursue the bent of your inclination and judgment, being very sincerely, dear Sir, &c.

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## TO GOVERNOR JEFFERSON.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 8 November, 1780.

SIR,

We have already had reports, that the enemy left Portsmouth precipitately a few days after landing. I shall be happy to hear it confirmed, as well as the cause to which their hurry is attributed, that of the appearance of a French or Spanish fleet upon the coast of Carolina. Should the account be premature, and should they establish a post in Virginia, I think it will be good policy to remove the troops of convention to a greater distance from them. General Phillips has applied for passports for a flag-vessel to proceed to James River as heretofore, with clothing and other necessaries for those troops. This will be granted; and, should they be removed from Charlottesville, your Excellency will be pleased, upon the arrival of the vessel in James River, to give directions for her to proceed to the most convenient place of debarkation, relatively to the position in which the troops may be.

I am glad to hear that you have permitted Governor Hamilton and Major Hayes to go to New York; while they remain there upon parole, they will be less capable of concerting mischief than in Virginia, and it will deprive the enemy of a pretext for complaining that they are treated with rigor. Another embarkation is said to be preparing at New York, and I think it a very probable circumstance, considering the situation of the



enemy's affairs in South Carolina and ours in this quarter. They are well acquainted with the expiration of the times of the better half of our army the latter end of December, and they know they may safely detach a number equal to that we disband, from this time to the month of May or June next, which is as soon as we generally get our recruits into the field. Should the enemy continue in the lower parts of Virginia, they will have every advantage by being able to move up and down the rivers in small parties, while it will be out of our power to molest them for want of the means of suddenly transporting ourselves across those rivers to come at them. This might be in a very great degree obviated, and they kept in check, if we had a number of flat-boats upon travelling carriages attending the army collected to watch their motions. We could then move across from river to river with more rapidity than they could go down one and up another, and none of their detachments would ever be secure by having the water between them and us. Major-General Greene is perfectly acquainted with the kind of boats I have mentioned, and with the mode of preparing them. He will give the proper directions for having them constructed, should your Excellency approve the plan. Newcastle I think from its situation would be a good and safe place to build the boats.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

Head-Quarters, 11 November, 1780.

SIR,

I have received your letter of the 7th instant, with the enclosures. The destruction of the forage, collect-

ed for the use of the British army at Coram, is of so much consequence, that I should advise the attempt to be made. I have written to Colonel Sheldon to furnish a detachment of dismounted dragoons, and will commit the execution to you. If the party of refugees at Smith's House can be attempted without frustrating the other design, or running too great a hazard, I have no objection. But you must remember, that this is only a secondary object, and in all cases you will take the most prudent means to secure a retreat. Confiding entirely in your prudence, as well as enterprise, and wishing you success, I am, Sir, &c.\*

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 16 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Your forage will be made to subserve a project, which I have in view, and the success of which will depend upon a concurrence of things and upon causes that are unalterable. I have to request, that matters may be so ordered by you, as that the detachment

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\* In consequence of this letter Major Tallmadge ordered a detachment of Sheldon's dismounted dragoons to repair to Fairfield. They were there met by other troops, and on the 21st of November, at four o'clock in the evening, the party embarked in eight boats under the command of Major Tallmadge. Including the crews of the boats the party consisted of eighty men. They crossed the Sound in four hours at a place where it was twenty miles broad, and landed on Long Island. Leaving twenty men in charge of the boats, Major Tallmadge marched into the Island with the design of attacking Fort St. George at South Haven. A severe storm compelled him to delay the march till the evening of the 22d, when he pushed forward across the Island, and at three o'clock the next morning he was within two miles of the fort. He then divided his men into three parties, ordering them to attack the fort at three different points. This order was so well executed, that the three divisions arrived nearly at the same moment, and, forcing their way through a strong *abatis* and

employed on this occasion may be at White Plains, or as low down as you mean they shall go, by two o'clock on Thursday the 23d instant. They will remain there that night upon their arms; and, as it is not unlikely that the enemy, if they are in force at Kingsbridge, may attempt to surprise them, a vigilant lookout is to be kept, and small parties of horse and foot employed in patrolling the different roads leading from the enemy's lines.

It is my earnest wish, that you may make your foraging party as strong, and have it as well officered, as possible. I am of opinion, that you may trust the several works (as it will be for a few days only, and this body will be in advance of them) to the invalids, and to such troops as are rendered unfit for the field on account of clothing. The guard-boats should, upon this occasion, be uncommonly alert. They should proceed as low down as they can with safety, and so dispose of themselves as by signals to communicate the quickest intelligence of any movements on the river. A chain of expresses may also be fixed between the foragers

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other obstructions, met within the walls of the fort. They were fired upon from the houses and barracks, but these were immediately assailed and carried, and the whole garrison taken prisoners. It was now four o'clock in the morning. The barracks and every thing combustible within the fort were burnt; as was also a vessel in the harbour freighted with public stores. The number of prisoners was fifty-four, of whom seven were wounded. While these were marched back to the boats under an escort, Major Tallmadge proceeded with a small detachment and burnt three hundred tons of hay at Coram. They all at length arrived at the boats by four o'clock in the afternoon, embarked, and reached Fairfield at eleven the same evening with their prisoners, having thus accomplished the enterprise, including a march of forty miles by land, in fifty-five hours without the loss of a man. — *Major Tallmadge's Letter, November 25th.*

Congress passed a resolve complimentary to the commander and troops engaged in this expedition, which was said to have been "planned and conducted with wisdom and great gallantry by Major Tallmadge, and executed with intrepidity and complete success by the officers and soldiers of his detachment." — *Journals, December 6th.*



and your quarters, for the purpose of speedy information of any extraordinary event or occurrence below.

It is unnecessary to be more explicit. Your own judgment and conviction of the precision, with which this business, especially in point of time, should be executed, will supply any omission of mine. The time of being at White Plains in force, under the appearance of a large forage, if you cannot make it real, is the first object to be attended to. I dare not commit my project to writing, for fear of a miscarriage of my letter; but it is more than probable, that between this and the day of execution I shall send an officer to you with a detailed account of it.\* So soon as this comes to hand, I beg of you to send by water five boats of the largest size that can be conveniently transported on carriages to the Slote above Dobbs's Ferry, where I will have them met by carriages. Let there be five good watermen from the Jersey line, if they have them, allotted (with their arms and accoutrements) to each boat, under the care of an active, intelligent subaltern, who is also a good waterman. If there should be any armed vessels in the river above Dobbs's Ferry let me know it, that I may order the carriages to King's Ferry. The officer and men are to attend the boats by land as well as by water.

Sending the invalids and badly clothed men of Pennsylvania to Morristown, those of Massachusetts and Connecticut to West Point, and the artillerists to New Windsor, strongly marks the cantonments of the army;

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\* This project was an attack on the posts in the northern part of New York Island. The foraging party was intended to operate as a feint, and to divert the attention of the enemy in another direction at the time of the attack. General Stark commanded the detachment, consisting of two thousand five hundred men, destined for this object. He left West Point on the 21st, and marched to White Plains. — *Heath's Memoirs*, p. 264.

and this will be made more manifest, when Major Gibbs fixes upon my quarters, for which purpose he is now gone up to New Windsor. The detachment from the Massachusetts and Connecticut lines, now on their march to West Point, including ten hearty and well clothed men from a detachment of their regiment, amounts to fourteen hundred men, which will enable you to enlarge your foraging party very considerably. The enclosed for Colonel Gouvion requires his attendance at head-quarters. With much esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO PRESIDENT REED.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 20 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Your favor of the 15th is just come to hand. I cannot suffer myself to delay a moment in pronouncing, that, if Arnold, by the words (in his letter to his wife), "I am treated with the greatest politeness by General Washington and the officers of the army, who bitterly execrate Mr. Reed and the Council for their villanous attempt to injure me," meant to comprehend me in the latter part of the expression, he asserted an absolute falsehood. It was at no time my inclination, much less my intention, to become a party in his cause; and I certainly could not be so lost to my own character, as to become a partisan at the moment I was called upon officially to bring him to trial. I am not less mistaken, if he has not extended the former part of the paragraph a little too far. True it is, he self-invited some civilities I never meant to show him, or any officer in arrest, and he received rebuke before I could convince him of the impropriety of his entering upon a justification of his

conduct in my presence, and for bestowing such illiberal abuse as he seemed disposed to do upon those whom he denominated his persecutors. Although you have done me the justice to disbelieve Arnold's assertion to his wife, a regard to my own feelings and character claims a declaration of the falsehood of it from, dear Sir, your most obedient and affectionate, &c.

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TO JOHN SULLIVAN, IN CONGRESS.\*

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 20 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You have obliged me very much by your friendly letter, and I can assure you that I shall be very happy in your correspondence. You are too well acquainted with my course of business to expect frequent or long letters from me, but I can truly say that I shall write to none with more pleasure, when it is in my power to write at all, than to you. The determination of Congress to raise an army for the war, and the honorable establishment on which the officers are placed, will, I am persuaded, be productive of much good. Had the first measure been adopted four, or even three years ago, I have not the smallest doubt in my mind but we should at this day have been sitting under our own vines and fig-trees in the full enjoyment of peace and independence; and I have as little doubt, that the value which I trust officers will now set upon their commissions will prove the surest basis of public economy. It was idle to expect, that men who were suffering every

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\* General Sullivan, having resigned his commission in the army, and been appointed a delegate to Congress from New Hampshire, took his seat in that body on the 11th of September.



species of present distress, with the prospect of inevitable ruin before them, could bear to have the cord of discipline strained to its proper tone; and where that is not the case, it is no difficult matter to form an idea of the want of order, or to convince military men of its consequent evils.

It is to be lamented, that the call upon the States for specific supplies should come at this late hour, because it is much to be feared that, before those at a distance can be furnished with the resolves and make their arrangements, the season for salting provision will be irretrievably lost; and this leads me to a remark, which I could wish never to make, and which is, that the multiplicity of business, in which Congress are engaged, will not let them extend that seasonable and provident care to many matters, which private convenience and public economy indispensably call for, and proves, in my opinion, the evident necessity of committing more of the executive business to small boards or responsible characters, than is practised at present; for I am very well convinced, that, for want of system in the execution of business, and a proper timing of things, our public expenditures are inconceivably greater than they ought to be.

Many instances might be given in proof, but I will confine myself to the article of clothing, as we are feelingly reminded of it. This, instead of being ready in the fall for delivery, is then to be provided, or to be drawn from the Lord knows whither; and, after many soldiers have been forced from the field for want of it, is eked out at different periods, as it can be had through the winter, till spring, and in such a piecemeal way, that the soldier, deriving little comfort from it, is hurt both in appearance and pride, while the recruiting service is greatly injured. Were this the result of neces-

sity, not a word would be said ; but it is the effect of a divided attention, or overmuch business ; for, at the periods of the extreme suffering of the army, we can hear of clothing in different places falling a prey to moths, and canker-worms of a worse kind ; and I am much mistaken, too, if the clothing system (if ours can be called a system) does not afford a fruitful field for stockjobbing.

It may be asked what remedy I would apply to these evils ? In my opinion there is a plain and easy one. It will not, I acknowledge, give relief to our immediate and pressing wants, no more than order can succeed confusion in a moment ; but, as both must have a beginning, let Congress without delay (for this is the season to be looking forward to the supplies for another year) employ some eminent merchant of approved integrity and abilities, to import, in his own way, materials for the annual clothing of officers and men, agreeably to estimates to be furnished by the clothier-general. Or, if they prefer it, let these imports be made by a committee of their own body. When a stock is once obtained, discontinue all Continental agents for Continental purposes, and confine the business of clothing the army wholly to the importer, clothier-general, and regimental clothiers. This would be easy and simple, and would soon extricate that department from those embarrassments and impositions, which have a tendency to distress individuals and load the public with an enormous expense. At present we do not know where or to whom to apply. I have made the distresses of the army known to Congress, the Board of War, and the States individually, without learning from whence the supplies are to come, and can see a very gloomy prospect before us this winter on the score of clothing.

I have two reasons for preferring the materials for



clothing to ready made clothes ; first, because I think we can have them made by the regimental tailors to fit each man, and to suit the fashion of each regiment ; and, secondly, because the materials will always have a more ready sale, if peace takes place and the troops are disbanded, than ready-made clothes. They would attract less notice, too, at the places of export. Another question may here arise ; Where are the means ? Means must be found, or the soldiers must go naked. But I will take the liberty in this place to give it as my opinion, that a foreign loan is indispensably necessary to the continuance of the war. Congress will deceive themselves, if they imagine that the army, or a State that is the theatre of war, can rub through a second campaign as the last. It would be as unreasonable as to suppose, that, because a man had rolled a snow-ball till it had acquired the size of a horse, he might do so till it was as large as a house. Matters may be pushed to a certain point, beyond which we cannot move them. Ten months' pay is now due to the army. Every department of it is so much indebted, that we have not credit for a single express ; and some of the States are harassed and oppressed to a degree beyond bearing. To depend, under these circumstances, upon the resources of the country, unassisted by foreign loans, will, I am confident, be to lean upon a broken reed.

The situation of the southern States is very embarrassing, and I wish it were in my power to afford them relief in the way you have mentioned, but it is not. The very measure, which you suggest, I urged as far as decency and policy would permit me to do at the interview at Hartford, but to no effect.\* I cannot be more

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\* General Sullivan had suggested the expediency of ordering the French fleet from Newport to Boston, where it might remain secure till reinforced, and of calling the French troops to head-quarters. Such



particular on this subject, and what I now say is in confidence.

The report of Sir Henry Clinton's going to the southward was groundless, and I believe few troops have left New York since those under Leslie. I set out with telling you that I could not write long letters, but have ended with a flat contradiction of it. I am, with much esteem and regard, dear Sir, &c.

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TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 20 November, 1780.

SIR,

I am authorized by Congress to propose a meeting of commissioners, for the purpose of effecting an exchange of all Continental prisoners of war now in your possession, and of the hostages given in Canada, as well as of all officers on parole, and officers violators of parole, and militia actually taken in arms and remaining prisoners of war, for an equal number of the convention troops, and other prisoners in our hands, rank for rank; and, where similar rank will not apply, to pursue the exchange on the footing of composition, according to the valuation or tariff agreed on by the commissioners at Amboy in March last. In this business will of course come into contemplation an equitable adjustment and payment of the accounts of the convention troops. I think it necessary to apprise you of this circumstance, that there may be no misapprehension, and that, if the

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an arrangement would excite Sir Henry Clinton's fears for the safety of New York, and prevent his sending detachments to the southern States. This measure was pressed upon the French officers at the conference in Hartford, and it would seem to have been the best that could be adopted, for the troops, who were detached from New York during the winter, constituted an essential part of the British southern army.

commissioners meet, they may come clothed with proper powers to render the meeting effectual. I request your speedy answer; after which, the time and place of meeting may be regulated.\* I am, &c.

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TO COLONEL GOUVION.

Head-Quarters, 21 November, 1780.

SIR,

You will proceed to Fort Lee, and thence, with the greatest secrecy and caution, along the margin of the North River to the landing, which is opposite to Spiten Devil Creek. You will observe, with the greatest accuracy possible, the number and situation of the enemy's works from Fort Washington upwards; the huts, encampments, and barracks, in or near them; the number of troops that occupy these, and are otherwise within view; the landing-places on the Island; noting which are easiest for debarking troops, and which the best admit of secrecy; the approaches to the several works, particularly Fort Washington; the redoubt on the same ridge to the northward of it, and Laurel Hill; the guard-houses and washing-houses along the river; the vessels and boats in the river, and their several stations.

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\* Sir Henry Clinton assented to the proposition contained in this letter, but suggested that the adjustment of accounts should not be limited to the convention troops, but extend to all the prisoners that had been made on both sides during the war, as well British as American. Concerning this point Washington replied, that he had written to Congress on the subject; but, since it would take much time to collect and arrange the accounts, he thought it not best to appoint commissioners for the purpose till this should be done. In the mean time the business of exchange might go forward, according to the principles upon which both parties were agreed.

You will make these observations at different points, from the landing opposite Spiten Devil to the banks opposite the hollow, that extends across the Haerlem River. You will endeavour to arrive in time to-morrow morning to observe where the troops parade at assembly, which will the better enable you to judge of their number. In short, you will make every observation necessary for forming a plan for surprising the posts, which have been mentioned, by a night expedition, and for determining the propriety of such an attempt. You will also remark the state of the roads from the encampment of the light corps to Fort Lee, particularly that part of it from the heights of Fort Lee to the landing below, and ascertain the practicability of moving down boats in carriages to the landing, either in wagons or on the shoulders of men.

The perfect confidence I have in your judgment and address assures me, that you will execute this trust in the most proper manner. For your better security, I shall send a patrol towards the Three Pigeons; but they will not fall in with you, or know your errand. I shall expect your report to-morrow night, or very early the next morning. I am, dear Sir, &c.

P. S. You will observe whether there are any small boats at any of the landings on this side, which the inhabitants may make use of to convey intelligence.

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TO COLONEL STEPHEN MOYLAN.

Head-Quarters, 21 November, 1780.

SIR,

At nine o'clock in the morning of Friday the 24th, you will parade with your regiment at Totawa Bridge,



furnished with two days' provision ; and you will detach parties towards the New Bridge, and thence upwards to the bridge near Demarest's, and downwards as far as you think necessary to answer the purpose of securing all the crossing-places on the Hackensac, and preventing any person from going with intelligence to the enemy. You will select a sufficient party of the trustiest of your men, to patrol from the Marquis's old quarters below the Liberty Pole towards Bergen Town, Bull's Ferry, Weehawk, and Hoboken. A vedette is to be constantly at Bull's Ferry, and make reports every two hours. Major Goetschius is also ordered with his militia to patrol from the New Bridge downwards for the same purpose. Much depends on the punctual execution of these orders ; for which I have entire reliance on your judgment and knowledge of the country. I confide the rest to your discretion.

I am, Sir, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Head-Quarters, 21 November, 1780.

SIR,

On Friday morning at sunrising you will march the division under your command to a mile below Acquaquenoc Bridge, advancing a regiment a mile or two in your front towards Newark, and remain in this position until retreat-beating. You will then renew your march slowly a mile or two forward, till it is quite dark, and there halt until further orders. These will reach you, in all probability, before you halt. When you arrive, however, at Acquaquenoc, you will begin a forage, for which purpose a number of wagons will be sent down ; but you will do this in such a manner, as not to fatigue

your men, whose services may be wanted in a more essential manner. You will have two days' provision cooked. Three would be better. You know the importance of secrecy in all military movements.

I am, with great regard, Sir, &c.

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TO COLONEL TIMOTHY PICKERING, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

Head-Quarters, 22 November, 1780.

SIR,

You have been directed to furnish the commander of the boats with materials for muffling the oars; to pay particular attention, that they are in good order, well provided with oars, mounted on good carriages, and in such manner, that they cannot be injured; that the horses are with them by Thursday at twelve o'clock; that they are then removed through the Notch below the mountain, there to remain until Friday morning; that there is hay, and grain if possible, ready at that place to feed them amply, and that there is hay, and grain also, at Acquaquenoc Bridge to feed them during the halt there. These particulars, I doubt not, you have taken your measures for. I now add also, that on Friday, by o'clock, the transportation of the boats, from the Notch to Acquaquenoc Bridge, is to commence; and that it will be of the greatest importance to have a complete relief of good horses ready at Acquaquenoc Bridge, early on Friday afternoon, to accompany the boats, and at a proper place to relieve the others, and to hasten the transportation. You will also furnish the officer commanding the boats with oakum, thin plank, and nails, to repair them with expedition in case of accident.

I must entreat your personal attention, as far as practicable, to the execution of these orders, that there may not be a failure in a single article to defeat our object, which, if happily terminated, will have most valuable consequences. I rely absolutely upon your exertions, and will not doubt the accomplishment of my wishes, so far as depends upon you. I am, &c.

P. S. Some forage will be necessary at the park of artillery, for the horses that are to move the heavy pieces.\*

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TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DAVID HUMPHREYS.

Instructions.

SIR,

You are immediately to proceed to West Point, and communicate the business committed to you in confidence to Major-General Heath, and to no other person whatsoever. From thence you will repair to the detachment at White Plains, on Friday next, taking measures to prevent their leaving that place before you get to them. And, in the course of the succeeding night, you may inform the commanding officer of the enterprise in contemplation against the enemy's posts on York Island.

As the troops are constantly to be on their arms, no previous notice should be given; but they may be put in motion precisely at four o'clock, and commence a

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\* He wrote also to General Knox; "By twelve o'clock on Friday you will have ready all such pieces of your park, as are most proper to annoy shipping, and cover a body of troops in their passage across a river. A relief of horses to accompany them will be desirable, if they are to be had. Your usual punctuality assures me of the same in this instance."



slow and regular march towards Kingsbridge, until they shall discover, or be informed of, the concerted signals being made, when the march must be pressed with the greatest rapidity. Parties of horse should be sent forward to keep a look out for the signals.

Although the main body ought to be kept compact, patrols of horse and light parties might be sent towards Eastchester and Westchester; and, upon the signals being discovered, Sheldon's regiment and the Connecticut State troops (who may also be put in motion as soon as the orders can be communicated after four o'clock) should be pushed forward to intercept any of the enemy, who may attempt to gain Frog's Neck, and to cut off the Refugee corps at Morrisania. A few men, with some address, may spread such an alarm, as to prevent an attempt of the enemy to retreat to Frog's Neck, from an apprehension of surrounding parties. You will communicate these instructions to the commanding officer of the detachment, who, upon his approach to Kingsbridge, will receive orders from me as early as possible. Should the signals not be discovered, the troops will halt at least six miles from the bridge, until further intelligence can be obtained. The absolute necessity of the most perfect secrecy is the occasion of communicating my orders through this channel. Given at Head-quarters, Passaic Falls, this 22d day of November, 1780.\*

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\* The following note was written to General Stark at the same time as the above letter. — "Colonel Humphreys, one of my aids-de-camp, is charged by me with orders of a private and particular nature, which he is to deliver to you, and which you are to obey. He will inform you of the necessity of this mode of communication."

Notwithstanding the extensive preparations that were made for this enterprise, it failed of being carried into effect. Colonel Humphreys has explained the issue in a few words.

"The Commander-in-chief spent a whole campaign," said he, "in ri-

TO JOHN SULLIVAN, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 25 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

This letter will be presented to you by the Chevalier de Chastellux, a major-general in the French service, a gentleman of polite and easy manners, and of literary as well as military abilities.

I intended in my last (but, having spun my letter to an enormous length, deferred it) to observe, that, as Congress had made one or two late promotions from brigadiers to major-generals, apparently on the principle of a State proportion (which by the way, if made a general rule, I am persuaded will be found hurtful), an idea has occurred to me, that possibly from the same principle, on a future occasion, one might take place which would be particularly injurious. I mean with respect to General Knox. Generals Parsons and Clinton have been superseded by Smallwood. Parsons is since restored to his rank. Knox now stands, after

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pening this project. Boats, mounted on travelling-carriages, were kept constantly with the army. The Marquis de Lafayette, at the head of the Light Infantry, was to have made the attack in the night on Fort Washington. The period chosen for this enterprise was the very time, when the army were to break up their camp and march into winter-quarters; so that the Commander-in-chief, moving in the dusk of the evening, would have been on the banks of the Hudson, with his whole force, to support the attack. Never was a plan better arranged, and never did circumstances promise more sure or complete success. The British were not only unalarmed, but our own troops were likewise entirely misguided in their expectations. The accidental intervention of some vessels prevented at this time the attempt, which was more than once resumed afterwards. Notwithstanding this favorite project was not ultimately effected, it was evidently not less bold in conception or feasible in accomplishment, than that attempted so successfully at Trenton, or than that which was brought to so glorious an issue in the successful siege of Yorktown."—*Life of Putnam*, pp. 13, 15.

The foraging expedition was prosecuted, however, by General Stark near the enemy's lines, and with considerable success.

Clinton, first on the list. If from the consideration I have mentioned, or from his being at the head of the artillery, he should be overlooked, and a younger officer preferred, he will undoubtedly quit the service; and you know his usefulness too well not to be convinced, that this would be an injury difficult to be repaired. I do not know, all things considered, who could replace him in his department. I am sure, if a question of this kind should be agitated when you are present, this intimation would be unnecessary to induce you to interpose; but, lest you should be absent at the time, I think it would be advisable to apprize some other members, in whom you have confidence, to guard against it. I am, &c.\*

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TO COLONEL ARMAND.

Head-Quarters, Passaic Falls, 27 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The opinion I have of your services and merit would make me cheerfully give my influence to the accomplishment of your wishes, were I not persuaded that it would be attended with inconveniences. I cannot enter into the motives, which have produced the promotions you speak of. I am sensible, that, by a comparison of your situation with that of the French officers in gen-

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\* In a letter to the President of Congress, dated the 25th of November, General Washington said;—"The death of that useful and valuable officer, Mr. Erskine, geographer to the army, makes it requisite that a successor should be appointed. I beg leave to recommend Mr. Simeon Dewitt. His being in the department gives him a pretension, and his abilities are still better. From the character Mr. Erskine always gave of him, and from what I have seen of his performances, he seems to be extremely well qualified." In compliance with this recommendation, Mr. Dewitt was appointed geographer to the army.



eral, your claim is well founded ; but the circumstances of our service now are very different from what they were at an earlier period ; and many things have been done, which could not be admitted as a rule of present practice, without being not a little prejudicial.

I shall be really sorry, if you should think it necessary to withdraw yourself from the service on account of the ill success of your application to Congress. You know the estimation in which I hold your talents and usefulness. If you continue, you may assure yourself, that I shall do what depends on me, to make your command honorable and agreeable. In addition to this, I am persuaded, that you will always maintain the same place in my esteem, which you now possess. When you determine finally to return home, I shall take the liberty to recommend to Congress the promotion you desire. I approve of the appointment of Mr. Penet to a lieutenancy in your legion, which must be confirmed by Congress before it can take place.

I am, with very great esteem, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Instructions.

SIR,

You will march with the division under your command to the ground in the neighbourhood of Morristown, which Colonel Craig has pitched upon for the winter cantonment of the line, and on which he has been preparing huts. You will, as soon as possible, get both officers and men completely and comfortably covered. As soon as the timber necessary for building is drawn together, you will deliver over to the deputy quartermaster-general all the wagons and horses, but

such as are absolutely necessary for the transportation of forage and fuel; and all the saddle-horses, but such as belong to officers, who are entitled from their rank and office to keep them.

It is recommended to the officers, who are entitled to keep more horses than one, to divest themselves of as many as they can; and the quartermaster-general will be directed to put them out and support them at public expense. The scantiness of forage requires every exertion to avoid the consumption of it in and near the army. I have directed the quartermaster-general, if it be in his power, to procure ox-teams for the service of the winter. They are not only subsisted much easier than horses, but the soldiers and wagoners cannot abuse them by riding and other uses.

The state of our magazines of provision requires also every attention to frugality and economy; for which purpose it will be necessary to inspect the issues every now and then, and to compare them with the returns of the men. The same may be observed of public stores of every kind, of which our magazines are almost entirely exhausted. I would recommend in the strongest manner the preservation of the persons and property of the inhabitants from wanton or unnecessary violation. They have, from their situation, borne much of the burthen of the war, and have never failed to relieve the distresses of the army, when properly called upon. You will pay particular attention to drawing the public arms and accoutrements from the levies at the time of their dismissal.

It is to be hoped, that you will receive a number of recruits in the course of the winter. Should you do so, you will put them in training, that they may, by imbibing the rudiments of a soldier in detail, be fit to join the line in performing their manœuvres in the spring;

which you will direct to commence as soon as the season will admit. You will not suffer the established mode of discipline and manœuvre to be in the smallest degree deviated from; as it is my wish to see the whole army take the field next campaign with more than a common uniformity in the performance of all its duties, since we shall probably open it in conjunction with the army of our allies, composed of some of the first corps of France; for which reason it will be doubly incumbent upon the officers, who remain in service, to perfect themselves in the duties of their respective stations. You will on no account suffer a regiment to be without a field-officer, nor a company to be without at least one commissioned officer, unless some uncommon circumstance should require it.

The security of your camp will require light patrolling parties, to be advanced towards the Sound. The officers commanding them may be directed to cut off, as effectually as possible, the pernicious intercourse between New York and New Jersey; the most probable way of doing which is, by the total destruction of all the craft of every kind, found between Amboy and Second River; which I would recommend, not only upon that account, but to prevent the passage of deserters. The State, I am informed, has this session passed severe laws against the practice, and it would therefore be well to make yourself acquainted with them. Should you, at any time between this and your junction with the main body of the army, have occasion to retire from your command for a while, you will deliver over these orders to your successor, who is to do the same, should there be a further change. The Jersey brigade will be stationed at Pompton and at Sydman's in the Clove, and will be subject to your general direction. Given at Head-Quarters, Preakness, this 27th day of November, 1780.



## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 28 November, 1780.

SIR,

I arrived at this place to-day, having yesterday broken up the camp near Passaic Falls, and detached the troops to their different places of cantonment. I shall repair to New Windsor, where I purpose to establish my winter-quarters, after having made some necessary regulations here and visited the hospitals.

The following will be the general position of the army during the winter. The Pennsylvania line about four miles from hence in part of the huts, which were occupied by the troops last winter; the Jersey line at Pompton, with a detachment from them to secure the entrance of the Clove near Suffern's. The design of these is not only to cover the country and our communication with the Delaware, but as much as possible to ease us in the article of transportation. The Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island lines will be in the Highlands, upon the east side of Hudson's River; the Massachusetts line at West Point, Moylan's regiment of horse at Lancaster in Pennsylvania, and Sheldon's at Colchester in Connecticut. One regiment of New York is in garrison at Fort Schuyler, and another is at Saratoga; but to give more effectual security to the northern and western frontiers, which are both harassed and much exposed, I propose, if provision can be had, which is exceedingly doubtful, to send the remainder of the line to Albany and Schenectady, where it will be ready to act as occasion may require, and where the officers will have it more in their power to arrange themselves agreeably to the new establishment.

I have lately had a very pressing application from

Colonel Scammell for liberty to resign the office of adjutant-general, and resume the command of his regiment. Finding him determined upon the measure, I thought it my duty to cast about for a proper person to succeed him in so important an office, before I mentioned his request. The gentleman I would recommend is Brigadier-General Hand, whom I have sounded upon the occasion, and who I find will accept the appointment, should Congress think proper to confer it upon him. His rank, independent of his other qualities, is a circumstance of consequence. Besides giving weight and dignity to the office, it will take off any uneasiness, which might have arisen, had an officer younger than any of the present inspectors been appointed; because by the regulations the adjutant-general is assistant inspector-general, and of course commands the others in that department. I shall very reluctantly part with Colonel Scammell, as he has constantly performed his duty to my entire approbation, and to the satisfaction of the army; but his reasons, which I should transmit at length, had I not sent up his letter among my papers to New Windsor, were such as I could not oppose, without requiring him to make greater sacrifices than he assured me his fortune would afford.\*

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\* *Extract from Colonel Scammell's Letter.* — "Congress having put the regiment in point of numbers and term of service on a reputable footing, and being so much reduced in property as not to be able to equip myself for the office I at present have the honor to hold, I beg your Excellency will please to grant or obtain leave for me to retire from the staff department, and rejoin my regiment by the 1st of January next; that I may have an early opportunity to attend to the internal police and recruiting of it, and my successor, of gaining a perfect knowledge of the business of the office previous to the commencement of the next campaign." — *November 16th.*

Lafayette, who had been consulted on the subject by General Washington, mentioned Colonel Smith as a proper person for the office of

Having received information, through Major Tallmadge of the second regiment of dragoons, that the enemy had collected a valuable magazine of forage at Coram upon Long Island, the destruction of which he at the same time offered to attempt with my permission, which he obtained, I do myself the honor to enclose a copy of his report, by which Congress will perceive how very handsomely he acquitted himself in the execution of his whole plan. There can be no stronger proof of the gallant behaviour and good conduct of the Major and his officers, and the bravery and fidelity of his men, than the recital of the circumstances attending the affair throughout its progress. With great respect I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

Morristown, 28 November, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received, with much pleasure, the report of your successful enterprise upon Fort St. George and the vessel with stores in the harbour; and was particularly well pleased with the destruction of the hay, which must, I should conceive, be severely felt by the enemy at this time. I beg of you to accept my thanks for your judicious planning and spirited execution of this business, and that you will offer them to the officers

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adjutant-general, "unless," said he, "you were to cast your eye on a man who I think would suit better than any other in the world. Hamilton, I confess, is the officer whom I should like to see in that station." The letter, containing this hint, did not reach Washington till after the above had been sent to Congress; but if it had, and all other considerations had been satisfactory, it is probable that the objection on the score of rank would have been insurmountable. — See Letter to General Greene, *December 13th.*



and men, who shared the honors of the enterprise with you. The gallant behaviour of Mr. Muirson gives him a fair claim to an appointment in the second regiment of dragoons, or any other of the State to which he belongs, where there is a vacancy ; and I have no doubt of his meeting with it accordingly, if you will make known his merit, with these sentiments in his favor. You have my free consent to reward your gallant party with the little booty they were able to bring from the enemy's works. With much esteem, I am, Sir, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 8 December, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Since mine of yesterday by the Count de Custine, another opportunity has offered of writing to you more leisurely ; and, as your departure for the southward, if that ultimately should be your determination, may be incommoded by delay, I have taken the liberty of facilitating your journey by the enclosed despatches.\*

I beg you to be persuaded, however, that I do not mean by this to fix your determination of serving in the southern army. It is my earnest wish, as I mentioned at Morristown, that you should be governed in this matter by European and southern advices. These you

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\* When the army went into winter-quarters, the Light Infantry corps, which had been commanded by Lafayette, was broken up, and the different parts rejoined the lines and regiments to which they originally belonged. Seeking activity and opportunities for distinguishing himself, Lafayette had formed a project of transferring his services to the southern army under General Greene during the winter, and had asked General Washington's advice. Lafayette was now in Philadelphia, having gone thither immediately after the separation of his detachment of Light Infantry.

are more in the way of receiving than I am. If there is a prospect of a naval superiority in these seas, and an augmentation of the French land force at Rhode Island, I shall, with the freedom of a friend, give it as my opinion, that your going to the southern army, if you expect a command in this, will answer no valuable purpose, but must be fatiguing to yourself, and embarrassing to General Greene, as it may contravene a permanent arrangement, to the disgust of those, who, considering themselves as belonging to that army, may be hurt by disappointments. On the other hand, if we are likely to remain in a state of inactivity in this quarter, your seeking service at the southward, where there is a more fruitful field for enterprise, is not only an evidence of your zeal, but will be supported by every rule of military reasoning. Hence it is, I again repeat, that circumstances should alone decide. In all places, and at all times, my best wishes for your health, honor, and glory will accompany you. With much truth I can add, that I am, my dear Marquis, &c.

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## TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 10 December, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received the letters you did me the favor to write before you left Philadelphia, and have made a representation to Congress respecting the inspector's department, agreeably to your request. This moment I am also favored with yours of the 24th ultimo from Richmond, and am pleased to find, that you are still pursuing with indefatigable industry those measures, which will tend so much to promote the public ser-

vice.\* You will see by the dating of this letter, that head-quarters are at the same place at which they were in the campaign of 1779.† The army is cantoned in the following manner. The Pennsylvania line near Morristown; the Jersey brigade at the entrance of the Clove, to cover the communication; the New York brigade in the vicinity of Albany, furnishing the garrison of Fort Schuyler; and the New England lines at West Point and its dependencies; the regiments much weakened by discharging the levies.

It is reported from New York, that the enemy are about to make another detachment, consisting of one battalion of grenadiers, one battalion of light infantry, one battalion of Hessian grenadiers, Knyphausen's regiment, the forty-second British, a draft of five men from each company in the line, and two troops of light dragoons under Generals Knyphausen and Phillips; their destination conjectured to be southward. I should be glad to hear from you often, being, dear Baron, &c.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 10 Decembèr, 1780.

SIR,

As an apology for suffering many of your letters to remain so long unanswered, I must assure you, that I have been constantly employed, since I broke up my camp near Passaic Falls, in visiting the winter cantonments of the army between Morristown and this place.

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\* Baron Steuben had been left by General Greene in Virginia with the command of the forces in that State, and instructed to use all practicable means for repelling the invasion of the enemy, and also to arrange and send forward such levies as could be collected.

† That is, within the command of West Point.



I have experienced the highest satisfaction in the visits, which Chevalier de Chastellux, Viscount de Noailles, Count de Damas, Count de Custine, and the Marquis de Laval have done me the honor to make.\* I have only to regret, that their stay with me was so short. I unfortunately missed seeing the Count de Deuxponts, who had left my quarters on his way to Philadelphia before I arrived at them. I however flatter myself, that I shall have the pleasure of seeing him on his return.

I very much approve of your intention of quartering the second division in Connecticut, rather than in Massachusetts. The troops will certainly be more convenient to the probable scene of operations.† I shall withdraw the chain of our dragoons, and shall in future send my despatches to the Duke de Lauzun at Lebanon, as your Excellency desires. I wish it were in my power to furnish your Excellency with the New York

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\* These gentlemen were officers in the French army under Count de Rochambeau.

† The second division of the French troops destined for America, which had been blockaded in the harbour of Brest, was expected daily on the coast. Count de Rochambeau had visited New London, Norwich, Lebanon, Windham, and other towns, and ascertained that the troops might be well provided for in those places. As this division never arrived, there was no occasion for farther preparations. The French army remained during the winter at Newport, except the Duke de Lauzun's legion, which was cantoned at Lebanon, not far from the residence of Governor Trumbull, where a supply of forage could be easily obtained.

The son of Count de Rochambeau, then a colonel in the army, was sent to France with despatches containing the results of the conference at Hartford, and particularly a memoir setting forth the wants of the Americans in men, ships, and money. In case the vessel should be in danger of capture, Colonel Rochambeau was instructed to sink his papers, and make a verbal communication of their contents to the minister. La Pérouse commanded the frigate, which was sent with these despatches. To escape the British fleet, then blockading the harbour of Newport, he went to sea, on the 28th of October, in a violent gale of wind, and passed unharmed through the British squadron. He was chased, and his frigate was dismantled, but not till it had got beyond the reach of the enemy.—*Mémoires de Rochambeau*, Tom. I. p. 256.

papers; but as our communication with that place is very irregular, I only obtain them accidentally. I now enclose to you one, which contains nothing material, but the account of the late dreadful hurricane in the West Indies. I take the opportunity of sending this by Colonel Fleury, who returns to your army. I was made very happy in again seeing that amiable and valuable officer, whose services I have experienced upon so many occasions.\* I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

New Windsor, 13 December, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

It gives me much pleasure to hear, that my letters of introduction were serviceable to you. I am persuaded there is not wanting a disposition in Congress, or the individual States at the southward, to afford you every support, which the unhappy state of our finances will admit; but if any thing in my power can give a spring to their exertions, every motive, which can flow from public and private considerations, will urge me to comply with your wishes. You have no doubt an arduous task in hand; but where is the man charged with conducting public business in these days of public calamity, that is exempt from it? Your difficulties I am persuaded are great; they may be insurmountable; but you see them now through a different medium from what you have ever done before, because the embarrassment of every department is now concentrated in the commanding officer, exhibiting at one view a prospect of our complicated distresses.

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\* Colonel Fleury, so much distinguished for his bravery at Fort Mifflin, Stony Point, and other places, had left the American service, and was now an officer in the army of Count de Rochambeau.

Your friends, and the great public, expect every thing from your abilities, that the means which may be put into your hands are competent to ; but they both know full well the deranged situation of our southern affairs ; and neither, I trust, are so unreasonable as to expect impossibilities. I therefore think, that you have nothing to apprehend on the score of public dissatisfaction ; on the contrary, that you may gain but cannot lose in your military reputation.

We reached our winter-quarters about the beginning of this month, and I have been driven by necessity to discharge the levies. Want of clothing rendered them unfit for duty, and want of flour would have disbanded the whole army, if I had not adopted this expedient for the relief of the soldiers for the war. Without knowing that Colonel Hamilton ever had an eye to the office of adjutant-general, I did, upon the application of Colonel Scammell to resign it, recommend General Hand for reasons which may occur to you. One of them, and not the smallest, was, by having an officer of rank appointed, to guard against the discontents, which would have arisen in the inspector's department, if a junior officer to the present sub-inspectors had been appointed ; for you know, that, by the present establishment of the inspection, the adjutant-general for the time being is the second officer in the line. It would have been disagreeable therefore to the present sub-inspectors, some of whom are full colonels, to have a lieutenant-colonel put over them.

With much sincerity I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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\* General Greene had expressed a desire that Hamilton might receive the appointment of adjutant-general. "Colonel Scammell," said he, "perhaps will be promoted to the rank of brigadier. At least it has been talked of. Should this take place, a new adjutant-general will be necessary ; and I beg leave to suggest the propriety of giving this ap-



## TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 14 December, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Soon after despatching my last letter to you, your favor dated at Paramus was put into my hands by Colonel Gouvion. The Chevalier de la Luzerne's despatches came in time for the post, which is the only means left me for the conveyance of letters, there not being so much money in the hands of the quartermaster-general (I believe I might go further and say, in those of the whole army), as would bear the expense of an express to Rhode Island. I could not get one the other day to ride so far as Pompton!

I am now writing to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay on the subject of your several letters. When their answer arrives, I will communicate the contents to you. You must be convinced, from what passed at the interview at Hartford, that my command of the French troops at Rhode Island stands upon a very limited scale, and that it would be impolitic and fruitless in me to propose any measure of coöperation to a third power without their concurrence; consequently an application from you antecedently to an official proposition from the minister of France, the gentlemen at the head of the French armament at Rhode Island, the Congress, or myself, could only be considered as coming from a private gentleman. It is therefore my advice to you to postpone your correspondence with the Spanish generals, and let your in-

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pointment to Colonel Hamilton. His services may not be less important to your Excellency in your family business, if he only employs a deputy extraordinary; and I am persuaded the appointment will be received with great gratitude, as I am confident it is his wish, by what he said some time before I left camp."—*Richmond November 19th.* See Letter to Congress, *November 28th.*

fluence come in hereafter, as auxiliary to something more formal and official. I do not hesitate in giving it clearly as my opinion to you (but this opinion and this business should be concealed behind a curtain), that the favorable moment of the Spanish operations in the Floridas ought to be improved to the utmost extent of our means; provided the Spaniards, by a junction of their maritime force with that of his Most Christian Majesty under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay, will give us a secure convoy, and engage not to leave us until the operations shall be at an end, or it can be done by consent of parties.

I am very thankful to the minister for permitting, and to you for communicating to General Greene, the intelligence of the Spanish movements towards the Floridas. It may have a happy influence on his measures; and it may be equally advantageous to the Spaniards. Your expressions of personal attachment and affection to me are flattering and pleasing, and fill me with gratitude. It is unnecessary, I trust, on my part, to give you assurances of mutual regard, because I hope you are convinced of it; and, as I have already put it absolutely in your own choice to go to the southern army, or to stay with this, circumstances and inclination alone must govern you. It would add to my pleasure, if I could encourage your hope of Colonel Neuville's exchange. I refused to interest myself in the exchange of my own aid. General Lincoln's were exchanged with himself; and, upon that occasion, for I know of no other, Congress passed a resolve prohibiting exchanges out of the order of captivity.

Under one general head I shall express my concern for your disappointment of letters, our disappointment of clothes, and disappointment in the mode of raising

men; but I shall congratulate you on the late change of the administration of France, as it seems to be consonant to your wishes, and to encourage hope.\* I am much pleased at the friendly disposition of Portugal. Much good, I hope, will result from the combination of the maritime powers. I am in very confined quarters; little better than those at Valley Forge; but such as they are, I shall welcome into them your friends on their return to Rhode Island. I am, &c.

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TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

New Windsor, 14 December, 1780.

SIR,

Yesterday brought me the honor of your Excellency's favor without date; but which I suppose to have been written on the 5th instant, as it accompanied a letter from the Marquis de Lafayette of that date. Receive, my good Sir, the expressions of gratitude which are due to your Excellency for the important intelligence you have communicated, relative to the designs of the Spanish court upon the Floridas. I shall transmit the account of these interesting events to Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, with propositions which, if acceded to, I shall do myself the honor of communicating to your Excellency.

It would have been fortunate for the army, if your

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\* M. de Sartine, the French minister of marine, had retired, and been succeeded by the Marquis de Castries, whom Lafayette represented as "a man of great worth," who would take a more lively interest in the affairs of his office, and act with more efficiency than his predecessor. Count de Rochambeau also said, "He is one of our best lieutenant-generals, and a most firm man." By the French officers generally the change seems to have been considered auspicious for the operations in America.



feelings for its want of clothing could have been relieved by the agreeable tidings of the arrival of that article; but, alas! we are so accustomed to want, that we dare not flatter ourselves with relief. Your despatches for Rhode Island, accompanying your letter to me, came to hand at the instant the post was setting out, and were committed to his care. It is the only means of conveyance now left me, since the chain of expresses formed by the dragoon horses, which were worn down and sent to their cantonment, has been discontinued. The quartermaster-general has it not in his power, for want of money, to furnish an express on the most urgent occasion. I anticipate with much pleasure the visit I shall receive from the Chevalier de Chastellux and the other gentleman of the French army on their return to Rhode Island, and beg the favor of your Excellency to present my compliments to them and Monsieur Marbois. With great respect and personal attachment, I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU AND THE CHEVALIER  
DE TERNAY.

New Windsor, 15 December, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,

Two days ago I did myself the honor to inform his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, that Sir Henry Clinton was making another embarkation. This is since confirmed by other accounts; but I have received none yet, which fix the particular corps or numbers with certainty, though all agree, that this detachment is intended as a reinforcement to Lord Cornwallis, that it is to consist of about two thousand five hundred, and that it is the intention of the enemy to push

their operations at the southward this winter in the most vigorous manner. Official information is likewise lately received, that this is the resolution of the British cabinet, and that for this purpose a powerful reinforcement is to be sent to America with all possible despatch.

When it is considered how essential it is to the independence of the United States, and how important to the interest of their allies, that the common enemy should be obliged to relinquish their conquests in South Carolina and Georgia, your Excellencies will, I am confident, agree in opinion with me, that no means ought to be left unessayed to endeavour to dislodge them in the course of this winter and next spring.

It is needless for me to enter into a detail of the situation of our affairs at the southward. Your Excellencies must know, that, from the great loss of men, artillery, and stores in Charleston, and from the defeat of our army near Camden, we can only hope to re-assemble such a force, and that chiefly of raw troops, as will prevent the enemy from extending their conquests over North Carolina. To attempt the reduction of Charleston, supposing we had men sufficient for the purpose, is a thing impracticable, while the transportation of artillery and all kinds of stores proper for a siege must be made from hence by land.

I am informed by the Marquis de Lafayette, who is still at Philadelphia, that a vessel had just arrived at that place from L'Orient, which port she left the middle of October; but as he makes no mention of the second division of land and sea forces, expected in America to reinforce the army and navy at present under your Excellencies' respective commands, I am led to believe, that the much desired event is more remote than under present circumstances is to be wished.

A piece of intelligence, which has been communicated to me in confidence by the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, has turned my attention towards a new object, and brought into my mind the outlines of a plan, which, if it can be acceded to by the parties necessary to its execution, may be attended with the most solid and permanent advantages. The communication of the minister is, that the court of Spain have in contemplation two expeditions against the British settlements in the Floridas, namely, Pensacola and St. Augustine. The first, consisting of four thousand men convoyed by eight ships of war, had sailed from Havana on the 16th of October. The force destined against the other place was twelve ships of the line, besides frigates and bomb-ketches, and ten thousand men. These were to leave Havana some time in the present month. The plan, with which I am impressed, and which I would submit to your consideration, is, the propriety of attempting to combine our force with that of Spain for the purpose of totally subduing the common enemy, not only in the Floridas, but in the States of South Carolina and Georgia.

It is not for me, at this moment, to enter upon a detail of the business. My general ideas are, that a proposition or request should be made to the general and admiral of the Spanish forces (and through them to the governor of Havana, if they are not themselves at liberty to accede to the proposal,) to coöperate with us conjunctly or by diversion for the purposes I have mentioned. In case they accede, their ships of war are to be sent, as soon as they have made good the debarkation of their troops at St. Augustine, or at any other given point, to form a junction with the squadron of his Most Christian Majesty at Rhode Island, and take under their convoy the French and



American troops, destined for the expedition against Charleston; the former of whom will be embarked at Newport, the latter at Philadelphia. I should make such drafts from this army, as would amount to two thousand men at least. The Count de Rochambeau would, I should hope, be able to detach double that number, and leave a sufficiency with the militia, who might be called in upon the occasion, to give security to your works, hospitals, and spare stores, should you choose to leave the two last behind you. These corps, and the troops who will be collected under the command of General Greene, in conjunction with the force, which may be furnished by the Spaniards in the manner aforementioned, will form an army not to be resisted by any, which the British can draw together in that quarter, and capable of effecting the utmost wishes of the allied powers.

It is unnecessary for me to remark, that the basis of my plan and propositions is, that the combined fleets shall be decidedly superior to that of the enemy, and that they shall coöperate to the completion of the enterprise, or until it shall be abandoned by general consent. To ensure so essential a point as that of a naval superiority, the propriety of a further requisition on the admiral, commanding his Most Christian Majesty's fleet in the West Indies, is submitted to your judgment.

I persuade myself that you will view these propositions with an eye to all their consequences, and candidly approve or reject them as they appear to you practicable or proper. In making them I am solely influenced by motives of general good, and would not wish them carried into execution, unless they shall be deemed as conducive to the interests of the powers, who have generously stepped in for our relief, as to those of the United States.

Should the plan happily meet your approbation I have to request, that the Chevalier de Ternay will be good enough to despatch a frigate, if one can be spared, with the substance of these propositions to the generals of his Most Catholic Majesty; duplicates and triplicates of which I will endeavour to forward by way of Philadelphia. If the communication is to be made, no time should be lost in doing it, and procuring an answer. I think I could, in a month after hearing of the proposition being agreed to on the part of Spain, be ready to embark at Philadelphia, if the state of the Delaware River will admit of it.

I cannot conclude this letter, without mentioning an argument, which in my opinion ought to induce the Spaniards to accept of these propositions. The force, which the British will be able to draw together in South Carolina and Georgia, will be so much superior to the American, that they may, without putting matters to risk, leave small garrisons in Savannah and Charleston, and throw such a reinforcement into St. Augustine, a very strong fortification, as will in all probability defeat the enterprise; whereas, if they find that measures are pursuing to divest them of those acquisitions, which I am convinced they mean to make the basis of a negotiation, I think it more than probable that they will abandon the Floridas to their fate, and exert themselves to the utmost to retain the only apparent compensation for their vast expenditure of blood and treasure. Besides this, the Spaniards ought to reflect, that, while Britain is in possession of Georgia and South Carolina, they must hold the Floridas by a very precarious tenure or by a very expensive one.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* This plan was not approved by Count de Rochambeau. News had lately arrived of the appointment of a new minister of marine, of the

## TO COLONEL ELISHA SHELDON.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 17 December, 1780.

SIR,

I have your favor of the 13th, accompanied by one from Governor Trumbull, respecting the cantonment of your regiment. As it is the request of the State, and as you seem to think that you will be benefited by the exchange, I have consented to your taking your quarters in Massachusetts, in the towns which you have pointed out. But I could not help remarking to the Governor, that this repeated interference of the civil authority, in directing the cantonments of the army, is a

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preparation of a grand armament at Brest, and the assembling of a large Spanish force at Cadiz, which it was rumored would be under the command of Count d'Estaing; and there was every probability, in the opinion of Count de Rochambeau, that despatches from the French ministry would very soon arrive, which would contain a plan of operations. In this view he could not with propriety engage in any measures, which might thwart such a plan. It was moreover his belief, that the Spanish commander in the West Indies had his course of action marked out by definite instructions, and would not assume the responsibility of sending a squadron to transport the French and American troops to the south. Again, the Chevalier de Monteil, the French admiral commanding in the West Indies, had only a small force in those seas since the departure of M. de Guichen for Europe, and would not be able to furnish such a number of vessels from his squadron, as would ensure a naval superiority on the American coast.

The Chevalier de Ternay died at Newport, on the 15th of December, after a short illness. He was succeeded in the command of the fleet by the Chevalier Destouches, who replied to the above letter in relation to his department, that the season was extremely unfavorable to the project in question. The northeasterly winds were so prevalent and strong, that he did not think the Spanish vessels could lie at anchor off Rhode Island. And he also agreed with Count de Rochambeau in believing, that the Spanish officers would consider themselves so rigidly bound by their instructions, as to deter them from listening to proposals, that would divert them from the enterprise in which they were engaged. He added, that his own squadron could not be put into a condition to depart, by reason of a deficiency in the supplies of hard bread.—*MS Letter of Rochambeau and Destouches, December 22d.*



thing very unprecedented, and what may, if generally practised and submitted to, throw the whole into such positions as would render them useless to the security of the country, and unable to afford succour to each other. When you have fixed your own quarters, inform me where they are, that I may know how to direct to you.\* You will communicate the enclosed general orders to Major Tallmadge, and to the officers and men of your regiment, who were under his command at the surprise of Fort George. I am, &c.

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## TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 17 December, 1780.

SIR,

I submitted to the interference of the State of Connecticut last year with respect to the cantonment of the horse, without any animadversion or remark, because I was hopeful that the impropriety of it would appear to them, and prevent the like in future. I shall (as it is the request of the State, and because it is my wish to harmonize as much as possible with the civil authority in the prosecution of a cause, in which we are all equally interested) send Sheldon's regiment this winter to the State of Massachusetts, but cannot help remonstrating very pointedly against a repetition of the practice in future for the following reasons.

Four things have always influenced me in the distribution of the troops to their winter cantonments; security of our capital posts, which makes it necessary that they should have such a relative situation to each other as to afford the necessary succour; cover

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\* Colonel Sheldon established his quarters at Northampton, and his regiment was cantoned in that town, Hatfield, and Hadley.

to the country; their own convenience; and the convenience of the inhabitants, where the two last are not inconsistent with the first.

It is unnecessary, I am persuaded, for me to remark, that if any one State can or will undertake to point out a cantonment for one part of the army, another may with equal propriety do it for another part; and upon the same principle, and by the same parity of reasoning, that Connecticut undertakes to advise or direct Sheldon's horse to Massachusetts, that State may order them to New Hampshire, and New Hampshire to some other State. In a word, it is striking at the most essential privilege of the Commander-in-chief that can be conceived.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO JOHN SULLIVAN, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 17 December, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Your letter propounds a question respecting promotion, which I candidly acknowledge I am puzzled to answer with satisfaction to myself. If in all cases ours was one army, or thirteen armies allied for the common defence, there would be no difficulty in solving your question; but we are occasionally both, and I should

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\* Sheldon's horse had been ordered to Colchester in Connecticut. He marched by the way of Hartford, where the legislature of the State were then convened. They passed a resolve directing the governor to write to General Washington, and request him to station Sheldon's regiment for the winter in the western part of Massachusetts. The reason alleged in the governor's letter was, that the French cavalry had taken quarters at Colchester and the towns adjacent, and there would not be a sufficient supply of forage for both.

not be much in error if I were to say, that we are sometimes neither, but a compound of both.

If we were considered in every point of view as one army, lineal promotion, as well above as below the rank of colonel, would undoubtedly be the most equitable and satisfactory mode of rising; and no possible objection could be made to it by any State, or by the troops of a State; or, if Congress, having regard to the number of troops, which each State is to furnish to the confederated army, were to allow the number of general officers, which should be thought competent thereto, neither would there be any difficulty here, because the promotion would be lineal in each State; and, though it might fall hard upon the colonels of such States as only furnish one regiment for Continental service, it would be incidental to their State quotas, and must be submitted to; as the annexation of their regiments to other State troops, also, must be, to form brigades. But it is our having no fixed principle, that I know of, and sometimes acting upon one and then the other of the cases here mentioned, as it happens to suit an individual State, or particular characters, that creates our difficulties and the prevailing discontents.

It is well known, that in the early stages of this war I used every means in my power to destroy all kinds of State distinctions, and labored to have every part and parcel of the army considered as Continental. The steps, which have led to a different sentiment, and to our present system of politics, you are not to be informed of. We must take things as they are. And therefore, under the ideas that prevail, and our general practice, I am, though puzzled, more inclined to let all promotions be lineal in each State, to the rank of brigadier inclusive (where there are more than one regiment), than to adopt any other mode; because it is more



consonant to the expectation of the army than any other; and because, under it, I believe a newly appointed brigadier from the southern troops would at this day be disagreeable to an eastern brigade, and *vice versâ*. How far State promotions beyond the rank of brigadier are eligible or not, is a matter on which much may be said on both sides. On the one hand, it may be urged that the State, which sends more than a brigade into the field, has as good a right to accompany them with a general, as the middling State has to furnish a brigadier, or the smallest a colonel, because neither has more than its due proportion of officers. On the other hand, it may be observed, that, as officers advance in rank and acquire that general knowledge, which is necessary to qualify them for extensive command, their feelings are more hurt, and the service more injured, by placing juniors over them, than when it happens to inferiors; though the same principle, which bars the rise of a colonel, where there is but one regiment, will apply to a brigadier, where the State furnishes only a brigade. At present we want no new major-generals, having rather a surplusage; but may not the following expedient answer in future, at least in a degree, the views of all; namely, to suffer the larger States to have major-generals of their own line proportioned to the number of their troops, and the other major-generals to be promoted from brigadiers according to seniority? This, at the same time that it yields compliance to the views of the large States, does not preclude the brigadiers of the smaller from promotion, as there must be major-generals for separate commands, and for the wings of the army, who cannot be supplied by the State quotas of troops, where there is not more than a just proportion of officers to men.

Our present mode of promotion is regimentally to captains inclusively, and in the line of the State afterwards. But I am convinced, as well from the reason and justice of the thing, as from several conversations I have held with some of the most judicious officers of the army, that it would be more agreeable to it, that all promotion should be lineal, instead of regimental, in every State line; for which reasons I shall recommend the measure to Congress for the new establishment of the army.\*

What I have said with respect to promotion is general; but there is a case before me in the Jersey line, which makes me wish that Congress would fix their principle. This State has three regiments, which are to be reduced to two. Dayton is the senior colonel, and among the oldest of that rank in the whole army, a valuable officer, and does not want to leave the service. Shreve is the next oldest colonel in Jersey, and will not go out. His character you are as well acquainted with as I am. Ogden is the youngest, and extremely desirous of staying, but cannot continue if Colonel Dayton remains in service in his present rank. The matter, therefore, as it is related to me, is brought to this issue, that Dayton or Ogden is to go out, unless the former can be promoted, which would remove every difficulty, and be agreeable to the present system of State policy, as there is no general officer in that line; but if the promotion is delayed till after the first of January, or, in other words, till after Dayton or Ogden is deranged, the remedy will come too late; because we shall have sent out a valuable officer upon half-pay, and, if Dayton is the one that goes, there will be a person to promote. Who? But here I drop the curtain.

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\* This was done in a letter to Congress, dated December 20th.

It may suffice to say, that, if the State of New Jersey is to be allowed a brigadier, it ought to be granted before the first of January for more reasons than that of economy.

That you may have some data by which to judge of the propriety of new appointments, I shall take the liberty of observing, that the States, from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania inclusively, with Hazen's regiment, make by the last requisition twenty-nine battalions of infantry. That three of these battalions, according to the present establishment of the army, will make as large a brigade as four of the old, and that the number of brigadiers in the States here mentioned amounts at this time to no more than eight, namely, Stark of New Hampshire, Glover and Paterson of Massachusetts, Huntington of Connecticut, Clinton of New York, and Wayne, Hand, and Irvine of Pennsylvania; and these may be reduced to seven, if Hand should be placed in the staff. I am most firmly of opinion, that, after the States have brought their troops into the field, the less they have to do with them, or their supplies of clothing and the like, the better it will be for the common interest; for reasons which manifest themselves more and more every day, and for the clearest motives of public economy. I am, dear Sir, with much esteem, &c.

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TO BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY  
AT THE COURT OF VERSAILLES.

New Windsor, 20 December, 1780.

SIR,

A few days since, by the Chevalier de Chastellux, I had the honor to receive your favor of the 19th of March introducing him; and I thank you for bringing



me acquainted with a gentleman of his merit, knowledge, and agreeable manners. I spent several days very happily with him at our camp near the Great Falls of the Passaic in New Jersey, before the army separated for its cantonments, the principal of which is at West Point in the vicinity of this place, where I make my own quarters.

Disappointed of the second division of French troops, but more especially in the expected naval superiority, which was the pivot upon which every thing turned, we have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign, after a flattering prospect at the opening of it, and vigorous struggles to make it a decisive one on our part. Latterly we have been obliged to become spectators of a succession of detachments from the army at New York, in aid of Lord Cornwallis, while our naval weakness, and the political dissolution of a large part of our army, put it out of our power to counteract them at the southward, or take advantage of them here.

The movements of Lord Cornwallis during the last month or two have been retrograde. What turn the late reinforcements, which have been sent to him, may give to his affairs, remains to be known. I have reinforced our southern army principally with horse, but the length of the march is so much opposed to the measure, that every corps is in a greater or less degree ruined. I am happy, however, in assuring you, that a better disposition never prevailed in the legislatures of the several States, than at this time. The folly of temporary expedients is seen into and exploded, and vigorous efforts will be used to obtain a permanent army, and carry on the war systematically, if the obstinacy of Great Britain should compel us to continue it. We want nothing but the aid of a loan to enable us to put our finances into a tolerable train. The country does

not want resources, but we the means of drawing them forth.

It is unnecessary for me to go into a more detailed account of our affairs, as you are doubtless officially advised of every material occurrence. I shall therefore only add my compliments to Mr. Adams, and the strongest assurances of being, with the greatest esteem and respect, dear Sir, yours, &c.

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TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DAVID HUMPHREYS.

Instructions.

SIR,

You will take command of such of the detachments of water guards, now on the river, as you may think necessary, and with them attempt to surprise and bring off General Knyphausen from Morris's House on York Island, or Sir Henry Clinton from Kennedy's House in the city, if, from the tide, weather, and other circumstances, you shall judge the enterprise practicable. In the execution of it, you will be guided by your own discretion; and I have only to suggest, that secrecy, rapidity, and prudence in making good your retreat, will be indispensably necessary to insure success. Given at Head-Quarters, 23d of December, 1780.\*

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\* Colonel Humphreys was provided with two whale-boats and a barge, and accompanied by Captain Wells, Lieutenant Hart, and twenty-eight other persons, including non-commissioned officers and privates. They left the American post at Dobbs's Ferry in the evening of the 25th, having agreed on the watchword *Success*, and intending to return the same night. The wind was so high during the night, that, not being able to land, they were driven below the city. One of the boats was forced nearly down to Sandy Hook. Another got ashore on Staten Island. They were all at length taken to Brunswic, whence Colonel Humphreys and his party returned to the army.

## TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 26 December, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

My sentiments, respecting your serving in the southern army this winter, were fully, though concisely, explained in my last. If I were to add aught to the opinion therein given, it would be to wait, as we are hourly expecting it, something more explicit from France. It is impossible for us to remain much longer in uncertainty, with respect to the second division of French troops. Vessels daily arriving from that kingdom, though they may not bring us official advices, must realize or destroy our hope of an early succour. In a letter, which came to my hands a few days ago from Count de Rochambeau, dated at Boston the 13th instant, are these words.

“On arriving at this place, I found very interesting news, brought by an American vessel, which left the river of Nantz on the 4th of November. She has given me the annexed list of vessels, which are coming from Brest, destined for America, with a convoy which is preparing at Brest. She tells me, that there is a change in our ministry; that Monsieur Sartine retires, and that Monsieur de Castries succeeds him; that the Mars, an American vessel of twenty guns, would depart a little while after her, charged with despatches for us. Although there is something extraordinary in all this news, it appears to me so circumstantial, that it gives an air of truth to what regards the armament.” He adds, that “all the other vessels had rejoined the Spaniards at Cadiz, to attempt the reduction of Gibraltar, which was short of provisions.”

I have received no letter yet from the Count, in answer to mine respecting the expedition of the Spaniards



to the southward. The Chevalier de Ternay, to whom my letter was equally addressed, is dead, as you will have learnt from the despatches, which I forwarded to the minister a few days ago. If circumstances, which you can more easily explain than I conjecture, should make a visit from me to Rhode Island necessary, I certainly should be most happy in your company. But do not let this influence your determination.\*

The light infantry and grenadiers, who were under orders for embarkation at New York, and had actually prepared for it, were countermanded, and other troops sent in their place; but whether Knyphausen goes or not, since this change has taken place, I am not able to say. A confirmation of the British fleet in the channel having suffered by storm, and of the African princes having excluded the British armed vessels from their ports, as also of Tarleton's defeat, would be most welcome received. I had the pleasure of the Chevalier

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\* Lafayette abandoned his idea of going to the south, which will be explained by the following extracts from his letters.

"I most heartily thank you for the kind and friendly letters you have been pleased to send me. I am so happy in your friendship, that every mark of your affection for me gives me a degree of pleasure greater than I can express. There is intelligence of ships and troops having been put in readiness at Brest. A Spanish officer may possibly wait on you to concert a coöperation. We are also to expect news from my friend the new minister of the French navy, and before they arrive you would not like my departure. Two other reasons also have weight with me. First, if the enemy make this detachment, without which nothing material will happen in the south, and if the intelligence be true about the fast recruiting of the six months' men, something may possibly be done in this quarter. Secondly, for reasons, which I will explain to you when we meet, a visit from you to the French army is much to be wished, and in this case you will be glad, that I may accompany you." — *Philadelphia, December 16th.*

"Colonel Laurens having been appointed to go to France and solicit succours for the next campaign, he has also been directed to take your orders at head-quarters. I am by order of Congress to have a conference with him, and I intend giving him many letters for France. As, in giving your instructions to Laurens, the presence of one who knows the people

de Chastellux's company when on his way to Albany ; but the Viscount de Noailles and Count de Damas passed on the other side of the river without calling.

I am, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR JEFFERSON.

New Windsor, 28 December, 1780.

SIR,

Your Excellency's favor of the 13th reached me this day. I have ever been of opinion, that the reduction of the post of Detroit would be the only certain means of giving peace and security to the whole western frontier, and I have constantly kept my eye upon that object ; but, such has been the reduced state of our Continental force, and such the low ebb of our funds, especially of late, that I have never had it in my power to make the attempt. I shall think it a most happy circumstance, should your State, with the aid of Continental stores which you require, be able to accomplish it. I am so well convinced of the general public utility with which the expedition, if successful, will be attend-

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may be agreeable to you, I shall set out for head-quarters on Friday or Saturday morning." — *December 26th.*

In a letter from Colonel Laurens himself, this subject is mentioned as follows. — "Your Excellency will be not a little surprised to learn, that Congress have been determined to send me to France, for the special purpose of representing the present state of our affairs and soliciting the necessary succours. I was in great hopes, that Congress would have availed themselves of the abilities of Colonel Hamilton for these important objects, and that I should have been suffered to persevere in a line of duty, to which I feel myself more adequate. But, unfortunately for America, Colonel Hamilton was not sufficiently known to Congress to unite their suffrages in his favor, and I was assured that there remained no other alternative than the total failure of the business. Thus circumstanced, I was induced to submit, and renounce my plan of participating in the southern campaign." — *Philadelphia, December 23d.*



ed, that I do not hesitate a moment in giving directions to the commandant at Fort Pitt to deliver to Colonel Clark the articles which you request, or so many of them as he may be able to furnish. I have also directed him to form such a detachment of Continental troops as he can safely spare, and put them under the command of Colonel Clark. There is a Continental company of artillery at Fort Pitt, which I have likewise ordered upon the expedition, should it be prosecuted. The officers of this company will be competent to the management of the mortar and howitzers.

I do not know for what particular purpose Colonel Clark may want the six-pound cannon; but, if he expects to derive advantage from them in the reduction of works of any strength, he will find himself disappointed. They are not equal to battering a common log blockhouse, at the shortest range. This we have found upon experience. I would therefore advise him to consider this point, and leave them behind, unless he sees a probability of wanting them in the field. I have enclosed the letter for Colonel Brodhead commanding at Fort Pitt, which Colonel Clark may deliver whenever he sees fit. It is possible, that some advantage may arise from keeping the true destination of the expedition a secret as long as circumstances will admit. If so, the fewer who are entrusted the better.

The matter, which the house of delegates have referred to my determination, stands thus. A board of general officers in the year 1778 determined, that officers bearing Continental commissions should take rank of those having State commissions only while their regiments continued upon a State establishment; but that, when such regiments became Continental, the officers should be entitled to receive Continental commissions from the date of their State appointments. Thus you



see, it is not in my power to recommend them to Congress for Continental commissions, while in State regiments, without infringing an established rule. As to the second point, "Whether such officers shall have promotion in the line, or be confined to the said two regiments," I think that they had best, for the sake of peace and harmony, be confined to the two regiments. For many of those officers left the Continental line in very low ranks, and obtained very high ranks in that of the State. This created much uneasiness when the troops came together in service; and it was with difficulty that many of the Continental officers could be made to brook being commanded by those, who had been their inferiors the preceding campaign. I am therefore of opinion, that an attempt to introduce those gentlemen now into the Continental line would create a source of infinite discontent and uneasiness, more especially as you have a sufficient number of officers, at home and in captivity (and vacancies ought in justice to be reserved for such of the latter as wish to serve again), for the quota of Continental troops assigned to the State by the last establishment. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO COLONEL DANIEL BRODHEAD.

New Windsor, 29 December, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The State of Virginia have determined to undertake an expedition, which I have ever had in view, and which I wished to carry into execution by a Continental force; but you are sufficiently acquainted with the situation of our affairs, both as to men and supplies, to know that it has been impossible to attempt it. It is

the reduction of the post of Detroit. His Excellency Governor Jefferson informs me, that he thinks they shall be able, with the aid of some artillery and stores already at Fort Pitt, to accomplish this most desirable object; and that, should they even fail of carrying their point, much good will result from creating a diversion, and giving the enemy employ in their own country. The artillery and stores required by Governor Jefferson are four field-pieces, and sixteen hundred balls suited to them; one eight-inch howitzer, and three hundred shells suited to it; two royals; grape shot; necessary implements and furniture for the above; five hundred spades; two hundred pick-axes; one travelling-forge; some boats, should the State not have enough prepared in time; some ship-carpenter's tools.

Colonel Clark, who is to command the expedition, will probably be the bearer of this himself; and you are to deliver to him, or his order, at such time as he shall require them, all or so many of the foregoing articles as you shall have it in your power to furnish. You will likewise direct the officers with the company of artillery to be ready to move, when Colonel Clark shall call for them; and, as it is my wish to give the enterprise every aid, which our small force can afford, you will be pleased to form such a detachment as you can safely spare from your own and Gibson's regiments, and put it under the command of Colonel Clark also. I should suppose, that the detachment cannot be made more than a command for a captain or major at most. You know the necessity of confining it to a Continental officer of inferior rank to Colonel Clark.

Your good sense will, I am convinced, make you view this matter in its true light. The inability of the continent to undertake the reduction of Detroit, which, while it continues in possession of the enemy, will be

a constant source of trouble to the whole western frontier, has of necessity imposed the task upon the State of Virginia, and of consequence makes it expedient to confer the command upon an officer of that State. This being the case, I do not think the charge of the enterprise could have been committed to better hands than Colonel Clark's. I have not the pleasure of knowing the gentleman; but, independently of the proofs he has given of his activity and address, the unbounded confidence, which I am told the western people repose in him, is a matter of vast importance; as I imagine a considerable part of his force will consist of volunteers and militia, who are not to be governed by military laws, but must be held by the ties of confidence and affection to their leader.

I shall conclude with recommending to you, in general, to give every countenance and assistance to this enterprise, should no circumstances intervene to prevent its execution. One thing you may rest assured of, and that is, that, while offensive operations are going forward against Detroit and the Indians in alliance with the British in that quarter, your posts with small garrisons in them and proper vigilance will be perfectly secure. For this reason, and the expedition depending upon the supplies here required, I shall expect a punctual compliance with this order, and am, with real esteem and regard, &c.

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TO COLONEL ZEBULON BUTLER.

New Windsor, 29 December, 1780.

SIR,

Congress having, in order to remove all cause of jealousy and discontent between the States of Penn-



sylvania and Connecticut, directed me to withdraw the present garrison of Wyoming, and to replace them with troops from the Continental army, not belonging to the line of Pennsylvania or Connecticut, or citizens of either of the said States, I have for that purpose ordered Captain Mitchell of the Jersey line to relieve you. You will, therefore, upon his arrival, deliver up the post to him, and march with all the men at present under your command and join the army in the neighbourhood of this place. I am well aware of the difficulty, which there will be, of bringing away the men of Ransom's company; but I trust, and shall expect, that you will exert yourself to do it effectually; because, if they remain behind in any numbers, it would seem like an intention to elude the resolve above cited. You will, before you march, give Captain Mitchell every necessary information respecting the situation of the country, and make him acquainted with those characters, upon whom he can depend for advice and intelligence, in case of an incursion of the enemy. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 2 January, 1781.

SIR,

I have been honored with your favor of the 21st ultimo, in which Congress have been pleased to refer to me the propriety of granting General Stark's request. His health is undoubtedly so much impaired, that he has been able to do but very little duty the preceding campaign, and retirement for a time seems therefore necessary. Congress will either direct his return to the army at a certain period, or will leave it at large, as

they may judge proper. I beg leave to call the attention of Congress to my letter, in which I mentioned Colonel Scammell's desire to quit the office of adjutant-general. I had not at that time his letter on the subject with me. I now enclose a copy of it, in which his reasons for wishing to return to the line are fully set forth. I find him still determined in his resolution, and I shall therefore, I hope, be excused for pressing Congress to appoint a successor.

I have at length, through a channel on which I can depend, gained an account, as accurate as circumstances will admit, of the embarkation which sailed from New York on the 20th ultimo. It consisted of about sixteen hundred men, and was chiefly composed of detachments from the British, German, and Provincial corps. The Queen's Rangers are said to be the only entire corps. Arnold commands, which, my informant says, gives disgust to many of the other officers. The destination was not reduced to a certainty, but from the preparations, and the Refugees who embarked in the fleet, it was generally thought to be to the southward. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* In consequence of the memorable defeat of the British detachment under Colonel Ferguson at King's Mountain, Lord Rawdon, by order of Lord Cornwallis, wrote to General Leslie, then in the Chesapeake, suggesting the expediency of his advancing to North Carolina. "No force has presented itself to us," said Lord Rawdon, "whose opposition could be thought serious to this army; but then we have little hopes of ever bringing the affair to an action. The enemy are mostly mounted militia, not to be overtaken by our infantry, nor to be safely pursued in this strong country by our cavalry. Our fear is, that, instead of meeting us, they would slip by us into this province were we to proceed far from it, and might again stimulate the disaffected to serious insurrection. This apprehension must greatly circumscribe our efforts."—*Lord Rawdon to General Leslie, October 24th*. For these reasons a speedy coöperation was desired, but not ordered. It was left wholly to the discretion of General Leslie, who, on receiving this letter, resolved to move as soon as possible by water to Cape Fear River. That his purpose might be un-

## TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

New Windsor, 3 January, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

To-day at noon I received yours of the 2d in the morning by Major Fishbourn, who has given me a full account of the unhappy and alarming defection of the Pennsylvania line. The officers have given convincing

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suspected, he engaged pilots for James River, and nobody but himself and two officers were entrusted with the secret of his destination. He left the Chesapeake on the 24th of November, and went to sea. He did not stop at Cape Fear, as he at first proposed, but arrived in Charleston on the 13th of December, after a tempestuous voyage; and marched thence with a large part of his force to form a junction with Lord Cornwallis.

In consequence of this movement of General Leslie, it was resolved to send another body of troops to the Chesapeake.

"This detachment," said Sir Henry Clinton in a letter to Lord George Germain, "is under the command of General Arnold, with whom I thought it right to send Colonels Dundas and Simcoe, as being officers of experience and much in my confidence. The objects of this expedition are nearly the same as those of the one under Major-General Leslie, but rather more positive as to the establishment of a post at Portsmouth on the Elizabeth River. I have also directed General Arnold to prepare materials for building a number of boats, that we may, as soon as possible, have a naval force in Albemarle Sound, which force, when the season is too far advanced for it to act in those waters, may be employed to great advantage in the rivers of the Chesapeake."—*MS. Letter, December 16th, 1780.*

The expedition consisted of sixteen hundred and nine effectives. A severe gale separated the fleet on the 26th and 27th of December, but a reunion was effected at the Capes of the Chesapeake, and the fleet entered Hampton Roads on the 30th, except three transports and one armed vessel, with upwards of four hundred men on board. These arrived on the 4th of January. Half of the cavalry horses were lost, and several guns were thrown overboard. Arnold was instructed to strike at the magazines of the Americans, should an opportunity of doing it without risk offer itself; and to assemble and arm the loyalists, but not to encourage any to join him, till there was the fairest prospect of protecting them. In all cases Arnold was to consult Dundas and Simcoe, before undertaking any important measure. He was to coöperate with Lord Cornwallis, should it be the united opinion of those two officers, or should he receive a positive order from Lord Cornwallis to that effect. The whole tenor of the instructions shows a distrust of Arnold, and a strict watchfulness over his conduct.



proofs, that every thing possible was done by them to check the mutiny upon its first appearance, and it is to be regretted, that some of them have fallen sacrifices to their zeal. I very much approve of the determination of yourself, Colonel Butler, and Colonel Stewart to keep with the troops, if they will admit of it, as, after the first transports of passion, there may be some favorable intervals, which may be improved. I do not know where this may find you or in what situation. I can therefore only advise what seems to me most proper at this distance, and upon a consideration of all circumstances.

Opposition, as it did not succeed in the first instance, cannot be effectual while the men remain together, but will keep alive resentment, and may tempt them to turn about and go in a body to the enemy, who, by their emissaries, will use every argument and means in their power to persuade them that it is their only asylum; which, if they find their passage stopped at the Delaware, and hear that the Jersey militia are collecting in their rear, they may think but too probable. I would therefore recommend it to you to cross the Delaware with them, draw from them what they conceive to be their principal grievances, and promise faithfully to represent to Congress and to the State the substance of them, and endeavour to obtain a redress. If they could be stopped at Bristol or Germantown the better. I look upon it, that if you can bring them to a negotiation, matters may be afterwards accommodated; but that an attempt to reduce them by force will either drive them to the enemy, or dissipate them in such a manner, that they will never be recovered. Major Fishbourn informs me, that General Potter and Colonel Johnson had gone forward to apprize Congress of this unfortunate event, and to advise them to go out of the

way to avoid the first burst of the storm. It was exceedingly proper to give Congress and the State notice of the affair, that they might be prepared; but the removal of Congress, waving the indignity, might have a very unhappy influence. The mutineers, finding the body before whom they were determined to lay their grievances fled, might take a new turn and wreak their vengeance upon the persons and property of the citizens; and, in a town of the size of Philadelphia, there are numbers who would join them in such a business. I would therefore wish you, if you have time, to recall that advice, and rather recommend it to them to wait and hear what propositions the soldiers have to make.

Immediately upon the receipt of your letter, I took measures to inform myself of the temper of the troops in this quarter, and have sent into the country for a small escort of horse to come to me; and if nothing alarming appears here, and I hear nothing farther from you, I shall to-morrow morning set out towards Philadelphia, by the route of Chester, Warwic, Colonel Seward's, Davenport's Mill, Morristown, Somerset, Princeton, and Trenton, on which route you will direct any despatches for me. As I shall be exceedingly anxious to hear what turn matters have taken, or in what situation they remain, you will be pleased to let me hear from you. I am, &c.\*

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\* The Pennsylvania line, by the new arrangement of the army, consisted of six regiments. These were stationed for the winter in the huts near Morristown, which had been occupied by the army as winter-quarters the preceding year. The regiments were under the immediate command of General Wayne, who wrote as follows in the letter, of which Major Fishbourn was the bearer.

"A most general and unhappy mutiny suddenly took place in the Pennsylvania line about nine o'clock last night. A great proportion of the troops, with some artillery, are marching towards Philadelphia. Every exertion has been made by the officers to divide them in their deter-

P. S. *January 4th, seven o'clock, A. M.* — Upon second thought I am in doubt whether I shall come down, because the mutineers must have returned to their duty, or the business be in the hands of Congress, before I could reach you, and because I am advised by such of the general officers, as I have seen, not to leave this post in the present situation of things, temper of the troops, and distress of the garrison for want of flour, clothing, and in short every thing.

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mination to revolt. It has succeeded in a temporary manner with near one half. How long it will last, God knows.

"I have ordered the Jersey brigade to Chatham, where the militia are also assembling, lest the enemy should take advantage of this alarming crisis. Indeed, the alarm-guns have been fired, and the beacons kindled towards Elizabethtown; perhaps occasioned by our unhappy affair. I am this moment, with Colonels Butler and Stewart, taking horse to try to halt them on their march towards Princeton. As a last resort, I am advised to collect them, and move slowly towards Pennsylvania. What their temper may be, I cannot tell. We had an escape last night. Perhaps we may be equally fortunate to-day. Captain Billings is killed; Captain Talbot mortally wounded; some others are also hurt." — *January 2d, nine o'clock, A. M.*

General Wayne overtook the mutineers the same day on their march towards Princeton. He was advised not to go among them; but, when they halted for the night, he sent to them and requested, that one sergeant or more from each regiment should be delegated to meet at his quarters, and make known their grievances. This was done, and among the others came the sergeant, whom they had chosen to be their commander. Their complaints were, that many soldiers had been detained beyond the term of their enlistment; that the arrearages of pay and the depreciation had not been made up; and that they were suffering every privation for want of money and clothes. A mode of redress was pointed out by General Wayne and the Colonels, which seemed to satisfy the delegated sergeants, and they agreed to use their efforts to bring over the minds of the others. But the attempt was ineffectual, and they all marched the next day, January 4th, to Princeton. Those who were well disposed, and willing to separate from the mutineers, were requested by the officers to march in the same body, as it was hoped their presence and influence might serve to moderate the violence of the leaders, and check the contagion of their example.



TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF  
NEW HAMPSHIRE.

New Windsor, 5 January, 1781.

SIR,

It is with extreme anxiety and pain of mind I find myself constrained to inform your Excellency, that the event I have long apprehended would be the consequence of the complicated distresses of the army, has at length taken place. On the night of the 1st instant, a mutiny was excited by the non-commissioned officers and privates of the Pennsylvania line, which soon became so universal as to defy all opposition. In attempting to quell this tumult in the first instance, some officers were killed, others wounded, and the lives of several common soldiers lost. Deaf to the arguments, entreaties, and utmost efforts of all their officers to stop them, they moved off from Morristown, the place of their cantonment, with their arms and six pieces of artillery. And, from accounts just received by General Wayne's aid-de-camp, they were still in a body on their march to Philadelphia to demand a redress of their grievances. At what point this defection will stop, or how extensive it may prove, God only knows. At present the troops at the important posts in this vicinity remain quiet, not being acquainted with this alarming and unhappy affair; but how long they will remain so cannot be ascertained, as they labor under some of the same pressing hardships as the troops who have revolted.

The aggravated calamities and distresses that have resulted from the total want of pay for nearly twelve months, the want of clothing at a severe season, and not unfrequently the want of provisions, are beyond description. The circumstances will now point out

much more forcibly what ought to be done, than any thing that can possibly be said by me on the subject.

It is not within the sphere of my duty to make requisitions, without the authority of Congress, from individual States; but at such a crisis as this, and circumstanced as we are, my own heart will acquit me, and Congress and the States eastward of this, which, for the sake of despatch, I address, I am persuaded will excuse me, when once for all I give it decidedly as my opinion, that it is vain to think an army can be kept together much longer under such a variety of sufferings as ours has experienced, and that unless some immediate and spirited measures are adopted to furnish at least three months' pay to the troops in money, which will be of some value to them, and at the same time ways and means are devised to clothe and feed them better (more regularly I mean) than they have been, the worst that can befall us may be expected.

I have transmitted to Congress a copy of this letter, and have in the most pressing manner requested them to adopt the measure, which I have above recommended, or something similar to it; and as I will not doubt of their compliance, I have thought proper to give you this previous notice, that you may be prepared to answer the requisition.

As I have used every endeavour in my power to avert the evil, that has come upon us, so will I continue to exert every means I am possessed of to prevent an extension of the mischief; but I can neither foretell nor be answerable for the issue.

That you may have every information that an officer of rank and abilities can give of the true situation of our affairs, and the condition and temper of the troops, I have prevailed upon Brigadier-General Knox to be the bearer of this letter. To him I beg leave to

refer your Excellency for many matters, which would be too tedious for a letter. I have the honor to be, with great esteem and respect, &c.\*

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX.

New Windsor, 7 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

You will proceed with the despatches, with which you are charged, to the governors of the States of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and to the president of New Hampshire. You are acquainted with the subject of those despatches, in which the gentlemen to whom they are addressed are referred to you for a more particular account of the situation of the army, the causes of discontent in it, and the probable means of giving satisfaction to the soldiery. Upon the first two heads, you have no need of any instructions. What seems to me most essentially necessary to answer the end of the third, is an immediate supply of money and clothing; that is, of the former a sum equal to three months' pay at least of the new emission, or some other of equal value; of the latter a complete suit of clothes, not only for the men now in service, but for the number of recruits who are to join the army.

That you may be able to speak fully upon the article

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\* This letter was sent as a circular to the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. A letter was also written to Governor Clinton, requesting him to be prepared to call out the militia, in case the infection should extend to the troops in the neighbourhood of West Point, and the enemy should take advantage of this state of things, and come up the river in force, which could be done with the less difficulty, as the river was free from ice.



of clothing, I will inform you minutely of our present supply and future prospects. The few men, who remain in service, will with difficulty find a sufficiency of shirts, vests, breeches, and stockings to carry them through the winter. In coats we are very deficient. When those which are in the hands of the agents are brought forward, there will not be more than one third of what are wanting. Thus you perceive, that the old soldiers will have occasion for a full supply of clothing when they take the field, and that the recruits, unless they are furnished by their respective States, must be absolutely destitute. We may obtain some supplies from France between this time and the spring, but we have been so often disappointed from that quarter, that prudence dictates the impolicy of placing dependence upon it.

I have been speaking of the northern army only. General Greene represents the southern as literally naked, and therefore, should there be an arrival from Europe, a great part must be applied to that army, as the southern States have not resources within themselves. I have hitherto only spoken of a sum of money equal to three months' pay; but it is possible that a further sum may be necessary, and that of specie, to give new bounties to those soldiers, who were early enlisted for the war upon very low terms. There can no ill result from securing such a fund; for, if it should not be wanted for that purpose, it may be applied usefully to a thousand others.

You will generally represent to the supreme executive powers of the States, through which you pass, and to gentlemen of influence in them, the alarming crisis to which our affairs have arrived, by a too long neglect of measures essential to the existence of an army, and you may assure them, that, if a total alteration of sys-

tem does not take place in paying, clothing, and feeding the troops, it will be in vain to expect a continuance of their service another campaign. You will press upon the governors the necessity of a speedy adoption of the measures recommended at this time, and inform them that you will call upon them in your way back to the army, to learn what has been done in consequence of your application. I am, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

New Windsor, 7 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

You will be pleased to observe, on the subject of your letter of last night, that, although I am not very sanguine in my expectation of the success of the enterprise proposed, yet I think in our present circumstances it will be advisable to encourage it. Colonel Hull may therefore have permission to make the attempt, in conjunction with the militia; but I would not advise the destruction of any houses, except the temporary huts built by the Refugees. Colonel Drake may be supplied with five thousand cartridges for the militia, he to be accountable for the expenditure of them.†

By a letter from General Wayne, I am informed the

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\* On the representations made by General Knox, the legislatures of Massachusetts and New Hampshire voted to send forward immediately to the army a gratuity of twenty-four dollars in hard money for each of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers belonging to those States, who were engaged to serve during the war.

† Colonel Hull was now stationed at Pine's Bridge near the lines, and the plan referred to was that of an attack upon the Refugees of Delancey's corps at Morrisania, in conjunction with a party of militia under Colonels Drake and Crane. The project had been communicated by Colonel Hull to General Heath, with a request to be favored with his opinion.

Pennsylvania line still continued in the same state at Princeton, and that he had received intelligence that the enemy were preparing to make a movement into Jersey. Their attention being drawn that way may possibly make the plan in contemplation the more practicable. I wish the guard-boats to keep a vigilant lookout, and the officers to give you the earliest information of any movement below.

Colonel Hull and the militia colonels should be strongly impressed with the idea, that the whole success depends absolutely upon the secrecy and rapidity of the movement. It will also be well to give a reinforcement of a hundred men from the New Hampshire line. After this detachment is made, if another could be sent from any part of your command towards Pompton, to cover the stores at Ringwood and to act as occasion may require, it might be advantageous. These ought to be of the best clad men, and not less than one hundred; but I submit it entirely to your discretion to act as the present situation of the garrison will justify. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

New Windsor, 8 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I received your favor of the 4th with the enclosure by the express the evening before last. I had been deliberating in my own mind, whether to continue at this place or set out for Princeton; but I am advised by the governor of this State, and the general officers with me, which seems to be consonant to your opinion also, to remain here, as the ultimate measures would probably be taken before I could arrive; and as the



personal influence of yourself and the gentlemen with you, together with that of the governor and council of the State, would effect whatever could be done in that way.\*

I am now happy to inform you, that the troops at the several posts in this vicinity continue still quiet, without giving indications of outrage or defection. At this distance, and under our present circumstances, it is impossible to recommend (if advice could reach you in time) any particular line of conduct, but only in general to observe, that such measures founded in justice, and a proper degree of generosity, as will have a tendency to conciliate or divide the men, appear most likely to succeed. Certain it is, that, should they finally go to the enemy, they will be a considerable augmentation of strength against us ; or, should they be dispersed, their loss to the service will be severely felt. Both these evils are therefore to be avoided, if there is any proper ground on which it can be done. The circumstances of the moment will point out the measures necessary to be pursued, taking into view at the same time the consequences which will be involved, with respect to other troops, who are nearly in the same situation.

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\* He wrote to Congress, in regard to this topic ; — “ I should immediately upon the receipt of this alarming intelligence have proceeded to Morristown, and from thence wherever the troops might be, had matters been in such a situation here as to justify my leaving these important posts without being well assured of the temper and affections of the garrison, who labor under nearly the same distresses, and have in some degree the same causes of complaint as the Pennsylvanians ; and more especially as the officers had a little time before acquainted me, that they had discovered some symptoms of a similar intention. Luckily, however, no such disposition has yet appeared. But as the distresses of the troops for flour and some kinds of clothing are great, and they may only want some plausible pretence for breaking out, I am strongly advised by the general officers present not to leave this place, particularly as the river is entirely free from ice, and therefore favorable for the enemy to take the advantage of such an event, should it unfortunately happen.” — *January 6th.*

I have entire confidence in the zeal, ability, and influence of the gentlemen concerned in the negotiation; and, let the issue be what it may, I shall have the consolation of believing, that whatever could be done on the occasion has been faithfully and strenuously attempted. I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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\* When the news of the revolt reached Philadelphia, a committee was appointed by Congress, consisting of General Sullivan, Mr. Witherspoon, and Mr. Mathews, who were instructed to confer with the executive of Pennsylvania on the subject. This committee, and Governor Reed on the part of the Council of Pennsylvania, set off to meet the troops. Meantime General Wayne remained with them at Princeton. It was ascertained that overtures were about to be made to the insurgents by the enemy, to which it was feared they would listen, and for two or three days the officers were in a state of extreme anxiety. They were somewhat relieved by an incident, which is thus related in a letter from General Wayne.

"About four o'clock yesterday morning we were waked by two sergeants, who produced a letter from the enemy, enclosed in a small piece of *tea-lead*. They also brought under guard two caitiffs, who undertook to deliver it to the leaders of the malecontents. One of these culprits says he is a sergeant in Odell's newly raised corps, and was promised a considerable reward on bringing back an answer. The soldiers in general affect to spurn at the idea of turning *Arnolds*, as they express it. We have used every address to inflame their minds against wretches, who would dare to insult them by imagining them traitors; for, had they thought them virtuous, they would not have carried those overtures."—*Princeton, January 8th.*

Governor Reed arrived at Princeton, and the committee of Congress at Trenton. The following proposals were offered to the mutineers.

"1. To discharge all those, who had enlisted *indefinitely* for three years, or during the war; the fact to be inquired into by three commissioners to be appointed by the executive, and to be ascertained, where the original enlistment could not be produced, by the oath of the soldier.

"2. To give immediate certificates for the depreciation on their pay, and to settle arrearages as soon as circumstances would admit.

"3. To furnish them immediately with certain specified articles of clothing, which were greatly wanted."

These terms were accepted, on the further stipulation that three commissioners should be deputed from the line to act conjointly with the others in determining what soldiers should be discharged. They resulted, however, in the disbanding of a very large portion of the troops, and a temporary dissolution of the line.

The emissaries, or spies, were given up, tried by a court-martial, and



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

New Windsor, 9 January, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

It is impossible for any one to sympathize more feelingly with you, in the sufferings and distresses of the troops, than I do; and nothing could aggravate my unhappiness so much as the want of ability to remedy or alleviate the calamities, which they suffer, and in which we participate but too largely. None of the clothing so long expected from France has yet arrived. We are compelled therefore to have recourse to the States, and the supplies are very inadequate to our wants. Should the French clothing be brought in, you may depend upon having a full proportion of it. You will be persuaded in the mean time, that I am perfectly sensible of the innumerable embarrassments and hardships you have to struggle with, in such an exhausted country, and that I should be happy to be able to afford the wished relief. The brilliant action of General Sumpter, and the stratagem of Colonel Washington, deserve great commendation. It gives me inexpressible pleasure to find, that such a spirit of enterprise and intrepidity still prevails.

I was much surprised, that any dispute about rank was likely to arise between Baron Steuben and General Smallwood; nor can I conceive upon what principles the latter can found his claim of seniority. For, if the date of his commission is to be carried back to any given period previous to his appointment, it may super-

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executed on the 11th of January. A full collection of the official papers concerning the revolt of the Pennsylvania line is published in the second volume of HAZARD'S *Register of Pennsylvania*. See also MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*, Vol. IV. pp. 393-403. — Sir Henry Clinton's statement of the affair may be found in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. XI. p. 148.



sede not only the officers now in question, but many others, and indeed derange and throw into confusion the rank of the whole line of major-generals. But as the services of the Baron may be extremely necessary in Virginia, it may not be amiss for him to continue there, till the principles of Major-General Smallwood on the subject are more clearly ascertained, and a decision is made by Congress, if the dispute cannot be otherwise determined.

The preposterous conduct of those concerned in releasing, instead of exchanging, the prisoners lately taken at the southward, is really astonishing. I had entertained hopes, that a considerable number of our prisoners in Charleston might be obtained for them. In this quarter an extensive exchange has taken place. We have few officers and no privates remaining in the hands of the enemy.

I am extremely sorry to inform you of the defection of the Pennsylvania line. On the 1st instant a mutiny was raised by the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. In attempting to quell this tumult in the first instance several lives were lost. The mutineers moved off to Princeton with their arms and six pieces of artillery, under pretext of marching to Philadelphia to demand a redress of their grievances; but they cannot be induced by General Wayne, who has come to them, to pass the Delaware. Their demands are exorbitant, and tend to the immediate dissolution of the line. On the contrary, unless complied with, there is great danger of their falling to the enemy, who have sent emissaries to tamper with them. It is however a happy circumstance, that the remainder of the troops have given no signs of defection, though it is uncertain how far they would act against those in revolt. God only knows what will be the consequences, or what can be done

in this critical dilemma. All reason, authority, and personal influence seem to be lost upon them. I am, &c.

P. S. *January 11th, seven o'clock, A. M.* — I cannot suffer the post to depart, without adding the favorable intelligence last night received from Trenton. The Pennsylvanians have given an unequivocal and decided mark of attachment to our cause, and detestation of the enemy's conduct, by delivering up the negotiator sent to treat with them, together with his guide and papers. A court-martial is ordered for his trial. These are favorable indications, that the affair may yet be happily settled.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

New Windsor, 10 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Your favors from Morristown have both reached me in the course of this day. I cannot conceive how Major Fishbourn could have misunderstood me, as to my intention of going down. The postscript of my letter to General Wayne, which was added after I had consulted Governor Clinton and the general officers, was to the contrary. Upon receiving your letter of the 7th, I sent directions to General Heath to assemble all the general officers, and officers commanding corps, at his quarters to-morrow morning, where I shall meet them. What I have to propose is of too delicate a nature to commit to paper; neither can I say, until I have had the meeting, whether it will be prudent for me to go down towards Morristown.\* You shall hear from me after

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\* The object of the meeting was, first, to ascertain whether the spirit of defection had probably extended to the troops of the garrison and the

the meeting is over. I think it appears by the letter, which has fallen into your hands, that there has not been much if any intercourse between the mutineers and Sir Henry Clinton; and, if the future correspondence can be intercepted, it will embarrass the British and the troops. You will have been the best judge of the kind of answer, which it would be proper to give to Sir Henry's message; but as we had not force sufficient to wish to decoy him out, perhaps it will have been most prudent to answer him in the negative. I am certain, that, in consequence of my letter of the 8th to General Wayne, every offer that could with propriety be made has been made. What further is to be done can be better determined by you on the spot, than by me at a distance. The steps you have hitherto taken are judicious and strictly proper. Be pleased to thank the Marquis and Colonel Laurens for their letters, which a press of business prevents me from answering.\*

I am, with regard, &c.

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neighbouring posts; secondly, to obtain the opinion of the officers, as to the expediency of sending a force to quell the mutiny. On the first head, it was nearly a unanimous opinion of the officers, that no apprehensions were to be entertained of the troops; and on the second, it was advised, that a detachment of one thousand men should be drawn out and held in readiness to march with four days' provision at the shortest notice.

The detachment consisted of five battalions; two of which were taken from the Massachusetts line, one from the New Hampshire line, one from the Connecticut line, and the other chiefly from Colonel Hazen's regiment. These were selected and arranged by General Heath. The command devolved upon Major-General Howe, he being entitled to it by seniority.

\* The Marquis de Lafayette and Colonel Laurens were on their way from Philadelphia to head-quarters, and had stopped at Morristown after hearing that General Washington was expected at that place. Colonel Laurens said in his letter, that he was persuaded nothing but a superior investing force would reduce the mutineers to reason; and he thought, the sooner decisive measures were taken, the greater facility there would be in terminating the unhappy affair.



TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

New Windsor, 12 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The receipt of your letter of the 9th, enclosing one from General Wayne, has, if possible, added to my embarrassments. I had heard from General Sullivan and Lord Stirling, that the mutineers had delivered up the British emissaries immediately upon their arrival in Princeton. From this I was in hopes, that they had precluded themselves from all assistance from that quarter, and that the reduction of them by force, should matters come to extremities, would not be difficult. But now their conduct appears to me in this light; they have made known the propositions offered by Sir Henry Clinton only by the way of threat, and seem to say, if you do not grant our terms, we can obtain them elsewhere.

At the meeting with the general and field officers yesterday, it was almost a unanimous opinion, that their men might be depended upon. I therefore gave directions for a detachment of one thousand men to be prepared and held in readiness. If things are in a train of negotiation, as would seem to be the case from General Wayne's postscript, to move a force between Trenton and the enemy might create suspicions in the minds of the mutineers, and make them fly to the enemy for safety. I do not think it prudent to write to the committee of Congress, to Governor Reed, or to General Wayne, lest my letter should be stopped. I think, therefore, from a consideration of the subject in every light, that it will be best for you to go down to the Pennsylvania side, opposite to Trenton, and send for some of the gentlemen over. There inquire minutely into the situation of affairs, and if there are

no hopes of a reasonable compromise, get from them an opinion of what ought ultimately to be done. If force should be determined upon, the governors of Pennsylvania and Jersey should instantly make arrangements for bringing out as many of their militia as can be collected, while the detachment above mentioned is marching from hence, that the intercourse between Trenton and this place may be as expeditious as possible. Desire Colonel Nelson to fix a relay of expresses from the neighbourhood of Trenton to Morristown, and let the quartermaster at Morristown continue them from thence to this place.

I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

New Windsor, 12 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The Marquis de Lafayette, Colonel Laurens, and others, arrived here yesterday; but they bring no later accounts, than those I had with me at West Point. Nor have I heard any thing further from the revolted troops, or the committee of Congress, since General Sullivan's letter, which you heard read. I beg, therefore, that the detachment may be hurried, and that I may be informed when it will be ready to move. I will

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\* In a letter from General Wayne, of the same date as the above, he says; "The conditions now made and agreed to are the joint act of the committee of Congress and the governor of Pennsylvania, to whom the former delegated their powers. The mutineers as yet hold command, but we have expectations of reclaiming it, in appearance at least, either this evening or to-morrow morning. However, I believe it will be the most advisable measure to dissolve the line, and collect it anew, as well and expeditiously as we can. The spies were executed yesterday pursuant to their sentence." — *Trenton, January 12th.*

direct Colonel Blaine to wait upon you, and fix matters with respect to the article of provision. Major-General Howe applied to me yesterday for the command of the detachment. In point of right he ought to have it; but in point of policy it might be better to give it to either General Parsons or General Glover; and this I told him, but ultimately desired him to fix the matter with you, and the other two gentlemen, who might be more competent judges of the weight of my observations to him than I could be myself. Determine as you will; I shall be satisfied.

When the detachment marches, you will be pleased to pay particular attention, that each work is sufficiently manned and provided, that the guard-boats below are uncommonly watchful, that upon the appearance of any force on the water they fire alarm-guns at Stony or Verplanck's Point, and, not depending on this, that they send expresses besides. Let a field-piece with a small guard be stationed at Fort Montgomery, for the more certain receiving and communicating the alarm at King's Ferry; and let every means be used to obtain intelligence of the enemy's designs at New York; and, in a word, every possible diligence and attention given to the security of the post in the absence of the detachment. I am, Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

New Windsor, 14 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

With respect to the soldiers, who have been prisoners, I have to observe, that I think it reasonable the indulgence of furloughs should be granted to those, whose circumstances require it, and for whose return



their officers can become in a great measure responsible. I do not know particularly what clothing there is remaining in the store, but such as there is may be issued, so far as will make them comfortable.

The subject of yours of yesterday is of so delicate a nature, that I am almost afraid it will be productive of ill consequences to have it handled even by the most prudent officers, in the most cautious manner. To seem to draw into question the fidelity and firmness of the soldiers, or even to express a doubt of their obedience, may occasion such a relaxation of discipline, as would not otherwise exist. I could wish to have these matters treated with the greatest prudence by the officers, and not conversed upon before their domestics, as I am apprehensive has sometimes incautiously been practised.\*

Although it is not probable that the detachment will march, I would have it still held in readiness. In the mean time, the opening of the new road is of so great importance, that it ought not to be neglected; and it will not, I believe, under the present circumstances, interfere too much with the design of the detachment, since General Wayne informs me, that the spies were given up, and the affair likely to be settled.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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\* General Heath had taken some indirect measures to ascertain the sentiments of the soldiers, as to the conduct of the Pennsylvania line, particularly of those constituting the detachment ordered to be in readiness to march. A woman was sent into one regiment to listen to the conversation of the men, and she heard them say, that they would have no hand in putting down the Pennsylvanians. The representations of a sergeant had been received and credited in another case; and General Heath's steward told him, that he had heard the men declare, that they would not march from West Point till they were paid and clothed.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.\*

New Windsor, 15 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

In compliance with your request I shall commit to writing the result of our conferences on the present state of American affairs, in which I have given you my ideas with that freedom and explicitness, which the objects of your commission, my entire confidence in you, and the exigency demand. To me it appears evident;

1. That, considering the diffused population of these States, the consequent difficulty of drawing together its resources, the composition and temper of a part of the inhabitants, the want of a sufficient stock of national wealth as a foundation for revenue, and the almost total extinction of commerce, the efforts we have been compelled to make for carrying on the war have exceeded the natural abilities of this country, and by degrees brought it to a crisis, which renders immediate and efficacious succours from abroad indispensable to its safety.

2. That, notwithstanding, from the confusion always attendant on a revolution, from our having had govern-

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\* In conformity with the instructions from Congress to Colonel Laurens, that he should consult General Washington on the objects of his mission before his departure for France, he proceeded to head-quarters for that purpose. The substance of their consultations was embodied in the form of a letter, which it was intended Colonel Laurens should use in such a manner as he might think proper. He introduced copious extracts from it into a memorial, which he presented to Count de Vergennes, and which is contained in the *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, Vol. IX. p. 211. Those extracts differ in some slight particulars from the copy here printed, which is taken from General Washington's letter-books. The original letter, in the handwriting of General Washington, was likewise sent to Count de Vergennes, by Colonel Laurens or Dr. Franklin, and is still preserved among the American Papers in the Archives of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

ments to frame and every species of civil and military institutions to create, from that inexperience in affairs necessarily incident to a nation in its commencement, some errors may have been committed in the administration of our finances, to which a part of our embarrassments are to be attributed; yet they are principally to be ascribed to an essential defect of means, to the want of a sufficient stock of wealth, as mentioned in the first article, which, continuing to operate, will make it impossible by any merely interior exertions to extricate ourselves from those embarrassments, restore public credit, and furnish the funds requisite for the support of war.

3. That experience has demonstrated the impracticability long to maintain a paper credit without funds for its redemption. The depreciation of our currency was in the main a necessary effect of the want of those funds; and its restoration is impossible for the same reason, to which the general diffidence which has taken place among the people is an additional and, in the present state of things, an insuperable obstacle.

4. That the mode, which for want of money has been substituted for supplying the army, assessing a proportion of the productions of the earth, has hitherto been found ineffectual, has frequently exposed the army to the most calamitous distress, and, from its novelty and incompatibility with ancient habits, is regarded by the people as burthensome and oppressive, has excited serious discontents, and in some places alarming symptoms of opposition. This mode has, besides, many particular inconveniences, which contribute to make it inadequate to our wants, and ineligible but as an auxiliary.

5. That, from the best estimates of the annual expense of the war and the annual revenues which these



States are capable of affording, there is a large balance to be supplied by public credit. The resource of domestic loans is inconsiderable, because there are properly speaking few moneyed men, and the few there are can employ their money more profitably otherwise; added to which, the instability of the currency and the deficiency of funds have impaired the public credit.

6. That the patience of the army, from an almost uninterrupted series of complicated distress, is now nearly exhausted, and their discontents matured to an extremity, which has recently had very disagreeable consequences, and which demonstrates the absolute necessity of speedy relief, a relief not within the compass of our means. You are too well acquainted with all their sufferings for want of clothing, for want of provisions, for want of pay.

7. That, the people being dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the war, there is cause to apprehend, that evils actually felt in the prosecution may weaken those sentiments which began it, founded, not on immediate sufferings, but on a speculative apprehension of future sufferings from the loss of their liberties. There is danger, that a commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burthens, pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another.

8. That, from all the foregoing considerations result, first, absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succour in money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of finance, to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations; secondly, the vast importance of a decided effort of the allied arms on this continent, the ensuing campaign, to

effectuate once for all the great objects of the alliance, the liberty and independence of these States. Without the former we may make a feeble and expiring effort the next campaign, in all probability the period to our opposition. With it, we should be in a condition to continue the war, as long as the obstinacy of the enemy might require. The former is essential to the latter; both combined would bring the contest to a glorious issue, crown the obligations, which America already feels to the magnanimity and generosity of her ally, and perpetuate the union by all the ties of gratitude and affection, as well as mutual advantage, which alone can render it solid and indissoluble.

9. That, next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object most interesting. This would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive, and, by removing all prospect of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting the war. Indeed, it is not to be conceived how they could subsist a large force in this country, if we had the command of the seas, to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert the war into a vigorous offensive. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how infinitely it would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points; and it appears, too, to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports friendly to them and hostile to the British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of these seas.



10. That an additional succour in troops would be extremely desirable. Besides a reinforcement of numbers, the excellence of French troops, that perfect discipline and order in the corps already sent, which have so happily tended to improve the respect and confidence of the people for our allies, the conciliating disposition and the zeal for the service, which distinguish every rank, sure indications of lasting harmony, — all these considerations evince the immense utility of an accession of force to the corps now here. Correspondent with these motives, the enclosed minutes of a conference between Count de Rochambeau, Chevalier de Ternay, and myself will inform you, that an augmentation to fifteen thousand men was judged expedient for the next campaign; and it has been signified to me, that an application has been made to the court of France to this effect. But if the sending so large a succour in troops should necessarily diminish the pecuniary aid, which our allies may be disposed to grant, it were preferable to diminish the aid in men; for the same sum of money, which would transport from France and maintain here a body of troops with all the necessary apparatus, being put into our hands to be employed by us, would serve to give activity to a larger force within ourselves, and its influence would pervade the whole administration.

11. That no nation will have it more in its power to repay what it borrows than this. Our debts are hitherto small. The vast and valuable tracts of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility of climates and soils, the advantages of every kind which we possess for commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and prosperity, and a certainty, its independence being established, of redeeming in a short term



of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts it may have occasion to contract.

12. That, notwithstanding the difficulties under which we labor, and the inquietudes prevailing among the people, there is still a fund of inclination and resource in the country, equal to great and continued exertions, provided we have it in our power to stop the progress of disgust, by changing the present system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more capable of activity and energy in public measures; of which a powerful succour in money must be the basis. The people are discontented; but it is with the feeble and oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself. They are not unwilling to contribute to its support, but they are unwilling to do it in a way that renders private property precarious; a necessary consequence of the fluctuation of the national currency, and of the inability of government to perform its engagements oftentimes coercively made. A large majority are still firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a reunion with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with France; but this disposition cannot supply the place of means customary and essential in war, nor can we rely on its duration amidst the perplexities, oppressions, and misfortunes, that attend the want of them.

If the foregoing observations are of any use to you, I shall be happy. I wish you a safe and pleasant voyage, the full accomplishment of your mission, and a speedy return; being, with sentiments of perfect friendship, regard, and affection, dear Sir, &c.

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 15 January, 1781.

SIR,

The unhappy mutiny of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the Pennsylvania line, the perplexed state of affairs in this quarter, the distressed condition of the troops at West Point and in the vicinity of it, on account of provisions and some essential articles of clothing, combined with other embarrassments of less importance, have engrossed all my time and attention, and must be offered as an apology for not complying sooner with the order of Congress of the 1st instant, enclosed in your Excellency's letter of the 2d, relative to the expediency of removing the French troops to Virginia.

Congress, being no strangers to the blockade of the French squadron at Rhode Island, must have had in contemplation a land march of the French army to the above State; to which the season, length of the way, badness of the roads, difficulty of transportation, and possibly want of covering in a good military position when there, the expectation of the second division, and the arrangements which are made in consequence by the French general, might be offered as weighty objections by auxiliary troops against the measure. But, as Congress have been pleased to ask my opinion of the expediency of it, I think it a duty incumbent on me to add, that it is not agreeable to the sentiments, perhaps to the orders, of the officers commanding the land and naval force at Rhode Island to separate, while the latter is awed by a superior marine. The experiment has already been tried.

I shall act according to the best of my judgment in a further exchange of prisoners; and will carry the views of Congress into effect, as far as I am able.

In my last I communicated the reasons, which prevented my departure for Morristown upon the first intimation I received of the revolt of the Pennsylvania line, and the contingencies on which my going thither then depended. I found, notwithstanding my utmost exertion and all the aid I could derive from the government of this State, that I could only supply the garrison from day to day with provisions ; that it was a doubtful point, though the troops appeared totally quiet in this quarter, how far they were to be depended upon, in a serious and spirited attempt to quell others, whose declared intention was to seek redress of those grievances, in which they themselves participated, and of which they were constantly complaining ; while the propriety of weakening the garrison, supposing the utmost reliance was to be had on them, without provisions in the magazine or works, was not less questionable. On the other hand, all authority in the officers of the Pennsylvania line over their men being at an end, and the influence of those who remained with them employed to no purpose, I was convinced that the unhappy precedent they had set, and the shock which discipline had received by the revolt, would only be increased by my appearance among them, without the means of enforcing obedience ; the necessity of doing which, for the support of military authority, was so essential, as to be attempted at almost every hazard. But to choose for the best, in such perplexing circumstances as I was driven to, was not very easy. Ultimately, however, I determined to prepare a detachment of a thousand men, and directed General St. Clair, who was at Morristown, to proceed immediately to the committee of Congress at Trenton, and, if matters were not then settled, or in their opinion in a favorable train for it, to make the ulterior arrangements for militia with Mr. President



Reed and Governor Livingston, that, with their assistance, the detachment from hence might be enabled to act effectually. Thus the matter stood when a letter from the committee advised me, that the business was likely to be accommodated to mutual satisfaction.

It would be happy for us, and favorable to the probable operations of the next campaign, if, instead of living chiefly upon the supplies of this State, these and the provisions in Jersey could be held as a kind of reserve magazine. Proper attention has been paid to such officers of the Continental lines under my immediate command, as now are or have been prisoners with the enemy, in making the new arrangement of the army; and I have no doubt but equal regard will be had to those in the southern army. I shall write to General Greene on this head, and will transmit to him a copy of the resolve explaining the sense of Congress on this matter. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MRS. SARAH BACHE.\*

New Windsor, 15 January, 1781.

DEAR MADAM,

I should have done myself the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of the letter you did me the favor to write on the 26th of December, at the moment of its

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\* Mrs. Bache was one of the ladies, who superintended the contributions in Philadelphia for the benefit of the soldiers. 'She wrote to General Washington;—"We packed up the shirts in three boxes, and delivered them to Colonel Miles, with a request that he would send them to Trenton immediately, lest the river should close; where they now wait your Excellency's orders. There are two thousand and five in number. They would have been at camp long before this, had not the general sickness prevented. We wish them to be worn with as much pleasure as they were made."

receipt, had not some affairs of a very unusual nature, which are too recent and notorious to require explanation, engaged my whole attention. I pray you now to be persuaded, that a sense of the patriotic exertions of yourself and the ladies, who have furnished so handsome and useful a gratuity for the army, at so critical and severe a season, will not easily be effaced, and that the value of the donation will be greatly enhanced by a consideration of the hands by which it was made and presented.

Amidst all the distresses and sufferings of the army, from whatever sources they have arisen, it must be a consolation to our virtuous countrywomen, that they have never been accused of withholding their most zealous efforts to support the cause we are engaged in, and encourage those who are defending them in the field. The army do not want gratitude, nor do they misplace it in this instance.

Although the friendship of your father may oblige him to see some things through too partial a medium, yet the indulgent manner in which he is pleased to express himself respecting me is indeed very gratifying; for nothing in human life can afford a liberal mind more rational and exquisite satisfaction, than the approbation of a wise, a great, and virtuous man.\* Mrs. Washington requests me to present her compliments to Mr. Bache and yourself, with which you will be pleased to accept of mine, and believe me to be, with great consideration and esteem, dear Madam, &c.

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\* Mrs. Bache was the daughter of Dr. Franklin, and she had said; "My father, in one of his last letters, says, 'If you see General Washington, assure him of my very great and sincere respect, and tell him that all the old generals here amuse themselves in studying the accounts of his operations, and approve highly of his conduct.'"

TO BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

New Windsor, 15 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have the honor of addressing this letter to you by Colonel Laurens, one of my aids-de-camp, whom Congress has been pleased to commission for particular purposes to the court of Versailles. Justice to the character of this gentleman, conspiring with motives of friendship, will not permit me to let him depart without testifying to you the high opinion I entertain of his worth, as a citizen and as a soldier. You will find him a man of abilities, perfectly acquainted with our circumstances, and exemplary for his honor and candor. I can with pleasure add assurances of his attachment to you personally, and of his perfect disposition to conform to his instructions by availing himself of your advice and assistance upon all occasions; and with this conviction I confidently take the liberty of recommending him to your friendship.

The present infinitely critical posture of our affairs made it essential, in the opinion of Congress, to send from hence a person, who had been an eyewitness of their progress, and who was capable of placing them before the court of France in a more full and striking point of light, than was proper or even practicable by any written communications. It was also judged of great importance, that the person should be able to give a military view of them, and to enter into military details and arrangements. The choice has fallen upon Colonel Laurens, as a gentleman who unites all these advantages, and adds to them an integrity and an independence of character, which render him superior to any spirit of party.

What I have said to him, I beg leave to repeat to



you, that to me nothing appears more evident, than that the period of our opposition will very shortly arrive, if our allies cannot afford us that effectual aid, particularly in money, and in a naval superiority, which are now solicited. Colonel Laurens is fully possessed of my ideas of our situation and wants, and has himself so thorough a knowledge of them, that I should trouble you to no purpose by enlarging. You may place entire confidence in him, and in the assurance that I am, with the warmest sentiments of respect, esteem, and regard, dear Sir, &c.\*

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\* There was a party in Congress unfavorably disposed towards Dr. Franklin, and it is probable, that the appointment of a special minister to go to France and solicit succours had its origin as much in the prejudices existing against the plenipotentiary already there, as in the absolute necessity of the case. We have before referred (p. 175) to the manner in which this subject was viewed by the French cabinet. The Chevalier de la Luzerne took care to make due reports of the state of opinion in Congress, particularly in regard to every thing, which had a bearing on French affairs. In reply to one of his letters, Count de Vergennes had recently written to him concerning Dr. Franklin.

"I have too good an opinion," said he, "of the intelligence and wisdom of the members of Congress, and of all true patriots, to suppose that they will allow themselves to be led astray by the representations of a man, whose character they ought to know, or that they will judge of us from any other facts, than the generous proceedings of his Majesty. As to Dr. Franklin, his conduct leaves nothing for Congress to desire. It is as zealous and patriotic, as it is wise and circumspect; and you may affirm with assurance, on all occasions where you think proper, that the method he pursues is much more efficacious than it would be, if he were to assume a tone of importunity in multiplying his demands, and above all in supporting them by menaces, to which we should neither give credence nor value, and which would only tend to render him personally disagreeable. You will moreover readily perceive, that such menaces would be the more superfluous and ill-judged, as, believing that Congress would be incapable of dictating them, we should put them all to the account of their representative, and he would derive no other fruit from them than the irreparable loss of our confidence.

"Furthermore, that Congress may be enabled to judge, that they ought to rely much more on our good will, than on the importunity of Dr. Franklin, you may inform them, that, upon the first request of their minister, we have promised him a million of livres to put him in a condition to

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, 22 January, 1781.

SIR,

You are to take the command of the detachment, which has been ordered to march from this post against the mutineers of the Jersey line. You will rendezvous the whole of your command at Ringwood or Pompton, as you may find best from circumstances. The object of your detachment is to compel the mutineers to un-

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meet the demands made on him from this time till the end of the year; that we are occupied in providing for him new resources for the year coming; and that, in short, we shall in no case lose sight of the interests of the American cause. I flatter myself, that these marks of regard will be understood by the patriots, and will destroy any prepossessions, which the ill-advised language of Mr. Izard and Mr. Arthur Lee may have produced."—*MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, December 4th, 1780.*

Again Count de Vergennes wrote, after the appointment of Colonel Laurens was known to him;

"Congress rely too much on France for subsidies to maintain their army. They must absolutely refrain from such exorbitant demands. The great expenses of the war render it impossible for France to meet these demands if persisted in. You must speak in a peremptory manner on this subject; and, to give more weight, you must observe, that the last campaign has cost us more than one hundred and fifty millions extraordinary, and what we are now about to furnish will surpass that sum. You may add, that our desire to aid Congress to the full extent of our power has engaged us to grant to Dr. Franklin (besides the one million, of which he had need to meet the demands for the last year) four millions more, to enable him to take up the drafts, which Congress have drawn on him for the present year. I dare believe, that this procedure will be duly estimated in America, and convince Congress that they have no occasion to employ the false policy of Mr. Izard and Mr. Lee to procure succours. If you are questioned respecting our opinion of Dr. Franklin, you may without hesitation say, that we esteem him as much on account of the patriotism as the wisdom of his conduct; and it has been owing in a great part to this cause, and to the confidence we put in the veracity of Dr. Franklin, that we have determined to relieve the pecuniary embarrassments in which he has been placed by Congress. It may be judged from this fact, which is of a personal nature, if that minister's conduct has been injurious to the interests of his country, or if any other would have had the same advantages."—*MS. Letter, February 15th.*

conditional submission ; and I am to desire, that you will grant no terms while they are with arms in their hands in a state of resistance. The manner of executing this I leave to your discretion. If you succeed in compelling the revolted troops to a surrender, you will instantly execute a few of the most active and incendiary leaders.

You will endeavour to collect such of the Jersey troops to your standard, as have not followed the pernicious example of their associates ; and you will also try to avail yourself of the services of the militia, representing to them how dangerous to civil liberty is the precedent of armed soldiers dictating terms to their country. You will open a correspondence with Colonels Dayton and Shreve of the Jersey line, and Colonel Frelinghuysen of the militia, or any others.

I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO PRESIDENT WEARE.†

New Windsor, 22 January, 1781.

SIR,

I have received the disagreeable intelligence, that a part of the Jersey line had followed the example of that of Pennsylvania ; and when the advices came away, it was expected the revolt would be general. The precise intention of the mutineers was not known, but their complaints and demands were similar to those of the Pennsylvanians.

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\* For an account of the revolt of the New Jersey line, see APPENDIX, No. X.

† This letter was sent as a circular to the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York.



Persuaded that, without some decisive effort at all hazards to suppress this dangerous spirit, it would speedily infect the whole army, I have ordered as large a detachment as we could spare from these posts to march under Major-General Howe, with orders to compel the mutineers to unconditional submission; to listen to no terms, while they are in a state of resistance; and, on their reduction, to execute instantly a few of the most active and incendiary leaders. I am not certain what part the troops detached for this purpose will act, but I flatter myself they will do their duty. Any extremity, to which the Jersey troops may be drawn, I prefer to a compromise.

The weakness of the garrison, but still more its embarrassing distress for want of provisions, made it impossible to prosecute such measures with the Pennsylvanians, as the nature of the case demanded; and, while we were making arrangements, as far as practicable, to supply these defects, an accommodation took place, which will not only subvert the Pennsylvania line, but have a very pernicious influence on the whole army. I mean, however, by these remarks only to give an idea of the miserable situation we are in, and not to blame a measure, which perhaps in our circumstances was the best that could have been adopted. The same embarrassments operate against coercion at this moment, but not in so great a degree; the Jersey troops not being, from their numbers, so formidable as were the Pennsylvanians.

I dare not detail the risks we run from the present scantiness of supplies. With flour we are fed only from day to day. We have received few or no cattle for some time past, nor do we know of any shortly to be expected. The salted meat, which we ought to have reserved in the garrison, is now nearly exhausted.

I cannot but renew my solicitations with your State to exert every expedient for contributing to our immediate relief. With perfect respect, I am, &c.

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TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING THE BRITISH FLEET  
AT NEW YORK.

Head-Quarters, 25 January, 1781.

SIR,

Through a variety of channels, representations of too serious a nature to be disregarded have come to us, that the American naval prisoners in the harbour of New York are suffering all the extremities of distress, from a too crowded and in all respects disagreeable and unwholesome situation, on board the prison-ships, and from the want of food and other necessaries. The picture given us of their sufferings is truly calamitous and deplorable. If just, it is the obvious interest of both parties, omitting the plea of humanity, that the causes should be without delay inquired into and removed; if false, it is equally desirable, that effectual measures should be taken to obviate misapprehensions. This can only be done by permitting an officer, of confidence on both sides, to visit the prisoners in their respective confinements, and to examine into their true condition. This will either at once satisfy you, that, by some abuse of trust in the persons immediately charged with the care of the prisoners, their treatment is really such as has been described to us, and requires a change; or it will convince us, that the clamors are ill grounded. A disposition to aggravate the miseries of captivity is too illiberal to be imputed to any but those subordinate characters, who, in every service, are too often remiss or unprincipled. This reflection as-

sures me, that you will acquiesce in the mode proposed for ascertaining the truth, and detecting delinquency on one side, or falsehood on the other.

The discussions and asperities, which have had too much place on the subject of prisoners, are so irksome in themselves, and have had so many ill consequences, that it is infinitely to be wished, that there may be no room given to revive them. The mode I have suggested appears to me calculated to bring the present case to a fair, direct, and satisfactory issue. I am not sensible of any inconveniences it can be attended with, and I therefore hope for your concurrence. I shall be glad, as soon as possible, to hear from you on the subject. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* This letter was answered by Admiral Arbuthnot three months after its date, as follows.

"Royal Oak, off New York, 21 April, 1781.

"Sir,

"If I had not been very busy, when I received your letter dated the 25th of January last, complaining of the treatment of the naval prisoners at this place, I certainly should have answered it before this time; and, notwithstanding I then thought, as I now do, that my own testimony would have been sufficient to put the truth past a doubt, I ordered the strictest scrutiny to be made into the conduct of all parties concerned in the victualling and treatment of those unfortunate people. Their several testimonies you must have seen, and I give you my honor, that the transaction was conducted with such strict care and impartiality, that you may rely on its validity.

"Permit me now, Sir, to request, that you will take the proper steps to cause Mr. Bradford, your commissary, and the jailor at Philadelphia, to abate that inhumanity, which they exercise indiscriminately upon all people, who are so unfortunate as to be carried into that place. I will not trouble you, Sir, with a catalogue of grievances, further than to request, that the unfortunate may feel as little of the severities of war, as the circumstances of the time will permit, that in future they may not be fed in winter with salted clams, and that they may be afforded a sufficiency of fuel.

"I am, Sir,

"your most obedient

"and humble servant,

"M. ARBUTHNOT."



## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

New Windsor, 25 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I am much obliged to you for the account of the success of the enterprise against Morrisania. Since the troops under the command of Major-General Parsons appear to be so much fatigued, I would advise to complete the detachment of Major-General Howe, if possible, from the troops remaining in camp, particularly from the brigades on the east side of the river; because these men may be immediately replaced by those returning from the enterprise. And, perhaps, by the address of General Parsons, some volunteers may be obtained from the last mentioned troops. At any rate, the service is so pressing, that the men should be marched for Pompton as soon as possible from one quarter or the other. You will be best able to determine from whence they can be sent, when you see General Parsons, which will be, I suppose, before the receipt of this letter. I shall set out for Ringwood tomorrow morning, to act as circumstances may require.

I am, dear Sir, &amp;c.

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TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING THE  
NEW JERSEY LINE.

Ringwood, 26 January, 1781.

SIR,

I enclose to you a letter for the commissioners appointed to inquire into and redress the grievances of the Jersey line, which you will be pleased to deliver to them. At the same time I am to desire, that you will make the subject of it an object of your particular at-

tention. You will insist on the rights of the service, and take care to give the officers the fullest opportunity of furnishing evidence of the manner of enlistment. I am persuaded the commissioners will be actuated by a proper spirit; but, if there should appear to be too much lenity and indulgence in their measures, you are to interpose in preventing the discharge of the men, till you can report to me the train in which the business is transacted. You will of course keep these instructions to yourself. I am, &c.

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TO THE COMMISSIONERS FOR REDRESSING THE  
GRIEVANCES OF THE NEW JERSEY LINE.

Ringwood, 27 January, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

The fatal tendency of that spirit, which has shown itself in the Pennsylvania and Jersey lines, and which derived so much encouragement from impunity in the case of the former, determined me at all events to pursue a different conduct with respect to the latter. For this purpose I detached a body of troops under Major-General Howe, with orders to compel the mutineers to unconditional submission, and execute on the spot a few of the principal incendiaries. This has been effected this morning; and we have reason to believe the mutinous disposition of the troops is now completely subdued, and succeeded by a genuine penitence.

But having punished guilt and supported authority, it now becomes proper to do justice. I therefore wish the commissioners, as soon as convenient, to enter upon the objects for which they have been appointed. But I think it my duty to observe to them the necessity of the greatest caution in discussing one article, the terms

of the enlistments of the troops. In transacting this with the Pennsylvanians, for want of proper care, the greater part of the line has been dismissed, though only a small proportion was entitled to a dismissal. Authentic and unequivocal proofs have been since found, that a majority of the discharged men were fairly and explicitly enlisted for the war. This evil arose from admitting the oaths of the individuals themselves, before the vouchers could be collected. From the temper of the soldiery, who will avoid no means of getting rid of the service, it becomes necessary to admit none but the most unsuspecting evidence in their favor. Generally on investigation the complaints on this head have appeared ill founded; and as the presumption is strong against the soldier, the proofs of an unfair detention ought to be equally strong. Men are extremely wanted. It is at an infinite expense that they are procured, and they ought not lightly to be released from their engagements.\*

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\* In settling the difficulties with the Pennsylvania line it was agreed, that, where the written terms of enlistment could not be produced, the soldier's oath should be received. As the attestations of enlistment were scattered in the hands of different officers, it was necessary to proceed before they could be collected; and in three whole regiments only about one hundred men were retained. "I could wish," said General Wayne, "that the commissioners had given time for the officers to produce the attestations before they made the oath so common. The papers were collected the soonest possible; the enlistments were generally and expressly *for the war*. But the birds were flown. I will not say, that it was not in some degree an act of expediency, in order to get the artillery, spare ammunition, and part of the small arms out of their hands. These I have taken the precaution to forward by water to Philadelphia." All the troops, that were not discharged, were sent home on furlough, with orders to rendezvous in March as follows; the first and second regiments at Philadelphia, the third at Reading, the fourth at Carlisle, the fifth at York and Chester, the sixth at Lancaster. — *MS. Letter dated Trenton, January 21st.*

In the same letter General Wayne expressed himself as cheered with brighter hopes. "I am now fully convinced," said he, "that there is no



Whenever a complaint has been made to me, I have invariably directed an inquiry; for I have ever considered it as not less impolitic than unjust in our service to use fraud in engaging or retaining men. But as I mentioned above, the complaint has much oftener been found to originate in the levity of the soldier than in truth. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 29 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Although the petition of the non-commissioned officers of Colonel Sprout's regiment was conceived in decent terms, and presented with respect, yet every thing that looks like combination ought to be discountenanced, while the men are assured, that, whatever can be done to redress all their real grievances, will be strenuously attempted.\* The good disposition shown by the troops at these posts in general, and by the detachment under the command of Major-General Howe in particular, entitles them to every mark of consideration, and will, I doubt not, have a powerful influence in procuring a speedy relief from the hardships under which they labor. My endeavours will never be wanting to have ample justice done to them.

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situation in life, which admits not of some consolation. Ours once appeared very gloomy; but more bright and pleasing prospects begin to dawn. The soldiers are as impatient of liberty as they were of service; and they are as importunate to be reenlisted as they were to be discharged. Money is fast collecting for the purpose, and I hope a few weeks will put it in my power to announce to your Excellency a *reclaimed* and formidable line."

\* This petition was signed by the sergeants of the regiment, and contained the usual list of grievances; want of bounty-money, wages, clothes, and provisions.

With respect to your inquiry, whether it is allowable for the officers belonging to one State to enlist men belonging to another, I am clearly of opinion it is not, and will give orders effectually to prevent it in future. But in the instance of Captain Machin, who I am informed has recruited five or six men of the Massachusetts line, whose time of service was expiring, I would recommend, that, if the recruiting money, which has been paid to them, cannot be replaced by officers of that line, these men should notwithstanding be retained in service, and be delivered to the New York line, where I am further informed an exchange can be made of these recruits for an equal number of men belonging to the State of New York, now serving in Colonel Crane's regiment of artillery. If one of these expedients is not adopted, I do not see but the bounty and men will be finally lost to the service. A sergeant of Captain Machin's waits upon you with this.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

New Windsor, 29 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your letter of this day with the papers accompanying it. For fear of a revival of the discontents in the Jersey line, I think it advisable that there should remain near them other troops on whose fidelity we can more perfectly rely. On this account I approve the detention of the New Hampshire detachment and the artillery, till we hear something more of the movements on Staten Island. Perhaps on receiving intelligence of what has happened in the Jersey line, General Robertson may desist from his supposed

intention.\* To march the Jersey troops alone to Morristown might only be one temptation the more; and to harass other troops with that march in the present state of things would, in my opinion, be inexpedient on more accounts than one. If the Massachusetts detachment is commodiously situated, it may remain where it is till we receive further intelligence; if not, let it return to West Point. In this case you will yourself also return. Signify, if you please, to Colonel Barber my approbation of his keeping the New Hampshire detachment and artillery till further orders.

I am, with great regard, Sir, &c.

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

New Windsor, 31 January, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

To learn from so good authority as your information, that the distresses of the citizens of this State are maturing into complaints, which are likely to produce serious consequences, is a circumstance as necessary to be known, as it is unpleasing to hear, and I thank you for the communication. The committees now forming are at this crisis disagreeable things; and if they cannot be counteracted, or diverted from their original purposes, may outgo the views of the well-meaning members of them, and plunge this country into deeper distress and confusion, than it has hitherto experienced; though I have no doubt that the

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\* General Robertson was on Staten Island with a large detachment of British troops, watching the movements in Jersey, and prepared, as it was supposed, to make an incursion for the purpose either of drawing over the malecontents, or of striking a blow in that quarter, as circumstances might seem to warrant.



same bountiful Providence, which has relieved us in a variety of difficulties heretofore, will enable us to emerge from them ultimately, and crown our struggles with success.

To trace these evils to their sources is by no means difficult; and errors once discovered are more than half corrected. This I hope is our case at present; but there can be no radical cure till Congress is vested, by the several States, with full and ample powers to enact laws for general purposes, and till the executive business is placed in the hands of able men and responsible characters. Requisitions then will be supported by law. Jealousies, and those ruinous delays and ill-timed compliances, arising from distrust and the fear of doing more than a sister State, will cease. Business will be properly arranged; system and order will take place; and economy must follow; but not till we have corrected the fundamental errors enumerated above.

It would be no difficult matter to prove, that less than half the present expenditures, including certificates, is more than sufficient, if we had money, and these alterations in our political movements were adopted, to answer all our purposes. Taxes of course would be lessened, the burden would be equal and light, and men sharing a common lot would neither murmur nor despond.

The picture you have drawn of the distresses of the people of this State I am persuaded is true; and I have taken the liberty in a late letter, and in as delicate terms as I could express my sentiments, to hint to Congress the propriety of the policy of leaving the resources of this State and Jersey as a kind of reserve. More than this might bring on me the charge of an intermeddler, till I could speak decisively from

my own knowledge. At all times, and under all circumstances, you will please and honor me by a free communication of your sentiments; as I can with much truth assure you, that, with the greatest esteem and affection, I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 31 January, 1781.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency the report of Major-General Howe, of his proceedings in suppressing the mutiny in the Jersey line, in which all his measures were taken with decision and propriety. Enclosed are two other reports, of Brigadier-General Parsons and Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, respecting an enterprise against Delancey's corps at Westchester, in which, with small loss on our side, the barracks of the corps and a large quantity of forage were destroyed, fifty-two prisoners and a considerable number of horses and cattle brought off, and a bridge across Haerlem River under one of the enemy's redoubts burnt. General Parsons's arrangements were judicious, and the conduct of the officers and men employed on the occasion is entitled to the highest praise. The position of the corps, two or three miles within some of the enemy's redoubts, required address and courage in the execution of the enterprise. I am, dear Sir, &c.\*

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\* The expedition was commanded by General Parsons; but the advanced corps, by which the attack was made at Morrisania, was under the immediate direction of Colonel Hull. With three companies of Continental troops and a party of volunteer horsemen, he proceeded in the night of the 21st of January to Morrisania, having taken care to guard his flanks by stationing detachments at suitable points. He came to a small creek near the barracks occupied by Delancey's corps, over

## TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DUBUYSSON.

New Windsor, 1 February, 1781.

SIR,

I have received your favor announcing your promotion, and soliciting my influence in obtaining your exchange. I desire you to be persuaded, that I rejoice in your prosperity, and wish you an increase of well-merited honors and felicities ; but, at the same time, I cannot conceive that the private concerns of any individual should be preferred to the public good, or that general rules, established for the benefit of all those unfortunate men, whom the fortune of war has placed in the power of the enemy, should be dispensed with on ordinary occasions.

Priority of capture has been an invariable principle in making those exchanges, which have been negotiated under my immediate direction ; and I see no reason for

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which he expected to find a bridge. In this, however, he was disappointed ; and the recent rains had swelled the waters so much, that it was difficult to pass over, particularly as the creek was filled with floating ice. Not to be baffled in this stage of their enterprise, the infantry mounted behind the horsemen, and within fifteen minutes about seventy were conveyed across, who, with the cavalry, were thought sufficient for the attack. The rest remained to protect the pass. The noise produced in crossing had alarmed the post, and prevented the surprise from being as complete as was intended ; but the assault was so rapid and vigorous, that it was entirely successful in its main object. All the barracks and a large quantity of forage were destroyed, and fifty-four of Delancey's corps were made prisoners. The party retired in good order, though much harassed by the enemy, and joined the main body under General Parsons near East Chester, having brought away all the prisoners, and many cattle and horses. Major Maxwell, with a small detachment, destroyed the pontoon bridge over Haerlem Creek. Other parties were sent to Frog's Neck and Delancey's Bridge, and there was a good deal of skirmishing in the course of the 22d, while General Parsons drew off his troops to their original positions within the lines. His loss was thirteen men killed, thirteen wounded, and six missing. — *MS. Letters of General Parsons and Colonel Hull, January 25th.*



departing from so equitable a rule. The inconveniences I foresee would be innumerable. The danger of partiality would alone be a sufficient objection. Besides this, from the number of letters I have received from you since your captivity, you must be sensible, Sir, that were a door opened for all our officers who are prisoners to expect partial exchanges would be made for them, my whole time and attention must be devoted to their applications. In fine, Sir, I cannot interfere in the matter, without violating an express resolution of Congress, counteracting my own sentiments, introducing a new system, and doing the most palpable injustice. I am, &c.

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TO THE DUKE DE BIRON, PARIS.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 3 February, 1781.

SIR,

The Marquis de la Rouerie,\* who is on the point of returning to France for a few months, having informed me that he has had the advantage of belonging to a regiment commanded by you, I cannot refuse it to my sentiments for him to take the liberty of recommending him to you, as an officer who has distinguished himself by his talents, bravery, and zeal in the service of this country. He has served nearly four years, with the rank of colonel, and the greater part of the time has commanded a legionary corps. The numerous and rapid promotions of foreigners, in the early period of the war, have occasioned a susceptibility in the American officers on this point, which has hitherto prevented the advancement of Colonel Armand, though his services and merit are acknowledged. He has however

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\* Colonel Armand.

this consolation, that many of those promotions conferred rank without employment, while he has enjoyed a more military existence in the actual command of a corps.

Though I have not the honor of a personal acquaintance with you, I have taken the liberty of addressing you upon this occasion with that frankness, which is the privilege of military men, and with that confidence, which your reputation inspires; and I am happy in the opportunity of testifying to you the consideration and esteem, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 3 February, 1781.

SIR,

I have on different occasions done myself the honor to represent to Congress the inconveniences arising from the want of a proper gradation of punishments in our military code; but, as no determination has been communicated to me, I conclude a multiplicity of business may have diverted their attention from the matter. As I am convinced a great part of the vices of our discipline springs from this source, I take the liberty again to mention the subject. The highest corporal punishment we are allowed to give is a hundred lashes; between that and death there is no medium. As instances daily occur of offences for which the former is altogether inadequate, courts-martial, in order to preserve some proportion between the crime and the punishment, are obliged to pronounce sentence of death. Capital sentences on this account become more frequent in our service, than in any other; so frequent as to render their execution in most cases inexpedient;

and it happens from this, that the greater offences often escape punishment, while the less are commonly punished; which cannot but operate as an encouragement to the commission of the former.

The inconveniences of this defect are obvious. Congress are sensible of the necessity of punishment in an army, of the justice and policy of a due proportion between the crime and the penalties, and, of course, of the necessity of proper degrees in the latter. I shall therefore content myself with observing, that it appears to me indispensable that there should be an extension of the present corporal punishment, and that it would be useful to authorize courts-martial to sentence delinquents to labor on public works; perhaps even for some crimes, particularly desertion, to transfer them from the land to the sea service, where they have less opportunity to indulge their inconstancy. A variety in punishment is of utility, as well as a proportion. The number of lashes may either be indefinite, left to the discretion of the court, or limited to a larger number. In this case I would recommend five hundred.

There is one evil, however, which I shall particularize, resulting from the imperfection of our regulations in this respect. It is the increase of arbitrary punishments. Officers, finding discipline cannot be maintained by a regular course of proceeding, are tempted to use their own discretion, which sometimes occasions excesses; to correct which, the interests of discipline will not permit much rigor. Prompt and arbitrary punishments are not to be avoided in an army; but the necessity for them will be more or less, in proportion as the military laws have more or less vigor.

There is another thing in our articles of war, which I beg leave to suggest to Congress the propriety of altering. It is the part allowing colonels to furlough



their soldiers. This privilege, if suffered to operate, would often deprive the army of more men than it could spare. It has been attended with abuses, and it is disagreeable by a general order to restrain the exercise of a privilege granted by the authority of Congress. To prevent uneasiness and discussion, it were to be wished Congress would think proper to repeal this article, and vest the power of designating the mode of granting furloughs according to circumstances in the Commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army. It would perhaps be useful to prescribe a printed form, for which purpose I have taken the liberty to enclose one. This would hinder counterfeits and impositions. On the same principle I enclose the form of a discharge. It would in my opinion be a good regulation, that a soldier returning home, either on furlough or discharged, who did not in ten days after his return produce to the nearest magistrate his printed certificate, should be apprehended by the magistrate as a deserter, and through the governor be reported to the general officer commanding in the State or department. This regulation, published in the army and in the several States, would have a tendency to discourage desertion. Something of this kind has been lately adopted in Virginia, and I doubt not will have a good effect. It is to be desired that its utility may become general. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

New Windsor, 3 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The unexpected reduction of the Pennsylvania line, from the unfortunate affair, adds to the necessity of

the greatest attention to improve the measures adopted for recruiting it. I do not know precisely what these are; but I am informed in general that money is raising for the purpose, and that the recruiting service goes on with success. In order to have it conducted with regularity and activity, I request you will undertake to superintend it, and make your arrangements with the State accordingly. Enclosed you will find a copy of the instructions to the recruiting officers of the other parts of the army, which will also be proper for the government of those of your State. We have found from experience, that, by some means or other, numbers of men are lost between the place of enlistment and the place of rendezvous. To prevent this, as far as possible, will be worthy of your particular attention. I have permitted General Wayne to retire for a while. General Irvine will immediately assist you in the execution of the business.

It seems a great part of the soldiers of your line have fraudulently procured a discharge, by the precipitate admission of their oaths before the papers relative to their enlistments could be produced. In right, this cannot exempt them from their engagements, and after what has happened, if it were thought expedient to compel the return of such, I should have no doubt of its justice; and I would take the most effectual and convenient measures to notify them, that if they did not immediately return to their duty, they should be considered and treated as deserters. I perceive there are objections to the measure, and, unacquainted as I am with all the circumstances, I cannot competently judge of its propriety. I therefore shall be obliged to you for your opinion. Let me hear from time to time of your arrangements and progress. I am, with great esteem and regard, &c.

TO JOHN SULLIVAN, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 4 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Colonel Armand delivered me your favor last evening, and I thank you for the several communications contained in it. The measure adopted by Congress of appointing ministers of war, finance, and for foreign affairs, I think a very wise one. To give efficacy to it, proper characters will, no doubt, be chosen to conduct the business of these departments. How far Colonel Hamilton, of whom you ask my opinion as a financier, has turned his thoughts to that particular study, I am unable to answer, because I never entered upon a discussion on this point with him. But this I can venture to advance, from a thorough knowledge of him, that there are few men to be found, of his age, who have a more general knowledge than he possesses; and none, whose soul is more firmly engaged in the cause, or who exceeds him in probity and sterling virtue.\*

I am clearly in sentiment with you, that our cause became distressed, and apparently desperate, only from

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\* In reply to this passage General Sullivan said; "I am glad to find, that you entertain the same sentiments of the virtues and abilities of Colonel Hamilton, as I have ever done myself. After I wrote, I found the eyes of Congress turned upon Robert Morris as financier. I did not therefore nominate Colonel Hamilton, as I foresaw it would be a vain attempt." — *March 6th*. Another member of Congress wrote, a few days afterwards, that Robert Morris was chosen without a dissenting voice, although Samuel Adams and General Ward, of the Massachusetts delegation, declined balloting.

General Sullivan added; "The choice of a minister of war is postponed to the 1st of October. This was a manœuvre of Samuel Adams and others from the north, fearing that, as I was in nomination, the choice would fall on me, who, having apostatized from the true New England faith by sometimes voting with the southern States, am not eligible. They were not, however, acquainted with all the circumstances.



an improper management of it; and that errors once discovered are more than half mended. I have no doubt of our abilities or resources, but we must not sleep nor slumber; they never will be drawn forth if we do; nor will violent exertions, which subside with the occasion, answer our purposes. It is a provident foresight, a proper arrangement of business, system and order in the execution, that are to be productive of that economy, which is to defeat the efforts and hopes of Great Britain; and I am happy, thrice happy, on private as well as public account, to find, that these are in train. For it will ease my shoulders of an immense burthen, which the deranged and perplexed situation of our affairs, and the distresses of every department of the army, had placed upon them.

I am not less pleased to hear that Maryland has acceded to the confederation, and that Virginia has relinquished her claim to the land west of the Ohio, which, for fertility of soil, pleasantness of climate, and other natural advantages, is equal to any known tract of country in the universe, of the same extent, taking the great lakes for its northern boundary.

I wish most devoutly a happy completion of your plan of finance, which you say is nearly finished, and

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I was nominated against my will, and, if chosen, should not have accepted. General McDougall is appointed minister of marine."

There was a difference of opinion in Congress as to the utility or expediency of establishing separate departments, which should be respectively under the charge of an individual. M. de la Luzerne said, in a letter to Count de Vergennes, "Divisions prevail in Congress about the new mode of transacting business by secretaries of different departments. Samuel Adams, whose obstinate and resolute character was so useful to the revolution in its origin, but who shows himself very ill suited to the conduct of affairs in an organized government, has placed himself at the head of the advocates for the old system of committees of Congress, instead of relying on ministers, or secretaries, according to the new arrangement." — *MS. Letter, March 25th.*

much success to your scheme of borrowing coined specie and plate. But in what manner do you propose to apply the latter? As a fund to redeem its value in paper to be emitted, or to coin it? If the latter, it will add one more to a thousand other reasons; which might be offered in proof of the necessity of vesting legislative or dictatorial powers in Congress, to make laws of general utility for the purposes of war, that they might prohibit, under the pains and penalty of death, specie and provisions from going to the enemy for goods. The traffic with New York is immense. Individual States will not make it felony, lest, among other reasons, it should not become general; and nothing short of it will ever check, much less stop a practice, which, at the same time that it serves to drain us of our provision and specie, removes the barrier between us and the enemy, corrupts the morals of our people by a lucrative traffic, weakens by degrees the opposition, and affords a means for obtaining regular and perfect intelligence of every thing among us, while even in this respect we derive no benefit from a fear of discovery. Men of all descriptions are now indiscriminately engaging in it, Whig, Tory, speculator. On account of its being followed by those of the latter class, in a manner with impunity, men, who two or three years ago would have shuddered at the idea of such connexions, now pursue it with avidity, and reconcile it to themselves (in which their profits plead powerfully) upon a principle of equality with the Tory, who, knowing that a forfeiture of the goods to the informer is all he has to dread, and that this is to be eluded by an agreement not to inform against each other, goes into the measure without risk.

This is a digression; but the subject is of so se

rious a nature and so interesting to our wellbeing as a nation, that I never expect to see a happy termination of the war, nor great national concerns well conducted in peace, till there is something more than a recommendatory power in Congress. It is not possible in time of war, that business can be conducted well without it. The last words therefore of my letter, and the first wish of my heart, concur in favor of it. I am with much esteem and respect, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR JEFFERSON.

New Windsor, 6 February, 1781.

SIR,

I am much obliged to your Excellency for your letter, giving me an account of the enemy's incursion into your State. Baron Steuben has informed me of their successive operations as far as five miles below Hood's. It is mortifying to see so inconsiderable a party committing such extensive depredations with impunity; but, considering the situation of your State, it is matter of wonder that you have hitherto suffered so little molestation. I am apprehensive you will experience more in future; nor should I be surprised if the enemy were to establish a post in Virginia, till the season for opening the campaign here. But as the evils you have to apprehend from these predatory incursions are not to be compared with the injury to the common cause, and with the danger to your State in particular, from the conquest of the States to the southward of you, I am persuaded the attention to your immediate safety will not divert you from the measures intended to reinforce the southern army, and put it in a condition to stop the progress of the enemy in that



quarter. The late accession of force makes them very formidable in Carolina, too powerful to be resisted without powerful succours from Virginia; and it is certainly her policy, as well as the interest of America, to keep the weight of the war at a distance from her. There is no doubt that a principal object of Arnold's operations is to make a diversion in favor of Cornwallis; and to remove this motive, by disappointing the intention, will be one of the surest ways for removing the enemy.

We have just received an account, that the enemy's fleet, employed in blockading that of our allies at Rhode Island, has lately suffered severely by a storm. One seventy-four is said to have been stranded and entirely lost on the east end of Long Island, another (some accounts say two others) dismasted and towed into Gardiner's Bay, and one of ninety guns driven to sea in great distress. I expect every moment a confirmation of this agreeable intelligence, and the particulars. I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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\* The British squadron, employed in blockading the French fleet at Newport, was stationed during the winter in Gardiner's Bay at the east end of Long Island. The vessels were anchored in a line between Gardiner's Island and Plum Island. The naval force kept on this station was of course superior to that of the French at Newport. It consisted of one ship of ninety guns, four of seventy-four, three of sixty-four, one of fifty, and two or three frigates.

On the 10th of January two French frigates and a transport, laden with various supplies for the fleet, set sail from Boston harbour. They arrived safely at Newport, after encountering three severe gales. The commander of the British squadron had gained intelligence of their departure from Boston, and sent out two line-of-battle ships and two frigates to intercept them. These vessels were driven back by the violence of the winds, and in the night of the 22d much damage was sustained by the British fleet in Gardiner's Bay. When the morning dawned, a sixty-four was discovered standing to the south of Montauk Point under juremasts; the Culloden seventy-four was on a reef near Gardiner's Island; and the Bedford seventy-four was off New London, all her masts having been carried away and her upper tier of guns thrown overboard. The

## TO BARON STEUBEN, IN VIRGINIA.

New Windsor, 6 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I have duly received your several letters, which the smallness of my family at this time, and a multiplicity of business, have prevented my acknowledging sooner. I am sorry for your embarrassments, and obliged to you for your exertions. With the materials you have, I am sure you will do the best you can; and I hope the State, by adopting better arrangements, will hereafter aid you more effectually. The governor in his

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Culloden was finally lost, but her masts and guns were used to repair the two other ships. The *America*, a sixty-four, was driven out to sea, and was supposed at first to be lost; but she returned on the 8th of February without injury.

As soon as the news of this disaster reached M. Destouches, he despatched an officer to Plum Island to observe the condition of the British fleet, intending to go out with all his force and attack it, should circumstances encourage the attempt. By the officer's report, however, the fleet appeared too strong, notwithstanding its recent injuries, and the anchorage too judiciously chosen between the islands, to render an attack advisable.

M. Destouches immediately resolved on another scheme, which the present state of affairs enabled him to execute. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, at the solicitation of the governor of Virginia and of Congress, had requested that if possible a ship of the line and some frigates might be sent into the Chesapeake Bay to oppose Arnold. The British force was so much weakened by the damage done to the three ships, that M. Destouches could now without hazard spare a corresponding detachment from his own fleet. He determined, therefore, to send a sixty-four and two frigates to the Chesapeake for the purpose of blocking up Arnold's squadron, and of coöperating with the American troops on land. This detachment was commanded by M. de Tilly, and sailed from Newport on the 9th of February. Count de Rochambeau offered to furnish a division of land forces; but this was thought unnecessary and inexpedient, as the movement was intended to be rapid, and only to cut off Arnold's communication by water, it being presumed that the Continental troops and militia in Virginia were sufficient to operate against him by land. — *Rochambeau's MS. Letters, January 29th, February 3d, 8th, 12th.*

letter to me does justice to your efforts and to your zeal.

The measures you have taken with regard to the assembling of recruits, furloughs, and discharges, will, I am persuaded, be very useful. I have written to Congress to make similar regulations general. When I receive their determination, I will communicate it. You will have heard of the defection of the Pennsylvania line, and the disagreeable compromise made with them. It has ended in a temporary dissolution of the line. One half has been absolutely discharged, and the remainder have been furloughed to reassemble in the beginning of April. The oaths of the men respecting the terms of their enlistments were precipitately admitted before the documents could be produced; by which it afterwards appeared, that the greater part had perjured themselves to get rid of the service. We had it not in our power to employ coercion in the first instance, owing to the distance they were from the main army, and a variety of other impediments, which you will easily conceive. I am told the line will soon be reëstablished on a better footing by new enlistments. Fortunately a part of the Jersey line since followed their example, and gave us an opportunity, after compelling all the mutineers to an unconditional surrender, to make examples of two of the most active leaders. The perfect submission and penitence, which appeared, made it unadvisable to extend the severity. I believe we shall have no more trouble at present from a spirit of this kind.

The enemy at New York seem to be doing nothing. We were told some time since of their having embarked heavy cannon and stores; but we have heard nothing of their destination. I shall not be surprised if a post is established in Virginia. I am, &c.



TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING THE  
NEW JERSEY TROOPS.

New Windsor, 7 February, 1781.

SIR,

After posting a captain's command at the entrance of Smith's Clove, and another at Pompton or Ringwood, as you shall judge most expedient, to protect the country, secure the stores, and cover the communication, you will march the remainder of the Jersey troops to Morristown, and dispose of them in the huts lately occupied by the Pennsylvanians. The garrison of the blockhouse at Dobbs's Ferry will be relieved by the troops under Major-General Heath, and join their respective regiments. I should think it advisable for the two commands, which are to be left in the vicinity of your present cantonment, to be entire companies of about forty men each under their own officers, to be relieved once a fortnight, or as often as you think proper. I prefer this, on several accounts, to detachment.

Notwithstanding your troops at Morristown and these commands will be so far distant from the enemy, yet very great vigilance will be necessary to prevent the possibility of a surprise, and to detect and apprehend such emissaries from the enemy or disaffected persons, as may be induced from the situation to lurk about the posts, or attempt any thing inimical in those parts of the country. I am, &c.\*

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\* This plan of removing the Jersey troops to Morristown was suggested by the Rev. James Caldwell, to whom Washington wrote as follows. "Upon weighing maturely the reasons for removing the Jersey troops to Morristown, I have given orders for the purpose. This I hope will be productive of all the good consequences you suggest, and especially that it will tend essentially to promote the recruiting service, which I consider as an object of the greatest importance."—*February 7th.*

## TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX.

## Instructions.

SIR,

In the conference between Count de Rochambeau and myself it was agreed, that if by the aid of our allies we can have a naval superiority through the next campaign, and an army of thirty thousand men, or double the force of the enemy at New York and its dependencies, early enough in the season to operate in that quarter, we ought to prefer it to every other object, as the most important and decisive. And applications have been made to the court of France in this spirit, which it is to be hoped will produce the desired effect.

It is therefore incumbent upon us to make every necessary preparation on our part for the siege of New York, as far as our funds and means render it practicable. Applications have also been made to the court of France for a large supply of powder, arms, heavy cannon, and several other essential articles in your department. But as we cannot ascertain the extent of the success these applications will meet with, and as they only go to such articles as are less within the compass of our own internal means, we ought not to neglect any exertions in our power for procuring within ourselves those things of which we shall stand in need.

I give you this communication of what is in prospect, that you may take your measures accordingly, by making such estimates, demands, and other arrangements, as may appear to you best calculated to produce what we want. And you may rely upon all the assistance and support it will be in my power to give. In your calculations you will estimate the force on our side at about twenty thousand men. The remainder, with a

proportionate field and siege apparatus, are to be supposed to be furnished by our allies. You are well acquainted with New York and its defences, and you can therefore judge of the means requisite for its reduction by a siege.

The general idea of the plan of operations, if we are able to procure the force we count upon, is, to make two attacks; one against the works on York Island, and the other against the works of Brooklyn on Long Island. The latter will probably be conducted by our allies. Ulterior operations must depend on circumstances. If we should find ourselves unable to undertake this more capital expedition, and if we have means equal to it, we shall attempt, as a secondary object, the reduction of Charleston; and Savannah, Penobscot, and other places, may come successively into contemplation. Your dispositions will refer to these different objects; though, indeed, a preparation for the principal one will substantially comprehend the less. These instructions would have been earlier given to you, but for the commotions in the army, which suspended my attention. Given at Headquarters, February 10th, 1781.

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TO MRS. FRANCIS, MRS. HILLEGAS, MRS. CLARKSON,  
MRS. BACHE, AND MRS. BLAIR.

New Windsor, 13 February, 1781.

LADIES,

The benevolent office, which added lustre to the qualities that ornamented your deceased friend,\* could

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\* Mrs. Reed of Philadelphia, who had been principally active in originating the association of ladies for collecting contributions in aid of the soldiers.



not have descended to more zealous or more deserving successors. The contributions of the association you represent have exceeded what could have been expected, and the spirit that animated the members of it entitles them to an equal place with any, who have preceded them in the walk of female patriotism. It embellishes the American character with a new trait, by proving that the love of country is blended with those softer domestic virtues, which have always been allowed to be more peculiarly your own.

You have not acquired admiration in your own country only; it is paid to you abroad, and, you will learn with pleasure, by a part of your own sex, whose female accomplishments have attained their highest perfection, and who from the commencement have been the patronesses of American liberty.

The army ought not to regret their sacrifices or sufferings, when they meet with so flattering a reward, as the sympathy of your sex; nor can they fear that their interests will be neglected, while espoused by advocates as powerful as they are amiable. I can only answer to the sentiments, which you do me the honor to express for me personally, that they would more than repay a life devoted to the service of the public and to testimonies of gratitude to yourselves. Accept the assurances of the perfect respect and esteem, with which I am, Ladies, your most obedient, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, New Windsor, 15 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Some advices, which I have received, will detain me here longer than I expected.\* I am to desire you will immediately have all the light companies of the troops under your command completed to fifty rank and file each, and will assemble the whole without delay at Peekskill. They must be completed with shoes, and as far as possible with all other necessities for a march to Morristown. As it will be a pretty expeditious one, it is an additional reason for having the men robust, and in other respects well chosen. The adjutant-general must carefully inspect them when formed, and exchange all whom he does not approve. I wish them to be ready to march from Peekskill by the 19th at farthest. I shall instruct the quartermaster-general to prepare wagons. The officers must take their light baggage, and there must be a sergeant added to each company. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 15 February, 1781.

SIR,

The Count de St. Maime last evening did me the honor to deliver to me your letter of the 3d instant.

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\* These advices were from Count de Rochambeau, dated February 3d, hinting at a plan proposed by M. Destouches for despatching three or four vessels of his squadron to the Chesapeake, as mentioned heretofore. The idea appeared in so favorable a light to Washington, that, although he was on the eve of a departure for Newport, he delayed his journey to prepare for sending a detachment of land forces to co-operate with such an expedition.

It appears by the report of the naval officer, that the enemy were inferior to the Chevalier Destouches, and, from the situation of the Bedford and the America, would probably remain so for some time. It appears also to have been your Excellency's expectation, that M. Destouches would either go with his whole fleet, or send a detachment to Chesapeake Bay in quest of Arnold.

There is a variety of positions where Arnold, by putting his vessels under protection of land batteries, may defy a naval attack, and, by collecting the provisions with which the country abounds and raising a few works, may remain in security till the enemy, by repairing their damaged ships, should regain their superiority at sea and come to his relief. Portsmouth, where he was by the last accounts, is particularly favorable to his security in this view. Unless therefore the ships, which M. Destouches may have sent, should by good fortune suddenly fall in with him, embarked and moving from one place to another, they will have little prospect of success.

From these considerations, if the object is judged of sufficient importance, it is in my opinion essential that there should be a coöperation of land and naval forces, and that M. Destouches should protect the expedition with his whole fleet. How far this will be safe or advisable, he can best judge; but it has appeared to me probable, that he would prefer going with his whole fleet, rather than separating it, as, by making a detachment he would lose his superiority and would give Mr. Arbuthnot an opportunity to escort his disabled ships safe to New York, and follow his detachment with the remainder.

Imagining it to be not unlikely, that he may think it advisable to employ his whole fleet upon the occa-



sion, and that your Excellency would approve a co-operation with a part of your army, (of the propriety of which, for want of a knowledge of your local situation, I cannot judge,) I have, to give the enterprise all possible chance of success, put under marching orders a detachment of twelve hundred men, who will advance in a few days towards the Head of Elk River, there to embark and proceed to a coöperation. I did not delay the march of this detachment till I could hear from M. Destouches and you, as there is not a moment to be lost, if the expedition is to be undertaken; and the inconvenience of moving the troops to no purpose will be small, in comparison with the advantage of gaining time. I should have made it more considerable, could I have spared the troops. It may arrive at its destined place of operation in about four weeks from this time.

If the Chevalier Destouches and your Excellency should approve the project of a coöperation, in which the whole fleet shall be employed, it would be desirable that you could embark about a thousand troops on board the ships, and as many pieces of siege artillery, with the necessary apparatus, as you may think proper. This will give a degree of certainty to the enterprise, which will be precarious without it.

Arnold's force consists of about fifteen hundred men. As these will be in intrenchments, though not formidable, an inferior regular force with the militia will find it difficult to reduce them; but, with the addition of the detachments I have proposed to send, the affair would be soon terminated. This addition is of importance; but the sending of artillery is absolutely necessary, as it would be productive of too much delay and expense to send heavy pieces with their stores hence by land at this season.

As by this movement the troops will be exposed to

a disagreeable march, and some expense will be incurred, I shall be glad that both inconveniences may cease as soon as possible, if the project is not carried into execution; and I therefore request your Excellency will favor me with an immediate answer. The capture of Arnold and his detachment will be an event particularly agreeable to this country, a great relief to the southern States, and of important utility in our future operations.\*

I regret that the present prospect will compel me to postpone setting out for Rhode Island till I hear from you, and will deprive me still longer of the pleasure, for which I impatiently wish, of seeing your Excellency and the army.

*February 19th.* — The destruction of the corps under the command of Arnold is of such immense importance to the welfare of the southern States, that I have resolved to attempt it with the detachment I now send, in conjunction with the militia, even if it should not be convenient for your Excellency to detach a part of your force, provided M. Destouches is able to protect our operation by such a disposition of his fleet, as will give us the command of the Bay, and prevent succours being sent from New York. By a letter I have just received from Baron Steuben, who com-

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\* As Count de Rochambeau did not receive this letter till the 19th, which was ten days after the departure of M. de Tilly's detachment, it was not then practicable for him and M. Destouches to unite in carrying the plan here suggested into effect; more especially as the British blockading squadron had been strengthened by repairing the disabled vessels, and that of M. Destouches was weakened by the absence of three of his ships. In this state of things there would be too great a risk in going to sea with a force so much inferior. Count de Rochambeau wrote, that, if the above plan had come to his hands before the sailing of the detachment to Virginia, it was probable M. Destouches would have determined to go out with his whole fleet, and in that case he should have spared one thousand land troops for the enterprise.



mands in Virginia, it appears we may expect every thing from the temper of the militia, of which militia are capable; but an additional regular force to that I am sending would no doubt make the success much more prompt and certain. If M. Destouches should send any ships into the Bay, on the principle of a co-operation, it will be necessary that a light frigate should come up to the Head of Elk to protect the passage of the troops across the Bay. I impatiently wait to be favored with your Excellency's answer to these points. With the truest respect, &c.\*

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\* When this letter was written, the departure of M. de Tilly's little squadron for the Chesapeake seems not to have been known, although it took place ten days before; but the intelligence must have come quickly after writing the letter, as it is mentioned in the instructions to Lafayette the next day. That expedition was successful in part, but not to the extent anticipated. M. de Tilly returned to Newport on the 24th of February, having been absent only fifteen days. Near the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay he captured the *Romulus*, a British frigate of forty-four guns. He also took two privateers, one of eighteen and the other of fourteen guns, sent four prizes to Yorktown, and burnt four others. About five hundred prisoners were taken. Admiral Arbuthnot had sent a messenger to Arnold, giving intelligence of the approach of the French squadron, and had thus put him on his guard. He had withdrawn his frigates, one of forty-four and two others of thirty-two guns each, so high up the Elizabeth River, that they could not be approached by the *Eveill  *, the largest French vessel; and one of the French frigates, the *Surveillante*, ran aground in that river, and was got off only by taking out her guns and casks of water. An extract from M. de Tilly's letter to the Chevalier de la Luzerne will explain his situation and the motives for his return.

"Whatever desire I may have," said he, "to comply with the wishes of M. Destouches, and transport myself to all the parts of the Chesapeake Bay, into which the forces of Arnold could be withdrawn, it is not possible for me with my vessel to penetrate to the retreat in which he has taken shelter. The shallowness of the water does not allow me to ascend nearer to him than within about four leagues. I should run the hazard of being blockaded myself, if I were to remain long here; and, without a hope of doing harm to the enemy, I should enfeeble the force at Newport. These considerations, and the express orders of M. Destouches to employ no more time in the expedition than would be absolutely necessary, have determined me to put to sea." — *MS. Letter February 15th.*



## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 17 February, 1781.

SIR,

General Morgan's signal victory over Colonel Tarleton and the flower of the British army reflects the highest honor upon our arms, and I hope will at least be attended with this advantage, that it will check the offensive operations of the enemy, until General Greene shall have collected a much more respectable force than he had under his command by the last accounts from him. I am apprehensive, that the southern States will look upon this victory as much more decisive in its consequences than it really is, and will relax in their exertions. It is to be wished, that the gentlemen in Congress, who have interest in those States, would remove such ideas, if any such should be found to exist, and rather stimulate them to redouble their efforts to crush an enemy, pretty severely shaken by the two successful strokes upon Ferguson and Tarleton.

I shall not fail to communicate to Major-General Parsons, and the officers and men who were under his command, the very flattering notice which Congress has been pleased to take of their expedition to Morisania.

Upon General Knox's return from the eastward, I desired him to form an estimate of the artillery and ordnance stores necessary for an operation upon the largest scale, which would be that against New York. He has accordingly furnished one, a copy of which I do myself the honor to enclose for the information of Congress, that application may be made in time to the States possessed of the heaviest cannon for the loan of them and other stores, should they be wanted, and that directions may be given to the Board of War, and

those boards whose business it is to provide ammunition and other articles, to endeavour to procure the deficiency of the estimate. We ought without doubt to be prepared for an operation against New York. Should circumstances make it requisite to lessen the object, the overplus stores would nevertheless form not only a valuable magazine, but such a one as we ought ever to have in reserve. The impossibility of crossing the North River with horses, and some unforeseen business, have hitherto prevented my journey to Newport, and make the time of my setting out precarious.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

New Windsor, 19 February, 1781.

SIR,

I am honored with your Excellency's letter in behalf of the legislature of New York, with the copy of one to Congress. I beg leave to assure the legislature of the high sense I entertain of the honor they do me by their confidence in this communication, while I deplore the melancholy picture given of the distress of the State, which I have every reason to believe, from the facts that have fallen within my own observation, is not exaggerated.

I sincerely wish it were in my power to comply with the request of the State, for leaving its two regiments for the defence of the frontier next campaign; but I should not merit its confidence, if I were to flatter it with an expectation, which may probably be disappointed. The reduction of the number of our regiments, if they were completed, would scarcely leave us a force adequate to a vigorous offensive campaign,

which it is to be hoped will take place, towards which proposals have been made and engagements entered into on my part. But we have too much room to fear the regiments of several of the States will be far from complete, which will, in the case I have mentioned, render the collection of our whole force the more indispensable.

Situated as I am, I can only say, that I anxiously wish it were in my power to give security to the frontier of all the States; that I sensibly feel for the peculiar circumstances of this; that I shall be happy, if practicable, to give it effectual protection and relief, but I cannot promise the practicability of it. Much will depend upon the operations of the campaign; if they have for object any decisive enterprise, we shall be obliged to employ all our force. If they are of a defensive kind, the protection of the frontiers will be attended to in a manner equal to their importance, and I hope successfully. I beg your Excellency to assure the legislature of the high respect I entertain for them, and of the gratitude I feel for the support I have upon all occasions experienced from the State. With every sentiment of personal respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Instructions.

SIR,

I have ordered a detachment to be made at this post, to rendezvous at Peekskill on the 19th instant, which, together with another to be formed at Morristown from the Jersey troops, will amount to about twelve hundred rank and file. The destination of this



detachment is to act against the corps of the enemy now in Virginia, in conjunction with the militia, and some ships from the fleet of the Chevalier Destouches, which he informs me sailed the 9th instant from Newport.

You will take the command of this detachment, which you will in the first instance march by battalions towards Pompton, there to rendezvous and afterwards to proceed with all possible despatch to the Head of Elk. You will make your arrangements with the quartermaster-general concerning the route you are to take, concerning transportation, tents, intrenching tools and other articles in his department, of which you may stand in need; with the commissary-general concerning provisions; with the clothier concerning shoes and clothing; and with General Knox concerning the artillery and stores you will want for the expedition. The result of these several arrangements you will report at head-quarters.

When you arrive at Trenton, if the Delaware is open and boats are readily to be had, you will save time by going from thence by water to Christiana Bridge, Marcus Hook, or Chester; if you cannot avail yourself of this mode, you must proceed by land, by the route which the quartermaster and commissary may designate as most convenient for covering and supplies. You are not to suffer the detachment to be delayed for want of either provision, forage, or wagons on the route. Where the ordinary means will not suffice with certainty, you will have recourse to military impress. You will take your measures with the quartermaster-general in such a manner, that vessels may be ready on your arrival at the Head of Elk to convey you down the Bay to Hampton Roads, or to the point of operation; and you will open a previous com-

munication with the officer commanding the ships of his Most Christian Majesty, to concert your coöperations, and to engage him to send, if it can be spared, a frigate up the Bay to cover your passage, without which, or some other armed vessels, you might be insecure.

When you arrive at your destination, you must act as your own judgment and the circumstances shall direct. You will open a correspondence with Baron Steuben, who now commands in Virginia, informing him of your approach, and requesting him to have a sufficient body of militia ready to act in conjunction with your detachment. It will be advisable for him to procure persons in whom he can confide, well acquainted with the country at Portsmouth and in the vicinity; some, who are capable of giving you a military idea of it, and others to serve as guides.

You should give the earliest attention to acquiring a knowledge of the different rivers, but particularly James River, that you may know what harbours can best afford shelter and security to the coöperating squadron, in case of blockade by a superior force. You are to do no act whatever with Arnold, that directly or by implication may screen him from the punishment due to his treason and desertion, which, if he should fall into your hands, you will execute in the most summary way.

Having recommended to Count de Rochambeau to detach a land force with the fleet, that may be destined for the Chesapeake Bay, (though, from the disposition which has already taken place, it is not probable that a land force will yet be sent,) if the recommendation should be complied with, you will govern yourself in coöperating with the officers commanding the French troops, agreeably to the inten-

tions and instructions of his Most Christian Majesty, of which you were the bearer, and which, being still in your possession, it is unnecessary for me to recite.

You will keep me regularly advised of your movements and progress; and, when the object of the detachment is fulfilled (or unfortunately disappointed), you will return to this post with it by the same route, if circumstances admit, and with as much expedition as possible. I wish you a successful issue to the enterprise, and all the glory which I am persuaded you will deserve. Given at Head-Quarters, New Windsor, February 20th, 1781.\*

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TO BARON STEUBEN.

New Windsor, 20 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The effect of deranging the measures of the State for succouring General Greene was to be expected. It is however an event of the most serious nature; and I am persuaded, if the enemy continue in the State, as their force is not large, you will do every thing in your power to make the defence of the State as little as possible interfere with an object of so much the more importance, as the danger is so much the greater. From the picture General Greene gives of his situation, every thing is to be apprehended, if he is not powerfully supported from Virginia.

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\* This letter was accompanied by the following note. "The enclosed are your instructions, in the prosecution of which, if you should receive authentic intelligence of the enemy's having left Virginia, or, by adverse fortune, the detachment from Monsieur Destouches has lost its superiority in that State, and is disabled thereby to coöperate, you will return with the detachment under your command, as the enemy cannot be affected by it while they have the command of the waters; but the detachment may be capitally injured by committing itself on the water."



The storm mentioned to you in my last has given our allies a temporary superiority, which they have employed by detaching a sixty-four and some frigates to the Chesapeake Bay. These I hope will have arrived before this reaches you. The remainder of the fleet is ready to support this detachment. Convinced that a naval operation alone will probably be ineffectual, and that militia would be unequal to the reduction of Arnold in his works, I have detached a corps of twelve hundred men from this army, chiefly consisting of the light infantry, and of course commanded by the Marquis de Lafayette, which will I hope arrive at the Head of Elk about the 6th of March, to embark there and proceed down the Bay to Hampton Roads or the point of operation. This corps will carry with it some heavy artillery; but if you can procure any in addition, it will be of great importance. I am to desire you will make such arrangements with respect to the militia and supplies, and will take such a position, as you judge will be most conducive to the success of the enterprise. The Marquis de Lafayette will open a correspondence with you for this purpose.

When the French squadron appears, you will immediately open a correspondence with the officer commanding, acquainting him with my intentions and your preparations; and you will have ready pilots well acquainted with the navigation of the several rivers, to be put on board, that he may want no assistance of this sort in our power to give. I have requested the governor to aid you in procuring the pilots, and in every other matter in which his aid may be of use to you.

If the fleet should have arrived before this gets to hand, secrecy will be out of the question; but if it should not have made its appearance, you will con-

ceal your expectations, and only seem to be preparing for defence. The ships will bring you some arms and stores, which had arrived at Providence for the State of Virginia. Arnold, on the appearance of the fleet, may endeavour to retreat by land through North Carolina. If you take any measure to obviate this, the precaution will be advisable. Should you be able to capture this detachment with its chief, it will be an event as pleasing as it will be useful.

All I can recommend with respect to Colonel Armand's corps at present is, that you will station it at some proper place to repose and attend to its discipline and equipment. The quartermaster-general is to provide horses. The Colonel himself is gone to France to procure clothes, arms, and accoutrements. Congress have made no other provision for recruiting the corps, than in a resolution of the 2d of January last, directing that a sufficient number of volunteers might be drawn from the line to complete it, when the state of the regiments would admit, not to exceed five from each regiment. I am, with very great esteem, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

New Windsor, 22 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

You will, by the time this reaches you, be acquainted with the destination of the detachment under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, which, though as large as could possibly be afforded from the troops in this quarter, is not so competent to the certain completion of the object in view as I could wish. By some accounts from Philadelphia, I am led to hope that further assistance may be derived from the Penn-

sylvania line. If you find it practicable to form a battalion of eight companies of fifty rank and file each, three officers to a company, and two field-officers to a battalion, in such time as the Marquis shall think will answer his purpose, you will be pleased to do it, and put it under his command. The detachment will be but temporary. The nomination of the field-officers I leave to you.

It is possible that the battalion may be formed, but not in time to embark at the Head of Elk with the other troops. This will not be so material, provided it can be done in a short time afterwards. That time you and the Marquis will determine. If the companies cannot be completed to fifty each, I would have them at forty rather than lose the reinforcement, or even half a battalion of two hundred under the command of a field-officer rather than none. Transports can be provided and held ready at the Head of Elk, should they not embark with the other troops. The places of rendezvous of the first, second, fifth, and sixth battalions are none of them very distant from Elk, and I should imagine the detachment would be most readily and conveniently formed from them. But this I leave to your judgment. I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL PARSONS.

New Windsor, 22 February, 1781.

SIR,

Captain Walker has communicated to me some discoveries made of a plot among the Tories of Stratford and Fairfield county, of which I have directed him to give you the particulars. It seems a clue has been found to it, which, if rightly improved, will ena-



ble us to detect the affair in all its extent, and punish the principals and their accomplices. I need not observe to you, of how dangerous a tendency combinations of this nature are, nor of how much importance it is to put an effectual stop to them. Your knowledge of the country and characters of the people will enable you best to conduct the investigation; and, as you live in one of the counties where it seems to originate, you may do it with the less risk of suspicion.

I am therefore to request, that you will undertake the affair in the manner you think most likely to succeed, and will set about it immediately. You may want a party of men, when you have matured the discovery, to seize the persons concerned. These you may take from the Connecticut line, as a guard to the part of the country where they will be necessary. In the present state of our force they cannot exceed a subaltern's command. The two points most essential will be, to detect any characters of importance, who may be concerned in it, and if possible to get into our hands the register of the associators' names. The person, who will serve you as a spy, must be assured of some generous compensation, such as will be an object to his family, and secure his fidelity. This I leave to your management.

I am, with great regard, &c.

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TO THE CHEVALIER DESTOUCHES.

New Windsor, 22 February, 1781.

SIR,

The desire you express of being useful to these States, evinced by the measure you have taken to

rid the coasts of Virginia of very troublesome and destructive neighbours, has a title to our acknowledgments. I hope the ships you have sent will meet with immediate success; but I am rather apprehensive the enemy will be able to secure their vessels under the protection of land batteries.

The Count de Rochambeau will have communicated to you my propositions. The detachment mentioned to him has marched, and may arrive at the Head of Elk by the 5th or 6th of March, to proceed thence by water to the point of operation. The information you were pleased to give me, that you held the remainder of your fleet ready to protect your expedition in the Bay, was a motive for accelerating its motions. If you have it in your power to block up Arnold in the Bay, and make such a general disposition with your fleet, as will at the same time prevent succours going from this quarter to him, I shall flatter myself that this coöperation will effect the reduction of the corps now in Virginia, and the ships will then of course fall into your hands. I am sensible the safe return of the America may make a material difference in your arrangements; but, however this may be, I wait your determination to regulate my ulterior measures.

If the late important and agreeable intelligence of the success of Count d'Estaing is confirmed,\* we may flatter ourselves that it will at once lead to a decisive and glorious issue of the war. I am impatient to have it in my power to congratulate you on its certainty. With sentiments of perfect consideration and attachment, I have the honor to be, &c.†

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\* Report of a naval engagement between Count d'Estaing and Admiral Hood in the West Indies, which proved not to be well founded.

† Immediately after the return of the three vessels from the Chesapeake.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

New Windsor, 23 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I hinted to you, that the detachment, which was forming, might be five or six weeks absent from this post. Possibly it may be longer, and advance us into a season when the enemy, if they are in force and circumstances in New York, may endeavour to avail themselves of our weakness. To provide against this I have, as you are already informed, written pressing for the recruits of Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Isl-

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peake, M. Destouches resolved to set on foot another expedition with his whole naval force.

"The letters," said Count de Rochambeau, "found on board the vessels taken by M. de Tilly, have decided M. Destouches to follow in full the plan given by your Excellency, and to risk every thing to hinder Arnold from establishing himself at Portsmouth in Virginia. M. Destouches is arming with the greatest diligence the forty-four-gun ship that was taken, and he hopes that this, with the frigates, will be able to go up Elizabeth River. He will protect this expedition with his whole fleet. Your Excellency has given me orders to join thereto one thousand men. I will send eleven hundred and twenty. All my grenadiers and chasseurs will be there. The corps will be commanded by the Baron de Viomenil. I will add four four-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and four *obusiers*. The navy will furnish twenty-four-pounders if necessary, but it is presumed that against earthen intrenchments the twelve-pounders will be sufficient.

"As to leaving our road and harbour without defence, though I shall have a great many transports to protect, and very little artillery of a long reach, with about twenty-five hundred men under arms, I will do my best to prevent our transports or magazines from receiving any damage. I propose asking the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island to send me for that purpose two thousand militia, to stay here while this expedition may last. I hope your Excellency will approve of my making use of your name, in my demand to the governors of both of these States. The great consequence, that your Excellency seemed to attach to the establishment of Arnold at Portsmouth, has determined M. Destouches to sacrifice every other object to this one. I expect all this armament to be ready eight days hence."—*MS. Letter of Count de Rochambeau, February 25th.*



and to be hastened to the army. I shall direct the commanding officers of the militia of Ulster, Orange, and Dutchess to have their men in readiness to repair to West Point upon the first alarm, and the firing of the beacons. I would have you make the same request to those of Westchester.

Independently of this, I shall request Governor Livingston to have the Jersey militia properly arranged, and held in readiness to oppose any invasion of that State by the way of Elizabethtown; and I earnestly request, that your disposition for defending the several works at and in the vicinity of West Point may be perfect, and so arranged, that no confusion may take place, or delay happen, if we should be suddenly called on. Let every work have water and provision in it, and the commanding officer of each be well informed of his duty, and the part that is expected of him.

Besides these, let the officer commanding the water guards be directed to use the utmost vigilance, and instructed to obtain the best intelligence he can of the movements at New York. The officers commanding at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point must be ordered to defend those posts to the last extremity. The beacons upon Butter Hill and the mountain opposite to the village of Fishkill should be examined, and put in good order, to fire at a moment's warning. Providing for, and giving security to, the different works, you will consider as the great objects of your attention. Every other consideration is secondary, and must yield to them; for which reason I think you had best further reduce the command upon the lines to a patrol of fifty men under an active captain. I am, &c.

## TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

New Windsor, 24 February, 1781.

SIR,

The important intelligence you do me the favor to communicate comes so many ways, and with so many marks of authenticity, that we have the greatest reason to hope it is true. If so, without the interference of other powers, of which there seems to be no probability, I think we may regard it as an event decisive of a speedy and glorious termination of the war, and that his Britannic Majesty, in spite of his last speech, will be obliged to receive the law. In mine of the 19th I informed you of my ultimate determination, respecting the detachment from this army. The enclosed for the Chevalier Destouches, which, after perusal, I beg you to seal and transmit, communicates its march, the time of its expected arrival at its destination, and my present views.

There were rumors from New York, that Sir Henry Clinton had received orders to concentrate his force at one point, but, as they come through a suspected channel, I give them no credit; yet, if the enemy have received the blow of which our West India accounts speak, this would be a natural consequence.

The flattering distinction paid to the anniversary of my birth-day is an honor for which I dare not attempt to express my gratitude. I confide in your Excellency's sensibility to interpret my feelings for this, and for the obliging manner in which you are pleased to announce it. The measures we have been taking for the expedition to Virginia will delay some time my visit to Rhode Island. I wait to see whether Sir Henry Clinton may form any new projects in consequence. When this is ascertained, and the additional

precautions we are taking for security here are completed, I shall yield to my impatience for testifying personally my attachment to your Excellency and your army.\* I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

New Windsor, 24 February, 1781.

SIR,

The reiterated request of both Houses of Assembly, to leave the two regiments of the State in the quarter where they now are, places me in a delicate and painful situation. I have already assured your Excellency, and through you the legislature, of my perfect disposition to comply with the wishes of the State, as far as I have the means, to which indeed its exertions entitle it; but, as an officer intrusted with the general interest of the confederacy, in expectation of an offensive campaign, under engagements which I shall at

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\* *From Count de Rochambeau's reply.*—"I have received your Excellency's favor of the 24th instant. All that regards the land forces will be ready in twenty-four hours, but the navy may yet be eight days before every thing will be ready on her part. Be assured, that, on my part, nothing shall be wanting to make the greatest diligence."—*February 27th.*

*Three o'clock, P. M.*—"I have this moment received an express from Boston, with the good news, that the frigate *Astrée*, commanded by M. de la Pérouse, has just arrived, and that she brings money and despatches from Court, and that the captain was to land them the next day."

*March 1st.*—"I send an extract from the ministerial letters, which I have received by the frigate commanded by M. de la Pérouse. You will see that my son has stayed, by order of his Majesty, to wait for the result of a definitive project. By private letters from Versailles we learn, that the Prince de Montbarrey has given in his resignation, and is succeeded by the Marquis de Ségur, one of our most distinguished lieutenant-generals, an intimate of the Marquis de Castries, and that there are great movements in the ministry."



any rate find it difficult to fulfil, I cannot, in policy, in justice to the United States, in good faith to our allies, consent to divest myself of so considerable a part of my efficient force, as the two regiments in question. The good of the service, joined to my regard for the State, will always prompt me, as it has heretofore done, to every effort in my power to prevent or repel attacks upon it; but to give an assurance, that its troops shall remain as a cover to the western and northern frontier from an apprehended invasion, is more than I could answer, while our views extend beyond a mere defensive.

Other applications similar to that from this State have been made to me, a compliance with which would leave us without a competent garrison for the defence of West Point. A heavy detachment from this part of the army, for an important service, has obliged me to draw in all my outposts, and to call six companies of the York line from Albany, as the smallest possible number necessary for the security of West Point.

While I am compelled to deliver these sentiments, I entreat your Excellency to assure the Assembly, that it is impossible to feel more than I do for the distresses of the State, and, as far as it can be made consistent with my general duty, no person will do more to serve it. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 25 February, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received your favor of the 23d from Pompton. You may make yourself perfectly easy as to

ships of the line being at New York. The *Iris* and the others mentioned by Hagerty are frigates. This man relates a circumstance to me, that he does not seem to have informed you of. It is, that a reinforcement of six hundred men is preparing for Arnold, and that the convoy is to be the *Farges* Indiaman, which is fitting up, but that she will not be ready till the end of this week. I do not give much credit to any thing he says; but, if it is so, Colonel Dayton will probably be able to gain some knowledge of it.

The return of clothing wanting for the detachment was so long coming to hand, that I had directed the clothier to despatch a parcel, which he did some days ago, and I am glad to find that the essential articles all exceed your demand. It will be too late to send a further supply of shoes from here. You must endeavour to get them in Philadelphia.

The enclosed contains an article of most important news from the West Indies; in addition to which I have received a letter from Count de Rochambeau in which he has the following paragraph. "The news of Count d'Estaing's success over the fleet of Admiral Hood has again arrived here by a schooner, that on the 1st of this month set sail from Cape François. The private letters say it is very sure." I cannot but flatter myself, that this must have a good foundation, as it comes through different channels, and, it is said, from persons of intelligence and credit in the Island.\*

The *America* of sixty-four guns had got into Gardiner's Bay, after being long out. The *Bedford* was remasted. This again gives Admiral Arbuthnot the superiority, and puts it out of M. Destouches's power to give us any further assistance.

I return you Dr. Franklin's letter, and am much

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\* The intelligence proved to be erroneous.

obliged to you for the perusal of it. Be good enough to take care of the enclosed for the Board of War and Lieutenant-Colonel Diriks. I have already hinted to you the necessity of having a number of boats for debarking the troops at the point of destination. This is a matter, to which the quartermaster-general must pay particular attention. I therefore repeat it. It is also of essential importance to keep fast sailing vessels (pilot-boats would be best) plying from the Head of Elk to Hampton Road for the purpose of corresponding with the French commodore, or to apprize you of any danger, which may arise from a change of circumstances; as I am not without apprehensions, that the detachment from M. Destouches's squadron will be followed by a superior one from Gardiner's Bay, as soon as the destination of the former is known. This evinces strongly the necessity of despatch, which depends upon great exertion in providing the transports.

With the commissary-general of issues, as I mentioned in a former letter, or his deputy at Philadelphia, and Colonel Pickering, you will make the necessary arrangement for provisions for your corps. If it could be done solely with the latter, the business would be in fewer hands. As your march will be rapid to the Head of Elk, leave good officers to bring up the tired, lazy, and drunken soldiers.

*February 26th.* — I do not think it very probable, that three hundred dragoons will trust themselves in the heart of Connecticut, with a superior regular corps and the force of the country to oppose them, but I have nevertheless given the intelligence to the Duke de Lauzun.\*

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\* Intelligence had come from New York, that three hundred horsemen had crossed over to Long Island and proceeded eastward, and that



Upon your arrival in Philadelphia, if not before, you will hear that a body of men, supposed to be a reinforcement under General Provost from Europe, had landed at Cape Fear, in consequence of which the whole Pennsylvania line are ordered to the southward.\* I have therefore directed General St. Clair, instead of confining himself to a single battalion, to send as many as he can down the Chesapeake with your detachment, if circumstances should admit of your embarkation.

If the troops landed at Cape Fear are from Europe, I do not imagine their convoy is more than a frigate or two. Will it not be well, when matters are ripe for discovering your object, to endeavour to get the *Ariel*, the *Trumbull*, and any other public vessels of war, which may be in the Delaware, to go round to the Chesapeake? A combination of vessels, though of unequal rate, might perplex and distress the small squadron of our ally. This you can urge to the gentlemen of the marine department. If nothing unforeseen occurs, I shall set out for Rhode Island when General Duportail arrives here. I think I may expect him about the 1st of next month. I am, &c.

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boats had at the same time been sent up the Sound. It was inferred, that this party would pass from Long Island to Connecticut, and attempt to intercept General Washington on his way to Newport, as it was supposed his intended journey was known to the enemy. Lafayette suggested, that the Duke de Lauzun should be informed of this movement as soon as possible, that he might be prepared with his cavalry, then stationed at Lebanon, to repel the invaders.

\* The party, which landed at Cape Fear, consisted of three hundred men detached from Charleston under Major Craig.

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 26 February, 1781.

SIR,

The situation of the southern States is alarming; the more so, as the measure of providing a regular and permanent force was by my last advices still unattempted, where the danger was most immediate and pressing. Unless all the States enter in good earnest upon this plan, we have little to expect but their successive subjugation. Particular successes, obtained against all the chances of war, have had too much influence, to the prejudice of general and substantial principles.

In obedience to the orders of Congress, I have imparted their wishes to the Count de Rochambeau, informing him that the proposal was made on the presumption of a naval superiority. But, as this superiority has ceased by the safe return of the *America*, a sixty-four, which was missing and supposed to be dismantled, and by a detachment from the French fleet of one vessel of the line and two or three frigates into the Chesapeake Bay, it will of course be out of the power of our allies to transport the whole or any part of their troops to the succour of the southern States. Besides this obstacle, the present instructions and expectations of the French general and naval commander are opposed to an immediate change of position.

The order for the Pennsylvania line to march to the southward interferes with the conditional arrangements of the next campaign;\* but in the present ex-

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\* On receiving the news of the invasion of North Carolina by the entrance of troops into Cape Fear River, Congress resolved that the Pennsylvania line should be ordered to the south, and constitute a part of the southern army. — *Journals*, February 20th. The president was also in-

igency of accumulating danger in that quarter, I am entirely of opinion that these troops ought to be detached.

On the first notice of the storm and its ill effects, I intimated to the French general the possibility and importance of improving the opportunity in an attempt upon Arnold. When I received a more distinct account of the damage sustained by the British fleet, which was a long time coming to me, I immediately put in motion as large a part of my small force here, as I could with any prudence detach to proceed under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette to the Head of Elk, and made with all expedition a proposal for a coöperation in the Chesapeake Bay with the whole of the fleet of our allies and a part of their land force. Before my proposition arrived, the Chevalier Destouches, in consequence of an application to him through the Chevalier de la Luzerne, had sent the force I have already mentioned to the Chesapeake Bay. This separation, and the return of the *America*, prevented the execution of my plan; but the Marquis de Lafayette still continues his march to attempt whatever circumstances will permit.

It is probable that Congress, before this reaches them, will have heard of the arrival of the ships in the Bay; but, if they should have met with any delay,

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structed to write a pressing letter to the Commander-in-chief, describing the wants and defenceless condition of the southern States, and the necessity of using every practicable means for sending relief. He was particularly desired to make strong representations to the French commanders, and induce them if possible to forward reinforcements to the south, or make such dispositions as would create a diversion in that quarter. The landing of the troops in Cape Fear River was magnified to an affair much beyond its real importance. It was supposed that a reinforcement of five hundred men had come from Europe; whereas it was only a detachment of three hundred from Charleston, after the arrival of General Leslie at that port from Virginia.



I need not observe how necessary it will be to conceal our expectations; as the only chance of success to a merely maritime operation depends on surprise. I take the liberty to suggest, that the American frigates in the Delaware may perhaps at this juncture be usefully employed in the Chesapeake or in the Cape Fear River. The latter may be preferable, but secrecy and despatch will be essential.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

New Windsor, 26 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Congress, as you will have been informed, have determined that the Pennsylvania line shall compose a part of the southern army, and have ordered it to proceed to Virginia in detachments, as they may be in readiness to march. I have given General St. Clair directions to carry the resolve into execution as expeditiously as possible. I think it essential, that one of the brigadiers should proceed with the first detachment, that he may be at hand to receive and form the remainder as they arrive. This may be the more necessary, as the presence of an officer of authority and rank may be requisite to restore that discipline, which the late convulsion will have in some degree destroyed. General Irvine being employed upon the recruiting business, this duty of course devolves on you.

I have advised General St. Clair, if circumstances will admit of the detachment under the command of the Marquis going down the Chesapeake by water, to endeavour to take the opportunity of sending as many men as possible by the same conveyance. You

will, in that case, either make use of the water passage, or proceed by land and meet the troops at their place of debarkation, as you may think best. But I imagine you will prefer the former, when the Marquis informs you of the object of the detachment. Wherever your duty calls you, I shall wish you happiness and success, as I am, with very true esteem, &c.

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TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 26 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I am so totally unacquainted with the state of the southern prisoners, that I did not choose to enter into a negotiation with Sir Henry Clinton, on the idea of a general exchange, although liberty was given me by Congress. Nothing particular has therefore been done respecting the gentlemen, who are confined at St. Augustine; as it could not be supposed, that the enemy would consent to a partial exchange of persons of the most considerable influence in the southern States, and who, besides, are pretended to have rendered themselves obnoxious. Indeed, whenever a negotiation is entered upon, I foresee difficulties in procuring the liberation of those gentlemen, who are most of them of eminence in the civil line, as we have none of similar rank in our possession to exchange for them. However, whenever the matter is gone into, you may be assured that all possible attention shall be paid to them, not only from my own inclinations to serve them, but in obedience to an act of Congress, which directs that particular regard shall be had to them in the negotiation of the exchanges of southern prisoners. The interest you take in them will be an additional consideration. I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

New Windsor, 27 February, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I am glad to hear of Colonel Laurens's departure. He wrote to me a few days before he sailed, and mentioned in the warmest manner your exertions to get the ship manned. The few Continental soldiers you spared on the occasion were well bestowed, considering the importance of Colonel Laurens's mission.\*

Our last advices from General Greene are of the 31st of January. Lord Cornwallis, with twenty-five hundred men entirely divested of baggage, had made a push against General Morgan, and was near recovering the prisoners taken upon the 17th of January; but General Morgan got them off, and they had crossed the Yadkin on their way to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis was still advancing, and General Greene studiously avoiding an engagement, unless he could draw together a greater force of militia than he had much

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\* On the arrival of Colonel Laurens in Boston, January 25th, he found that the Alliance had not completed her crew, and that the prospect of soon doing it was extremely unfavorable. The Massachusetts Navy Board encouraged him to believe, that the power of impressing seamen for this special service might be obtained from the legislature; and, while the Board was pursuing the application, he made a short visit to Count de Rochambeau at Newport, whom it was important for him to consult on the subject of his mission. The legislature declined granting the power to impress, and the rumor that such a thing was in agitation had so alarmed the sailors, that some concealed themselves and others fled from the town. When Colonel Laurens returned, therefore, very little progress had been made in obtaining men. The legislature offered an increased bounty out of their own chest, with permission to enlist State troops then on duty at the Castle. Several recruits were thus procured; but still there was a deficiency, which General Lincoln made up by taking men from the Continental troops, who were qualified for the marine service. Colonel Laurens went to sea on the 13th of February, after having been wind-bound for several days in Nantasket Road. — *MS. Letters of Lincoln and Laurens, February 4th and 15th.*



prospect of doing. I am very anxious for the issue of this manœuvre, which may be productive of the most important consequences. Lieutenant-Colonel Lee with his legion had surprised Georgetown. I have not many particulars. He took Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and several other officers prisoners, and killed a Major Irvine. A good many privates were killed; few taken. Our loss one killed, two wounded.

I have tried the efficacy of proclamations of pardon to deserters so often, and have found so little good resulting from them, that I am inclined to think desertion is rather encouraged than remedied by a frequent repetition of them. The soldier goes off, remains at home after a furlough, and looks for a proclamation as a thing of course. I am, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 8 o'clock, P. M., 27 February, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have this moment received a letter from the Count de Rochambeau with intelligence, of which the enclosed is a copy. By this it appears, that the first squadron had returned to Newport; but that M. Destouches was fitting up the *Romulus* with an intent to despatch her, and I suppose the frigates, for the Chesapeake, as being of better construction for the navigation of that Bay, than the ships which were there before. I have written to Count de Rochambeau and to M. Destouches, and have informed them, that you are prosecuting your march to the Head of Elk, and that you will embark there and wait only for a certain knowledge of the French squadron being again in the Chesapeake Bay, to determine you to proceed to a

coöperation. I hope the squadron will have again sailed before my letter reaches Newport.

Upon your arrival at the Head of Elk, you will immediately embark the troops if the transports are ready, that not a moment's time be lost, after you receive certain advices that our friends are below. But until that matter is ascertained beyond a doubt, you will on no account leave Elk River. You will write immediately to Baron Steuben, and inform him that he may expect the return of the squadron, and that he is to continue every preparation and make every arrangement before directed for the prosecution of the coöperation. You will readily perceive the propriety of keeping parts of this letter and intelligence secret. With the warmest attachment, I am, &c.

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TO JOHN PARKE CUSTIS.\*

New Windsor, 28 February, 1781.

DEAR CUSTIS,

If you will accept a hasty letter in return for yours of last month, I will devote a few moments to this purpose, and confine myself to an interesting point or two. I do not suppose, that so young a senator as you are, little versed in political disquisitions, can yet have much influence in a populous assembly, composed of gentlemen of various talents and of different views. But it is in your power to be punctual in your attendance (duty to the trust reposed in you exacts it of you), and to hear dispassionately and determine coolly all great questions. To be disgusted at the decision of questions, because not consonant to our own ideas,

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\* The son of Mrs. Washington by her former marriage. See Vol. II. pp. 361, 370, 374, 381.

and to withdraw ourselves from public assemblies, or to neglect our attendance at them, upon suspicion that there is a party formed, who are inimical to our cause and to the true interest of our country, is wrong, because these things may originate in a difference of opinion ; but, supposing the fact is otherwise, and that our suspicions are well founded, it is the indispensable duty of every patriot to counteract them by the most steady and uniform opposition. This advice is in consequence of information, that, you and others being dissatisfied at the proceedings of the Virginia Assembly, and thinking your attendance of little avail (as there is a majority for measures, which you and a minority conceive to be repugnant to the interest of your country), you are indifferent about the Assembly.

The next and I believe the last thing I shall have time to touch upon, is our military establishment ; and here, if I thought the conviction of the necessity of having a permanent force had not ere this flashed upon every man's mind, I could write a volume in support of the utility of it ; for no day or hour arrives unaccompanied with proof of some loss, some expense, or some misfortune consequent on the want of it. No operation of war, offensive or defensive, can be carried on for any length of time without it. No funds are adequate to the supplies of a fluctuating army, though it may go under the denomination of a regular one ; much less are they competent to the support of militia. In a word, for it is unnecessary to go into all the reasons the subject will admit of, we have brought a cause, which might have been happily terminated years ago by the adoption of proper measures, to the verge of ruin by temporary enlistments and a reliance on militia. The sums expended in bounties, waste of arms, consumption of military stores, provis-



ions, and camp utensils, to say nothing of clothing, which temporary soldiers are always receiving and always in want of, are too great for the resources of any nation, and prove the fallacy and danger of temporary expedients, which are no more than mushrooms, and of as short duration, but leave behind them a debt, which is continually weighing upon us.

It must be a settled plan, founded on system, order, and economy, that is to carry us triumphantly through the war. Supineness and indifference to the distresses and cries of a sister State, when danger is far off, and a general but momentary resort to arms when it comes to our doors, are equally impolitic and dangerous, and prove the necessity of a controlling power in Congress to regulate and direct all matters of general concern. The great business of war never can be well conducted, if it can be conducted at all, while the powers of Congress are only recommendatory. While one State yields obedience, and another refuses it, while a third mutilates and adopts the measure in part only, and all vary in time and manner, it is scarcely possible that our affairs should prosper, or that any thing but disappointment can follow the best concerted plans. The willing States are almost ruined by their exertions; distrust and jealousy ensue. Hence proceed neglect and ill timed compliances, one State waiting to see what another will do. This thwarts all our measures, after a heavy though ineffectual expense is incurred.\*

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\* The want of powers in Congress to draw out the resources of the country, and apply them to an efficient prosecution of the war, was a topic very much discussed, particularly after all the States had acceded to the Confederation. In an elaborate and able paper presented to Congress by the legislature of New York, in February, 1781, a vivid picture is drawn of the distresses and embarrassments, which prevailed throughout the country, with pertinent remarks as to their causes. After mentioning the extraordinary backwardness of nearly all the States, in com-

Do not these things show, in the most striking point of view, the indispensable necessity, the great and good policy, of each State sending its ablest and best men to Congress; men, who have a perfect understanding of the constitution of their country, of its policy and interests; and of vesting that body with competent powers? Our independence, our respectability and consequence in Europe, our greatness as a nation hereafter, depend upon it. The fear of giving sufficient powers to Congress, for the purposes I have mentioned, is futile. Each Assembly, under its present

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plying with the requisitions of Congress, the question is asked, to what this defect is to be ascribed.

"Clearly to a want of power in Congress," say the legislature, "to enforce its laws and compel each State to do its duty; or to a neglect of exertion, if it has the power. If it has not the power, the States with respect to each other are what individuals are supposed to have been in a state of nature; and those that make the greatest exertions for the common benefit of all have only their labor for their pains, and that too without effectually serving the common cause. We shall not presume to give our opinion on the question, whether Congress has *adequate* powers or not. But we will without hesitation declare, that, if they have them not, they ought to have them; and that we stand ready on our part to confer them. But certain it is, that extensive powers have been exercised by Congress. They have made war, absolved the inhabitants of these States from their allegiance to the crown of Great Britain, emitted money, entered into alliances, sent and received ambassadors, and invested a military officer with dictatorial powers. No objection has, that we know of, been made by any State to any one of these measures. Hence we venture to conclude, that other States are in sentiment with this; that these were powers which necessarily existed in Congress; and we cannot suppose that they should want the power of compelling the several States to do their duty, and thereby enabling the Confederacy to expel the common enemy."

This inference is forcible and just, and must have been obvious to every reflecting mind. In fact the idea of exercising the great and fundamental prerogatives of government above enumerated, without the power of enforcing those subordinate acts, which are essential to the existence of every political association, is on the face of it nugatory and absurd. The web of complicated causes, which led to this inconsistency in the American Congress, might be unravelled; but the attempt would be here out of place.

constitution, will be annihilated, and we must once more return to the government of Great Britain, and be made to kiss the rod preparing for our correction. A nominal head, which at present is but another name for Congress, will no longer do. That honorable body, after hearing the interests and views of the several States fairly discussed and explained by their respective representatives, must dictate, and not merely recommend and leave it to the States afterwards to do as they please, which, as I have observed before, is in many cases to do nothing at all.

When I began this letter, I did not expect to fill more than one side of the sheet, but I have run on insensibly. If you are at home, give my love to Nelly and the children; if at Richmond, present my compliments to any inquiring friends. I am sincerely and affectionately, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 1 March, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have just received letters from the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Destouches, informing me of their intention to operate in the Chesapeake Bay with their whole fleet, and a detachment of eleven hundred French troops, grenadiers and chasseurs included. The Chevalier expects to sail the 5th of this month, so that you will arrive at the Head of Elk, before he appears in the Bay. He seems to make a difficulty, which I do not comprehend, about protecting the passage of your detachment down the Bay; but, as it is entirely without foundation, I take it for granted it will cease on his arrival. It is of the great-



est importance to the expedition, as well as for the honor of our arms, that you should be on the spot to coöperate.

The Count de Rochambeau requests me to send an aid-de-camp to the commanding officer in Virginia, to assemble the militia and have every thing else ready against the arrival of the fleet. You know all the necessary directions have been given; but, to gratify the Count, I am to desire you will send Colonel Gouvion without delay to Baron Steuben to communicate this latter intelligence, and press the preparations, directing the Baron on the arrival of the French troops to enter immediately into their views. You know the infinite value of secrecy in an expedition circumstanced like this. The Baron de Viomenil will command the French detachment. I shall set out in the morning for Rhode Island, where I hope to arrive before the fleet sails, to level all difficulties and be in the way to improve circumstances.

Since writing the above, I have received a letter from General Greene, by which it appears, that Cornwallis, with twenty-five hundred men, was penetrating the country with very great rapidity, and Greene, with a much inferior force, retiring before him, having determined to pass the Roanoke. This intelligence, and an apprehension that Arnold may make his escape before the fleet can arrive in the Bay, induces me to give you greater latitude than you had in your original instructions. You are at liberty to concert a plan with the French general and naval commander for a descent into North Carolina, to cut off the detachment of the enemy, which had ascended Cape Fear River, intercept if possible Cornwallis, and relieve General Greene and the southern States. This, however, I think ought to be a secondary object, and

only attempted in case of Arnold's retreat to New York, or in case you should think his reduction would be attended with too much delay, and that the other enterprise would be more easy, and, from circumstances, more necessary. There should be strong reasons to induce a change of our first plan against Arnold, if he is still in Virginia. With a view to the second enterprise, you must be making your arrangement for transportation and supplies, and must endeavour to gain all the information you can about the country, which may be the scene of your operations.

Continuing your march, after the fleet has withdrawn itself from the Bay, may excite suspicions of their intended return. You can cover your design by saying you are going to the assistance of General Greene. You will remember, that your corps is a part of this army, and will let this idea have proper weight in your determinations. I am, &c.\*

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TO CHRISTOPHER ELLERY, WILLIAM CHANNING, WILLIAM TAGGART, SOLOMON SOUTHWICK, AND OTHERS, INHABITANTS OF NEWPORT.

March, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

Among the distinguished honors, which have a claim to my gratitude since my arrival, I have seen with pe-

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\* General Washington left head-quarters on the 2d, as mentioned above, and arrived in Newport on the 6th. He immediately went on board the admiral's ship, and had an interview with M. Destouches. The land forces were embarked, and the fleet was nearly ready to sail. He remained several days at Newport, and made such arrangements with Count de Rochambeau for the operations of the campaign, as the present state of affairs would warrant. He was absent nineteen days from New Windsor, during which time General Heath commanded.

culiar satisfaction those effusions of esteem and attachment, which have manifested themselves in the citizens of this ancient town. My happiness is complete in a moment that unites the expressions of their sentiments for me with their suffrages in favor of our allies. The conduct of the French army and fleet, of which the inhabitants testify so grateful and so affectionate a sense, at the same time that it evinces the wisdom of the commanders and the discipline of the troops, is a new proof of the magnanimity of the nation. It is a further demonstration of that generous zeal and concern for the happiness of America, which brought them to our assistance, a happy presage of future harmony, a pleasing evidence that an intercourse between the two nations will more and more cement the union, by the solid and lasting ties of mutual affection.

I sincerely sympathize with you, Gentlemen, in lamenting the depredations suffered by the town while in possession of the enemy, and heartily join you in those liberal wishes, the accomplishment of which would soon more than restore it to its former flourishing condition.

Accept my acknowledgments for the polite and obliging manner, in which you have been pleased to communicate to me the sentiments of your fellow citizens, and the assurances of my warmest esteem for them and for you personally. I am, Gentlemen, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Newport, ten o'clock, P. M., 8 March, 1781.

DEAR MARQUIS,

I have the pleasure to inform you, that the whole fleet went out with a fair wind this evening about



sunset. You may possibly hear of their arrival in the Chesapeake before this letter reaches you; should you not, you will have every thing prepared for falling down the Bay at a moment's warning. We have not yet heard of any move of the British in Gardiner's Bay. Should we luckily meet with no interruption from them, and Arnold should continue in Virginia till the arrival of M. Destouches, I flatter myself you will meet with that success, which I most ardently wish, not only on the public, but your own account.

I am, dear Marquis, &c.

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TO WILLIAM GORDON.

Newport, 9 March, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Your letter came to my hands at this place. I am conscious of being indebted to you not only for this but for several other unacknowledged favors. I thank you for ascribing my omissions to a multiplicity of other matters. I can with much truth assure you, that my business has increased with our difficulties, and kept equal pace with them. To what length these have arisen no man of observation need be informed. Excepting to Mrs. Washington when she is absent from me, and now and then a letter to a friend, more on business than for the purpose of communication, I rarely put pen to paper for private correspondence. Your complaint, therefore, is a common accusation against me; and will, I fear, remain in too much force, till our affairs are a little more systematized, the powers of Congress enlarged, and military matters in a less fluctuating state than they have been. These changes would enable me to conduct the affairs of my depart-

ment with ease and satisfaction to myself, and would allow me some time for private indulgences, to which I have long been a stranger.

I came here on business, and as soon as that business is finished I shall return to my dreary quarters at New Windsor. We have, as you very justly observe, abundant reasons to thank Providence for its many favorable interpositions in our behalf. It has at times been my only dependence, for all other resources seemed to have failed us. My respects to Mrs. Gordon. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Newport, 11 March, 1781.

DEAR MARQUIS,

I informed you on the 8th in the evening, that the French fleet had put to sea. By advices from New London, the British did the same yesterday morning with their whole force. They gave out publicly, that they were bound for the Chesapeake. I think the French had so much the start, that they will first reach that Bay; but, as there is no accounting for the delays and accidents of the sea, I have given you this notice, lest, upon hearing that a fleet had arrived below, you might take it for granted that it was a friendly one, and fall down. You will now see, that precaution on that head is more than ever necessary. That success may attend you, is the sincere wish of your friend, &c.

TO JABEZ BOWEN AND OTHERS, INHABITANTS  
OF PROVIDENCE.

March, 1781.

GENTLEMEN,

I am happy in the opportunity which your address affords me of testifying to you, how deeply I am penetrated with those demonstrations of attachment, which I have experienced from the inhabitants of this town. The confidence and affection of his fellow-citizens are the most valuable and agreeable reward a citizen can receive. Next to the happiness of my country, this is the most powerful inducement I can have to exert myself in its service. Conscious of a desire to promote that great object, however short of my wishes the success of my endeavours may fall, I console myself with a persuasion, that the goodness of my intentions in some measure justifies your approbation.

The determination you are pleased to express, of making every effort for giving vigor to our military operations, is consonant with the spirit that has uniformly actuated this State. It is by this disposition alone that we can hope, under the protection of Heaven, to secure the important blessings for which we contend.

With sincere gratitude for your sentiments and wishes towards me, I beg you to accept the assurances of that perfect esteem and regard, with which I have the honor to be, Gentlemen, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR HANCOCK.

Hartford, 17 March, 1781.

SIR,

It would have afforded me the greatest pleasure, had I been able to extend my late visit to Newport



as far as Boston; but the important operations, which may be expected at the southward, made it necessary for me to return as soon as possible to the North River, that I might be more immediately in the way of receiving intelligence, and communicating to Count de Rochambeau any which might be essential to the common interest. The present is a most important moment. The success of the expedition now in agitation seems to depend upon a naval superiority, and the force of the two fleets is so equal, that we must rather hope for, than entertain an assurance of victory. The attempt, however, made by our allies to dislodge the enemy in Virginia, is certainly a bold one, and, should it fail, will nevertheless entitle them to the thanks of the public.

The army under my immediate command is so much reduced by the detachment, which I have made to coöperate with the French troops in Virginia, that I have been under the necessity of calling for the recruits, who are raised in the neighbouring States. Few have yet come in; and I plainly perceive, that, unless very vigorous exertions are made, the quotas of the several States will be not only short, but exceedingly late in the field. I must therefore entreat your countenance and authority with the persons in the different townships, whose business it is to procure the levies, that they may not only send forward those to the places of rendezvous, who have been raised, but attend to completing the deficiencies where any may have happened. There is the greater necessity for a strict compliance with the number of men required by Congress, as the Pennsylvania line, which was to have composed part of the northern army, has lately been ordered to the southward. A regular and full compliance with the specific requisition of provision

is a matter of equal importance with the foregoing, to which I beg leave to call your attention also. I have the honor to be, with most perfect respect and esteem, &c.

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TO THE CHEVALIER DE CHASTELLUX.

New Windsor, 21 March, 1781.

I arrived, my dear Chevalier, at these my quarters in the forenoon of yesterday, after passing over very bad roads, and riding through very foul weather without any damage. I must again give vent to that sensibility, which your goodness has impressed me with, and again thank you for all those civilities, which your politeness heaped upon me at Rhode Island. I shall be grateful for them, and shall wish for opportunities to prove the sincerity of these professions.

Great Britain is at war with the Dutch. The manifesto and declaration of that court I have done myself the honor to transmit to the Count de Rochambeau. We have it by report, that Admiral Destouches is safely arrived in Hampton Road.\* A number of militia under the command of Baron Steuben were hovering round Arnold, ready to coöperate with General Vio-menil and the Marquis de Lafayette, in the moment of their debarkation; the latter of whom had advanced his detachment to Annapolis, to receive more readily the protection and convoy of the frigates of M. Destouches.

General Greene, by my last accounts, was gathering strength. Lord Cornwallis was retreating; but the object of his retrograde movement was uncertain. A

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\* It turned out to be a false report.

little time must discover it. Will you do me the favor to present my respects to General Viomenil, and those gentlemen to whom I am indebted for unbounded civilities; and do me the justice to believe, that, with sentiments of the purest regard, and the warmest personal attachment, I have the honor to be, &c.

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## TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

New Windsor, 21 March, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Upon my arrival at this place yesterday, I found your letter, enclosing the complaint of sundry field-officers of the Massachusetts line.\* It is a painful reflection, that the best meant endeavours to promote the service are subject to, and often meet with, the most unfavorable constructions, and that the numerous embarrassments, which the distressed situation of our affairs unavoidably involves us in, should be increased by ill-founded jealousies and groundless suspicions.

If the gentlemen, who addressed you, were hurt at

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\* The paper containing the complaint was signed by seven field-officers. After speaking of their services and sacrifices in the army, and their devotedness to the cause of their country, they add; "We flatter ourselves, that we have gained and possess the affection of our soldiery. We have certainly so much confidence in them, that we are willing to accompany them not only on tours of honor, but to encounter with them fatigues and danger, which we think we have a right to expect. But we are sorry to have so far lost the confidence of our general officers, that, when considerably more than one half of our men have been detached for command, one field-officer only from the line has been permitted to attend them, while nine remain to endure the sensible mortification of commanding between them a less number, the greater part of whom are on detached and extra service. Things thus circumstanced must pointedly wound the feelings of a military character, and they do certainly most sensibly ours." This complaint was presented to General Heath, and was forwarded by him to the Commander-in-chief.



the appointment of Colonel Gimat and Major Galvan to command in the detachment which marched, and which I presume to be the case, a candid investigation of the cause would have evinced in a moment the principle, and that it was not a predilection in favor of those gentlemen, or a want of confidence in the complainants, but the peculiar circumstances of the army, that gave birth to the measure.

At the time the detachment was ordered, there were, if my memory serves me, by the adjutant's return (and it was called for on purpose), but two regiments in camp, that had more than one field-officer, namely Hazen's and Webb's. Nothing therefore but necessity could have justified my leaving a regiment without one, at a time when new levies were ordered to join, and momentarily expected from every State, and when an equal and impartial distribution of them was to be made, and the whole to be provided for. Under such circumstances, no one, I am persuaded, who considers the good of the service and the consequences of such a want, can blame me for taking officers, who were eligible to command and unoccupied by other duties, to accompany the detachment.

These and these only were the reasons, why no more than one field-officer was taken from the line of Massachusetts, and not, as I have said before, from a want of confidence in them, or because I preferred those that did go. Thus much justice has dictated and I insert, to remove the idea which these gentlemen seem to have imbibed of an intended slight, but they must excuse me for adding, that I conceive it to be a right inherent in command to appoint particular officers for special purposes.

That part of your letter, which seems to respect yourself personally, needs explanation; for I never can

suppose that you deem it a slight, not to have been taken from the command of the most important post in America with four thousand men, to head a detachment from that post of only eight hundred. If this is not your allusion, I am ignorant of your meaning; but I shall take this occasion to observe once for all, that I am not conscious of exercising a partiality in favor of one line, one corps, or one man, more than another; that where appearances have been otherwise, in the eyes of those who were unacquainted with all the circumstances, I could easily have explained them; and that I never did and never will hurt intentionally the feelings of any deserving officer, unless I can be justified upon general principles, and good is to result from it. But, if officers will not see into the political motives by which I am sometimes governed in my appointments, and which the good of the common cause renders indispensably necessary, it is unfortunate; but it cannot, because it ought not, divert me from the practice of a duty, which I think promotive of the interest of the United States, and consistent with the views of that power under which I act.

I have been thus particular, because it is my wish to convince every officer, over whom I have the honor to be placed, of the sincerity of my disposition to make him as happy, as the times and our circumstances will admit, and as can be done consistently with the observance of that steady line of conduct I ever have pursued. I am, with esteem, &c.\*

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\* General Heath seemed fully to participate the sentiments and abet the conduct of the field-officers, and to consider his personal honor deeply implicated, if one may judge from the tone of his remarks, which caused the above reply.

"As the affair is laid open," said he, "I cannot smother my own feelings, which have been exceedingly wounded under some considerations on this occasion. I never will admit an idea to enter my breast, that

## TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 21 March, 1781.

SIR,

I returned to this place yesterday at noon. I did not prosecute my intention of visiting Springfield, as I wished not to be out of the line of communication from the southward, on account of the important intelligence which may be hourly expected from that quarter. Give me leave sincerely to congratulate your Excellency and Congress upon the completion of the Confederation of the United States, an event long wished for, which I hope will have the happiest effects upon the politics of this country, and which will be of essential service to our cause in Europe.

I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

## TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

New Windsor, 21 March, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR,

I returned the last evening from Newport, to which place I had been upon a visit to Count de Rochambeau. Your last letter has relieved me from much anxiety, by informing me that you had saved all your baggage, artillery, and stores, notwithstanding the hot pursuit of the enemy, and that you in turn were following them. I most sincerely hope your reinforcement may be such, as will enable you to prevent their taking a post in the upper country, and hinder the

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it is possible for any officer, especially a foreigner, to have the interest or honor of my country more at heart than I have; and if the conduct of my general in any instance should discover, that he placed less confidence in me, it cannot fail to make a painful impression." — *March 2d.*



disaffected from joining them. You may be assured, that your retreat before Lord Cornwallis is highly applauded by all ranks, and reflects much honor on your military abilities.

In my last I informed you of the detachment, which had marched towards the Chesapeake under the command of the Marquis. I at that time expected, that only a detachment of the French fleet would have gone round; but the admiral and general afterwards determined upon sending the whole, with a detachment of between eleven and twelve hundred grenadiers and light infantry. They sailed the 8th in the evening from Newport; the British from Gardiner's Bay the 10th in the morning. Much will depend upon which fleet reaches the Chesapeake Bay first. A reinforcement, either for Lord Cornwallis or Arnold, sailed from New York the 13th.\* Their number was said to be about fifteen hundred.†

\* The convoy put back, and did not finally sail till the 21st.

† The number actually sent was about two thousand.

The day after the fleet went to sea from Gardiner's Bay, Admiral Arbuthnot wrote as follows to Sir Henry Clinton. "Before this time you will have received the intelligence of the French having quitted Rhode Island with their ships and troops, supposed for the Chesapeake, and that they have dismantled their forts. I detached the Pearl and Isis two days ago to reconnoitre Newport harbour. They rejoined me yesterday morning, and acquainted me, that none of the enemy's ships remain there. In consequence of which I proceed in quest of them directly for the Chesapeake with the utmost expedition; Captain Hudson's vessels being sufficient to escort any troops you may incline to detach after me to reinforce General Arnold in Virginia."—*MS. Letter, at sea, March 11th.*

The statement about dismantling the forts is of course an error, as only between eleven and twelve hundred of the French troops accompanied the expedition.

General Phillips commanded the detachment sent to coöperate with Arnold in Virginia. All the troops in that quarter were intended to act in concert with the plans of Lord Cornwallis. By his instructions General Phillips was directed, in case Lord Cornwallis should be successful in the Carolinas, to move up the Chesapeake with a large force to

From what I saw and learned while at the eastward, I am convinced the levies will be late in the field, and I fear very far short of the requisition. My regard for the public good, and my inclination to promote your success, will prompt me to give every assistance and to make every diversion in your favor. But what can I do, if I am not furnished with the means? I most anxiously await the event of the present operation in Virginia. If attended with success, it may have the happiest influence upon our southern affairs, by leaving the forces of Virginia free to act. For while there is an enemy in the heart of a country, you can expect neither men nor supplies from it, in that full and regular manner in which they ought to be given.

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Baltimore; and to take post near the Susquehanna, and on the eastern shore of the Chesapeake Bay, where the loyalists were said to be numerous. The ultimate object was to seize upon the stores and armaments in Pennsylvania, and obstruct the trade of the Delaware. "I am preparing," said Sir Henry Clinton, "for every exertion within the compass of my very reduced force, which, after the several large detachments sent to the southward, amounts to no more than 6275 auxiliary troops, 4527 regular British, and 906 Provincials, ready for the field."—*MS. Letter to Lord George Germain, New York, April 5th.*

Again, Sir Henry Clinton wrote to General Phillips, "The security of the Carolinas is of the greatest moment, but the best consequences may be expected from an operation up the Chesapeake. Let the same experiment be tried there, which has hitherto been so unsuccessful at the south. Virginia has been looked upon as universally hostile; Maryland less so, but has not been tried; but in Pennsylvania, on both sides of the Susquehanna, and between the Chesapeake and Delaware, the friends of the King's interests are said to be numerous. Support should be rendered to them, and means of proving their fidelity put into their hands. If Lord Cornwallis can spare such part of his forces as to effect this movement, it is greatly to be desired."—*MS. Letter, April 11th.*

At the same time Lord Cornwallis wrote to Sir Henry Clinton; "I cannot help expressing my wishes, that the Chesapeake may become the seat of the war, even, if necessary, at the expense of abandoning New York. Until Virginia is in a manner subdued, our hold upon the Carolinas must be difficult if not precarious."—*Wilmington, April 10th.*

I had promised myself the pleasure of paying Mrs. Greene a visit at Coventry. But the important intelligence, which might be every moment expected from the southward, determined me not to go a mile out of the line of communication. Great Britain has made herself another enemy by a declaration of war against Holland. This has been announced in form in the New York papers. With the sincerest esteem, &c.

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TO JOSEPH WILLARD.\*

New Windsor, 22 March, 1781.

SIR,

I am much indebted to you for announcing my election as a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I feel myself particularly honored by this relation to a society, whose efforts to promote useful knowledge will, I am persuaded, acquire them a high reputation in the literary world. I entreat you to present my warmest acknowledgments to that respectable body, and to assure them, that I shall with zeal embrace every opportunity of seconding their laudable views and manifesting the exalted sense I have of the institution.

The arts and sciences essential to the prosperity of the state, and to the ornament and happiness of human life, have a primary claim to the encouragement of every lover of his country and mankind. For the polite and flattering terms in which you have been pleased to convey the sentiments of the Academy, I beg you to accept my thanks, and the assurance of my being, with great esteem, &c.

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\* The Reverend Joseph Willard was at this time corresponding secretary of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and was shortly afterwards elected President of Harvard University.



## TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

New Windsor, 23 March, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

By a manœuvre, too profound for my understanding, if it is intended for the public good, the choice of a minister of war is postponed till October. I have heard no reason assigned for it, and am uncharitable enough to believe, that no good one can be given.\*

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\* In a former letter General Washington had manifested a strong desire, that General Schuyler might be placed at the head of the new department of war. "I hear with infinite pleasure," said he, "that, though no nomination has yet taken place, you are generally spoken of; at the same time I learn with pain from Colonel Hamilton, that your acceptance of it is doubtful, if the choice should fall on you. I am perfectly aware of all your objections; I feel their force; but they ought not to prevail. Our affairs are brought to an awful crisis. Nothing will recover them but the vigorous exertions of men of abilities, who know our wants, and the best means of supplying them. These qualifications, Sir, without a compliment, I think you possess. Why then, the department being necessary, should you shrink from the duties of it? The greater the chaos, the greater will be your merit in bringing forth order."—*February 20th.*

After declaring his willingness to discharge any duties incumbent on him as a citizen and patriot, and even to accept such an appointment under certain circumstances, General Schuyler said; "But I cannot suppose, although some may mention me for the office, that Congress will be so imprudent with respect to themselves, or indelicate in regard to me, as to offer it, since I have explicitly on another occasion, and in writing, declared my intention never to hold any office under them, unless accompanied with a restoration of my military rank; and I candidly pointed at the inconveniences, which would result to themselves from such a restoration, as it must necessarily give umbrage to many officers."—*Albany, February 25th.*

To the paragraph on this subject in the text, General Schuyler replied; "The motives, which led Congress to postpone filling the war department, have leaked out, and been communicated to me. General Gates was in nomination; but, his friends reflecting, that the impropriety of appointing him, before he had exculpated himself from the imputation of misconduct in his command, would be too glaring an abuse of power, deferred it in hopes that by an acquittal the public confidence will be restored to him."—*April 3d.* General Sullivan, as we have seen above (p. 399), assigned another motive for the postponement.

We are in a most critical and disagreeable state of suspense with respect to the two fleets. Neither had arrived within the Chesapeake Bay on the 15th instant, when letters from the Marquis and Baron Steuben were dated at Yorktown, twenty miles from the mouth of James River, though both were expected. How unhappy it is for all our measures, that the adoption of them cannot be in season. Had the French commander at Rhode Island complied, in the first instance, with my request to send the whole fleet, and a detachment of their land force to Virginia, the destruction of Arnold's corps must have been complete, during the debilitated state of the British fleet. The undertaking now is bold and precarious, rendered more so by an unfortunate and to me unaccountable delay of twenty-four hours in their quitting Newport, after it was said they were ready to sail; the wind being as favorable to them and as adverse to the enemy, as Heaven could furnish. But it is our true policy to make the most of their assistance without censuring their mistakes. Therefore it is I communicate this in confidence.\* I am, with great esteem and regard, Sir, &c.

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\* It should be observed, in regard to the point here mentioned, that General Washington's letter to Count de Rochambeau and M. Des-touches, requesting them to despatch the whole fleet to Virginia, with a detachment of land troops, did not arrive in Newport till after the three vessels under M. de Tilly had sailed. The fleet being thus divided, it was deemed imprudent to go to sea, when a superior British force was on the look-out, and ready to follow. It would be unjust, therefore to attach any blame to the French commanders for not complying with a request, which was not known to them till compliance was impossible. No more can be said, than that the circumstance of not receiving General Washington's advices in due time was unfortunate. See above (p. 410); also the letter to Count de Rochambeau, dated *April 30th*.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARMSTRONG.

New Windsor, 26 March, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I received with much pleasure the account of your recovered health, and sincerely wish it may be of long continuance and much usefulness to yourself and country. We ought not to look back, unless it is to derive useful lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear bought experience. To inveigh against things, that are past and irremediable, is unpleasing; but to steer clear of the shelves and rocks we have struck upon is the part of wisdom, equally as incumbent on political as other men, who have their own little bark, or that of others, to navigate through the intricate paths of life, or the trackless ocean, to the haven of security and rest.

Our affairs are brought to a perilous crisis, that the hand of Providence, I trust, may be more conspicuous in our deliverance. The many remarkable interpositions of the Divine government, in the hours of our deepest distress and darkness, have been too luminous to suffer me to doubt the happy issue of the present contest; but the period for its accomplishment may be too far distant for a person of my years, who, in his morning and evening hours, and every moment unoccupied by business, pants for retirement, and for those domestic and rural enjoyments, which in my estimation far surpass the highest pageantry of this world.

I am sorry to hear, that the recruiting business in your State is clogged with so many embarrassments. It is perhaps the greatest of the great evils attending this contest, that States as well as individuals had rather wish well, than act well; had rather see a thing



done, than do it, or contribute their just proportion to the doing of it. This conduct is not only injurious to the common cause, but in the end most expensive to themselves; besides the distrusts and jealousies, which are sown by such conduct. To expect brick without straw is idle, and yet I am called upon, with as much facility to furnish men and means for every service and every want, as if every quota required of the States had been furnished, and the whole was at my disposal; when the fact is, that I am scarcely able to provide a garrison for West Point, or to feed the men that are there. This and ten thousand reasons, which I could assign, prove the necessity of something more than recommendatory powers in Congress. If that body is not vested with a controlling power in matters of common concern, and for the great purposes of war, I do not scruple to give it decidedly as my opinion, that it will be impossible to prosecute it to any good effect. Some States are capitally injured, if not ruined, by their own exertions and the neglects of others; while by these irregularities the strength and resources of the country never are, and never can be, employed to advantage. I shall trespass no longer, than while I can assure you, that I am, with every sentiment of esteem, regard, and affection, &c.

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TO THE CHEVALIER DESTOUCHES.

Head-Quarters, 31 March, 1781

SIR,

I was last evening honored with your favor of the 19th instant by the Hermione, by way of Philadelphia, and with a duplicate from Newport. I am obliged by the minute detail you were pleased to give me of the

action on the 16th instant, between the squadron of his Most Christian Majesty under your command, and that of the British under Admiral Arbuthnot. Though you have not been able to accomplish the object, which you had in view, you have merited the thanks of every American by the boldness of the attempt, and by the gallantry and good conduct displayed through the whole course of the engagement. I will confess to you, Sir, I was never sanguine in my expectations, after I saw the British fleet follow you so closely from Gardiner's Bay. I knew that the success of the expedition depended almost entirely upon your arrival in the Chesapeake before Admiral Arbuthnot, a circumstance in which the winds and weather had more influence than valor or skill. Had it depended upon the latter, I should have had perfect confidence, and the event has justified my opinion.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO ALEXANDER MCDOUGALL, IN CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 31 March, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The expedition against Arnold has failed, after the favorable moment, occasioned by the disability of part

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\* The letter of M. Destouches describing this engagement is minute, but not very clear. Baron de Viomenil wrote at the same time, and applauded the good conduct of M. Destouches throughout the action. Of the land troops, under Viomenil, seven were killed, and twenty-nine wounded. There were eight line-of-battle ships and three or four frigates on each side. The force was nearly equal, the French having more men, but the British a larger number of guns. The French squadron entered the harbour of Newport on the 26th of March, having been absent eighteen days. The expedition had failed in its principal object; for although the naval combat was perhaps equally honorable to both parties, yet the British got possession of the Chesapeake Bay,

of the British ships at Gardiner's Bay, was suffered to pass away. I never was sanguine in my expectation of success; but, the object being great, the risk was warrantable. The attempt of the Chevalier Des-touches at the time he sailed was bold and enterprising. For this and political reasons, and because I know it will be grateful to the French general and admiral, I take the liberty of hinting to you the propriety (if it is not already done) of Congress paying them a compliment on the occasion. It may have a happy effect, which is the only apology I can offer for the freedom of suggesting it. I am, dear Sir, with great esteem and regard, &c.\*

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

New Windsor, 4 April, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Every day convinces me, that the enemy are determined to bend their force against the southern States, and that we must support them powerfully from this quarter, or they will be lost. Unless such support is given in time, it will be ineffectual. The enemy will not only have established themselves in posts, but in the affections of many of the people. The Pennsylvania line is already ordered to the southern army, and will march thither in detachments, as it is re-assembled and recruited. I should not hesitate immediately to order a further reinforcement, could I do it with prudence; but we are so extremely weak, not

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and effectually protected Arnold's detachment, and enabled the reinforcement under General Phillips to enter the Bay immediately afterwards.

\* A resolve, highly complimentary to the French commanders and troops, was passed on motion of Mr. Madison. — *Journals, April 4th.*



more than four hundred recruits from all the States having yet come in, about one hundred of whom are from Massachusetts, that, although the enemy have lately sent off another detachment of at least fifteen hundred men under the command of General Phillips, I do not think myself justifiable in doing it under present circumstances. But, that the measure may be adopted as early as possible, I must desire and call upon you, in the most positive manner to send forward every man from Massachusetts that you can collect. The urgency of the times requires that every exertion should be made to check the enemy in the rapidity of their progress to the southward.

You will have heard of the disappointment of the expedition against Arnold. General Greene has had a general engagement with Lord Cornwallis,\* from which, though he suffered a defeat, he might ultimately derive advantages, had his Lordship no prospect of fresh succours. But I have scarcely a doubt, that the detachment under General Phillips is intended for that quarter. Should they form a junction, and I see nothing to hinder it, General Greene's present force will not enable him to give any effectual opposition. He had two hundred and ninety out of his small body of Continental troops killed, wounded, and missing in the late action.† You very well know, that

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\* The battle of Guilford Court-House, in North Carolina, fought on the 15th of March.

† This number included only the soldiers. By the adjutant's return there were also thirty-one officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, and eight drummers and fifers, among the killed, wounded, and missing.

Of the Virginia militia fifteen were killed, sixty-seven wounded, and three hundred and twenty-two missing.

Of the North Carolina militia six were killed, five wounded, and five hundred and sixty-three missing.

In both cases the militia, that were missing, had returned home. Very

the collecting of militia depends entirely upon the prospects of the day. If favorable, they throng to you; if not, they will not move.

I perceive that you have, by a late public order, detained all the Massachusetts officers, who were then in the State; I suppose, that they might assist in bringing forward the levies. You will keep only as many as are absolutely necessary for that purpose, and send the others to their regiments. They are exceedingly wanted, as there is scarcely a sufficient number in camp for ordinary duties. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New Windsor, 4 April, 1781.

SIR,

The business, that has given constant exercise to the pen of my secretary, and not only frequently but always to those of my aids-de-camp, has rendered it impracticable for the former to register the copies of my letters and instructions in books; by which means valuable documents, which may be of equal public utility and private satisfaction, remain in loose sheets, and in the rough manner in which they were first drawn.

This is not only attended with present inconvenience, but has a tendency to expose them to damage and to loss. Unless a set of writers are employed for the sole purpose of recording them, it will not be in my power to accomplish this necessary work; and it will be equally impracticable, perhaps, to preserve from injury and loss such valuable papers. But to engage

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few were taken. General Greene's official letter to Congress describing this action is contained in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. XII. p. 37.

these, without the sanction of Congress, I have not thought myself at liberty.

The business now must be performed in some quiet retreat, and yet not so far from camp, but that I may without much inconvenience have recourse to the papers. It must be done under the inspection of a man of character, in whom entire confidence can be placed, and who is capable of arranging the papers, and methodizing the register. Such a one, with as many clerks as can be employed to advantage, I will endeavour to engage, with the permission of Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.\*

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 5 April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

While we lament the miscarriage of an enterprise, which bid so fair for success, we must console ourselves in the thought of having done every thing practicable to accomplish it. I am certain that the Chevalier Destouches exerted himself to the utmost to gain the Chesapeake. The point upon which the whole turned, the action with Admiral Arbuthnot, reflects honor upon the Chevalier and upon the marine of France.

As matters have turned out, it is to be wished that you had not gone out of the Elk. But I never judge of the propriety of measures by after events. Your

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\* In conformity with this suggestion, Congress authorized the Commander-in-chief to employ an additional confidential secretary, and as many writers as he should think proper, to arrange and register his public letters and documents, and to allow them such salaries as he should deem reasonable. — *Journals*, April 10th.



move to Annapolis, at the time you made it, was certainly judicious. The report of the French fleet being off Cape Fear was erroneous. They returned to the harbour of Newport on the 26th of last month.

I imagine the detachment will be upon its march this way before this reaches you. I do not know what you will have done with your heavy artillery. If you should not already have got it to the head of Christiana River, I think you had best leave it at Baltimore, or at any safe place. The light pieces, with the two smallest mortars and the ammunition and stores belonging to them, are to go to the southward with the first division of the Pennsylvanians. You will therefore leave them at some safe and proper place upon the communication, and on your arrival at Philadelphia inform General Wayne where they are, that he may take them along with him. I wish the detachment may move as quickly as it can without injury to the troops. I am, with sincere regard, &c.\*

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TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, 6 April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Since my letter to you of yesterday, I have attentively considered of what vast importance it will be to reinforce General Greene as speedily as possible; more especially as there can be little doubt, that the detachment under General Phillips, if not part of that now under the command of General Arnold, will ultimately join or in some degree coöperate with Lord

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\* For an explanation of some parts of this letter, and the principal facts respecting Lafayette's movement to the southward, see Vol. VIII. APPENDIX, No. I.

Cornwallis. I have communicated to the general officers, at present with the army, my sentiments on the subject; and they are unanimously of opinion, that the detachment under your command should proceed and join the southern army. Your being already three hundred miles advanced, which is nearly half way, is the reason that operates against any which can be offered in favor of marching that detachment back. You will therefore, immediately on the receipt of this, turn the detachment to the southward. Inform General Greene, that you are upon your march to join him, and take his direction as to your route, when you begin to approach him. Previously to that, you will be guided by your own judgment, and by the roads on which you will be most likely to find subsistence for the troops and horses. It will be well to advise Governor Jefferson of your intended march through the State of Virginia; or perhaps it might answer a good purpose, were you to go forward to Richmond yourself, after putting the troops in motion and having made some necessary arrangements for their progress.

You will now take with you the light artillery and smallest mortars, with their stores and the musket cartridges. But let these follow under a proper escort, rather than impede the march of the detachment, which ought to move as expeditiously as possible without injury to them. The heavy artillery and stores you will leave at some proper and safe place, if it cannot be conveniently transported to Christiana River, from whence it will be easily got to Philadelphia. You may leave it to the option of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens to proceed or not, as he may think proper. His family is in peculiar circumstances, and he left it in the expectation of being absent but a short time. Should there be other officers under similar circum-

stances, you may make them the same offers, and they shall be relieved.

I will now mention to you in confidence the reason, which operated with me more than almost any other, in favor of recalling your detachment and forming another. It was the uneasiness occasioned among the field-officers of those regiments which furnished the men, upon the appointment of Colonel Gimat and Major Galvan to commands in the corps. They presented a memorial to me upon the subject, and I gave them the true reason, which was, that the regiments in their lines were so extremely thin of field-officers of their own, that necessity, if nothing else, dictated the measure. I have heard nothing of the discontent lately; but, should I find it revive again, upon its being known that the corps is to continue together, I shall be obliged, for peace' sake, to relieve those two gentlemen by officers properly belonging to the lines from which the regiments are formed. You will therefore prepare them for such an event, and tell them candidly the reasons, founded principally upon their having already had their tour in the infantry. Should they be relieved, they will probably incline to continue with the southern army. There is as much or more probability of their finding employ there, than with us, as we shall from all appearances remain inactive.

I am, my dear Marquis, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR LIVINGSTON.

New Windsor, 8 April, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

Intelligence has been sent to me, by a gentleman living near the enemy's lines, who has an opportunity



of knowing what passes among them, that four parties had been sent out with orders to take or assassinate your Excellency, Governor Clinton, myself, and a fourth person, whose name is not known. I cannot say that I am under apprehensions on account of the latter, but I have no doubt they would execute the former, could they find an opportunity. I shall take such precautions on the occasion, as appear to me necessary; and I have thought it proper to advise your Excellency of what has come to my knowledge, that you may do the same. That they may fail of success, if they have any such plan in contemplation, is the earnest wish of, dear Sir, &c.\*

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

New Windsor, 8 April, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

At the same time that I commend the laudable efforts you have made, to have a corps of the troops of Pennsylvania in readiness to march with the detachment under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, I deplore with you the causes, which have occasioned this delay, and hitherto frustrated your endeavours. The critical situation of our southern affairs, and the

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\* This kind of intelligence was not uncommon. It was probably sometimes sent out through secret channels by the enemy, with the view of exciting alarm and vigilance at certain points, when they wished to draw attention away from others. It is certain, also, that plans were concerted for seizing the principal persons among the Americans. On one or two occasions Governor Livingston narrowly escaped. One of the spies, who came out with Sir Henry Clinton's proposition to the Pennsylvania mutineers, declared after he was taken, and repeated it at the time of his execution, that he knew a party, who had formed a scheme to seize General Washington, and he pretended to reveal the manner in which they proposed to carry it into effect.

reinforcements sent by the enemy to that quarter, urge the necessity of moving as large a proportion of the Pennsylvania line as possible, without a moment's loss of time. Indeed, I hope that, before this hour, by the measures you have taken, all the impediments to a movement will have been obviated. I am persuaded your utmost and unremitting exertions will not be wanting, on this and every occasion, of serving your country so essentially. That they may ever be crowned with success, and that nothing but propitious events may attend you on the march and in the field, is the sincere wish of, dear Sir, &c.





## APPENDIX.

1917.07.26

## APPENDIX.

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No. I. p. 33.

### FRENCH ARMY IN AMERICA UNDER THE COMMAND OF COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

It has already been seen, that Congress and General Washington disapproved the plan, first proposed by Lafayette, of an attack on Canada by a combined action of French and American troops. Various motives operated, it is true, to discourage this scheme. Political considerations had their weight; but the main difficulties, after all, arose from the apprehension, that an experiment, which should bring French and American soldiers into concert, was too doubtful in its results to be hazarded.

From the time that the alliance between the two countries was established by a treaty, this subject had of course employed the thoughts of every one, who reflected upon public affairs. The immense advantage that might be derived from a French military force in America was so obvious, that it could hardly escape any individual in the nation. But the obstacles to be encountered in effecting such an object were deemed formidable, if not indeed insurmountable. The French had been arrayed from the earliest history of the country against the English colonists, in every contest which had been waged between England and France; and the recent long and bloody war, prosecuted with so much violence on the frontiers, was still held in lively remembrance by a large portion of the inhabitants of British America. By this train of events and ancient habits, it was feared, that prejudices and antipathies had become so deeply rooted, as to preclude the possibility of a harmonious union between the troops of the two nations, even if the people could be reconciled to the presence of a French military force on American soil.



Such was the state of opinion when Lafayette returned to Europe. Ardent as were his wishes on this subject, and cordially as they were reciprocated by many of the principal persons in the United States, no one ventured to hope the realization of such a scheme, or to encourage any attempt to bring it to pass. It had made a deep impression, however, upon the mind of the young soldier, whose love for America was at this moment, as it was ever afterwards, a predominant passion of his soul. The issue is briefly and forcibly described by Mr. Everett, in his eloquent *Eulogy on Lafayette*.

"Great difficulties," says the orator, "it was supposed, would attend the coöperation of a French army with American forces on land. Congress was jealous of the introduction of a foreign soldiery into the interior of the country, and Washington himself gave but a reluctant consent to the measure. Considerable discontent had arisen in connexion with Count d'Estaing's movements in Rhode Island, which, had it not been allayed by the prudent and effectual mediation of Lafayette, would, as has been already stated, probably have prevented a French army from being sent over to the United States. Such were the feelings, on both sides of the ocean, when Lafayette went back to France in 1779; and during the whole of that year he exerted himself unceasingly, in his correspondence and conferences with the French ministry, to induce them to send out an army. The difficulties to be overcome were all but insurmountable, acting, as he was, not only without the instructions, but against the sense of Congress, and scarcely sanctioned by Washington. He however *knew* that success would attend the measure. He had that interior conviction, which no argument or authority can subdue, that the proposed expedition was practicable and expedient, and he succeeded in imparting his enthusiasm to the ministers. He knew that the anticipated difficulties could be overcome. He had proved, in his own experience, that coöperation was practicable. Military subordination made it impossible to put him, a young man of twenty-two, holding in the King's army only the commission of a subaltern, in the command of a large force; but he relied with a just confidence on the services, which his standing in America and his possession of the confidence of Washington would enable him to render. He accordingly pursued the object, with an ardor, an industry, and an adroitness, which nothing could surpass. When his correspondence with the French ministers, particularly the Count de Vergennes, shall be published, it will appear that it was mainly the personal efforts and personal influence of Lafayette, idol of the French people as he had made himself, which caused the army of Rochambeau to be sent to America."

This is an accurate view of facts. By repeated conferences with the ministers, by unwearied zeal and unceasing solicitation, he at length roused the attention of the French court, and accomplished his purpose; taking upon himself the entire responsibility in regard to America, and to the manner in which the army would be received by the people. The event showed with how much discrimination he had studied their character. After many personal interviews with the several ministers, from time to time, in which the subject had been discussed in all its forms, Count de Vergennes applied to him for a sketch in writing, which should embody his previous suggestions, and contain an outline of an expedition to America, in which naval and land forces should be united.

## LAFAYETTE TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

" Havre, 18 July, 1779.

" SIR,

" You ask me for some ideas respecting an expedition to America. As it is not a fixed plan, which you require, nor a memorial addressed in form to the ministry, it will be the more easy to comply with your wishes.

" The state of America, and the new measures which the British appear to be adopting, render this expedition more than ever necessary. Deserted coasts, ruined ports, commerce checked, fortified posts whence expeditions are sent, all seem to call for our assistance both by sea and land. The smallest effort made now would have more effect on the people, than a great diversion at a more distant period; but, besides the gratitude of the Americans, and particularly of the oppressed States, a body of troops would insure us a great superiority on that continent. In short, Sir, without entering into too tedious details, you know that my opinions on this point have never varied; and my knowledge of this country convinces me, that such an expedition, if well conducted, would not only succeed in America, but would be of very essential service to our own country.

" Besides the advantage of gaining the affection of the Americans, and that of concluding a good peace, France should seek to curtail the means of approaching vengeance. On this account it is extremely important to take Halifax; but, as we should require foreign aid, this enterprise must be preceded by services rendered to different parts of the continent; we should then receive assistance, and, under pretence of invading Canada, we would endeavor



our to seize Halifax, the magazine and bulwark of the British navy in the new world.

"Well aware that a proposition on a large scale would not be acceded to, I will diminish as much as possible the necessary number of troops. I will say four thousand men, a thousand of them to be grenadiers and chasseurs; to whom I will add two hundred dragoons and one hundred hussars, with the requisite artillery. The infantry should be divided into full battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels. If commissions of higher rank should be desired for the older officers, you are aware that the minister of marine has it in his power to bestow such, as, when the expedition returns to Europe, will have no value in the land service. We want officers who can deny themselves, live frugally, abstain from all airs, especially a quick, peremptory manner, and who can relinquish for a year the pleasures of Paris. Consequently we ought to have few colonels and courtiers, whose habits are in no respect American.

"I would ask then for four thousand three hundred men; and, as I am not writing to the ministry, allow me, for greater ease in speaking, to suppose myself for a moment the commander of this detachment. You are sufficiently acquainted with my principles to know, that I shall not court the choice of the King. Although I have commanded with some success a larger body of troops, and I frankly confess I feel myself capable of leading them, yet my intention is not to put forth my claims; but to answer for the actions of a stranger would be a folly, and as, setting talents aside, it is on the political conduct of the leader, the confidence of the people and of the American army, that half the success must depend, I am obliged reluctantly to set forth a character that I know, in order to establish my reasonings upon some basis.

"Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have been much harassed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix. Troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports between L'Orient and the Channel would furnish transport vessels. I hear that you have at L'Orient three vessels of the India Company, of forty guns and eight hundred tons. These caracks, if I recollect rightly, are fifty-gun ships of nine hundred and sixty tons burthen. A small number of vessels would be sufficient. They might soon be got ready, and their force would diminish the required escort. As for frigates, you will find in readiness, at L'Orient, the Alliance, the Pallas, and others.



However, if you are determined to employ the vessels, which are fitted out, in the expedition against England, it would be necessary to take ours from St. Malo in preference. L'Orient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have moreover guns of large calibre, which may be of use either in battle or in silencing batteries on shore. Besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the dragoons with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details, which I would give, if the project was decided upon, but which it would be superfluous to mention here. After the experience of Count d'Estaing, who found himself straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight months' provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort, that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers, three frigates, and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities. His character, his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen; but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess me strongly in his favor.

"Being then at the Island of Aix with our detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next question is how to act; and our movements must depend entirely on circumstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the 1st of September; and, by the second, to remain here until the last of January. Virginia and Carolina would be the scene of our operations during the months of December and January, and we should pass the remainder of the winter at Boston. I greatly prefer this project to waiting until the last of January. It might, however, be possible to sail in October. This even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January; but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy's fleet is to be reinforced; and, as we are assured that four or five weeks' preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops, there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn, and even for the month of September.

"The advantages of commencing our operations in that month would be, first, to deprive the enemy of Rhode Island, secure to ourselves till spring a fine Island and harbour, and have it in our

power to open the campaign when we please. Secondly, to establish our superiority in America before the winter negotiations. Thirdly, if peace should be desired, to place an important post in our side of the balance. Fourthly, in case the enemy should have extended their forces over any one of the States, to drive them away with the more ease, as we should take them by surprise.

"A few days before our departure, and not sooner, (to prevent the consequences of any indiscretion) three corvettes should be despatched to America, with letters to M. de la Luzerne, to Congress, and to General Washington. We might write, that the King, desiring to serve his allies, and agreeably to the requests of Dr. Franklin, intends sending some vessels to America, and with them a body of land forces, and that, if Congress is in want of their assistance, they will willingly lend their aid to General Washington; but otherwise they will proceed to the Islands. This form will be perfectly appropriate. On my part, I would write, in my capacity of an American officer, more detailed letters to Congress and to General Washington. To the latter I would say confidentially, that we have almost a *carte blanche*, and unfold my plans and request him to make the necessary preparations. It should be reported at our departure, that we are destined as a garrison to one of the Antilles while the troops of those Islands act on the offensive, and that in the summer we shall be ordered to attempt a revolution in Canada.

"The squadron, sailing before the 10th of September, would arrive at Sandy Hook, off the coast of Jersey, early in November, one of the finest months of the year in independent America. Our fleet would then seem to threaten New York, and we should find on our arrival pilots for different destinations, and the necessary signals and countersigns. To deceive the enemy, pilots might be assembled from several ports under pretence of sending them to the Islands at the request of the French. This business, as well as the preparations and signals, might be entrusted to a lieutenant-colonel of the royal corps of engineers, an officer of great merit, and the head of the American corps of engineers, who, under cover of working at the fortifications of the Delaware, might remain near Sandy Hook. If Rhode Island should be the proper point of attack, of which I have no doubt, we would steer southward towards evening, and, putting about during the night, land at Block Island and lay siege to Newport.

"There are some Continental troops at Providence, who might reach Bristol in a day. There are militia at Tiverton, who might



also be mustered. Greenwich, having also a body of troops, must have flat-bottomed boats; those at Sledge Ferry would be sent down. All these we should find on the spot. To escape the inconveniences experienced the past year, the naval commander should send without a moment's delay two frigates to occupy the eastern channel, and force the middle one, a thing of trifling danger. The vessels found there should be destroyed; and, as the enemy usually leave at Connanicut Island a body of from six to fifteen hundred men, we might easily seize it, and make our land rendezvous there. If the wind should be favorable, the vessels might return the same night, or the rest of the squadron might join them. All these manœuvres, however, will depend on circumstances. Thus much is certain, that the same wind which brings us to land, will enable us to make ourselves masters of the eastern channel, so as to assist the Americans at Bristol and Tiverton, and, if possible, to secure the middle channel. At all events, however, it is easy to effect a landing in the manner I describe. The frigates, or vessels necessary to protect the landing, either real or pretended, of the Americans, should anchor in these channels. The enemy would then be obliged either to disperse among the forts, and thereby to weaken their lines, or else to leave the field open to the Americans, who, by a diversion upon the lines, would force the enemy to keep them fully manned, and prevent their attending to their rear.

"Newport is strongly fortified on the side towards the land, but all the shore, that lies behind the town, offers good facilities for landing. It is, besides, too extensive to admit of being defended by batteries. There the French troops might easily disembark, and reaching at day-break the heights, which command the town and the enemy's lines, might seize their out-works, and storm all before them, protected, if necessary, by the fire of the ships. The enemy, scattered and confounded by these false attacks on both sides of the Island, would suppose that the system of the past year was re-adopted. The bolder this manœuvre appears, the more confident we may be of its success.

"You are aware, moreover, that in war all depends on the moment. The details of the attack would be quickly decided on the spot. I need only say here, that my thorough knowledge of the Island leads me to think, that, with the abovementioned number of troops, and a very slender coöperation on the part of the Americans, I might pledge myself to gain possession of the Island in a few days.



"It is necessary, however, to consider all the unfortunate contingencies that may occur. If the expedition to Rhode Island should be prevented, or if it should not succeed, and if nothing could be attempted at New York, we might then proceed on our expeditions against Virginia, or Georgia and Carolina, and winter afterwards at Boston; leaving Rhode Island to the next season, as proposed in our plan of sailing in the month of October.

"As soon as we are in possession of the Island, we must write to the State of Rhode Island, offering to resign the place to the national troops. Unless the State should prefer waiting for the opinion of General Washington, our offer would be accepted, and we should be invited to establish ourselves there during the winter. The batteries upon Goat Island, Brenton's Point, and Conanicut Island, would render the passage of the harbour the more secure to us, particularly with the aid of our vessels, as the British are not strong enough to attack us there, and would never attempt it in an unfavorable season. We should be supported by the country; and, although it is said to be difficult to procure provisions, I should endeavour to preserve our naval stores, and should obtain more resources than the American army itself.

"The same letter, that announces to Congress our success in Rhode Island, of which as far as calculations may be relied on there is little doubt, should also mention our proposed voyage to the West Indies, and inquire whether our assistance is further needed. Their reply would open to us new fields of service, and with their consent we would leave the sick in a hospital at Greenwich, and the batteries manned by the militia, and proceed to Virginia. It might be hoped, without presumption, that James River Point, if still occupied, would yield to the united efforts of our troops and those of the Virginians. The Bay of Chesapeake would then be free, and that State might bend its whole force against its western frontiers.

"If the capture of the Bermudas, or some expedition of the kind, should be considered necessary, the rest of the winter might be employed in carrying it into effect.

"It is impossible to estimate here the posts, which the British occupy in America. Georgia and Carolina appear to need our assistance, and the precise operations upon Rhode Island must be decided on the spot; but, to give a general idea, it is sufficient to say, that the months of December and January should be employed at the south. As the English are obliged to station some of their vessels, frigates, merchant ships, or transports in each of their ports, they would amount in the whole to a considerable loss.

"In the month of February we would return to Newport, where we might employ ourselves in interchanges with New York; and the French sailors, exchanged for soldiers, might be sent under a flag of truce to M. d'Orvilliers. Political interests might be treated of with Congress, and the commander of the detachment go to Philadelphia to make arrangements with the minister plenipotentiary for the next campaign, and to lay some proposals before Congress and General Washington. I should propose sending for deputies from the different savage nations, making them presents, endeavouring to gain them over from the side of the English, and to revive in their hearts that ancient love of the French nation, which at some future day it may be important for us to possess.

"It is needless to say here, that if we should wait until the month of October, the season would be too far advanced to think of Rhode Island, but the southern operations would be equally practicable, and their success more certain as we should take the enemy by surprise.

"In that case, instead of proceeding to Newport, we should winter at Boston, where we should be well received and provided with every accommodation. We could open the campaign when we pleased, and might make preparations beforehand for a great expedition against Rhode Island, procuring at the same time through the inhabitants of the ports north of Boston, and especially that of Marblehead, all the information they may have acquired about Halifax.

"But let us suppose ourselves established at Newport. The campaign opens by the close of April, and the British commander will be in no haste to quit New York. The fear of leaving himself unprotected on our side will prevent his executing any designs against the forts on the North River. It may even be in our power to assist General Washington in making an attack on New York. Count d'Estaing, before his departure, thought that he had discovered the possibility of a passage through the Sound. This question I leave to naval officers; but, without being one myself, I know that Long Island might be captured, the troops driven off, and, whilst General Washington made a diversion on his side, batteries might be erected that would greatly annoy the garrison of New York.

"At all events, preparations should be made to act against Halifax in the month of June. With the claims, which the other expedition would give us, I will pledge myself that we should be assisted in this by the Americans. I could find at Boston and in



the northern ports trustworthy persons, who would go to Halifax for us and procure all the necessary information. The town of Marblehead in particular would furnish us with excellent pilots. The inhabitants of the north, New Hampshire and Casco Bay, should be assembled under the command of their General Stark, who gained the victory of Bennington, ready to march, if circumstances required it, by the route of Annapolis. This country is said to be inhabited by subjects ill affected towards the British government. The last time I was in Boston, I saw there a respectable man, a member of the council in Nova Scotia, who had secretly entered into the service of General Gates, and who assured us of the favorable disposition of a part of the inhabitants. Some of them have entered into a correspondence with the Americans, and have given assurances, that they will form a party in our favor.

“With regard to ourselves, I suppose that we sail the 1st of June and that we are accompanied by some Continental frigates, and such private vessels as might be collected in Boston. Congress would undoubtedly furnish us with as many troops, as we should require; and those very brigades, which lately belonged to my division, and whose sole object at present is to keep the enemy at Rhodé Island in check, having no longer any employment, would be able to join us without impairing the main army. They would come the more willingly, as the greater part of the regiments, belonging to the northern part of New England, would be averse to crossing the Hudson River, and would prefer a service more advantageous to their own country. General Gates, who is popular in New England, and perfectly acquainted with Halifax, has often proposed to me to make an expedition in concert against that town, with French and American troops combined. We should find at Boston cannon and mortars. Others, if necessary, might be sent from Springfield; and the corps of American artillery is tolerably good.

“The enemy would suspect our designs the less, as their ideas run wholly upon an invasion of Canada. The movements of the militia in the north would be considered as a plan for uniting with us at Sorel, near the River St. Francis, as we ascended the St. Lawrence. This opinion, which, with a little address, might be strengthened, would awaken apprehensions and excite disturbances at Quebec. In the present harassed state of the English, I doubt if they will leave in port any vessels capable of joining the squadron; and if a vessel of war should by chance be at Halifax, ready for sea, they would probably despatch it to the threatened colony.



"I have never seen the town of Halifax, but those persons, who, before the war, were in the English service, and had spent most of the time in garrison, inform me, that the great point is to force to the right and left the passage of George's Island, and that a landing might be effected without difficulty, either on the side towards the eastern battery in order to seize that battery and Fort Sackville, or, which appears to be a shorter way, on the side towards the town. The northern suburb, where the magazines are, is but slightly defended. The basin, where vessels are repaired, might also be secured. Several officers worthy of confidence have assured me, that Halifax is built in the form of an amphitheatre; that all the houses might be cannonaded by the vessels, that had forced the passage; and in that case the town would compel the garrison to surrender. As the troops might destroy all the works on the shore, and the vessels of war easily carry the batteries on the Islands, I am well persuaded, and the accounts of all who have been there convince me still more, that Halifax would be unable to withstand the united efforts of our forces and those of the Americans. I have not made any allowance for the diversion in the north, of which, however, I feel certain, and which, if the troops should not go to Annapolis, would at least compel a part of the British garrison, and such of the inhabitants as adhered to the royal party, to remain in the fort.

"The idea of a révolution in Canada is gratifying to all good Frenchmen; and if political considerations condemn it, you will perceive, that this is to be done only by suppressing every impulse of feeling. The advantages and disadvantages of this scheme demand a full discussion, into which I will not at present enter. Is it better to leave in the neighbourhood of the Americans an English colony, the constant source of fear and jealousy, or to free our oppressed brethren, recover the fur trade, our intercourse with the Indians, and all the profits of our ancient establishments without the expenses and losses formerly attending them? Shall we throw into the balance of the new world a fourteenth state, which would be always attached to us, and which by its situation would give us a superiority in the troubles, that may at some future day agitate America? Opinions are very much divided on this topic. I know yours, and my own is not unknown to you. I do not therefore dwell on it, and consider it in no other light than as a means of deceiving and embarrassing the enemy. If, however, it should at any time be brought under consideration, it would be necessary to prepare the people beforehand; and the knowledge, which I was obliged to obtain, when a whole army was about to enter that country, has enabled me to form some idea of the means of succeeding there.

"But to return to Nova Scotia. Part of the American troops, who will accompany us, and such of the inhabitants as take up arms in our favor, might be left there as a garrison. It would be easy to destroy or take possession of the English establishments on the Banks of Newfoundland, and after this movement we should direct our course according to circumstances. Supposing that we could return to Boston or Rhode Island, during the month of September, and that New York had not yet been taken, we might still be enabled to assist General Washington. . Otherwise St. Augustine, the Bermudas, or some other favorable point of attack might engage our attention. On the other hand, if we should be ordered home, we might reach France in three weeks or a month from the Banks of Newfoundland, and alarm the coasts of Ireland on our way.

"If the September plan, which combines all advantages, appears too near at hand; if it were decided even not to send us in October; it would be necessary to delay our departure until the end of January. In that case, as in the former, we should be preceded fifteen days only by corvettes. We should be expected at the same place and in the same manner. We should pass the month of April at the south, attack Rhode Island in May, and arrive at Halifax the last of June. But you are aware that the autumn is on many accounts the most favorable time for our departure. At all events, you will not accuse me of favoring this opinion from interested motives, as a winter in Boston or Newport is far from equivalent to one spent in Paris. Fifteen hundred or two thousand select troops, thrown into America, might aid General Washington, and enable him to act on the offensive, by supplying him with good heads to his columns, and by uniting the French with an American division for combined operations. This plan would be of some use, but it appeared to me, that you wished for one offering results of greater importance.

"These views, in obedience to your request, I have the honor to submit to your judgment. I do not affect to give to them the form of a regular plan, but you will weigh the different schemes according to circumstances. I trust that you will receive these remarks with the greater indulgence, as my American papers, those respecting Halifax excepted, are at Paris, and consequently almost all my references are made from memory. Besides, I did not wish to annoy you with details too long for a letter; and if you are desirous to converse more freely on the subject, the impossibility of leaving the port of Havre at present will allow me time to spend three days at Versailles.



"I am thoroughly convinced, and I cannot without violating my conscience forbear repeating, that it is highly important for us to send a body of troops to America. If the United States should object to it, I think it is our duty to remove the objections, and even to suggest reasons for it; but on this head you will be anticipated, and Dr. Franklin is only waiting a favorable moment to make his propositions. Even if the operations of the present campaign with the efforts of Count d'Estaing, or some other fortunate accidents, should have given affairs a favorable turn, there will still be a sufficient field for us; and a single one of the proposed advantages would repay the trouble of sending the detachment.

"A very important point, and one on which I feel obliged to lay the greatest stress, is the necessity of perfect and inviolable secrecy. It is unnecessary to trust any person; and even the men, who are most actively employed in fitting out the detachment and the vessels, need not be informed of the precise intentions of government. At furthest, the secret should be confided to the naval commander, and to the leader of the land forces, and not even to them before the last moment.

"It will certainly be said, that the French will be coldly received in that country, and regarded with a jealous eye in their army. I cannot deny, that the Americans are difficult to be dealt with, especially by Frenchmen; but if I were intrusted with the business, or if the commander chosen by the King acts with tolerable judgment, I would pledge my life, that all difficulties would be avoided, and that the French troops would be cordially received.

"There is an excellent officer, who would give entire satisfaction here, but who, from my intimate acquaintance with our allies, I should be sorry to have sent among them. There are many, however, who I am certain would succeed perfectly. A knowledge of the language would be an immense advantage. Unhappily there are few flag officers, the Duke d'Ayen excepted, who can speak it.

"You will bear in mind that I am not writing to the minister of the King. For my own part, you know my sentiments, and you would never doubt, that my first interest is to serve my country. I hope, for the sake of the public good, that you will send troops to America. I shall be considered too young, I presume, to take the command, but I shall surely be employed. If, in the arrangement of the plan, any one to whom my sentiments are less known than to yourself, in proposing for me either the command or some inferior commission, should assign as a reason, that I should thereby be induced to serve my country with more zeal, either in council or in



action, I take the liberty (setting aside the minister of the King) to request M. de Vergennes to come forward as my friend, and to refuse in my name favors bestowed from motives so inconsistent with my character. I have the honor to be, &c.

"LAFAYETTE."

LAFAYETTE TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

"Havre, 30 July, 1779.

"SIR,

"I have received the letter, which you have had the goodness to write to me, and in which you promise me another after having read to M. de Maurepas the paper which I addressed to you. It is showing me a great favor to employ in answering me a part of your time, which is so precious; and I remain in eager expectation of your second letter. Being convinced that there is no time to lose in adopting the measures which I propose, my love for my country makes me feel an impatience, which I fear may pass for importunity; but you will excuse a fault arising from a feeling, which is dear to every good citizen.

"The Prince de Montbarrey will give you, with regard to Havre, all the information which you may desire. You are certainly right in thinking, that my blood is in a fermentation. We hear nothing of M. d'Orvilliers. Some say that he has gone to the Azores, to intercept the West India fleet, and to join M. d'Estaing, who was to return here, as I was informed by yourself or M. de Sartine; others affirm that he has gone to America.

"The latter do not bring me over to their opinion; and it is very probable that, if our fleet had been sent as they suppose, I should not now be in Normandy. Be that as it may, you know, I hope, that any arrangement and any station will satisfy me, and that I do not claim promotion, or assistance, or any mark of favor whatsoever. If M. d'Orvilliers or a detachment is now in the independent States of America, and my presence there can be in any way more serviceable than here, I shall be very willing to go over in an American frigate, which I will take on my own authority; and, with the very natural pretext of rejoining the army in which I served, I will go and endeavour to use my influence for the advantage of my country. Several persons say, also, that Spanish dollars have been sent to the Americans; I earnestly hope it is so, as my last advices show the necessity of them.

"If the project, for want of sufficient means, should not be adopted this year, I deem it my duty to submit to you a proposition, which would in a great measure accomplish the same object.

“While waiting until next year to commence combined operations with a squadron, why might you not send to Boston three thousand, or even two thousand men, with three hundred dragoons, who should be joined in the spring by ships of war, and a reinforcement of land troops? This detachment could be sent by two fifty-gun ships, using one of the India Company's ships for a transport, or Spanish vessels if you prefer them. To avoid expense, let them sail in company with the ships destined for the West Indies, with the escort of the merchantmen, with the *Bon Homme Richard* and all the frigates at L'Orient. These land troops would be left in America until the next campaign; and I will now mention what would be the result of such a measure, it being well understood that the convoy would proceed to the West Indies, or to any other destination, after having landed the detachment.

“First, we should raise by our presence the value of their paper money, an important point for French commerce. Secondly, we should be at hand to obtain information, and might take such preliminary steps as would conduce eventually to our obtaining possession of Halifax. Thirdly, such a detachment would inspire the American army with new vigor, would powerfully support an attack for retaking the forts on the North River, and would lead the Americans to such undertakings, as circumstances might render advisable.

“You have told me to give you all my ideas. It is my duty to submit to you this last one, which, as it seems to me, is not liable to any objection. At first I was afraid of expressing my opinion so strongly as I was inclined to do, lest I should be suspected of peculiar motives and predilections; but, now that people must know me better, and that you have my entire confidence, I speak more freely, and I solemnly affirm upon my honor, that if half my fortune was spent in sending succours of troops to the Americans, I should believe that in so doing I rendered to my country a service more important than this sacrifice.

“You will say, perhaps, that it will be difficult to find subsistence for the troops during the winter; but by paying in specie we should obtain provisions very cheap, and the additional number of mouths would be very small in comparison to the population of the country. Permit me, Sir, to offer you the assurance of my attachment.

“LAFAYETTE.”



LAFAYETTE TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

"Paris, 9 January, 1780.

"SIR,

"You were too busy yesterday for me to communicate to you the answer of M. de Montbarrey to the request for powder and guns, which I had taken it upon me to make. I spoke in my own name, and the advice which I took the liberty of giving was not ill received. M. de Montbarrey told me, that he would speak to you about it. He promised me an early answer; and, as you favor my request, I hope that we shall soon obtain the powder and the fifteen thousand complete sets of accoutrements, which we would add to the clothes bought with the King's money. You are conferring a great obligation upon America, and affording her great additional means of contributing to the advancement of the common cause. Every citizen must be strongly interested in the fate of our Islands, and must fear the effects, which would follow if an expedition should go out from New York. It is enough to know that country, whose independence is so important to the honor and safety of France, to desire that it may not be forgotten in the plan of the campaign, and to regret the loss of the time, which might be employed in giving it assistance. But these extensive operations are beyond my sphere. I shall merely ask for my guns, and assure you of the strong affection and respect with which I have the honor to be, &c.

"LAFAYETTE."

Not content with soliciting for a detachment of French troops to act in America, Lafayette requested large supplies of clothing, guns, and ammunition for the American army itself; and they were promised, although by some bad management afterwards they were not sent, or at least only in part. Such was the importunity of Lafayette, and the disinterested enthusiasm with which he represented the wants and claims of his republican friends, that the old Count de Maurepas, who was then prime minister, said one day in the Council, "It is fortunate for the King, that Lafayette does not take it into his head to strip Versailles of its furniture, to send to his dear Americans; as his Majesty would be unable to refuse it." In addition to his requests from the government, he purchased on his own account and brought to America a quantity of swords and military equipage, which he presented to the officers of the Light Infantry, whom he commanded during the campaign.

It was at length decided, that the command of the detachment should be given to Count de Rochambeau, and that Lafayette should command an American division, according to his own plan. The



instructions were drawn up in concert with him, and the three most essential points were yielded in conformity to his express recommendation and advice, namely, that the French army while in America should be subject to the orders of General Washington; that, when united, the American troops should be entitled to the right wing; and that American officers should command the French of equal rank. This arrangement Lafayette conceived to afford the only secure basis of harmony; and, considering the risk he took in pressing the expedition to an issue, he insisted on its being adopted as fundamental.

## INSTRUCTIONS TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

“Versailles, 1 March, 1780.

“His Majesty, having determined to send a considerable body of troops to America, to the assistance of his allies, the United States, has appointed Count de Rochambeau, one of his lieutenant-generals, to the chief command of the twelve battalions of infantry, which are to be commanded under his orders by four major-generals. This corps, which his Majesty has furnished with its proper complement of artillery for sieges and service in the field, is to be in readiness to start from Brest in the first days of April, under the escort of a squadron of six ships of the line, commanded by the *Chevalier de Ternay*.

“In sending such considerable succours to coöperate with General Washington, Commander-in-chief of the troops of the Congress of the United States of North America, in the military operations which he may determine upon, the intentions of his Majesty are;

“*Article I.*—That the general, to whom his Majesty intrusts the command of his troops, should always and in all cases be under the command of General Washington.

“*Article II.*—That all projects and plans for the campaign or for private expeditions should be decided upon by the American general, keeping in view that harmony which his Majesty hopes to see between the two Commanders-in-chief, and the generals and soldiers of the two nations.

“*Article III.*—The French troops, being only auxiliaries, should on this account, as was done in Germany in the campaign of 1757, yield precedence and the right to the American troops; and this decision is to hold good in all general or particular cases which may occur. The French general, who took part in the campaign mentioned as an example, and who moreover is perfectly well ac-

quainted with military rules, will give the greatest attention to maintain this arrangement, and to have it observed in its full extent. He will take care to give previous information of it to the general officers and the troops under his command, in order to avoid any difficulty that might disturb the good understanding, which his Majesty hopes to see prevail between the two armies united under the command of General Washington.

*"Article IV.*—In consequence of the above article, the American officers with equal rank and the same date of commission shall have the command, and in all cases the American troops shall take the right. In all military acts and capitulations the American general and troops shall be named first and will sign first, as has always been the custom, and in accordance with the principles above laid down with regard to auxiliary troops.

*"Article V.*—It is his Majesty's expectation and very positive order to Count de Rochambeau, that he will see to the exact and literal execution of the above four articles.

*"Article VI.*—The corps of French troops will retain in all cases, as has always been the custom, full jurisdiction and right of trial over every individual belonging to it. The decision of his Majesty upon a question of this nature, which arose at Brest concerning the Spanish troops, is to serve for a precedent in this matter, according to the laws of nations.

*"Article VII.*—His Majesty, having provided for all the wants of the troops who may be sent from Europe, expects that, as Congress and General Washington have been previously informed of the intended succours, and of the number of troops his Majesty has determined to send to North America, and the Marquis de Lafayette having been especially charged to give them notice of it, and also of the moment of their arrival, the strictest orders will have been issued for furnishing the necessary provisions and refreshments of all kinds, and the horses required for transporting the French artillery, and that these supplies will be at hand, wherever circumstances may render it advisable for the French troops to land. As his Majesty sends with the Marquis de Lafayette a commissary of war, who is in future to be employed for these troops, he hopes that every precaution will be taken in concert with this commissary to furnish provisions, hospitals, and whatever else may be needed by the French troops. This article is of the highest importance, and his Majesty trusts that Congress and General Washington will feel its indispensable necessity.

*"Article VIII.*—His Majesty confides to the prudence of Count

de Rochambeau, to his zeal and military talents, and above all to his firmness, the care of maintaining among the French troops under his command the most severe and exact discipline in all respects; above all it is enjoined upon him to promote by all possible means the greatest harmony and good understanding between the French and the American troops, and all the inhabitants who are either subjects or allies of the Congress of the United States of North America.

"Although it is left entirely to General Washington to dispose as he pleases of the auxiliary troops sent to America, his Majesty would desire that, in case the French division should not be immediately united with General Washington, and should be detached for any expedition with an American corps, the two French and American general officers might be independent of each other, whatever their rank, and act in concert without either giving or receiving orders.

"PRINCE DE MONTBARREY."

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS.

"Article I. — His Majesty desires and orders Count de Rochambeau to retain, as far as circumstances will permit, the French troops intrusted to his command collected together in one corps, and to represent on a proper occasion to General Washington, Commander-in-chief of the troops of Congress, under whose orders the French troops are to serve, that it is the King's intention that the French troops should not be dispersed, but that they should always act in a body and under French generals, except in the case of temporary detachments, which are to rejoin the principal corps in a few days.

"Article II. — His Majesty intends that the corps of French troops, sent to the assistance of the Congress of the United States of North America, should keep its own guards, and should perform all the service having in view its security in the camps, cantonments, or quarters, which it may occupy."

As soon as the plan was thoroughly matured, the preparations nearly completed, and the above instructions signed by the minister, it was determined that Lafayette should depart without delay for America, and explain every point to General Washington, that all things might be in readiness for the arrival and action of the French troops.



## INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

"Versailles, 5 March, 1780.

"The Marquis de Lafayette, on arriving in America, is to proceed immediately to join General Washington, and communicate to him the secret, that the King, willing to give the United States a new proof of his affection and of his interest in their security, is resolved to send to their aid at the opening of spring six vessels of the line, and six thousand regular troops of infantry. The convoy has orders to land the troops in Rhode Island, where they may be at hand to join General Washington's army, if he shall think it necessary; but as it is possible the English, after having voluntarily evacuated Rhode Island, may return, it is necessary, to prevent the French squadron from falling into any surprise, that the Marquis de Lafayette should request General Washington to send to Rhode Island, and even to Block Island, if the inhabitants can be confided in, some of the French officers, who are with him, each one of whom must be the bearer of a letter from him, that the French squadron may freely and safely enter the port.

"These officers should be charged to keep a most vigilant watch, and should have always at hand several light boats and skilful pilots, ready to set off the moment the French convoy shall appear in sight; but, as the weather or other circumstances may not permit these officers to go immediately on board, if the entrance of Rhode Island should be free and open, they shall hoist on Block Island, and on Point Judith and Seakonnet, the French flag; and, on the contrary, if the enemy shall have retaken possession of the Island, the American flag shall be hoisted, which will be a signal to the French commander to bear away from the port. Should no French officer arrive with a letter from General Lafayette, giving instructions as to the probability of a debarkation, and should no signals appear, the French squadron with its convoy will go into Boston harbour, and wait advices from General Washington.

"To prevent any surprise, in regard to the destination of the French officers, who are to be sent by the Marquis de Lafayette, and also to guard against any accident by which these officers may be replaced by suspicious persons, the words of *reconnaissance* shall be *St. Louis et Philadelphia*.

"Should the winds force the squadron to the south, it ought to proceed to the Capes of Virginia. Let an intelligent officer be stationed at Cape Henry, with orders to join the squadron, who

shall be well instructed in the state of American affairs, and particularly in regard to the possibility of debarking at Rhode Island. The same signals in case of the affirmative, are to be exhibited at Cape Henry as at Rhode Island. The words of *reconnaissance* shall be *Marie et Boston*. If General Washington thinks the French troops can be more usefully employed at the south, this officer will bring orders accordingly. He will be the bearer of instructions in detail respecting the place for debarking with safety, where in any case the squadron and transports would be protected, and where provisions can be obtained in sufficient abundance and horses for transporting the baggage and artillery.

"The French troops shall be simply auxiliaries, and with this title they shall act only under the orders of General Washington. The French general shall receive the orders of the American Commander-in-chief in all things, except what pertains to the internal management of his own troops, which ought to be regulated according to the laws of their own country. It shall be the duty of the naval commander to second by every means in his power all the operations to which his aid shall be called.

"As the operations must depend on circumstances and local possibilities, we forbear to give any instructions on the subject. It must be left to General Washington and his council of war to decide what shall be the most useful. All the King desires is, that the troops, whom he sends to the aid of his allies, may coöperate in the most effectual manner to relieve them from the oppression of their enemies. His Majesty expects, that, by a reciprocation of the regards which friends ought to show to each other, General Washington and his officers will afford as many conveniences to the French officers and troops, as shall be compatible with the good of the service. It will be indispensable, that General Washington should take means to render easy the procuring of subsistence for the French troops. Their wants should also be supplied at a reasonable price.

"The above arrangements being made with the American Commander-in-chief, the Marquis de Lafayette shall proceed to Congress, having first ascertained from General Washington how far it will be expedient to open to Congress the secret of our measures. When arrived in Philadelphia, he shall first see M. de la Luzerne, show him his instructions, communicate all that has passed between him and General Washington, and take no further steps except in concert with the French minister, by whose advice he must be influenced. His Majesty, who has an esteem for his



minister, desires him to have a part in all arrangements respecting America. In case the operations by land should not require the concert of the squadron, it will be free to cruise at such a distance from the coasts as the commandant shall think best for doing most harm to the enemy. But special orders will be given that it shall not go far, and that it shall take no part except with the advice of the commander on land.

“VERGENNES.”

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

“Although no instructions have been given to the Marquis de Lafayette, respecting the future operations of the French army, yet the Count de Vergennes recommends the following to the consideration of General Washington.

“It seems proper, that the offensive operations of the United States should be directed with a view to the accomplishment of two political objects. The one is, to drive the enemy as far as possible from their frontiers, that they may no longer be surrounded as they now are, while Florida, the Mississippi region, Canada, and Nova Scotia are occupied by British forces. The other, to induce Spain to take an interest in their cause, and to form an alliance with them, which can only be done by furthering the views of that country in the following respects. Spain has probably an eye upon the Floridas, which formerly belonged to her; and it would be very much more for the interest of America, that those provinces should return under the dominion of their old masters, rather than remain in the hands of the English. In that case, the United States, on one side at least, would be freed from the neighbourhood of the English, and could easily, in case of need, receive assistance which it would be impossible to give them more directly. Be this as it may, it is for the interest of Spain, whatever views she may have upon Florida, that the English may not feel sufficiently strong in the south to make any attempt upon their possessions.

“Among the different modes which present themselves for effecting these two salutary objects, there occur two which shall be summarily stated.

“First, all or a part of the auxiliary troops may be sent to Georgia or Carolina. Many difficulties present themselves in the way of this project, which can only be solved on the spot; such as the force of the English in those parts, which ought to be considerable, if all the troops debarked at New York at the end of last year have



been transported thither; the want of a port sufficient to receive the French squadron and transports, and shelter them from tempests and the enemy; the difficulty of entrepôts, communications, and subsistence for the army, which will be necessarily in want of every convenience for penetrating into the country; and many other obstacles, which cannot be detailed nor foreseen, except in the places themselves.

"Secondly, a mode which might not be less decisive, might be to cause a diversion of the British troops at the south by an attack on New York, and by compelling the enemy to recall many of their troops, and to assume the state of defensive instead of the offensive.\*

"The well-known humanity of General Washington, and the esteem in which he is held in Europe, as well as in America, render us confident, that there is no need of especially recommending to his care the preservation of a body of brave men, sent from more than a thousand leagues to the assistance of his country. While ready to risk every thing for the safety of America, they ought not to be sacrificed rashly or on slight occasions."

A copy of the instructions to the Marquis de Lafayette was sent to M. de la Luzerne, with directions, that, in case the frigate in which Lafayette sailed should be taken by the enemy, or any other accident should prevent its arriving in America, M. de la Luzerne should proceed to General Washington's head-quarters, and pursue the same steps as were indicated to Lafayette. He was enjoined to communicate the substance of these instructions to no person, except the President of Congress, and not even to him if there was the least doubt of his discretion. Count de Vergennes considered it extremely important, that the destination of the squadron should be kept secret till it should arrive in the American seas.

#### ORDER TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

"Versailles, 20 March, 1780.

"It is the King's intention, that the troops under the command of the Count de Rochambeau, with the equipment of field and siege artillery and all the necessary supplies for the wants of the French troops about to be sent over to America, should be all in readiness

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\* Count de Vergennes next goes into a minute plan of an attack upon New York, with the combined French and American forces; and ends by saying, that every thing must be left to the sagacity and intelligence of the American officers, who are acquainted with the localities and circumstances. As the plan was never acted upon, it is here omitted.

to embark, the instant that the squadron, which is to escort the troops and the transports in which they are to be conveyed, can be got ready for the voyage.

"But, in case the navy department should be unable to collect immediately and for the intended time of sailing the requisite number of transports, or if the wind or other circumstances should render it advisable to despatch a part of the squadron and of the transports which may be ready, for fear of delaying the operation too long by waiting till all the ships are collected, his Majesty authorizes Count de Rochambeau to make a division of the troops and supplies intended for this expedition, in order to facilitate the departure of the first part, of which he will himself take command, and which will be composed, according to his selection, of whatever he thinks necessary, as far as he can find room on board his transports. His Majesty expects that Count de Rochambeau will leave the command of the second division with the Baron de Viomenil, with orders to rejoin the first as soon as possible. His Majesty moreover confides to the wisdom, the prudence, and the intelligence of Count de Rochambeau and the Baron de Viomenil the execution of the details of this operation, whether to be performed at once, or by two divisions.

"PRINCE DE MONTBARREY."

There was a change in the arrangement here proposed respecting the commanders. Count de Rochambeau retained the Baron de Viomenil with him in the first division, and left in his stead the Count de Wittgenstein to command the second.

The general and admiral made strong representations to the ministers against dividing the force; but so many obstacles interposed to prevent a sufficient number of transports from assembling at Brest to convey the whole, that positive orders were sent from the King's council, directing the troops to be separated into two divisions, and the first division to depart as soon as possible. The fleet put to sea on the 2d of May, having been detained several days in the harbour by contrary winds; and it arrived at Newport on the 10th of July.

The Marquis de Lafayette had sailed in the French frigate *Hermione*, on the 19th of March, from the Isle of Aix, near Rochelle, and he arrived in Boston after a passage of thirty-eight days. He hastened to Washington's head-quarters, and thence to Philadelphia. His first letter to Count de Vergennes, after landing at Boston, giving a full account of his voyage, was thrown overboard to prevent its being taken by the enemy. He next wrote as follows.

## LAFAYETTE TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

*Watertown, May 2d.* — “I do not know whether the reception, which I have met with since my arrival, and the innumerable marks of kindness with which the American people have condescended to load me, have served to increase my enthusiasm; but I tell you the exact truth, when I assure you, that I have been most highly gratified with the public sentiment in regard to all the circumstances of the French alliance; a fact which may be interesting to you. The British are apprized, it is said, of the approach of a French squadron with troops. I know not what is thought of it; but every body agrees, that four ships of the line and three thousand men would produce an immense effect at this moment. I am on the road to head-quarters, and hope before twelve days to be with General Washington in Jersey.”

## LAFAYETTE TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.\*

“Philadelphia, 19 May, 1780.

“SIR,

“This letter will be handed to you by M. de Galvan, a French officer in the service of the United States, and you may receive with confidence the various accounts, which he will have the honor to give you. I have appointed him to await your arrival at Cape Henry, and you will see that my instructions to this officer are in conformity with those, which I have received from the Count de Vergennes.

“I reached Boston on the 26th of April. On the morning of the 10th of May I was at head-quarters, and, after passing four days with General Washington, I went to meet the Chevalier de la Luzerne. The military preparations and the political measures, which it was necessary for us to attend to, have delayed M. de Galvan up to the present moment. I now hasten to despatch him to his destination, and shall keep him informed of whatever news may be interesting to you, continuing to add the ideas of the general with regard to the best means of improving present circumstances.

“Immediately upon my arrival, confidential persons were sent out to procure plans and details upon the different points, which become interesting for the operations of this campaign. As to oth-

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\* With this letter was sent a copy of General Washington's letter to Lafayette, dated May 16th. It was not received by Count de Rochambeau till after his arrival at Newport.



er matters, the Chevalier de la Luzerne has had the goodness to enable me, as far as possible, to fulfil my instructions, and he has taken the first measures requisite to procure a supply of food and other necessities for the land and naval forces. Although the scarcity of all things is infinitely greater than when I left America, the precautions taken beforehand by the Chevalier de la Luzerne, and the measures we are now taking here, render it certain that the French will not be in want, either of flour or of fresh meat.

"I will now give you a summary statement of the present situation of the enemy on the continent. I shall say nothing of Canada, or Halifax, or the Penobscot, from whence we are expecting news, and which for the moment are not of essential importance. Rhode Island is in our possession; you can enter there in full security; letters, signals, and pilots will await you there, agreeably to my instructions. Your magazines, your sick, and all your unnecessary baggage can go up to Providence by water. I shall soon send to Rhode Island more particular information on this point.

"The enemy have at the present moment seven thousand men of their best troops employed at the siege of Charleston; they have also some ships of the line without the harbour, one vessel of fifty guns, two frigates of forty-four, and several smaller vessels. According to news from New York, Charleston still held out on the 3d of this month. On the Islands of New York, Long Island, and Staten Island, the forces of the enemy consist of eight thousand regular troops, a few militia upon which they place no dependence, and a small number of royalists, very contemptible in all respects. They have only one ship of seventy-four guns and some frigates. The American army is in three divisions. One guards the fort of West Point, and keeps open the communications on the North River; another is in South Carolina; and the third, which is the largest, is in the Jerseys under the immediate command of General Washington. This last division, not very numerous at present, will be increased in a few days; and for that reason I shall defer, till another letter, giving you a more exact account of its situation.

"Your voyage is known at New York. Advices were immediately sent on to Charleston, recalling either the troops or at least the ships of war. They are erecting fortifications on the Island, and preparing vessels loaded with stones to obstruct the passage. In a word, if it be true that the present divided state of the English forces seems to insure their destruction, and to promise us the conquest of New York, it is equally true that at the moment of

your arrival, if by good fortune things remain in their present state, we have no time to lose in taking advantage of these favorable circumstances.

"At the same time, that I here execute the orders of my general, and communicate to you the sentiments of my friend, permit me to assure you of the strong desire of our army to do whatever may please you, and how much we shall all endeavour to merit the friendship and the esteem of troops, whose assistance at the present moment is so essential to us. You will find amongst us a great deal of good will, a great deal of sincerity, and above all a great desire to be agreeable to you.

"I send a duplicate of this letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, and I shall send the same to Point Judith and Seakonnet, so that in case you should make land in Rhode Island you may at once sail for Sandy Hook. The next letter, which I shall have the honor to write you, will be dated at head-quarters. The confidence of General Washington, which M. de Galvan has deserved, and the means which he has of fulfilling his instructions, all assure me, that you will be satisfied with our choice. I have the honor to be, &c.

"LAFAYETTE."

The Marquis de Lafayette continued to write to Count de Rochambeau, till the arrival of the squadron at Newport. Copies of his letters were sent both to the Capes of the Chesapeake and to Rhode Island, that they might meet the Count in the shortest time, at whichever place he should first arrive. The letters contained the views of General Washington, besides the remarks of Lafayette, concerning a combined attack upon New York and other operations; and also all the intelligence that could be collected, as to the condition and movements of the enemy.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO LAFAYETTE.

"Versailles, 3 June, 1780.

"SIR,

"You will learn from the Chevalier de Ternay himself the circumstances that shall have attended his voyage. He went to sea on the 2d of May, and we have no reason to fear that any unfavorable accidents have happened to him. Admiral Graves, who appeared destined to watch and follow him, had not left Plymouth on the 20th of May, and his departure begins to be regarded as doubtful. If the British leave us at liberty on the American coasts, we may hope to accomplish some valuable object. Our land and sea officers are excellent, and have the talents and a laudable desire to distinguish themselves.



"This convoy takes out five thousand five hundred men. The want of transports has not permitted a larger number to embark, and the rest cannot be sent immediately. The English are putting to sea, and their squadron will the more easily blockade the harbour of Brest, as our forces there are small, the larger part of our vessels being at Cadiz. It is therefore probable, that the two regiments will not be sent till autumn; and perhaps only one then. We shall know by that time how the first division has been received, and whether any more are wanted. You will remember, that I at first requested only four thousand men, because I feared that a larger number might excite distrust and alarm in the United States. The advices of yourself, M. de la Luzerne, and the French officers, will enlighten us as to the future measures proper to be taken.

"What I regret most is, that the clothing, arms, and munitions of war for the American troops have not yet gone. They are all to go in the Alliance and under her convoy. It is more than a month since the whole ought to have gone to sea, as there have been no obstacles from blockade. I very much fear that these valuable cargoes will now be in danger from the enemy's vessels. I will not decide who is to be blamed for the delay, but I am afraid that the American agents are not free from reproach for negligence. On our part every thing was ready at the appointed time. I regret that I did not adhere more firmly to the plan proposed, of putting the arms and munitions under the convoy of M. de Ternay. We have no concern with the clothing.

"There is nothing new in Europe. From present prospects, the campaign will be only watched in this quarter, and if hard blows are struck, they will fall in America. Let that portion of it, where you are placed, be a brilliant theatre of action. By very great efforts alone can the United States hope to obtain a settled peace, which shall have for its basis their absolute independence. I shall learn with pleasure that your health is good, and that your friendship for me is always the same. You are aware, I flatter myself, of the sincerity of mine for you, and of the inviolable attachment with which I have the honor to be, &c.

"VERGENNES."

COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

"Newport, 16 July, 1780.

"SIR,

"Upon our arrival here the country was in consternation, the paper money had fallen to sixty for one, and even the government



takes it up at forty for one. Washington had for a long time only three thousand men under his command. The arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, and the announcement of succours from France, afforded some encouragement; but the Tories, who are very numerous, gave out that it was only a temporary assistance, like that of Count d'Estaing. In describing to you our reception at this place, we shall show you the feeling of all the inhabitants of the continent. This town is of considerable size, and contains, like the rest, both Whigs and Tories. I landed with my staff without troops; nobody appeared in the streets; those at the windows looked sad and depressed. I spoke to the principal persons of the place, and told them, as I write to General Washington, that this was merely the advanced guard of a greater force, and that the King was determined to support them with his whole power. In twenty-four hours their spirits rose, and last night all the streets, houses, and steeples were illuminated, in the midst of fire-works and the greatest rejoicings. I am now here with a single company of grenadiers, until wood and straw shall have been collected; my camp is marked out, and I hope to have the troops landed to-morrow.

"You see, Sir, how important it is to act with vigor. The Whigs are pleased, but they say that the King ought to have sent twenty thousand men and twenty ships, to drive the enemy from New York; that the country was infallibly ruined; that it is impossible to find a recruit to send to General Washington's army without giving him one hundred hard dollars to engage for six months' service, and that they beseech his Majesty to assist them with all his strength. The war will be an expensive one; we pay even for our quarters and for the land covered by the camp. I shall use all possible order and economy. I am not jealous of my authority in matters of finance, and I have appointed a council of administration composed of the general officers, the intendant, and the first commissary of war, which I shall call together every fortnight to do the King's business in the best possible manner. We shall be very secure here in winter-quarters, in barracks; the country is cold, but very healthy. We can easily obtain boards and wood from the interior. The land and naval forces here united afford each other a mutual support, and will be ready to act offensively as soon as you will enable us to do so. The harbour froze up last winter, but this has not happened before for forty years. I regard it as impossible to go for winter-quarters to the Antilles; it would be necessary to take there at once a supply of provisions, which we can only draw from day to day from the interior of the country, now that the intercourse and confidence be-

tween us and the inhabitants is increasing every day. There is also the risk of a long and troublesome passage with a convoy ; a month to land and a month to reëmbark the troops with their baggage in the spring ; and, for a decisive reason, the danger that in our absence the English will take this place, which they ought not to have abandoned.

"Send us troops, ships, and money ; but do not depend upon these people nor upon their means ; they have neither money nor credit ; their means of resistance are only momentary, and called forth when they are attacked in their own homes. They then assemble for the moment of immediate danger and defend themselves. Washington commands sometimes fifteen thousand, sometimes three thousand men. I have the honor to be, &c.

"COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU."

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GENERAL GREENE'S ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION  
AT SPRINGFIELD IN NEW JERSEY.

GENERAL GREENE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Springfield, 24 June, 1780.

SIR,

I have been too busily employed until the present moment to lay before your Excellency the transactions of yesterday.

The enemy advanced from Elizabethtown about five o'clock in the morning, said to be about five thousand infantry, with a large body of cavalry and fifteen or twenty pieces of artillery. Their march was rapid and compact. They moved in two columns, one on the main road leading to Springfield, the other on the Vauxhall road. Major Lee, with the horse and pickets, opposed the right column, and Colonel Dayton with his regiment the left, and both gave as much opposition as could have been expected from so small a force. Our troops were so extended, in order to guard the different roads leading to the several passes over the mountains, that I had scarcely time to collect them at Springfield and make the necessary dispositions, before the enemy appeared before the town ; when a cannonade commenced between their advance and our artillery posted for the defence of the bridge.

The enemy continued manœuvring in our front for upwards of two hours, which induced me to believe they were attempting to gain our flanks. My force was small, and from the direction of the roads my situation was critical. I disposed of the troops in the best manner I could, to guard our flanks, secure a retreat, and oppose the advance of their columns. Colonel Angell, with his regiment and several small detachments and one piece of artillery, was posted to secure the bridge in front of the town. Colonel Shreve's regiment was drawn up at the second bridge to cover the retreat of those posted at the first. Major Lee, with his dragoons and the pickets commanded by Captain Walker, was posted at Little's Bridge on the Vauxhall road; and Colonel Ogden was detached to support him. The remainder of General Maxwell's and General Stark's brigades were drawn up on the high grounds at the Mill. The militia were on the flanks. Those under the command of General Dickinson made a spirited attack upon one of the enemy's flanking parties, but his force was too small to push the advantage he had gained.

While the enemy were making demonstrations to their left, their right column advanced on Major Lee. The bridge was disputed with great obstinacy, and the enemy must have received very considerable injury; but, by fording the river and gaining the point of the hill, they obliged the Major with his party to give up the pass. At this instant of time their left column began the attack on Colonel Angell. The action was severe and lasted about forty minutes, when superior numbers overcame obstinate bravery, and forced our troops to retire over the second bridge. Here the enemy were warmly received by Colonel Shreve's regiment; but, as they advanced in great force with a large train of artillery, he had orders to join the brigade.

As the enemy continued to press our left on the Vauxhall road, which led directly into our rear and would have given them the most important pass, and finding our front too extensive to be effectually secured by so small a body of troops, I thought it most advisable to take post upon the first range of hills in the rear of Bryant's Tavern, where the roads are brought so near to a point that succour might readily be given from one to the other. This enabled me to detach Colonel Webb's regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Huntington, and Colonel Jackson's regiment with one piece of artillery, which entirely checked the advance of the enemy on our left and secured that pass.

Being thus advantageously posted, I was in hopes the enemy



would attempt to gain the heights, but discovered no disposition in them for attacking us ; and, seeing them begin to fire the houses in town, detachments were ordered out on every quarter to prevent their burning any buildings not immediately under the command of their cannon and musketry. In a few minutes they had set fire to almost every house in town and begun their retreat. Captain Davis, with a detachment of one hundred and twenty men in several small parties, and a large body of militia, fell upon their rear and flanks, and kept up a continual fire upon them till they entered Elizabethtown, which place they reached about sunset. Stark's brigade was immediately put in motion on the first appearance of a retreat, which was so precipitate that they were not able to overtake them.

The enemy continued at Elizabethtown Point until twelve o'clock at night, and then began to send their troops across to Staten Island. By six this morning they had totally evacuated the Point and removed their bridge. Major Lee fell in with their rear-guard ; but they were so covered by their works, that little or no injury could be done them. He made some refugees prisoners, and took some stores, which they abandoned to expedite their retreat.

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that the troops, who were engaged, behaved with great coolness and intrepidity, and the whole of them discovered an impatience to be brought into action. The good order and discipline, which they exhibited in all their movements, do them the highest honor. The artillery under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Forrest was well served. I have only to regret the loss of Captain-Lieutenant Thompson, who fell at the side of his piece by a cannon-ball. It is impossible to fix with certainty the enemy's loss ; but, as there was much close firing, and our troops were advantageously posted, they must have suffered very considerably.

I herewith enclose to your Excellency a return of our killed, wounded, and missing, which I am happy to find is much less than I had reason to expect from the heavy fire they sustained.\* I am at a loss to determine what was the object of the enemy's expedition. If it was to injure the troops under my command, or to penetrate further into the country, they were frustrated. If it was the destruction of this place, it was a disgraceful one. I lament that our force was too small to save the town from ruin. I wish every American could have been a spectator ; he would have felt for the sufferers and joined to revenge the injury.

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\* By the official return there were thirteen killed, forty-nine wounded, and nine missing.

I cannot close this letter without acknowledging the particular service of Lieutenant-Colonel Barber, who acted as deputy adjutant-general, and distinguished himself by his activity in assisting to make the necessary dispositions. I have the honor to be, &c.

NATHANAEL GREENE.

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No. III. p. 109.

MEMORANDUM FOR CONCERTING A PLAN OF  
OPERATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ARMY.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 15 July, 1780.

The Marquis de Lafayette will be pleased to communicate the following general ideas to Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay, as the sentiments of the underwritten.

1. In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.

2. The advantages of possessing the port of New York, by the squadron of France, have been already enumerated to Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay, and are so obvious, as not to need recapitulation. A delay in the execution of this enterprise may defeat all our projects, and render the campaign inactive and inglorious.

3. To render our operations nervous and rapid, it is essential for us to be masters of the navigation of the North River and of the Sound. Without this, our land transportation will be great, our expenses enormous, and our progress slow if not precarious for want of forage and others means.

4. With these ideas, and upon this ground, it is conceived that many advantages will result from the French squadron's taking possession of the inner harbour between Staten Island and the city of New York, and detaching a frigate or two above the *chevaux-de-frise* in the North River opposite to Fort Washington, for the purpose of opening the navigation of the River, shortening the transportation by land on the upper and lower communication, and bringing the enemy to an explanation respecting Staten Island. Shipping so near the town would, at the same time they cover the frigates in the

North River, keep the garrison in check, and be more likely to facilitate other movements of the army, than if they were to remain at the Hook or below the Narrows.

5. Our operations against the enemy in the city of New York may commence from either of three points, to wit, Morrisania, or the height near Kingsbridge, or Staten Island. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, but, under a full view of all circumstances, the preponderancy is in favor of Morrisania; especially since the aid of his Most Christian Majesty has come by the way of Rhode Island, instead of Cape Henry, as it was expected they would do, and touch at Sandy Hook, in consequence of advices lodged there.

6. As the means for carrying on our operations are not yet sufficiently appreciated, nor is the time by which our aids will arrive sufficiently ascertained, it is impossible to be precise as to the time the American troops can with safety rendezvous at Morrisania; but, as it is necessary to fix some epoch, it is hoped that it may happen by the 5th of August. I would propose that day for the reëmbarkation of the French efficient force at New London (if they should have come there), and that they proceed up the Sound to White-stone on Long Island, or to such other place on that Island, or on the main, as circumstances may require, and the Count shall be advised of. For, the operations against the enemy depending very much upon their holding all or dismantling some of their present posts, and upon contingencies on our side, it is not possible at this time to mark out a precise plan, or determine whether our approaches to the city of New York shall be by the way of York Island, Brooklyn, or both. Numbers must determine the latter, and circumstances of the moment the former.

7. It must be clearly understood and agreed between the parties, that, if any capital operation is undertaken, the French fleet and land forces will at all events continue their aid until the success of the enterprise, or until it is mutually determined to abandon it.

8. In all matters of arrangement and accommodation, not repugnant to the foregoing ideas, the Marquis, in behalf of the United States, will consult the convenience and wishes of the Count and Chevalier, and will be pleased to assure them of the disposition I possess to make every thing as agreeable to them as possible, and of my desire to manifest on all occasions the high sense I entertain of their merit, and the generous aid they have brought to us.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.



## No. IV. p. 112.

LETTER FROM COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU TO GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, ON THE ARRIVAL OF THE FRENCH  
ARMY AT NEWPORT.

Newport, Rhode Island, 12 July, 1780.

SIR,

Being ordered by the King, my master, to come and put myself under your command, I arrive with the deepest feelings of submission, of zeal, and of veneration for your person, and for the distinguished talents, which you display in supporting an ever memorable war.

Since M. de Lafayette left France, we have met with many disappointments. The departure of M. de Guichen had taken away the transport ships from Brest. Orders were given, as early as the month of February, to replace them by others from Havre, St. Malo, and Bordeaux. The two first of these harbours were blockaded by a small English squadron, and the ships were unable to leave Bordeaux on account of the same head winds, which detained us so long. The King determined to send me with a first division, taking with me whatever could be embarked at Brest. I was aided as far as possible by the royal navy, and we were ready to sail on the 14th of April, with five thousand men, field and siege artillery, and other things in proportion. We were prevented from going to sea by head winds until the 2d of May; and, in order not to render this letter too long, permit me to refer you for the particulars of our voyage to the copy of the account, which I send to the French minister.

We are now, Sir, under your command. I have received at this place M. de Lafayette's letters. As the return of Clinton and of Arbuthnot has altered the state of things since the first, I shall follow the last orders, which you send me, and I am engaged in landing the troops at Newport in Rhode Island. The Chevalier de Ternay desired, that, until we are able to commence operations, we should give each other mutual support at this post. I am about to encamp with Newport in my rear, and occupying the whole of the extremity of the Island on the side of the enemy. The Chevalier de Ternay anchors in the harbour, and will establish a post and batteries upon the Island of Conanicut. In this position we can defy all the English forces. Our long detention in the harbour, and our long passage, have given us many sick; but few are dangerously so, and three weeks' rest will fully recruit them.

At the same time I am busily engaged with M. de Corny, who, according to your Excellency's orders, has made all the preparations which he could, in hastening the arrival of the wagons for provisions and baggage, and horses enough to mount a few officers, and if possible a hundred of Lauzun's hussars; and, I hope that in a month we shall be ready to act under your Excellency's orders. In the mean while, I trust that the second division will reach us, or at least that we shall hear of its sailing. The King charged me personally to assure your Excellency, that he would give all possible assistance to his allies, and that this advanced guard would be supported by his whole power; and the strongest proof, which I can give you of it, is, that the whole detachment was ready to embark at Brest on the 1st of April, if there had been a sufficient number of transports. M. Duchaffault was in the harbour with a large number of ships, and nothing was waited for but the arrival of the convoy from Bordeaux, to appoint a second squadron to accompany the second division.

It is hardly necessary for me to tell your Excellency, that I bring sufficient funds to pay in cash for whatever is needed by the King's army, and that we shall maintain as strict discipline as if we were under the walls of Paris. General Heath arrived this morning. This place is very destitute of provisions of all sorts, and the inhabitants have been always afraid of seeing the enemy back again. General Heath has sent to all parts of the country the news of our arrival, of our discipline, and of our cash payments, and I do not doubt, that in a few days we shall find here an abundant market. I join to this letter a copy of my instructions, and even of my secret instructions also, as I do not choose to have any secrets with my general. I am with respect, Sir, &c.

COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

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No. V. p. 150.

LETTERS FROM GENERAL GREENE RESPECTING  
THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

GENERAL GREENE TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp, Preakness, 26 July, 1780.

SIR,

His Excellency General Washington has just transmitted to me a plan for conducting the quartermaster's department, agreed to in

Congress on the 15th instant, wherein I am continued as quartermaster-general, and directed to make the necessary appointments and arrangements in the department agreeably thereto, as soon as possible.

It was my intention, from the peculiar circumstances of our affairs, and I have long since communicated it to the Commander-in-chief and the committee of Congress, to continue to exercise the office of quartermaster-general during the active part of this campaign, provided matters were left upon such a footing, as to enable me to conduct the business to satisfaction; and in order to remove every shadow of suspicion, that might induce a belief that I was influenced by interested motives to make more extensive arrangements than were necessary, I voluntarily relinquished every kind of emolument for conducting the business, save my family expenses.

But however willing I might have been heretofore to subject myself to the fatigue and difficulties attending the duties of this office, justice to myself as well as to the public constrains me positively to decline it under the present arrangement, as I do not choose to attempt an experiment of so dangerous a nature, where I see a physical impossibility of performing the duties that will be required of me. Wherefore I request that Congress will appoint another quartermaster-general without loss of time, as I shall give no order in the business further than to acquaint the deputies with the new system, and direct them to close their accounts up to the 1st of August coming.

It is unnecessary for me to go into the general objections I have to the plan. It is sufficient to say, that my feelings are injured, and that the officers necessary to conduct the business are not allowed; nor is proper provision made for some of those that are. There is but one assistant quartermaster-general, who is to reside near Congress, and one deputy for the main army, allowed in the system. Whoever has the least knowledge of the business in this office, and the field duty, which is to be done, must be fully convinced, that it is impossible to perform it without much more assistance than is allowed in the present arrangement. Whether the army is large or small, there is no difference in the plan, though the business may be occasionally multiplied three-fold.

The two principal characters on whom I depended for support, and whose appointment under the former arrangement I made an express condition of my accepting the office, are now left out, and both have advertised me, that they will take no further charge of the business; and I am apprehensive, that many others, who have been held by



necessity and not by choice, will avail themselves of this opportunity to leave an employment, which is not only unprofitable, but rendered dishonorable. Systems without agents are useless things, and the probability of getting the one should be taken into consideration in framing the other. Administration seem to think it far less important to the public interest to have this department well filled, and properly arranged, than it really is, and as they will find it by future experience.

My best endeavours have not been wanting to give success to the business committed to my care, and I leave the merit of my services to be determined hereafter by the future management of it under the direction of another hand.

My rank is high in the line of the army; and the sacrifices I have made on this account, together with the fatigue and anxiety I have undergone, far overbalance all the emoluments I have derived from the appointment. Nor would double the consideration induce me to tread the same path over again, unless I saw it necessary to preserve my country from utter ruin, and a disgraceful servitude. I am, &c.

GENERAL GREENE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Camp, Preakness, 27 July, 1780.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to enclose to your Excellency a copy of a letter of resignation, as quartermaster-general, to Congress, and another upon the same subject to the committee of Congress in camp.

I have only to lament, that the measures of administration have laid me under the necessity at this critical moment. It is true, it has been my wish for a long time to get out of the department; but, as our political affairs were in so disagreeable a train, I was willing to submit to many inconveniences, in order to promote the public welfare, while I had a prospect of conducting the business to answer the expectations of the public, and to the satisfaction of the army. But the new system of Congress has cut off all prospect, and left me without the shadow of hope. The principal characters on whom I depended are left out, and many parts of the plan it is impossible to reduce to practice. Under this view of things I found myself constrained to quit the department, and leave those to answer for the consequences, who have reduced matters to this extremity.

When I take a view of the religious and political prejudices, that

have frequently influenced public bodies at different periods to adopt the most ruinous measures, I am not surprised to see an attempt to change a system of one of the most important departments of the army, in the most critical and interesting season of the campaign, and when every exertion under the best direction is incompetent to the demands of the service. Were measures of this kind new in the history of mankind, I should be led to apprehend, that more was intended than a change in the modes of conducting the business.

I am persuaded that your Excellency will approve my conduct, however inconvenient it may be to the service, as I am confident you would not wish me to attempt, what there is a physical impossibility of accomplishing ; and more especially when the attempt will only tend to deceive you and the public in your expectations from me.

Since the commencement of this war, I have ever made the good of the service the rule of my conduct, and in no instance have I deviated from this line ; and, when there has been a seeming variation, it has only been in cases where I could not render my services without forfeiting my reputation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

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No. VI. pp. 142, 171.

INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMANDERS AND THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE AT NEWPORT.

As soon as it was known, that the French army had arrived in Rhode Island, the Marquis de Lafayette was sent, with ample powers and instructions from General Washington, to make such arrangements with the French commanders for immediate operations, as the state of the army and naval force would admit. As all the plans depended, however, on the superiority of a French fleet in the American seas, which should be able to blockade the harbour of New York, and secure the landing of troops for an attack on that city, and as there was no prospect of such a superiority, till the arrival of the second French division, which was confidently expected, it was not possible to decide at once on any scheme of combined

action. Lafayette remained but a few days, therefore, at Newport, during which he communicated and explained the sentiments of General Washington, ascertained those of the French commanders, and rendered an essential service to the common cause, by the zeal, discretion, and disinterestedness, with which he executed all the duties of his mission. The following letter was written at that time.

LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"Newport, 31 July, 1780.

"DEAR GENERAL,

"In consequence of a note from me, the Admiral came up last evening, and defensive ideas gave way to offensive plans. Our conversation was long, and it is not yet ended; but I hasten to give you a summary of what passed between the Count de Rochambeau, the Chevalier de Ternay, and myself.

"I first began in my own name to give them a pretty exact account of the situation we were in three months ago, and of the extraordinary efforts which the country had made for the purpose of an immediate coöperation. I told them, that by the first of January our army would be dismissed, and that the militia was to serve only for three months. I added that for the defensive they were useless to us; nay, they were hurtful, and that I thought it necessary to take New York before the winter. All this was said in my own name, and therefore in a less delicate way than when I am your interpreter. I then told them, that I was going to speak from you, and after many compliments and assurances of confidence, I went on with your plan, beginning with the importance of possessing the harbour, and explaining the three methods, which you have directed me to point out, and which are to be hereafter regulated by circumstances.

"As to possessing the harbour, the Chevalier said, he did not believe his ships could go in; but that, if superior at sea, he would protect the landing of the troops, prevent an evacuation, and, indeed, blockade the harbour. The French general, with the advice of the naval commander, did not hesitate to prefer the going in transports to the point you mentioned. Both were of opinion, that nothing could be undertaken unless we had a naval superiority; and, as I know it is your opinion also (though it is not mine), I durst not insist on that article.

"There was another reason, which inclined me to wait for the reinforcement. I knew we had neither arms nor powder, and that it would be a long time before we could get them. I assented to



their views, on account of my private confidence in their superior abilities. I told them, that you also thought we should have a naval superiority; and I added in my own name, that we must at any rate act before the winter, and get rid of a shameful defensive.

"Their superiority at sea will, I think, take place in the course of this month. They have two reasons for depending upon it. First, unless prevented by an absolute impossibility, the second division, consisting of four other regiments, and all our stores, with a strong convoy of ships of the line, will be here very soon. As soon as they shall be heard of on the coast, the Chevalier de Ternay will at all events go out and meet them. Secondly, the gentleman \* to whom I wrote on my arrival has full liberty to send hither reinforcements. The admiral has already applied to him; but I am going to cause him to write other letters, and will send them to-morrow or the day after to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, whom I beg you will immediately desire to secure three fast-sailing vessels for the West Indies.

"I am going this evening to fix places with pilots, and also to consult about the entrance of the harbour. Dobbs and Shaw † are here, and I will have a full conversation with them and the admiral, concerning both the entrance of the harbour and the navigation of the Sound. To-morrow I shall call together with as much secrecy as possible a number of pilots for the harbour of Halifax and the River St. Lawrence. Enclosed you will find a letter from Count de Rochambeau. He requests you will have the goodness to let the minister know what the French army is about, as he had no time to write. It is, I think, very important, first, to send out to meet the reinforcement and give them proper directions; and, secondly, to have some vessels ready for the West Indies.

"The French set more value upon Rhode Island than it is worth. I have made them promise, however, that in case of an operation they will not leave a garrison here, and that their magazines shall be sent to Providence. You know I did not expect Clinton, and though I could not stand alone in my opinion, I ever lamented the calling out of the militia. I am happy to inform you, that they have been dismissed. Nothing can equal the spirit with which they turned out; and I did not neglect to let the French know, that they have done more for their allies, than they would have done for the security of their own Continental troops on a similar occasion. As to the

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\* A French commander in the West Indies.

† Two pilots acquainted with the harbour of New York, and selected and sent to the French admiral by General Washington.

three-months' men, the French general wants them to establish the communication with the main; but I will soon request him to let them go to the grand army, and will at the same time get from this State as many arms and as much powder as possible. I have written to Massachusetts for the same purpose.

"After I shall have seen the pilots, and made calculations with the commander of the artillery and the first engineer, whom the Count will consult, I shall draw a plan, to which I will get their answer, and repair with it to head-quarters. In the mean time I shall receive answers from Boston and from Governor Greene. The admiral cannot lend us more than thirty thousand pounds of powder; but you see that their demands, as to heavy pieces, are small; they indeed say, that they do not want any on the Island, and that their twenty pieces will be sufficient. Upon these matters I will be more positive after the commanders of artillery and engineers shall have made their calculations. By the 5th or 6th of August I hope I shall have nothing more to do in this place. The French army dislike the idea of staying here, and want to join you.

"Their dispositions towards the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the inhabitants and the militia towards them, are such as I could wish. You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our drafts, who went to Conanicut Island without provisions and tents, and who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French soldier and officer took an American with him, and divided his bed and his supper in the most friendly manner. The patience and sobriety of our militia are so much admired by the French officers, that two days ago a French colonel called all his officers together to desire them to observe the good examples, which were given to the French soldiers by the American troops. On the other hand the French discipline is such, that chickens and pigs walk between the lines without being disturbed, and that there is in the camp a cornfield, of which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories know not what to say to it. I am with the highest respect, and the most tender friendship, &c.

"LAFAYETTE."

A week after writing the above letter, Lafayette returned to General Washington's camp. To avoid erroneous impressions on either side, he drew up in writing a statement of his conversations with the French general and admiral, in the form of a letter to them, from which an extract is here inserted.

LAFAYETTE TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU AND M. DE TERNAY.

*"Camp, near Dobbs's Ferry, August 9th.*—As the result of our conversation, we agreed definitively upon the following articles, and I have accordingly handed them to General Washington.

"1. You have written to France to hasten the arrival and the augmentation of the expected succours. You have already demanded the five vessels of M. de Guichen, and I took charge of a separate letter repeating the same requisition, which is to pass through the hands of the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

"2. As soon as you hear of the arrival either of the second division or of the ships from the West Indies, you will immediately despatch an express to General Washington; and, while our army will march to Westchester, and yours will be making preparations for its embarkation, M. de Ternay will endeavour to effect a junction.

"3. If the French fleet is equal to that of the enemy, it will immediately fight for the superiority; if it is superior, it will immediately take on board the French troops, and transport them to the place fixed upon for the landing.

"4. A spot shall be chosen where the ships may protect the operation, and where the troops first landed may take a position supported by the fire of the ships, and behind which the rest of the army may join them; where, as the troops advance farther, they may still be supported on the right and left, and the rest of the landing be covered. Such a place shall be chosen, that the American division destined for this particular enterprise may arrive and land at the same time with Count de Rochambeau, and that their general may coöperate with the French general.

"5. According to the number of French troops able to operate, General Washington will send or lead himself to Long Island a number of troops equal to those of the enemy, who may be opposed to them, and will have a body of about the same strength either at Westchester, or on the Island of New York.

"6. The Chevalier de Ternay will attentively examine the possibility of forcing the passage of Sandy Hook; and, if he finds it can be done, he will accomplish at once that important object.

"7. As soon as any arms, clothing, or stores, belonging to the United States shall arrive, the Chevalier de Ternay will have the goodness, without giving them time to enter the harbour, to send them at once under a convoy of frigates, or, if there are no batteries erected, with a ship of the line, to some place in the Sound, which shall be fixed upon by General Washington.



"8. The French fleet will take charge of the boats, which we shall need, and which will be given at Providence. The admiral will lend us all the powder he can spare, which at this moment cannot be more than thirty thousand pounds.

"9. I will send to the French generals information respecting the passage of the Sound at Hell Gate. I will also communicate all the details concerning Brooklyn; and we will accordingly send our calculations for the artillery and the engineers, by which we shall determine what to send in these two respects with the American corps for Long Island. These two points are those, which raised some doubts in the opinion of the French generals, and I will send them from here some information concerning what I had the honor to tell them

"10. The sick and stores shall be sent to Providence, and the batteries upon that river shall be made fit for service.

"11. It is perfectly understood that the moment the French obtain a naval superiority, they will not lose a single day in commencing their coöperation."

Such was the general plan of operations, founded on the supposition of a naval superiority on the part of the French. But the second division did not arrive from France, as was expected, nor was the reinforcement sent from the West Indies. Hence the plan was never acted upon.

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No. VII. p. 212.

OFFICIAL LETTERS AND OTHER PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREASON OF ARNOLD.

Eighteen months before the consummation of his treason, General Arnold commenced writing to Sir Henry Clinton anonymously, and from time to time communicated to him important intelligence. Not knowing the person nor the rank of his correspondent, Sir Henry at first received his advances coldly, but permitted the correspondence to be continued, as no harm could result from it, and the intelligence would be useful. The business was intrusted to Major André, who was then his aid-de-camp. Fictitious names were assumed. Arnold adopted that of *Gustavus*, and André signed his letters *John Anderson*.

It was not till after Arnold had taken the command at West Point, that Sir Henry Clinton considered his proposals of sufficient moment to deserve particular attention. He then encouraged a more free and direct intercourse, foreseeing the immense advantage it would be to his Majesty's arms, if that garrison with its dependencies could be gained. This proffer was made by Arnold, in the letters which he wrote to André, and which were framed in such ambiguous terms, as to be understood only by the persons for whom they were intended, being clothed in the disguise of a pretended mercantile transaction. One letter will serve as a specimen. It was directed to "Mr. John Anderson, Merchant, to the care of James Osborn, to be left at the Reverend Mr. Odell's, New York." The following were its contents.

## GENERAL ARNOLD TO MAJOR ANDRÉ.

"August 30th, 1780. — Sir; On the 24th instant I received a note from you without date, in answer to mine of the 7th of July, also a letter from your House of the 24th July, in answer to mine of the 15th, with a note from Mr. B——, of the 30th July; with an extract of a letter from Mr. J. Osborn of the 24th. I have paid particular attention to the contents of the several letters; had they arrived earlier, you should have had my answer sooner. A variety of circumstances has prevented my writing you before. I expect to do it very fully in a few days, and to procure you an interview with Mr. M——e, when you will be able to settle your commercial plan, I hope, agreeable to all parties. Mr. M——e assures me that he is still of opinion that his first proposal is by no means unreasonable, and makes no doubt, when he has a conference with you, that you will close with it. He expects, when you meet, that you will be fully authorized from your House; that the risks and profits of the co-partnership may be fully and clearly understood.

"A speculation might at this time be easily made to some advantage with *ready money*; but there is not the quantity of goods *at market* which your partner seems to suppose, and the number of speculators below, I think, will be against your making an immediate purchase. I apprehend goods will be in greater plenty, and much cheaper, in the course of the season; both dry and wet are much wanted and in demand at this juncture; some quantities are expected in this part of the country soon. Mr. M——e flatters himself, that in the course of ten days he will have the pleasure of seeing you; he requests me to advise you, that he has ordered a draft on you in favor of our mutual friend S——y for £300, which

you will charge on account of the *tobacco*. I am, in behalf of Mr. M——e & Co., Sir, your obedient humble servant,

“GUSTAVUS.”

From this time various plans were concerted for effecting an interview between Arnold and André. It was the proposal of Arnold, that André should come within the American lines in disguise, calling himself John Anderson, and professing to be the bearer of intelligence. Under this pretence he was to seek the quarters of Colonel Sheldon, who commanded the cavalry stationed on the outposts at Salem and North Castle. Arnold informed Sheldon that he expected a person of this character, as appears by the following note.

GENERAL ARNOLD TO COLONEL SHELDON.

“*Robinson's House, 7 September, 1780.*—Since I saw you, I have had an opportunity of transmitting a letter to the person in New York, of whom I made mention, and am in expectation of procuring a meeting at your quarters. If I can bring this matter about, as I hope, I shall open a channel of intelligence, that will be regular and to be depended upon. I am, &c.”

Meantime André seems not to have approved the plan of going into the American lines in the way proposed by Arnold, and he wrote a letter to Colonel Sheldon on the subject under his assumed name.

JOHN ANDERSON TO COLONEL SHELDON.

“*New York, 7 September, 1780.*—Sir; I am told my name is made known to you, and that I may hope your indulgence in permitting me to meet a friend near your outposts. I will endeavour to obtain permission to go out with a flag, which will be sent to Dobbs's Ferry on Monday next, the 11th, at twelve o'clock, when I shall be happy to meet Mr. G——. Should I not be allowed to go, the officer who is to command the escort, between whom and myself no distinction need be made, can speak on the affair.

“Let me entreat you, Sir, to favor a matter so interesting to the parties concerned, and which is of so private a nature, that the public on neither side can be injured by it.

“I shall be happy on my part of doing any act of kindness to you in a family or property concern of a similar nature.

“I trust I shall not be detained; but, should any old grudge be a cause for it, I should rather risk that, than neglect the business in



question, or assume a mysterious character to carry on an innocent affair, and, as friends have advised, get to your lines by stealth.

"I am, Sir, with all regard, &c."

It will be observed, that the object of this letter was simply to give notice, that the writer would be at Dobbs's Ferry at a certain time. André took it for granted, that Sheldon would forward the letter to Arnold, who would understand it; and such was the result.

COLONEL SHELDON TO GENERAL ARNOLD.

"*Lower Salem, 9 September, 1780.* — "Dear Sir; Enclosed I send you a letter, which I received last evening from New York, signed John Anderson, who mentions his being made known to me. If this is the person you mentioned in your favor of yesterday, he must have had his information by your letter, as I never heard his name mentioned before I received the letter. I hope you will not fail meeting him at Dobbs's Ferry; if you cannot meet him yourself, pray send some person that you can confide in. I am so much out of health, that I shall not be able to ride that distance in one day. I am, &c."

Arnold was a little alarmed on receiving this letter, because André had spoken in such a manner as he feared would excite suspicion. He immediately wrote to Sheldon in reply.

GENERAL ARNOLD TO COLONEL SHELDON.

"*Robinson's House, 10 September, 1780.* — Dear Sir; I received last night your favor of yesterday. You judge right. I wrote to Mr. Anderson on the 3d instant, requesting him to meet me at your quarters, and informed him that I had hinted the matter to you, and that you would send any letter to me, or inform me of his arrival. I did not mention his name in my letter to you, as I thought it unnecessary. I was obliged to write with great caution to him. My letter was signed *Gustavus*, to prevent any discovery in case it fell into the hands of the enemy.

"From the tenor of Mr. Anderson's letter, (in particular that part where he says, 'The officer, who commands the escort, between whom and myself no distinction need be made, can speak on the affair;') I am led to conjecture my letter has been intercepted. There are several things in the letter, which appear mysterious. As you are unwell, and I want to go to Verplanck's Point to give directions in some matters there, I am determined to go as far as Dobbs's Ferry and meet the flag. If Mr. Anderson should not be permitted to

come out with the flag, and should find means to come to your quarters, I wish you to send an express to let me know; and send two or three horsemen to conduct him on the way to meet me, as it is difficult for me to ride so far. If your health will permit, I wish you to come with him. I have promised him your protection, and that he shall return in safety. I am convinced of his inclination to serve the public; and if he has received my letter, and in consequence thereof should come to your quarters, I make no doubt to fix on a mode of intelligence, that will answer my wishes.

"If General Parsons has arrived, I wish you to show him my letter, and tell him that my request is to have Mr. Anderson escorted to meet me. Please to write to me by return of the express through what channel you received Mr. Anderson's letter, and if your emissary has returned. I am, with great regard, &c."

General Arnold accordingly went at the time appointed to Dobbs's Ferry, but an accident prevented his meeting André. The British guard-boats fired upon his barge, as he was approaching the vessel in which André had come up the river, and he was in imminent danger of being either killed or taken prisoner. He retreated immediately and landed on the western side of the river, where there was an American post. Since his coming down from West Point would be known, he was afraid it might awaken suspicion. As a precaution, therefore, he wrote a letter to General Washington, dated "Dobbs's Ferry, September 11th." After touching on several topics of an official nature, he added;

"I am here this morning in order to establish signals to be observed in case the enemy come up the river; to give some directions respecting the guard-boats; and to have a beacon fixed upon the mountain about five miles south of King's Ferry, which will be necessary to alarm the country, the one fixed there formerly having been destroyed."

He returned the same day to his head-quarters at Robinson's House. Having failed in this attempt to procure an interview with André, it was now uncertain in what manner it could be brought about. Supposing André might still adopt the plan of coming within the lines, he wrote the following note, September 13th, to Major Tallmadge, who was stationed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, with a party of dragoons at North Castle.

"If Mr. John Anderson, a person I expect from New York, should come to your quarters, I have to request that you will give him an escort of two horsemen, to bring him on his way to this

place, and send an express to me, that I may meet him. If your business will permit, I wish you to come with him."

But André seems never to have seriously intended to go within the American lines, although pressed to do so by Arnold. It was his wish to procure an interview on board a vessel in the river. For this end Sir Henry Clinton sent the Vulture sloop of war up the river to Teller's Point, on the 16th of September. Colonel Beverly Robinson was in the sloop, to whom, as well as to the commander, Captain Sutherland, the plot was known.

COLONEL ROBINSON TO GENERAL ARNOLD.

*"On board the Vulture, off Teller's Point, 17 September, 1780.*  
—Sir; Having heard that General Putnam is at the Highlands on a visit to you, I have obtained Sir Henry Clinton's leave to come up in this ship, to endeavour to have an interview with him. My reasons for asking it are explained in the enclosed letter to him.

"As I understand you command in the Highlands, and make your head-quarters at my house, I have taken the liberty of enclosing my letter to General Putnam to you, and beg the favor of you to deliver it; but if he should have returned to Connecticut, I beg the letter may be returned to me; and in that case, I am persuaded (from the humane and generous character you bear), that could I be so happy as to see you, you would readily grant me the same request I should make to him. But for prudential reasons I dare not explain the matter further, until I have some assurances that it shall be secret if not granted. I did intend, in order to have your answer immediately, to send this by my servant, James Osborn, with a flag to you; but, thinking he might be stopped at Verplanck's Point, I have sent it to the officer commanding there, desiring it may be forwarded to you as soon as possible. I am, &c."

This letter was received from the flag by Colonel Livingston, who then commanded at Verplanck's Point, and was sent by him to General Arnold then at Robinson's House. It should be kept in mind, that the only purpose of the letter was to enable General Arnold, in a reply, to fix upon a time and place for an interview.

It happened, that, the next day, General Washington with his suite crossed King's Ferry on his way to Hartford, where he was to hold a conference with the French commander. As a proper mark of respect Arnold went down to King's Ferry in his barge, and met Washington there at the time of his crossing the river. The Vulture was then in sight, and it was known that a flag had brought a



letter to Arnold the day before. As his fears were ever on the alert, Arnold thought the best mode of avoiding suspicion would be to show the letter to General Washington, since it was written in such a disguise, that it might be considered as only relating to Colonel Robinson's private affairs; and moreover a further use of a flag would then seem to be under the sanction of General Washington.

GENERAL ARNOLD TO COLONEL ROBINSON.

"*Robinson's House, 18 September,\* 1780.*—Sir; I have received a letter from you of yesterday's date, with one for General Putnam, and have consulted with his Excellency General Washington on the subject of them, who is of opinion, that any application respecting your private affairs in this country ought to be made to the civil authority of this State, as they are entirely out of the line of the military. However willing I may be to oblige Colonel Robinson on any other occasion, it is not in my power to do it in this instance. General Putnam left this place some days since. I have, therefore, agreeably to your request, returned the letter addressed to him.

"If you have any other proposals to make, of a public nature, of which I can officially take notice, you may depend on it, that the greatest secrecy shall be observed, if required, as no person except his Excellency General Washington shall be made acquainted with them. The bearer, Captain Archibald, will take particular care of your letters, and deliver them to me with his own hand. I am, &c."

In this letter was enclosed the following, sealed and directed to Colonel Robinson.

GENERAL ARNOLD TO COLONEL ROBINSON.

"*September 18th,† 1780.*—Sir; I parted with his Excellency General Washington this morning, who advised me to avoid seeing you, as it would occasion suspicions in the minds of some people, which might operate to my injury. His reasons appear to me to be well founded; but, were I of a different opinion, I could not with propriety see you at present. I shall send a person to Dobbs's Ferry,

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\* This letter is thus dated in the original, but it could not have been written at *Robinson's House* on the 18th, since Arnold did not return during that day, after meeting General Washington, but went with him to Peekskill and passed the night. It was doubtless written on the morning of the 19th.

† In this date there is the same mistake, as in the preceding. The circumstance, however, is of little importance.

or on board the Vulture, Wednesday night the 20th instant, and furnish him with a boat and a flag of truce. You may depend on his secrecy and honor, and that your business of whatever nature shall be kept a profound secret; and, if it is a matter in which I can officially act, I will do every thing in my power to oblige you consistent with my duty. To avoid censure, this matter must be conducted with the greatest secrecy. I think it will be advisable for the Vulture to remain where she is until the time appointed. I have enclosed a letter for a gentleman in New York from one in the country on private business, which I beg the favor of you to forward, and make no doubt he will be particular to come at the time mentioned. I am, &c.

“P. S. I expect General Washington to lodge here on Saturday night next, and will lay before him any matter you may wish to communicate.”

To the letter bearing a public disguise, or constituting the outer envelope, Colonel Robinson made the following reply.

COLONEL ROBINSON TO GENERAL ARNOLD.

“*Vulture, off Teller's Point, 19 September, 1780.* — Sir; I am favored with yours by Captain Archibald, and am sorry I have missed the opportunity of seeing General Putnam, and that it is not thought proper to allow me to see you, my business being entirely of a private nature, only concerning myself, and no ways affecting public matters of either side. I was induced to make the application to you in hopes of meeting with a favorable reception from a gentleman of your character. But I have not the least reason to expect any civility from the civil authority of this State; neither am I at all disposed to ask any favor from them.

“Had I known General Washington was with you, I should certainly have made my application to him, as I flatter myself I should be allowed every reasonable indulgence from him. I beg my best respects may be presented to him. I can have nothing further to say to you at present, but must wait a more favorable opportunity of doing something for my family. I return you my thanks for your polite letter and civil expressions to me, and am, &c.”

Within the letter from Arnold to Colonel Beverly Robinson was also enclosed one, directed to *John Anderson*, and signed *Gustavus*.

GUSTAVUS TO JOHN ANDERSON.

“*September 15th.* — Sir; On the 11th at noon, agreeably to your request, I attempted to go to Dobbs's Ferry, but was prevented by

the armed boats of the enemy, which fired upon us; and I continued opposite the Ferry till sunset.

"The foregoing letter was written to caution you not to mention your business to Colonel Sheldon, or any other person. I have no confidant. I have made one too many already, who has prevented some profitable speculations.

"I will send a person in whom you can confide to meet you at Dobbs's Ferry at the landing, on the east side on Wednesday the 20th instant, who will conduct you to a place of safety, where I will meet you. It will be necessary for you to be disguised, and, if the enemy's boats are there, it will favor my plan, as the person is not suspected by them. If I do not hear from you before, you may depend on the person's being punctual at the place above mentioned.

"My partner, of whom I hinted in a former letter, has about ten thousand pounds cash in hand ready for a speculation if any should offer, which appears profitable. I have also one thousand pounds on hand, and can collect fifteen hundred more in two or three days. Add to this I have some credit. From these hints you may judge of the purchase that can be made. I cannot be more explicit at present. Meet me if possible. You may rest assured, that, if there is no danger in passing your lines, you will be perfectly safe where I propose a meeting, on which you shall be informed on Wednesday evening, if you think proper to be at Dobbs's Ferry. Adieu.

"*September 18th.* — "The foregoing I found means to send by a very honest fellow, who went to Kingsbridge on the 16th, and I make no doubt you have received it. But as there is a possibility of its miscarriage, I send a copy, and am fully persuaded that the method I have pointed out to meet you is the best and safest, provided you can obtain leave to come out."

These letters were forwarded with all despatch to New York, and Sir Henry Clinton agreed that Major André should go to Dobbs's Ferry as proposed. An order was sent to Captain Sutherland, directing him to fall down the river with the Vulture to that place.

André arrived at Dobbs's Ferry in the afternoon of the 20th. As Arnold had said, in his secret letter to Colonel Robinson, that he thought it "advisable for the Vulture to remain where she was until the time appointed," André concluded to push forward to the vessel, and not wait for it to descend the river. He got on board at seven o'clock in the evening. The Vulture was then at anchor at a short distance above Teller's Point.



The night passed away, and no person appeared from the shore. On the morning of the 21st, the following method was adopted to convey to Arnold the intelligence of André's being on board. In the course of the preceding day a boat had been enticed by a white flag to approach the shore, and was fired upon; or at least this occurrence was asserted to have taken place. It was made a pretext for sending a flag to Verplanck's Point with a letter.

## CAPTAIN SUTHERLAND TO GENERAL ARNOLD.

"*Vulture, off Teller's Point, 21 September.* — Sir; I consider it a duty to complain of any violation of the laws of arms, and I am satisfied that I now do it where I cannot fail to meet redress. It is therefore with reluctance I give you the concern to know, that, a flag of truce having been yesterday shown on Teller's Point, I sent a boat towards the shore, presuming some communication was thereby solicited. The boat's crew on approaching received a fire from several armed men, who till then had been concealed. Fortunately none of my people were hurt, but the treacherous intentions of those, who fired, are not vindicated from that circumstance. I have the honor to be, &c."

This note was in André's handwriting, though signed by Captain Sutherland; and the fact was thus made known to Arnold, that André was on board the *Vulture*.

The same night Joshua H. Smith went to the *Vulture* with a boat rowed by two men, and conveyed André to the shore at a place called the Long Clove, where Arnold met him, and whence they retired before morning to Smith's house. In the evening of the 22d of September, André and Smith crossed the river at King's Ferry, and proceeded to a house a few miles distant, where they lodged. The next morning they breakfasted together near Pine's Bridge. Here they separated. Smith returned, and André went forward alone towards New York, till he came to Tarrytown, where he was captured by Paulding, Williams, and Van Wart; and taken back to the nearest American post at North Castle. All the incidents, that occurred during this period, and the particulars of the capture, are minutely related in SPARKS'S *Life and Treason of Arnold*.

Led away by an infatuation not easy to be explained, Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, who commanded at North Castle, resolved to send the prisoner to General Arnold's head-quarters; notwithstanding that he had before him the papers, which had been taken from

André's boots, and which he knew to be in the handwriting of Arnold.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMESON TO GENERAL ARNOLD.

"*North Castle, 23 September, 1780.*—Sir; I have sent Lieutenant Allen with a certain John Anderson, taken going into New York. He had a passport signed in your name. He had a parcel of papers taken from under his stockings, which I think of a very dangerous tendency. The papers I have sent to General Washington. They contain the number of men at West Point and its dependencies; the number of cannon; the different pieces of ground that command the forts; the situation of each fort, and which may be set on fire with bombs and carcasses, and which are out of repair; the speech of General Washington to the council of war held on the 6th of the month; and the situation of our armies in general. I am, &c."

Towards evening, after the prisoner and the above letter had been sent off, Major Tallmadge returned to North Castle, having been absent on duty in the country below during the day. He was astonished at the course that had been pursued by Jameson, and persuaded him with much entreaty to recall the prisoner, who was already some miles on the way to West Point. Jameson despatched a messenger with the following letter.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMESON TO LIEUTENANT ALLEN.

"*North Castle, 23 September, 1780.*—Sir; From some circumstances, which I have just heard, I have reason to fear, that a party of the enemy are above. And as I would not have Anderson retaken, or get away, I desire that you will proceed to Lower Salem with him, and deliver him to Captain Hoogland. You will leave the guard with Captain Hoogland also, except one man, whom you may take along. You may proceed on to West Point, and deliver the letter to General Arnold. You may also show him this, that he may know the reason, why the prisoner is not sent on. You will please to return as soon as you can. I am, in haste, &c."

It was against the advice and strong remonstrance of Tallmadge, that the letter to Arnold was sent forward, but on this point he found Jameson immovable; and it was that letter, which gave Arnold notice of the capture of André in time to enable him to escape.

André was sent to Lower Salem, where he remained under the

charge of Major Tallmadge. Finding that there was no longer any hope of escape, he wrote the following letter, which contained the first intimation of his true name and character, that any person had received after his capture.

MAJOR ANDRÉ TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"Salem, 24 September, 1780.

"SIR,

"What I have as yet said concerning myself was in the justifiable attempt to be extricated; I am too little accustomed to duplicity to have succeeded.

"I beg your Excellency will be persuaded, that no alteration in the temper of my mind, or apprehension for my safety, induces me to take the step of addressing you, but that it is to rescue myself from an imputation of having assumed a mean character for treacherous purposes or self-interest; a conduct incompatible with the principles that actuate me, as well as with my condition in life.

"It is to vindicate my fame that I speak, and not to solicit security.

"The person in your possession is Major John André, adjutant-general to the British army.

"The influence of one commander in the army of his adversary is an advantage taken in war. A correspondence for this purpose I held; as confidential (in the present instance) with his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton.

"To favor it, I agreed to meet upon ground not within the posts of either army, a person who was to give me intelligence; I came up in the Vulture man of war for this effect, and was fetched by a boat from the ship to the beach. Being there, I was told that the approach of day would prevent my return, and that I must be concealed until the next night. I was in my regimentals, and had fairly risked my person.

"Against my stipulation, my intention, and without my knowledge beforehand, I was conducted within one of your posts. Your Excellency may conceive my sensation on this occasion, and will imagine how much more must I have been affected by a refusal to reconduct me back the next night as I had been brought. Thus become a prisoner, I had to concert my escape. I quitted my uniform, and was passed another way in the night, without the American posts, to neutral ground, and informed I was beyond all armed parties and left to press for New York. I was taken at Tarrytown by some volunteers.



"Thus, as I have had the honor to relate, was I betrayed (being adjutant-general of the British army) into the vile condition of an enemy in disguise within your posts.

"Having avowed myself a British officer, I have nothing to reveal but what relates to myself, which is true on the honor of an officer and a gentleman.

"The request I have to make to your Excellency, and I am conscious I address myself well, is, that in any rigor policy may dictate, a decency of conduct towards me may mark, that though unfortunate I am branded with nothing dishonorable, as no motive could be mine but the service of my King, and as I was involuntarily an impostor.

"Another request is, that I may be permitted to write an open letter to Sir Henry Clinton, and another to a friend for clothes and linen.

"I take the liberty to mention the condition of some gentlemen at Charleston, who, being either on parole or under protection, were engaged in a conspiracy against us. Though their situation is not similar, they are objects who may be set in exchange for me, or are persons whom the treatment I receive might affect.

"It is no less, Sir, in a confidence of the generosity of your mind, than on account of your superior station, that I have chosen to importune you with this letter. I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

"JOHN ANDRÉ, *Adjutant-general.*"

Lieutenant Allen arrived at General Arnold's head-quarters on the morning of the 25th, with the letter from Jameson. As soon as it was read by Arnold, he precipitately left his house, entered a boat, and ordered the boatmen to row down the river. He passed Verplanck's Point with a flag, and reached the Vulture in safety.

The messenger, whom Jameson had despatched with the papers to General Washington, after proceeding some distance, ascertained that the General was returning from Hartford by another route. He retraced his steps, came back to Salem, took André's letter, and hastened to West Point, expecting to meet Washington there.

About an hour after Arnold's escape, Washington arrived at Robinson's House, having ridden that morning from Fishkill. Four hours later the messenger arrived with the papers and Major André's letter. The plot was now revealed and the mystery cleared up. Arnold, in the mean time, was secure with the enemy. Before night the following letters were received.

## GENERAL ARNOLD TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"On board the *Vulture*, 25 September, 1780. — Sir; The heart which is conscious of its own rectitude, cannot attempt to palliate a step which the world may censure as wrong; I have ever acted from a principle of love to my country, since the commencement of the present unhappy contest between Great Britain and the Colonies; the same principle of love to my country actuates my present conduct, however it may appear inconsistent to the world, who very seldom judge right of any man's actions.

"I have no favor to ask for myself. I have too often experienced the ingratitude of my country to attempt it; but, from the known humanity of your Excellency, I am induced to ask your protection for Mrs. Arnold from every insult and injury that a mistaken vengeance of my country may expose her to. It ought to fall only on me; she is as good and as innocent as an angel, and is incapable of doing wrong. I beg she may be permitted to return to her friends in Philadelphia, or to come to me, as she may choose; from your Excellency I have no fears on her account, but she may suffer from the mistaken fury of the country.

"I have to request that the enclosed letter may be delivered to Mrs. Arnold, and she be permitted to write to me.

"I have also to ask that my clothes and baggage, which are of little consequence, may be sent to me; if required, their value shall be paid in money. I have the honor to be, with great regard and esteem, your Excellency's most obedient humble servant.

"N. B. In justice to the gentlemen of my family, Colonel Varrick and Major Franks, I think myself in honor bound to declare, that they, as well as Joshua Smith, Esq., (who I know is suspected) are totally ignorant of any transactions of mine, that they had reason to believe were injurious to the public."

## BEVERLY ROBINSON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*Vulture*, off *Singsing*, 25 September, 1780. — Sir; I am this moment informed that Major André, adjutant-general of his Majesty's army in America, is detained as a prisoner by the army under your command. It is therefore incumbent on me to inform you of the manner of his falling into your hands. He went up with a flag at the request of General Arnold, on public business with him, and had his permit to return by land to New York. Under these circumstances Major André cannot be detained by you, without the

greatest violation of flags, and contrary to the custom and usage of all nations; and, as I imagine you will see this matter in the same point of view as I do, I must desire you will order him to be set at liberty and allowed to return immediately. Every step Major André took, was by the advice and direction of General Arnold, even that of taking a feigned name, and of course he is not liable to censure for it. I am, Sir, not forgetting our former acquaintance, your very humble servant."

The Vulture set sail the same evening for New York, with Arnold on board. She reached the city the next morning, and conveyed the first intelligence to Sir Henry Clinton of the capture of his adjutant-general.

SIR HENRY CLINTON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*New York, 26 September, 1780.* — Sir; Being informed that the King's adjutant-general in America has been stopped, under Major-General Arnold's passports, and is detained a prisoner in your Excellency's army, I have the honor to inform you, Sir, that I permitted Major André to go to Major-General Arnold, at the particular request of that general officer. You will perceive, Sir, by the enclosed paper, that a flag of truce was sent to receive Major André, and passports granted for his return. I therefore can have no doubt but your Excellency will immediately direct, that this officer have permission to return to my orders at New York.

"I have the honor to be, &c."

The "enclosed paper," mentioned above, was the following letter from Arnold.

GENERAL ARNOLD TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

"*New York, 26 September, 1780.* — Sir; In answer to your Excellency's message, respecting your adjutant-general, Major André, and desiring my idea of the reasons why he is detained, being under my passports, I have the honor to inform you, Sir, that I apprehend a few hours must return Major André to your Excellency's orders, as that officer is assuredly under the protection of a flag of truce sent by me to him for the purpose of a conversation, which I requested to hold with him relating to myself, and which I wished to communicate, through that officer, to your Excellency.

"I commanded, at the time, at West Point, had an undoubted right to send my flag of truce for Major André, who came to me



under that protection, and, having held my conversation with him, I delivered him confidential papers in my own handwriting, to deliver to your Excellency; thinking it much properer he should return by land, I directed him to make use of the feigned name of John Anderson, under which he had, by my direction, come on shore, and gave him my passports to go to the White Plains on his way to New York. This officer cannot therefore fail of being immediately sent to New York, as he was invited to a conversation with me, for which I sent him a flag of truce, and finally gave him passports for his safe return to your Excellency; all which I had then a right to do, being in the actual service of America, under the orders of General Washington, and commanding general at West Point and its dependencies. I have the honor to be, &c."

On the 26th of September, André was brought to West Point, under an escort of dragoons commanded by Major Tallmadge; and on the 28th he was sent to Tappan, the head-quarters of the American army.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS FOR  
THE EXAMINATION OF MAJOR ANDRÉ.

"Head-Quarters, Tappan, 29 September, 1780.

"GENTLEMEN,

"Major André, adjutant-general to the British army, will be brought before you for your examination. He came within our lines in the night, on an interview with Major-General Arnold, and in an assumed character, and was taken within our lines in a disguised habit, with a pass under a feigned name, and with the enclosed papers concealed upon him. After a careful examination, you will be pleased, as speedily as possible, to report a precise state of his case, together with your opinion of the light in which he ought to be considered, and the punishment that ought to be inflicted. The judge-advocate will attend, to assist in the examination, who has sundry other papers relative to this matter, which he will lay before the Board. I have the honor to be, &c.

"GEORGE WASHINGTON."

The Board assembled the same day, and Major André was brought before them. In addition to his personal examination, he presented a brief statement of his case in writing.

PAPER DRAWN UP BY MAJOR ANDRÉ.

"On the 20th of September, I left New York to get on board the Vulture, in order (as I thought) to meet General Arnold there in

the night. No boat, however, came off, and I waited on board until the night of the 21st. During the day, a flag of truce was sent from the Vulture to complain of the violation of a military rule in the instance of a boat having been decoyed on shore by a flag, and fired upon. The letter was addressed to General Arnold, signed by Captain Sutherland, but written in my hand and countersigned 'J. Anderson, secretary.' Its intent was to indicate my presence on board the Vulture. In the night of the 21st a boat with Mr. — \* and two hands came on board, in order to fetch Mr. Anderson on shore, and, if too late to bring me back, to lodge me until the next night in a place of safety. I went into the boat, landed, and spoke with Arnold. I got on horseback with him to proceed to [Smith's] house, and in the way passed a guard I did not expect to see, having Sir Henry Clinton's directions not to go within an enemy's post, or to quit my own dress.

"In the morning A. quitted me, having himself made me put the papers I bore between my stockings and feet. Whilst he did it, he expressed a wish in case of any accident befalling me, that they should be destroyed, which I said, of course would be the case, as when I went into the boat I should have them tied about with a string and a stone. Before we parted, some mention had been made of my crossing the river, and going by another route; but, I objected much against it, and thought it was settled that in the way I came I was also to return.

"Mr. — \* to my great mortification persisted in his determination of carrying me by the other route; and, at the decline of the sun, I set out on horseback, passed King's Ferry, and came to Crompond, where a party of militia stopped us and advised we should remain. In the morning I came with [Smith] as far as within two miles and a half of Pine's Bridge, where he said he must part with me, as the Cow-boys infested the road thence forward. I was now near thirty miles from Kingsbridge, and left to the chance of passing that space undiscovered. I got to the neighbourhood of Tarrytown, which was far beyond the points described as dangerous, when I was taken by three volunteers, who, not satisfied with my pass, rifled me, and, finding papers, made me a prisoner.

"I have omitted mentioning, that, when I found myself within an enemy's posts, I changed my dress."

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\* Joshua H. Smith.

MAJOR ANDRÉ TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

"Tappan, 29 September, 1780.

"Sir,

"Your Excellency is doubtless already apprized of the manner in which I was taken, and possibly of the serious light in which my conduct is considered, and the rigorous determination that is impending.

"Under these circumstances, I have obtained General Washington's permission to send you this letter; the object of which is, to remove from your breast any suspicion that I could imagine I was bound by your Excellency's orders to expose myself to what has happened. The events of coming within an enemy's posts, and of changing my dress, which led me to my present situation, were contrary to my own intentions, as they were to your orders; and the circuitous route, which I took to return, was imposed (perhaps unavoidably) without alternative upon me.

"I am perfectly tranquil in mind, and prepared for any fate, to which an honest zeal for my King's service may have devoted me.

"In addressing myself to your Excellency on this occasion, the force of all my obligations to you, and of the attachment and gratitude I bear you, recurs to me. With all the warmth of my heart, I give you thanks for your Excellency's profuse kindness to me; and I send you the most earnest wishes for your welfare, which a faithful, affectionate, and respectful attendant can frame.

"I have a mother and three sisters, to whom the value of my commission would be an object, as the loss of Grenada has much affected their income. It is needless to be more explicit on this subject; I am persuaded of your Excellency's goodness.

"I receive the greatest attention from his Excellency General Washington, and from every person under whose charge I happen to be placed. I have the honor to be, with the most respectful attachment, your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

"JOHN ANDRÉ, *Adjutant-general*."

GENERAL ROBERTSON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*New York, 29 September, 1780.* — Sir; Persuaded that you are inclined rather to promote than prevent the civilities and acts of humanity, which the rules of war permit between civilized nations, I find no difficulty in representing to you, that several letters and messages sent from hence have been disregarded, are unanswered, and the flags of truce that carried them detained. As I ever have



treated all flags of truce with civility and respect, I have a right to hope, that you will order my complaint to be immediately redressed.

"Major André, who visited an officer commanding in a district, at his own desire, and acted in every circumstance agreeably to his direction, I find is detained a prisoner. My friendship for him leads me to fear he may suffer some inconvenience for want of necessaries. I wish to be allowed to send him a few, and shall take it as a favor if you will be pleased to permit his servant to deliver them. In Sir Henry Clinton's absence it becomes a part of my duty to make this representation and request. I am Sir, &c."

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL ROBERTSON.

"*Tappan, 30 September, 1780.* — Sir; I have just received your letter of the 29th instant. Any delay, which may attend your flags, has proceeded from accident and the peculiar circumstances of the occasion, not from intentional neglect or violation. The letter, which admitted of an answer, has received one as early as it could be given with propriety, transmitted by a flag this morning. As to messages, I am uninformed of any that have been sent. The necessaries for Major André will be delivered to him agreeably to your request. I am, Sir, &c."

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

"*Head-Quarters, 30 September, 1780.* — Sir; In answer to your Excellency's letter of the 26th instant, which I had the honor to receive, I have to inform you, that Major André was taken under such circumstances, as would have justified the most summary proceedings against him. I determined, however, to refer his case to the examination and decision of a board of general officers, who have reported, on his free and voluntary confession and letters;

"First, That he came on shore from the *Vulture* sloop-of-war, in the night of the 21st of September instant, on an interview with General Arnold, in a private and secret manner.

"Secondly, That he changed his dress within our lines; and, under a feigned name, and in a disguised habit, passed our works at Stony and Verplanck's Points, the evening of the 22d of September instant, and was taken the morning of the 23d of September instant, at Tarrytown, in a disguised habit, being then on his way to New York; and, when taken, he had in his possession several papers, which contained intelligence for the enemy."

"From these proceedings it is evident, that Major André was

employed in the execution of measures very foreign to the objects of flags of truce, and such as they were never meant to authorize or countenance in the most distant degree; and this gentleman confessed, with the greatest candor, in the course of his examination, 'that it was impossible for him to suppose, that he came on shore under the sanction of a flag.' I have the honor to be, &c.\*

## GENERAL CLINTON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*New York, 30 September, 1780.* — Sir; From your Excellency's letter of this date, I am persuaded the board of general officers, to whom you referred the case of Major André, cannot have been rightly informed of all the circumstances on which a judgment ought to be formed. I think it of the highest moment to humanity, that your Excellency should be perfectly apprized of the state of this matter, before you proceed to put that judgment in execution.

"For this reason, I shall send his Excellency Lieutenant-General Robertson, and two other gentlemen, to give you a true state of facts, and to declare to you my sentiments and resolutions. They will set out to-morrow as early as the wind and tide will permit, and wait near Dobbs's Ferry for your permission and safe conduct, to meet your Excellency, or such persons as you may appoint, to converse with them on this subject. I have the honor to be, &c.

"P. S. The Honorable Andrew Elliot, Lieutenant-Governor, and the Honorable William Smith, Chief Justice of this Province, will attend his Excellency Lieutenant-General Robertson."

These gentlemen, attended by Colonel Beverly Robinson, went up to Dobbs's Ferry in the Greyhound schooner. General Robertson only was permitted to land, and he met on the shore General Greene, who had been deputed by General Washington to hold the conference on his part. They remained together till nearly night, and the subject was fully discussed. General Robertson was likewise the bearer of two letters from Arnold, one of which was designed to aid the objects of his mission, though this would hardly seem credible after considering its contents.

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\* The closing part of the report of the board of officers was not quoted in the letter to Sir Henry Clinton. It was in the following words;—"The Board, having maturely considered these facts, do also report to his Excellency General Washington, that Major André, adjutant-general to the British army, ought to be considered as a spy from the enemy, and that, agreeably to the law and usage of nations, it is their opinion he ought to suffer death."



## GENERAL ARNOLD TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

*"New York, 1 October, 1780. — Sir; The polite attention shown by your Excellency and the gentlemen of your family to Mrs. Arnold, when in distress, demand my grateful acknowledgment and thanks, which I beg leave to present.*

*"From your Excellency's letter to Sir Henry Clinton, I find a board of general officers have given it as their opinion, that Major André comes under the description of a spy. My good opinion of the candor and justice of those gentlemen leads me to believe, that, if they had been made fully acquainted with every circumstance respecting Major André, they would by no means have considered him in the light of a spy, or even of a prisoner. In justice to him, I think it my duty to declare, that he came from on board the Vulture at my particular request, by a flag sent on purpose for him by Joshua Smith, Esq., who had permission to go to Dobbs's Ferry to carry letters, and for other purposes not mentioned, and to return. This was done as a blind to the spy-boats. Mr. Smith at the same time had my private directions to go on board the Vulture, and bring on shore Colonel Robinson, or Mr. John Anderson, which was the name I had requested Major André to assume. At the same time I desired Mr. Smith to inform him, that he should have my protection, and a safe passport to return in the same boat, as soon as our business was completed. As several accidents intervened to prevent his being sent on board, I gave him my passport to return by land. Major André came on shore in his uniform (without disguise), which, with much reluctance, at my particular and pressing instance, he exchanged for another coat. I furnished him with a horse and saddle, and pointed out the route by which he was to return. And, as commanding officer in the department, I had an undoubted right to transact all these matters; which, if wrong, Major André ought by no means to suffer for them.*

*"But if, after this just and candid representation of Major André's case, the board of general officers adhere to their former opinion, I shall suppose it dictated by passion and resentment; and, if that gentleman should suffer the severity of their sentence, I shall think myself bound by every tie of duty and honor to retaliate on such unhappy persons of your army as may fall within my power, that the respect due to flags, and to the law of nations, may be better understood and observed.*

*"I have further to observe, that forty of the principal inhabitants of South Carolina have justly forfeited their lives, which have hith-*



erto been spared by the clemency of his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, who cannot in justice extend his mercy to them any longer, if Major André suffers ; which, in all probability, will open a scene of blood at which humanity will revolt.

“Suffer me to entreat your Excellency, for your own and the honor of humanity, and the love you have of justice, that you suffer not an unjust sentence to touch the life of Major André. But if this warning should be disregarded, and he suffer, I call Heaven and earth to witness, that your Excellency will be justly answerable for the torrent of blood that may be spilt in consequence.

“I have the honor to be, &c.”

GENERAL ARNOLD TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

“*New York, 1 October, 1780.* — Sir ; I take this opportunity to inform your Excellency, that I consider myself no longer acting under the commission of Congress. Their last to me being among my papers at West Point, you, Sir, will make such use of it as you think proper.

“At the same time I beg leave to assure your Excellency, that my attachment to the true interest of my country is invariable, and that I am actuated by the same principle, which has ever been the governing rule of my conduct in this unhappy contest.

“I have the honor to be, &c.”

Generals Greene and Robertson separated without being able to agree upon the question at issue. The former promised, however, to represent the arguments of the latter faithfully to General Washington, and to give him early intelligence of the result. The commissioners remained on board the Greyhound at Dobbs's Ferry during the night.

GENERAL GREENE TO GENERAL ROBERTSON.

“*Camp, Tappan, 2 October, 1780.* — Sir ; Agreeably to your request I communicated to General Washington the substance of your conversation in all the particulars, so far as my memory served me. It made no alteration in his opinion and determination. I need say no more, after what you have already been informed. I have the honor to be, &c.”

GENERAL ROBERTSON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

“*Greyhound Schooner, Flag of Truce, Dobbs's Ferry, 2 October, 1780.* — Sir ; A note I had from General Greene leaves me in doubt

if his memory had served him to relate to you with exactness the substance of the conversation, that had passed between him and myself on the subject of Major André. In an affair of so much consequence to my friend, to the two armies, and humanity, I would leave no possibility of a misunderstanding, and therefore take the liberty to put in writing the substance of what I said to General Greene.

"I offered to prove, by the evidence of Colonel Robinson and the officers of the Vulture, that Major André went on shore at General Arnold's desire, in a boat sent for him with a flag of truce; that he not only came ashore with the knowledge and under the protection of the general, who commanded in the district, but that he took no step while on shore, but by the direction of General Arnold, as will appear by the enclosed letter from him to your Excellency. Under these circumstances I could not, and hoped you would not, consider Major André as a spy, for any improper phrase in his letter to you.

"The facts he relates correspond with the evidence I offer; but he admits a conclusion that does not follow. The change of clothes and name was ordered by General Arnold, under whose directions he necessarily was, while within his command. As General Greene and I did not agree in opinion, I wished, that disinterested gentlemen of knowledge of the law of war and nations might be asked their opinion on the subject, and mentioned Monsieur Knyphausen and General Rochambeau.

"I related that a Captain Robinson had been delivered to Sir Henry Clinton as a spy, and undoubtedly was such; but that, it being signified to him that you were desirous that the man should be exchanged, he had ordered him to be exchanged. I wished that an intercourse of such civilities as the rules of war admit of, might take off many of its horrors. I admitted that Major André had a great share of Sir Henry Clinton's esteem, and that he would be infinitely obliged by his liberation; and that, if he was permitted to return with me, I would engage to have any person you would be pleased to name set at liberty. I added, that Sir Henry Clinton had never put to death any person for a breach of the rules of war, though he had, and now has, many in his power. Under the present circumstances, much good may arise from humanity, much ill from the want of it. If that could give any weight, I beg leave to add, that your favorable treatment of Major André will be a favor I should ever be intent to return to any you hold dear.

"My memory does not retain with the exactness I could wish the

words of the letter, which General Greene showed me from Major André to your Excellency. For Sir Henry Clinton's satisfaction, I beg you will order a copy of it to be sent to me at New York.

"I have the honor to be, &c."

After sending this letter, the commissioners returned to New York. The time at first fixed for the execution of Major André was five o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st of October, and it was thus published in the orders of the day. But the conference between Greene and Robertson caused a postponement till the next day at twelve o'clock. On the morning of the day, in which the execution was expected to take place, André wrote as follows.

MAJOR ANDRÉ TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*Tappan, 1 October, 1780.*—Sir; Buoyed above the terror of death, by the consciousness of a life devoted to honorable pursuits, and stained with no action that can give me remorse, I trust that the request I make to your Excellency at this serious period, and which is to soften my last moments, will not be rejected.

"Sympathy towards a soldier will surely induce your Excellency and a military tribunal to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of honor.

"Let me hope, Sir, that if aught in my character impresses you with esteem towards me, if aught in my misfortunes marks me as the victim of policy and not of resentment, I shall experience the operation of these feelings in your breast, by being informed that I am not to die on a gibbet.

"I have the honor to be your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

"JOHN ANDRÉ,

"*Adj. Gen. to the British Army.*"

This request was duly considered by the Commander-in-chief and his principal officers; but, taking into view the nature of the offence, the peculiar circumstances attending it, the invariable rules of war, and the usage of nations, Washington could not consistently with his sense of duty grant an indulgence, which might seem to imply any doubt in his mind of the entire justice of the sentence, however strongly he might be moved by his well-known feelings of humanity, and his respect for the character of the sufferer. André was condemned as a spy, and hanged as such at twelve o'clock on the 2d of October. During the whole time of his captivity he had exhibited perfect fortitude and serenity; and in his last moments he



called on all around him to bear witness, that he died like a brave man.

The news of his death was carried to New York by his servant, who had come out and remained with him, and who took the regimentals in which he was executed and his other effects. The following order was issued to the British army by Sir Henry Clinton.

*"Head-Quarters, New York, October 8th.* — The Commander-in-chief does with infinite regret inform the army of the death of the adjutant-general Major André. The unfortunate fate of this officer calls upon the Commander-in-chief to declare, that he ever considered Major André a gentleman, as well as, in the line of his military profession, of the highest integrity and honor, and incapable of any base action or unworthy conduct. Major André's death is very severely felt by the Commander-in-chief, as it assuredly will be by the army; and must prove a real loss to the country and to his Majesty's service."

Rumors went abroad, that other officers of high rank in the American army were implicated with Arnold. It was proved afterwards, that these rumors were set afloat by the enemy, for the purpose of exciting distrust and discord in the American camp. Till this fact was established, however, General Washington felt extreme anxiety, and omitted no effort to ascertain the truth. Secret agents were sent into New York to make inquiries and procure intelligence. The intercourse was managed chiefly by Major Henry Lee, who was stationed with his dragoons on the lines, and whose ability and address, as well as his energy and promptitude, peculiarly qualified him for such a service. A paper had been found, in which the name of General St. Clair was mentioned in a suspicious manner, and which was traced to an emissary by the name of Brown.

MAJOR LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

*"October 13th, 1780.* — Sir; I have made it my business to see the person, who was Captain Brown's guide. From a minute examination of him, I am confident that General St. Clair was named to deceive, that Captain Brown did not see or hear from General St. Clair, and that Captain Brown passed himself on his conductor as a person engaged in our service, although his object was to communicate with some gentleman of consequence among us. I am apt to believe that he was charged with despatches for General Arnold.

"I have the honor to be, &c."

## GENERAL WASHINGTON TO MAJOR LEE.

"*October 13th.*—Dear Sir; I am very glad your letter of this date has given strength to my conviction of the innocence of the gentleman, who was the subject of your inquiry. I want to see you on a particular piece of business. If the day is fair, and nothing of consequence intervenes, I will be at the Marquis's quarters by ten o'clock to-morrow. If this should not happen, I shall be glad to see you at head-quarters. I am, &c."

Other papers were sent to General Washington by his spies in New York, which cleared up the matter fully, and rendered it certain, that all the insinuations against the American officers were to be ascribed to the arts of the enemy.

A project was set on foot for seizing the person of Arnold. It was concerning this matter, that Washington wished to see Major Lee. The romantic adventures of Sergeant Champe, so spiritedly and beautifully described in Lee's *Memoirs*, are well known.\* The following letters passed between General Washington and Major Lee on that subject.

## MAJOR LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*Light Camp, 16 October, 1780.*—I waited on Colonel Dey yesterday, but received no information favorable to the business you were pleased to charge me with. On my return last evening the Marquis mentioned to me the same matter as very eligible, and Colonel Hamilton made some inquiry on the same subject. I communicate this to you, lest a mention of it by those gentlemen to you may alarm you on the score of secrecy. Be assured, Sir, I shall endeavour most earnestly to accomplish your wishes, and have hopes to establish the commencement on Wednesday next."

## MAJOR LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

[*October 20th.*†]—"Sir; I have engaged two persons to undertake the accomplishment of your Excellency's wishes. In my negotiation I have said little or nothing concerning your Excellency, as I presumed it would operate disagreeably, should the issue prove disastrous.

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\* *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States*, Vol. II. pp. 159 - 187.

† In the original this letter is not dated; but in Lee's *Memoirs*, (Vol. II. p. 182,) it is said to have been written on the same day as Washington's answer to it.

"The chief of the two persons is a sergeant in my cavalry. To him I have promised promotion. The other is an inhabitant of Newark; I have had experience of his fidelity; and his connexions with the enemy render him, with his personal qualifications, very fit for the business. To this man I have engaged one hundred guineas, five hundred acres of land, and three negroes. I gave him the promise of negroes, because he is engaged in aiding me to destroy the refugees at Bergen Point. Success there puts it in my power to reward him according to compact. If nothing is done, he is to receive an additional sum of money. The outlines of the scheme, which I have recommended, are, that the sergeant should join General Arnold as a deserter from us, should engage in his corps now raising, and should contrive to insinuate himself into some menial or military berth about the General's person; that a correspondence should be kept up with the man in Newark, by the latter's visiting the former every two days; and that, when the favorable moment arrives, they should seize the prize in the night, gag him, and bring him across to Bergen woods.

"If your Excellency approves of what is done, the sergeant will desert from us to-morrow. A few guineas will be necessary for him. I have advised that no third person be admitted into the virtuous conspiracy, as two appear to me adequate to the execution of it.

"The sergeant is a very promising youth, of uncommon taciturnity, and inflexible perseverance. His connexions, and his service in the army from the beginning of the war, assure me that he will be faithful. I have instructed him not to return till he receives directions from me, but to continue his attempts however unfavorable the prospects may appear at first. I have incited his thirst for fame, by impressing on his mind the virtue and glory of the act. I have the honor to be, &c."

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO MAJOR LEE.

"*Head-Quarters, 20 October, 1780.* — Dear Sir; The plan proposed for taking A——, the outlines of which are communicated in your letter, which was this moment put into my hands without a date, has every mark of a good one. I therefore agree to the promised rewards, and have such entire confidence in your management of the business, as to give it my fullest approbation; and leave the whole to the guidance of your own judgment, with this express stipulation and pointed injunction, that he (A——) is brought to me alive. No circumstance whatever shall obtain my consent to his being put to death. The idea, which would accompany such an



event, would be that ruffians had been hired to assassinate him. My aim is to make a public example of him; and this should be strongly impressed upon those, who are employed to bring him off. The sergeant must be very circumspect; too much zeal may create suspicion; and too much precipitancy may defeat the project. The most inviolable secrecy must be observed on all hands. I send you five guineas; but I am not satisfied of the propriety of the sergeant's appearing with much specie. This circumstance may also lead to suspicion, as it is but too well known to the enemy, that we do not abound in this article.

"The interviews between the party in and out of the city should be managed with much caution and seeming indifference, or else the frequency of their meetings may betray the design, and involve bad consequences; but I am persuaded you will place every matter in a proper point of view to the conductors of this interesting business, and therefore I shall only add, that I am, dear Sir, &c."

MAJOR LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*October 21st.*—I have just returned from Newark, where I completed the business your Excellency committed to me. The virtuous sergeant deserted last night. I saw the two in Newark this day. This night they go to York.

"Desertion among us is a perfect stranger. My officers are very attentive, and some of them men of nice discernment. This leads me to apprehend they will discover, that the sergeant is on some secret command. Lest the example may operate on the soldiers, the captains will probably inform their troops of their conclusion. From the soldiers, the same sentiments may reach the people.

"To prevent this, I wish your Excellency would order me to move to a forage country; this is very scarce of hay. I can send two troops, including the one to which the deserter belongs, to an abundant neighbourhood back of the Mountain Meeting-House, where they will be safe, and ready for any operation. One troop can remain with me here, which number is adequate to the common duties. Sir Henry Clinton is still in New York. Report says Arnold sailed with the fleet, though this is not credible.

"I have the honor to be, &c."

MAJOR LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

"*Light Camp, 25 October, 1780.*—My friend got safe into New York. He was before Sir Henry Clinton, and has passed all

the forms of the garrison. He accidentally met Colonel Arnold \* in the street, which has paved a natural way for further acquaintance. The party entertain high hopes of success. I fear their patience will be exhausted ; therefore am of opinion it ought to be impressed on their minds at every meeting. I informed Mr. Baldwin, that I was under orders to march south ; that I would see him to-morrow, and send on some officer from you, who should transact the business on your Excellency's part in case of my departure. I also promised him ten or twelve guineas. I was induced to do this, because I apprehended he would fail in his assiduity, unless he received some part of his promised reward. On hearing from your Excellency I shall be able to-morrow to ascertain with Mr. Baldwin the next interview, the time, the place, and the person. The time and place I will communicate to my successor. Should I leave this army, I entreat your Excellency's attention to my sergeant, and should be happy if he could be sent on to me.

"I beg leave to thank your Excellency, for the confidence and friendship you have been pleased to give me since I became a soldier. I flatter myself I shall enjoy a continuation of it though absent, and that I shall be called on to perform any services private or public you may wish to execute, convenient to my local situation, and not superior to my ability or station. I sincerely pray for your health, happiness, and success. May you never again experience a second base desertion, and may you live to put an end to a war, which you have hitherto conducted happily, amidst so many and so great difficulties. I have the honor to be, &c."

There appears to be a discrepancy between these letters and some parts of the narrative of Champe's adventures, as given in Lee's *Memoirs*. The sergeant is there represented to have deserted before the execution of André, with the special design of seizing Arnold, and thereby saving André. But the execution of André took place on the 2d of October, and it is stated above that the sergeant did not desert till the night of the 20th. It was impossible, therefore, to have been a part of the scheme to save André.

The discrepancy may be explained upon the supposition, that the incidents described by Lee, as occurring previously to this latter date, applied to another person, and that in the lapse of time

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\* Arnold was appointed a colonel in the British service, with the brevet rank of brigadier-general.

the transactions in which they were both engaged had become confounded in the writer's memory. This solution is the more probable from the circumstance, that a sergeant, who was one of an escort that accompanied Captain Ogden to Paulus Hook, as the bearer of despatches from General Washington to Sir Henry Clinton, deserted at that place during the night of the 30th of September. (See *Life and Treason of Arnold*, p. 270.) The sergeant had been instructed to desert, and to act as a spy in New York for certain purposes. It may have been a part of his commission to seize Arnold, should circumstances favor such an enterprise.

British writers have represented the sentence against André as unnecessarily severe, if not inconsistent with military usage. To meet this charge we need only cite the case of an American officer, who had previously been taken in a similar character, and executed in the British camp.

#### CAPTAIN NATHAN HALE.

"The case of Captain Nathan Hale has been regarded as parallel to that of Major André. This young officer was a graduate of Yale College, and had but recently closed his academic course when the war of the revolution commenced. Possessing genius, taste, and ardor, he became distinguished as a scholar; and, endowed in an eminent degree with those graces and gifts of nature which add a charm to youthful excellence, he gained universal esteem and confidence. To high moral worth and irreproachable habits were joined gentleness of manners, an ingenuous disposition, and vigor of understanding. No young man of his years put forth a fairer promise of future usefulness and celebrity; the fortunes of none were fostered more sincerely by the generous good wishes of his associates, or the hopes and encouraging presages of his superiors.

"Being a patriot upon principle, and an enthusiast in a cause, which appealed equally to his sense of justice and love of liberty, he was among the first to take up arms in his country's defence. The news of the battle of Lexington roused his martial spirit, and called him immediately to the field. He obtained a commission in the army, and marched with his company to Cambridge. His promptness, activity, and assiduous attention to discipline, were early observed. He prevailed upon his men to adopt a simple uniform, which improved their appearance, attracted notice, and procured applause. The example was followed by others, and its influence was beneficial. Nor were his hours wholly absorbed by his military du-



ties. A rigid economy of time enabled him to gratify his zeal for study and mental culture.

"At length the theatre of action was changed, and the army was removed to the southward. The battle of Long Island was fought, and the American forces were drawn together in the city of New York. At this moment it was extremely important for Washington to know the situation of the British army on the heights of Brooklyn, its numbers, and the indications as to its future movements. Having confidence in the discretion and judgment of the gallant Colonel Knowlton, who commanded a Connecticut regiment of infantry, he explained his wishes to that officer, and requested him to ascertain if any suitable person could be found in his regiment, who would undertake so hazardous and responsible a service. It was essential, that he should be a man of capacity, address, and military knowledge.

"Colonel Knowlton assembled several of his officers, stated to them the views and desires of the General, and left the subject to their reflections, without proposing the enterprise to any individual. The officers then separated. Captain Hale considered deliberately what had been said, and, finding himself by a sense of duty inclined to the undertaking, he called at the quarters of his intimate friend, Captain Hull (afterwards General Hull), and asked his opinion. Hull endeavoured to dissuade him from the service, as not befitting his rank in the army, and as being of a kind for which his openness of character disqualified him; adding, that no glory could accrue from success, and detection would inevitably be followed by an ignominious death.

"Captain Hale replied, that all these considerations had been duly weighed, that 'every kind of service necessary to the public good was honorable by being necessary,' that he did not accept a commission for the sake of fame alone or personal advancement, that he had been for some time in the army without being able to render any signal aid to the cause of his country, and that he felt impelled by high motives of duty, not to shrink from the opportunity now presented.

"The arguments of his friend were unavailing, and Captain Hale passed over to Long Island in disguise. He had gained the desired information, and was just on the point of stepping into a boat to return to the city of New York, when he was arrested and taken before the British commander. Like André, he had assumed a character, which he could not sustain; he was 'too little accustomed to duplicity to succeed.' The proof against him was so con-

clusive, that he made no effort at self-defence, but frankly confessed his objects; and, again like André, without further remarks 'left the facts to operate with his judges.' He was sentenced to be executed as a spy, and was accordingly hanged the next morning.

"The sentence was conformable to the laws of war, and the prisoner was prepared to meet it with a fortitude becoming his character. But the circumstances of his death aggravated his sufferings, and placed him in a situation widely different from that of André. The facts were narrated to General Hull by an officer of the British commissary department, who was present at the execution, and deeply moved by the conduct and fate of the unfortunate victim, and the treatment he received. The provost-martial, to whose charge he was consigned, was a refugee, and behaved towards him in the most unfeeling manner; refusing the attendance of a clergyman and the use of a bible, and destroying the letters he had written to his mother and friends.

"In the midst of these barbarities, Hale was calm, collected, firm; pitying the malice that could insult a fallen foe and dying man, but displaying to the last his native elevation of soul, dignity of deportment, and an undaunted courage. Alone, unfriended, without consolation or sympathy, he closed his mortal career with the declaration, 'that he only lamented he had but one life to lose for his country.' When André stood upon the scaffold, he called on all around him to bear witness, that he died like a brave man. The dying words of Hale embodied a nobler and more sublime sentiment; breathing a spirit of satisfaction, that, although brought to an untimely end, it was his lot to die a martyr in his country's cause. The whole tenor of his conduct, and this declaration itself, were such proofs of his bravery, that it required not to be more audibly proclaimed. The following tribute is from the muse of Dr. Dwight.

"Thus, while fond virtue wished in vain to save,  
Hale, bright and generous, found a hapless grave;  
With genius' living flame his bosom glowed,  
And science charmed him to her sweet abode;  
In worth's fair path his feet adventured far,  
The pride of peace, the rising grace of war.'

"There was a striking similarity between the character and acts of Hale and André, but in one essential point of difference the former appears to much the greater advantage. Hale was promised no reward, nor did he expect any. It was necessary, that the service should be undertaken from purely virtuous motives, without a

hope of gain or of honor; because it was of a nature not to be executed by the common class of spies, who are influenced by pecuniary considerations; and promotion could not be offered as an inducement, since that would be a temptation for an officer to hazard his life as a spy, which a commander could not with propriety hold out. Viewed in any light, the act must be allowed to bear unequivocal marks of patriotic disinterestedness and self-devotion. But André had a glorious prize before him; the chance of distinguishing himself in a military enterprise, honors, renown, and every allurement, that could flatter hope and stimulate ambition. To say the least, his personal advantages were to be commensurate with the benefit to his country.

"But whatever may have been the parallel between these two individuals while living, it ceased with their death. A monument was raised and consecrated to the memory of André by the bounty of a grateful sovereign. His ashes have been removed from their obscure resting-place, transported across the ocean, and deposited with the remains of the illustrious dead in Westminster Abbey. Where is the memento of the virtues, the patriotic sacrifice, the early fate of Hale? It is not inscribed in marble; it is hardly recorded in books. Let it be the more deeply cherished in the hearts of his countrymen." — SPARKS'S *Life and Treason of Arnold*, pp. 299 – 305.

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LETTERS CONCERNING THE TRANSACTIONS OF  
LORD CORNWALLIS AND LORD RAWDON IN  
THE CAROLINAS.

SIR HENRY CLINTON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

New York, 9 October, 1780.

Sir,

Persuaded it is for the interest of mankind, that a correspondence should exist between generals commanding adverse armies, I do, without waiting your return to applications of an earlier date, made on my part on a subject very interesting to me, answer without delay your letter of the 6th instant.

I have heard the report you mention, that a number of persons



under the capitulation of Charleston had entered into a plot for the destruction of the place where they were protected, and that the officer commanding there had found it necessary to interfere. I have this only from common fame; no formal report has been made to me on the subject; but as I am well acquainted with Lord Cornwallis's humanity, I cannot entertain the least apprehension, that he will stain the lustre of the King's arms by acts of cruelty.

The friends of those persons, under the description you give of them, need be under no fears for their safety. Lord Cornwallis is incapable of straining the laws to take away the lives or liberties of the innocent. If any forced construction be put upon the laws by his Lordship, it will be in favor of the accused, and every plea their friends can offer for them will be humanely heard and respected. I am, Sir, &c.

HENRY CLINTON.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 16 October, 1780.

SIR,

On the same principle, upon which your letter of the 9th is founded, it has been my endeavour to conduct the correspondence between us, on the terms, which politeness and the nature of the intercourse demanded. In the affair to which you alluded, I persuade myself that all the attentions were observed, which the peculiarity of the circumstances would justify.

In my letter of the 6th ultimo, I barely made an inquiry about the persons who are the subjects of it. I stated no particular report, much less the one you mention, of a supposed plot for the destruction of Charleston, which I cannot but believe will, on investigation, appear as ill founded, as it does to me in the present situation of things improbable. I wish I could agree in opinion with you, as to the spirit which actuates your officers in the southern command; but I must conceive that the enclosed intercepted letters of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Rawdon breathe a very different temper. They not only profess a flagrant breach of the capitulation of Charleston, and a violation of the laws of nations, but, under whatever forced description the unhappy objects of the severity are placed, it is in a form, and carried to an extreme, at which humanity revolts. I flatter myself, that you will interpose your authority and influence to prevent a prosecution of measures, which cannot fail to aggravate the rigors of war, and to involve the most disagreeable consequences. I am, Sir, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

## LORD RAWDON TO MAJOR RUGELY.\*

Head-Quarters, Camden, 1 July, 1780.

SIR,

So many deserters from this army have passed with impunity through the districts, which are under your direction, that I must necessarily suspect the inhabitants to have connived at, if not facilitated their escape. If attachment to their sovereign will not move the country people to check a crime so detrimental to his service, it must be my care to urge them to their duty as good subjects, by using invariable severity towards every one, who shall show so criminal a neglect of the public interest. I am, therefore, Sir, to request of you, that you will signify, to all within the limits of your command, my firm determination in this case. If any person shall meet a soldier straggling without a written pass beyond the pickets, and shall not do his utmost to secure him, or shall not spread an alarm for that purpose, or if any person shall give shelter to soldiers straggling as above mentioned, or shall serve them as a guide, or shall furnish them with horses, or any other assistance, the persons so offending may assure themselves of rigorous punishment, either by whipping, imprisonment, or by being sent to serve his Majesty in the West Indies, according as I shall think the degree of criminality may require. I have ordered, that every soldier who passes the pickets, shall submit himself to be examined by any of the militia, who have any suspicion of him. If a soldier, therefore, attempts to escape when ordered by the militia-man to stop, he is immediately to be fired upon as a deserter. Single men of the light horse need not be examined, as they may often be sent alone upon expresses. Nor is any party of infantry with a non-commissioned officer at the head of it to be stopped.

I will give the inhabitants ten guineas for the head of any deserter belonging to the volunteers of Ireland; and five guineas only if they bring him in alive. They shall likewise be rewarded, though not to that amount, for such deserters as they may secure belonging to any other regiment. I am confident that you will encourage the country people to be more active in this respect. I am, Sir, with much esteem, &c.

RAWDON.†

\* The *original* letter of Lord Rawdon was found in Rugely's house, and sent to General Washington by General Gates. A copy of Lord Cornwallis's letter was forwarded by the Governor of North Carolina. When Sir Henry Clinton received them, he enclosed a copy of each to Lord Cornwallis and Lord Rawdon respectively.

† When Lord Rawdon received a copy of this letter, he wrote in reply. that

LORD CORNWALLIS TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL NESBITT BALFOUR,  
COMMANDANT AT NINETY-SIX.

August, 1780.

SIR,

I have the happiness to inform you, that on Wednesday the 16th instant I totally defeated General Gates's army. One thousand were killed and wounded ; about eight hundred taken prisoners. We are in possession of eight pieces of brass cannon (all they had in the field), all their ammunition-wagons, a great number of arms, one hundred and thirty baggage-wagons ; in short, there never was a more complete victory. I have written to Lieutenant-Colonel Turnbull, whom I have sent to join Major Ferguson on Little River, to push on after General Sumpter to the Waxaws, whose detachment is the only collected force of rebels in all this country. Colonel Tarleton is in pursuit of Sumpter. Our loss is about three hundred killed and wounded, chiefly of the thirty-third regiment and volunteers of Ireland.

I have given orders, that all the inhabitants of this province, who have subscribed and have taken part in this revolt, should be pun-

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there was every possible provocation and even necessity for the measures mentioned in it ; that he had the fullest proofs that the people, who daily came into his camp under the mask of friendship, held correspondence with the rebel militia ; and, moreover, that they used every artifice to influence the minds of the soldiers and induce them to desert ; that the encouragement and means of escape, which they gave the men, succeeded to an alarming degree ; that while commanding in the back country he was betrayed on every side by the inhabitants ; that several small detachments were attacked by persons, who had the hour before been with them as friends in the camp ; that the militia in the army not only enticed the soldiers away, but actually furnished them with horses to make their escape ; that it was absolutely necessary to put a stop to such a system of conduct ; that the safety of the army required it ; and that it was justified not more by the circumstances of the case, than by the nature of the offence.

For this purpose, he added, the letter complained of was written in compliance with duty, and, although with firmness, yet not with a wanton abuse of power. The threat to send delinquents to the West Indies, he said, all must see, from the impracticability of the thing, was meant to act only on the fears and prejudices of the vulgar, and not to be literally executed. It had its effect on the Irish, as was intended. — *MS. Letter to Sir Henry Clinton.*

How far these remarks go to justify the extraordinary tenor of the letter, the reader can judge. Considering the odium in which the name of Lord Rawdon is held, as connected with the war in the southern States, it seems proper that he should be heard in his own defence. See likewise his letter written late in life to General Henry Lee, respecting the case of Colonel Hayne, and published in the Appendix to H. LEE's *Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas.*



ished with the greatest rigor, and also those, who will not turn out, that they may be imprisoned, and their whole property taken from them or destroyed. I have likewise ordered, that compensation should be made out of their estates to the persons, who have been injured and oppressed by them. I have ordered in the most positive manner, that every militia-man, who has borne arms with us, and afterwards joined the enemy, shall be immediately hanged. I desire you will take the most rigorous measures to punish the rebels in the district in which you command, and that you will obey, in the strictest manner, the directions I have given in this letter relative to the inhabitants of this country.

CORNWALLIS.\*

SIR HENRY CLINTON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

New York, 23 October, 1780.

SIR,

I have received your letter of the 16th instant, enclosing copies of an extract of a letter from the Earl Cornwallis to Lieutenant-Colonel Nesbitt Balfour, and of a letter from Lord Rawdon to Major Rugely.

I must always consider an extract from a letter as a partial, and not always a candid description of a correspondence. But, admitting the authenticity of these papers, I am to suppose, that Lieutenant-

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\* In remarking upon this letter, Lord Cornwallis said, in the first place, that it was not written to Colonel Balfour, as represented, but to Colonel Cruger, then commanding at Ninety-Six. Next he complained, that his original letter had been garbled and altered in several parts. He mentioned the following instances;—"who have *subscribed*" was changed from "who have *submitted*,"—"who have been *injured*" from "who have been *plundered*,"—"most *rigorous*" from "most *vigorous*,"—"punish the rebels" from "*extinguish the rebellion*." These changes Lord Cornwallis said were evidently designed and wilful, and made an essential difference in the tone of the letter.

In reference to the contents generally, he observed, that he had only ordered punishment upon those, who had once submitted to the British government and taken the oaths and received protection in June and July, and had gone back into rebellion in August. The property of such persons he had seized and destroyed. Such persons as had voluntarily enrolled themselves in the King's militia, received arms and ammunition, and then seized the first opportunity to go over to the enemy, he had ordered to be hanged when taken. He had also ordered, that all measures should be pursued to extinguish the rebellion. So far from cruelty, or violation of the laws of nations, or a breach of the capitulation of Charleston, in these measures, he could only see in them strict justice and propriety. — *MS. Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton.*

General the Earl Cornwallis had determined to punish with a just severity certain persons, who, after subscribing to and taking a test-oath of allegiance and service to his Majesty, had committed crimes in violation of such test-oath so taken and subscribed to by them. And it seems to me both natural and proper, that loyal subjects, who have been injured and oppressed on account of their zeal for the King's service, should receive compensation in such cases by a discrimination between them and the avowed enemies to the British government.

I perceive no reason why a militia-man, who has joined the King's army, and is afterwards taken in that of the enemy, should be discriminated from other deserters. I need not point out to you, Sir, the right the laws of arms give over such offenders. And this will serve as the only necessary remark I have occasion to make on what is called a letter from Lord Rawdon, which concerns only deserters. For the style or terms in which it may be written, he is in the first instance answerable only to the King's Lieutenant-General commanding in the southern district, finally to me.

It has been my invariable line of conduct always to soften so far as possible, never to aggravate, the rigors of war. Such has been also the desire of every general officer in his Majesty's service acting in this unhappy war. But proper punishments upon guilty persons may become sometimes necessary. By guilty persons, I profess to mean those, who shall have been convicted upon the clearest grounds, and justest principles, of *real* not *supposed* crimes. A conduct so founded, leaves me in no apprehension of becoming involved in any disagreeable consequences.

I desire to conclude this subject by informing you, Sir, that I esteem myself accountable for my public conduct to his Majesty the King, to my country, and to my own conscience. The last being a principal mover of all my actions, will, I flatter myself, approve me to his Majesty and the government I serve, consequently to the world. The King's general officers serving on expeditions, or in different districts, under me, act from my orders; and I will observe respecting them generally, as I did in a late letter particularly concerning Lord Cornwallis's conduct, such as his lordship would assuredly govern himself by towards the conspirators at Charleston, that I am well acquainted with the humanity of the general and other officers of the King's army, and cannot entertain the least apprehension, that they will *stain* the lustre of the King's arms by acts of cruelty; they are incapable of *straining* the laws to take away the lives or liberties of the *innocent*.

If any forced construction be put upon the laws, it will be in *favor* of accused persons, and every plea their friends can offer for them, will be *humanely* heard and respected.

I will imagine this letter may be considered as a full answer to the subjects your letter of the 16th treats of; both as it relates to them in the present instance, or in any future one. I am, Sir, your humble servant.

HENRY CLINTON.

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No. IX. p. 281.

PLAN OF AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK ISLAND PROPOSED BY THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Light Camp, 30 October, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

In our conversations upon military operations you have often told me, that, since the beginning of the campaign, your eyes were turned towards a project, upon which I generally agree in opinion with you, and beg leave to offer some observations.

Far from lessening my desire of finishing the campaign by some brilliant stroke, the project of Staten Island, though it miscarried, has strengthened my opinions; as I have clearly seen by the details of that operation, that we should in all human probability have succeeded, and that our men were fully equal to any enterprise of the kind. My reasons for wishing to undertake something are these. First, any enterprise will please the people of this country, and show them that when we have men, we do not stand still; and even a defeat, provided it is not fatal, would have its good consequences. Secondly, the French court have often complained to me of the inactivity of the American army, who, before the alliance, had distinguished themselves by their spirit of enterprise. They have often said to me, "Your friends leave us now to fight their battles, and risk themselves no more." It is moreover of the greatest political importance to let them know, that on our side we were ready to co-operate. Be assured, my dear General, it will be the interest of many people to make it believed, that we were not ready; and if any thing will engage the ministry to give us the support asked for, it will be our proving to the nation, that we are fully prepared. So far



was the Chevalier de la Luzerne convinced of this, (and on this point the minister's interest is the same with ours,) that he was made happy by my mentioning the Staten Island affair. Thirdly, it is more than probable, that mediators will interfere this winter with a negotiation. Then England will say, "How can we give up people, whom we consider as half conquered? Their best fortified city has been taken by an army not much superior to the one, that was to defend it; their southern army has been routed almost as soon as looked at by the British troops; New York is so much ours, that they dare not approach it; and General Washington's army does not exceed five thousand men." What shall France answer, and especially since, from the letters I have received, I find that the Charleston affair has brought our army into contempt? But how great would be the difference, if France could say, "The American army has taken, sword in hand, your best works; they have offered battle to you upon your own Island, and perhaps are now in possession of New York"?

Upon these considerations, my dear General, what I want is this; to undertake an expedition, which may wear a brilliant aspect, which may afford probable and great advantages though remote, and which, if unsuccessful, will not prove fatal to us.

The basis of the plan will be, that, Fort Washington being in our possession, it may, with the batteries at Fort Lee, protect our crossing the North River, and be a security for our retreat, especially if some works are added at the point of reëmbarkation. The taking of Fort Washington we may demonstrate to be very probable, and upon that point you are of my opinion.

The enemy have on the northern part of the Island from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, who would immediately occupy all the upper posts. Their army on Long Island would repair to New York, and thither would also retire the troops posted at Haerlem. As soon as Fort Washington should be ours, the army might be thrown across to the Island, and the troops from West Point would at the same time arrive, so that we should effectually possess all the upper posts, or cut them off from the enemy's main army. Some militia would come to our assistance, and, as those posts are not well furnished with provisions, we could subdue them at least by famine. The enemy's army consists of nine thousand men. They must certainly leave one thousand in their several posts. Fifteen hundred of them at least will be either killed at Fort Washington, or blocked up at Laurel Hill. They will then have between six and seven thousand men to attack ten thousand. The two thousand militia

on their side I do not mention, because we may have four thousand militia against them. Under such circumstances it is probable, that Sir Henry Clinton will venture a battle. If he does, and by chance beats us, we shall retire under Fort Washington; but, if we beat him, his works will be at such a distance, that he will be ruined in the retreat. If, on the contrary, he knows that the French army is coming, and if we spread the report of a second division, or of Count de Guichen being on the coast, he will keep in his works, and we can then carry the upper posts. When we are upon the spot, we may reconnoitre New York, and see if something further may not be done. If Clinton should make a forage into Jersey, I am clear for pushing into the city.

If we make an attack, the state of the weather will render it necessary that we undertake immediately. I would have the army, as soon as possible, at a position near the New Bridge. This movement may invite Clinton into Jersey, and bring us nearer to the point of execution.

Though my private glory and yours, my dear General; both of which are very dear to my heart, are greatly interested, not so much on account of opinions in America as in Europe, that something should be done this campaign, I hope you know me too well to think, that I would engage in a project of this nature, unless I believed it politically necessary, and that it has a sufficient military probability. I have the honor to be, &c.

LAFAYETTE.

P. S. The six hundred men of Lauzun's legion might be brought forward in twelve days. If our movements should have no other effect, than to make a diversion in favor of the southward, it would, on that footing, meet with the approbation of the world, and perhaps impede the operations of General Leslie.

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No. X. p. 381.

#### REVOLT OF THE NEW JERSEY LINE.

The complaints of the New Jersey troops were nearly the same as those of the Pennsylvania line; and, when the latter revolted it was perceived that symptoms of disaffection began to appear in the former. To prevent the contagion of example, and the dangers of

combination, Colonel Barber, who commanded the New Jersey troops, marched the larger portion of them to Chatham. Another division was stationed at Pompton, under Colonel Shreve. The legislature of New Jersey, being then assembled, and fearing ill consequences, appointed commissioners to repair to the camp, ascertain the grounds of the soldiers' complaints, and endeavour to make such arrangements as would pacify them. Before the news of this appointment reached the New Jersey troops, they had become mutinous.

## COLONEL SHREVE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

" Pompton, 20 January, 1781.

" SIR,

" It is with pain I inform your Excellency, that the troops at this place revolted this evening and marched towards Trenton. Their behaviour and demands are similar to those of the Pennsylvania line, though no blood has been spilt. I was informed by a woman of their intention late this afternoon, and immediately ordered all the men off duty to be paraded, with the design to detach them in different parties for the night; but found very few that would turn out. I was amongst them for some time, but could not prevail upon them to desist. They have lately received a part of the depreciation of their pay, and most of them are much disguised with liquor. Colonel Frelinghuysen, one of the commissioners of the State, is now here. We mean to follow them in the morning, and endeavour to bring them to reason. I apprehend the detachment at Chatham will join them. If the other detachments should leave their posts, I shall direct Major Throop to send to Dobbs's Ferry, and to cover the stores at Ringwood and at this place. Colonel Dayton, I make no doubt, will be able to do duty, and will exert himself to compromise matters with those at Chatham. I am, Sir, &c.

I. SHREVE."

The revolted troops marched to join their comrades at Chatham. As soon as their approach was ascertained, the party at Chatham was diminished by detachments and furloughs, which were offered to those, who chose to accept them. Colonel Dayton wrote as follows.

## COLONEL DAYTON TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

" Chatham, 24 January, 1781.

" SIR,

" When the revolted troops were collected, the commissioners appointed by the Assembly to inquire into and redress the grievances of the



brigade, with myself, informed them what powers we were vested with, and at the same time assured them, that, when they returned to their duty, and not till then, we would hear and treat with them. A point, which they strongly contested, was, that their own oaths should be admissible in determining the terms of their enlistment, as it was with the Pennsylvanians. This we did not think proper by any means to grant, and they finally gave it up. They marched this day on their return to the huts with Colonel Shreve only, where they have promised again to put themselves under the command of their officers.

"As soon as the men, who were permitted to go out of the way, shall be collected, I shall detach a guard with the cannon to Morristown, and send on the others to the huts. As I am not without my fears, that, when they find they are not discharged agreeably to their wishes by the commissioners, they may again become seditious, and not consider themselves amenable to the orders of their officers, I would wish to be instructed by your Excellency whether in that case it would not be advisable to call in the militia, who, I am of opinion, can be at any time collected for that purpose, and make use of more rigorous measures to humble them.

"Enclosed is a copy of the pardon granted to the mutineers; several of whom did not comply with it, and whom, as they are proper objects, I could wish to see made examples of. I am, &c.

"ELIAS DAYTON."

#### FORM OF A PARDON.

"*Chatham, 23 January, 1781.* — The commandant of the Jersey brigade, in answer to the petition of the sergeants for a general pardon, observes, that, in consideration of the brigade having revolted before they were made acquainted with the resolution of the legislature directing an inquiry into their enlistments, and of their agreeing immediately upon their being informed of said resolution to return to their duty, and of their having neither shed blood nor done violence to the person of any officer or inhabitant; he hereby promises a pardon to all such as immediately without hesitation shall return to their duty, and conduct themselves in a soldierly manner. Those, who shall, notwithstanding this unmerited proffer of clemency, refuse obedience, must expect the reward due to such obstinate villany."

When this pardon was read to the troops, it was received with three cheers of apparent approbation; but it was soon discovered,

that this sentiment was not unanimous, and that a large party still refused submission. They marched in a disorderly manner back to their huts. The issue is described in the following letter from General Howe, who arrived from the main army with a detachment of about six hundred Continental troops.

## GENERAL HOWE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

“Ringwood, 27 January, 1781.

“SIR,

“In obedience to your Excellency’s commands I arrived at this place yesterday evening, and found that the mutineers were returning to their huts. Colonel Dayton had offered them pardon for their offences, provided they immediately would put themselves under the command of their officers, and would behave in future consistently with that subordination so essential to military discipline. To this they seemingly acceded, but soon demonstrated by their conduct, that they were actuated by motives exceedingly distinct from those they had professed; for, though in some respects they would suffer a few particular officers to have influence over them, yet it was by no means the case in general, and what they did do, appeared rather like following advice than obeying command.

“Arrived at their huts, they condescended once to parade when ordered, but were no sooner dismissed than several officers were insulted. One had a bayonet put to his breast, and upon the man’s being knocked down for his insolence, a musket was fired, which being their alarm-signal, most of them paraded in arms. In short, their whole behaviour was such as cried aloud for chastisement, and made it evident, that they had only returned to their huts, as a place more convenient for themselves, where they meant to negotiate with the committee appointed, previous to their meeting, to inquire into their grievances, and to whom they thought to have dictated their own terms.

“Having long been convinced, that in cases of insurrection no medium lies, either for civil or military bodies, between dignity and servility, but coercion, and that no other method could be possibly fallen upon without the deepest wound to the service, I instantly determined to adopt it. We marched from Ringwood about midnight, and having, by the assistance of Colonels Shreve and Barber, made myself acquainted with the situation of their encampment, I thought it proper to occupy four different positions about it. Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant Sprout, with one party and a piece of artillery, was ordered to take post on their left; Lieutenant-

Colonel Miller, with another party and two pieces, on their right; Major Oliver, with his men, in front of their encampment; Major Throop, with his, in the rear of it. Major Morril, who, with the New Hampshire detachment, had been ordered to Pompton by the way of King's Ferry and was arrived, was directed to post himself upon the Charlottenberg road, about half a mile above the first bridge.

"Thus was every avenue secured, and in this position the mutineers found us when day-light appeared. Colonel Barber, of the Jersey line, was sent to them with orders immediately to parade without arms, and to march to the ground pointed out for them. Some seemed willing to comply, but others exclaimed, 'What! No conditions? Then if we are to die, it is as well to die where we are as anywhere else.' Some hesitation happening among them, Colonel Sprout was directed to advance, and only five minutes were given the mutineers to comply with the orders, which had been sent to them. This had its effect, and they, to a man, marched without arms to the ground appointed for them. The Jersey officers gave a list of those, whom they thought the most atrocious offenders, upon which I desired them to select three (one of each regiment), which was accordingly done. A field court-martial was presently held, and they received sentence of death by the unanimous decree of the court. Two of them were executed on the spot; the third I have reprieved, because the officers inform me, that they were guided in their naming him more by his having been the commanding officer of the party, than from any circumstances of aggravation in his own conduct; and because it appeared in evidence, that, though he had been compelled to take the command, he had endeavoured to prevail upon the men to return to their duty. These reasons, Sir, induced me to spare him, which I am persuaded your Excellency will approve. I thought it would have a good effect to appoint the executioners from among those most active in the mutiny.

"After the execution, the officers were ordered to parade the men regimentally, and to divide them into platoons, each officer to take his platoon. In this situation they were directed to make, and they made, proper concessions to their officers, in the face of the troops, and promised by future good conduct to atone for past offences. I then spoke to them by platoons, representing to them, in the strongest terms I was capable of, the heinousness of their guilt, as well as the folly of it, in the outrage they had offered to that civil authority, to which they owed obedience, and which it was their



incumbent duty to support and maintain. They showed the fullest sense of their guilt, and such strong marks of contrition, that I think I may venture to pledge myself for their future good conduct.

"I take pleasure in expressing, Sir, the warmest approbation of the conduct of the detachments of every line detailed for this command. The rapid march made by each on the several routes they took in very inclement weather, through a depth of snow, and upon an occasion, which, from the nature of it, nothing but a sense of duty and love of their country could render pleasing, is a very meritorious instance of their patriotism, as well as of their zeal for the service. I have the honor to be, &c.

"ROBERT HOWE."


FROM THE GENERAL ORDERS' TO THE ARMY.

"*Head-Quarters, 30 January, 1781.*—The General returns his thanks to Major-General Howe for the judicious measures he pursued, and to the officers and men under his command for the good conduct and alacrity with which they executed his orders, for suppressing the late mutiny in a part of the New Jersey line. It gave him inexpressible pain to be obliged to employ their arms upon such an occasion, and he is convinced that they themselves felt all the reluctance, which former affection to fellow-soldiers could inspire. He considers the patience, with which they endured the fatigues of the march, through rough and mountainous roads, rendered almost impassable by the depth of the snow, and the cheerfulness with which they performed every other part of their duty, as the strongest proof of their fidelity, attachment to the service, sense of subordination, and abhorrence of the principles, which actuated the mutineers in so daring and atrocious a departure from what they owed to their country, to their officers, to their oaths, and to themselves.

"The General is deeply sensible of the sufferings of the army. He leaves no expedient unessayed to relieve them, and he is persuaded Congress and the several States are doing every thing in their power for the same purpose. But, while we look to the public for the fulfilment of its engagements, we should do it with proper allowance for the embarrassments of public affairs. We began a contest for liberty and independence, ill provided with the means for war, relying on our own patriotism to supply the deficiency. We expected to encounter many wants and distresses, and we should neither shrink from them when they happen, nor fly in the face of law and government to procure redress. There is no doubt the

public will in the event do ample justice to men fighting and suffering in its defence. But it is our duty to bear present evils with fortitude, looking forward to the period when our country will have it more in its power to reward our services."

END OF VOL. VII.















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